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Patricia Brace and Robert Arp
American auteur Jeffrey Jacob “J. J.” Abrams has a knack for creating the 
kind of twisty, densely plotted TV series and films that keep us on the 
edge of our seats and begging for more. His particular genius seems to be 
in the way he combines geek appeal and broader commercial and critical 
successes in TV shows like Felicity, Emmy-nominated Alias, Emmy- and 
Golden Globe–winning Lost, the critically acclaimed Fringe, and films such 
as the Godzilla-inspired Cloverfield, the reboot of the Star Trek franchise, 
and his Spielbergian ode to the late 1970s, Super 8. As writer, director, pro-
ducer, and even composer, he puts his particular stamp on everything he 
touches—a stamp that at times is rife with philosophical themes. His name 
on a project promises that your heart, mind, and sometimes even your soul 
will get a workout.
The Philosophy of J. J. Abrams is a collection of chapters by thinkers 
highlighting the philosophical insights present in Abrams’s television and 
film work. Using Abrams’s works as a touchstone, the book leads the reader 
through some basic concepts in philosophy, making it useful for an intro-
ductory philosophy course, but it also contains enough content on Abrams’s 
individual works to satisfy his fans, media and popular culture students, 
film students, and people who would like to dabble in a little philosophy.
Philosophical themes may be found throughout Abrams’s continuingly 
popular works. As cocreator of Lost, Abrams melded the popularity of the 
reality show Survivor to the twisted concept of a living island with incred-
ible monsters and a fascinating set of characters—many of them named for 
famous philosophers—whose interactions take place in the past, present, 
and future via flashbacks and flash-forwards. And if that wasn’t enough, 
in the final season we got flash-sideways into alternate pasts, presents, and 
futures! If any show contains philosophical analysis, it is this one. Man of 
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science or man of faith? Nature vs. nurture? Live together or die alone? The 
Island could be seen as a heavenly tabula rasa—or was it purgatory, or even 
hell? Would we ever get any answers to the show’s many mysteries?
Continuing his pattern of having an overarching mystery move the 
action of a television story, Abrams next took on Fringe, with its “Pattern” 
mythology slowly revealed as we learned more about the heroes of the 
piece. As with his other works, relationships are central; in this case, those 
caught in the orbit of the unconventional and at times quite mad Dr. Wal-
ter Bishop, whose highly unethical medical experiments on young children 
allowed him and his partner, William Bell (played by Leonard Nimoy), to 
find and eventually travel to a second Earth. When Walter’s son, Peter, died 
as a child, the grieving father kidnapped his doppelganger from the other 
Earth—what parent wouldn’t at least contemplate it? That Peter grows up 
ignorant of his true origins and estranged from his father (who has gone 
slowly mad and been institutionalized) is just the sort of poignant irony 
Abrams’s work celebrates.
Abrams’s film work champions the ability of ordinary people to undergo 
transformation and become, in their own ways, heroic. In Armageddon the 
least likely guys, a bunch of rough oil drillers, face their fear of death and save 
the world. On a more personal level, his script for Regarding Henry uses a 
sort of reverse flashback technique to show how a damaged man regains his 
simple humanity. In the wrong place at the wrong time (another common 
problem for Abrams’s heroes), Henry is shot in the head and loses his mem-
ory. His struggles to refill his blank slate reveal a portrait of a hard-driving, 
unethical corporate lawyer who was estranged from his family, having an 
affair, and ignoring his wife and child. It turns out that the damage was not 
the gunshot; that bullet to the brain was his salvation or a reset, bringing 
him into accord with his true ethical and familial center.
This “resetting of reality” is found in most of Abrams’s work (in tele-
vision, we see how 9/11 played out in two different ways on Fringe as well 
as seeing the alternate worlds on the final seasons of Felicity and Lost and 
Sydney’s missing three years on Alias) and most recently in his big-screen 
version of the classic Star Trek. Again, a framing device provides continuity 
for the piece—Mr. Spock, long retired from Starfleet, has lived among the 
Romulans for decades, working to reunite them with their ancestors, the 
Vulcans. When catastrophe looms, his efforts to save their planet fall short 
and set into motion a series of events that will throw him back into his own 
past, forever altering or perhaps creating a new reality.
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Questions of destiny loom large in all of Abrams’s work. We often hear 
characters say, “I was meant to do this,” “You’re not supposed to do this,” or 
“Nothing in my life has ever felt this right,” and this is especially true in Star 
Trek. Because he has already lived it, old Spock knows that James T. Kirk is 
meant to captain the Enterprise with Spock at his side. When Kirk miracu-
lously appears on the ice planet where he has been stranded, old Spock does 
what is necessary to maneuver the two younger versions of his captain and 
friend, and himself, together. We, the viewers, feel a sense of completion 
when the whole core crew—Kirk and Spock, plus the wonderfully freaked 
out “Bones” McCoy, sultry Uhura, boy genius Chekov, swashbuckling Sulu, 
and daft but deft Scotty—are finally together on-screen on the bridge of the 
Enterprise. Is this Star Trek? You betcha. Abrams has united the two reali-
ties in such a satisfactory way that we can remember the past fondly and 
still look forward to future installments of the series beyond Star Trek into 
Darkness—which totally kicked Klingon heinie, by the way.
Worry over the culture of surveillance and the changing nature of pri-
vacy has permeated the public consciousness in recent years with the advent 
of new technologies, from the Internet to GPS to the CCTV cameras in 
most large metropolitan areas. The Abrams-produced TV show Person of 
Interest taps into our unease about just what Big Brother really knows about 
our lives and how it uses that information. “The Machine”—created by Mr. 
Finch after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and used by the heroes to identify 
those in need of help . . . or censure—could just as easily be turned against 
us if in the control of the wrong people.
Friendship and collaboration are also what drive the ethical choices 
made by the characters in Abrams’s two alien invasion/terrorism allegory 
scenarios, Cloverfield and Super 8. In the former, we are swept along with a 
group of ordinary New Yorker twentysomethings who use a handheld digi-
tal camera to record their impossible flight from the city as it is attacked 
by Godzilla-sized aliens and their deadly, human-sized foot soldiers. In the 
latter, a group of teenagers making a student horror film in 1979 are drawn 
into a government conspiracy when they discover the truth about a crashed 
alien ship and its pilot, which had been tortured by its captors.
Exploring the Genius
The chapters in this volume run the philosophical gamut: the logic of time 
travel and parallel universes; the metaphysics and malleability of identity; 
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the alienation of the individual in a technological culture; ethical decisions 
in tough circumstances; and death, loss, and the search for meaning. In each 
of these thoughtful chapters, the writers explore how Abrams’s ability to tap 
the core of popular culture for deeper and more meaningful themes makes 
his works ripe for philosophical analysis. Abrams often places his charac-
ters in situations that at first seem mundane—for example, a young woman 
attending college or a group of people sitting on an airplane—and then sets 
them (and the audience) spinning, and thinking, too.
The three chapters in the first section, scene 1: Identity Issues, deal 
with the shifting nature of human identity. In the multi-verse of the 
Abrams television show Fringe, two or more versions of the same per-
son may exist and issues of personal identity and responsibility become 
clouded. What are we? Are we the totality of our conscious memories, 
or are we just our brains and physiological processes, or neither? “‘Grey 
Matters’: Personal Identity in the Fringe Universe(s),” by A. P. Taylor and 
Justin Donhauser, examines how two concepts of personal identity—the 
Lockean-based psychological theory and the somatic or brain theory—
are revealed in the events of the series and considers which seems the 
better fit to explain our world. In “Person of Interest: The Machine, Gilles 
Deleuze, and a Thousand Plateaus of Identity,” Franklin Allaire looks at 
how an “ultimate event” such as 9/11 may be used as justification for the 
collection of intimate personal data and the implications of having the 
Machine grant “identity” to an individual as either perpetrator or victim, 
in effect making a moral judgment.
Abrams is well known for producing TV shows and films with strong 
female characters, and in “Are J. J. Abrams’s ‘Leading Ladies’ Really Femi-
nist Role Models?” Cynthia Jones finds common threads of identity in three 
prime examples: Felicity’s Felicity Porter, Alias’s Sydney Bristow, and Fringe’s 
Olivia Dunham. Using feminist theories to examine these characters in terms 
of oppression and interconnectedness, Jones finds that despite their differing 
life circumstances—naive college student, worldly secret agent, and para-
normal investigator, respectively—the three young women are all products 
of their contact with and reaction to male-dominated society as they strive 
to create their own independent and free-acting identities.
The second section of the book, scene 2: Memento Mori, uses as its 
theme the quality of human life informed by the sure knowledge of death. 
In the first chapter, “The End Is Nigh: Armageddon and the Meaning of 
Life Found through Death,” Ashley Barkman reminds us of the fact that 
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the least likely guys—a bunch of rough oil drillers—face their fear of death 
and save the world in the Abrams-penned sci-fi thriller. She uses examples 
from the Bible and Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations to argue that life is often 
best understood in the context of death, the great equalizer, which stimu-
lates heightened awareness and tests one’s genuine beliefs.
In the second chapter of this section, “The Fear of Bones: On the Dread 
of Space and Death,” Jerry S. Piven and Jeffrey Stephenson invoke the utter-
ances of philosophers such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Dr. McCoy to explain 
how science and religion are two antithetical modes of resolving existential 
desire, anxiety, and dread. The yearning to comprehend the unknown can 
inspire creative imagination, ingenious problem solving, scientific inquiry, 
medical discovery, wish-fulfilling fantasies, mind-numbing faith, and even 
terroristic violence.
In “Do We All Need to Get Shot in the Head? Regarding Henry, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, and Ethical Transformation,” Adam Barkman argues that the 
Abrams-scripted film questions the ethical origins of human happiness. Just 
as the main character’s near-death experience alters his brain (a bullet will 
do that, you know) as well as his perception of what is important, perhaps 
certain disruptions of our comforts from time to time serve as a means to 
refocus us on the true nature of happiness.
We deal with a few ethical considerations in the third section, scene 3: 
Moral Matters. Phil Smolenski and Charlene Elsby look into one of the ever-
present defining questions of bioethics in “Fringe and ‘If Science Can Do It, 
Then Science Ought to Do It.’” Using Hans Jonas’s imperative of responsibil-
ity, they examine the technological wizardry employed by Walter Bishop in 
his lab in terms of the moral correctness of his (and the other characters’) 
decision-making processes in comparison to the viewers, who identify with 
and value the relationships between the characters on the show.
In the next chapter in this section, “An Inconsistent Triad? Competing 
Ethics in Star Trek into Darkness,” Jason T. Eberl looks at the ethical val-
ues of duty, utility, and loyalty in the second entry of Abrams’s Trek reboot 
films. Using Immanuel Kant’s deontology contrasted with John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarian perspective, Eberl looks at incidents where the Starfleet Prime 
Directive of noninterference is invoked as well as ignored in the film by the 
heroes, Kirk and Spock, as well as the villains, Khan Noonien Singh and 
Admiral Alexander Marcus.
Randall Auxier uses the relationships between humans and a stranded 
alien in the rather autobiographical Abram-directed film Super 8 to medi-
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tate on the true nature of moral empathy—and love—in “The Monster and 
the Mensch,” which completes this section.
The fourth section, scene 4: Friends and Family, opens with Joseph Foy’s 
“Abrams, Aristotle, and Alternate Worlds: Finding Friendship in the Final 
Frontier.” In the Star Trek reboot, the classic Trek characters James T. Kirk 
and Mr. Spock triumph in one dangerous situation after another, reveal-
ing the noble individual traits that will enable them to succeed in future 
endeavors with the Federation. However, as Foy shows, their ultimate chal-
lenge is really overcoming an initial enmity toward one another to defeat 
their Romulan foes. By the end of the film, they have started a friendship 
that will allow them to achieve the Aristotelian goal of true collaboration, 
where individual excellence will be used communally to support society.
The second chapter in this section is “Heroic Love and Its Inversion in 
the Parent-Child Relationship in Abrams’s Star Trek,” by Charles Taliaferro 
and Emilie Judge-Becker, in which they use three traditional precepts of 
justice (preacepta juris)—live in a morally right way, do no harm to others, 
and render to each what is her or his own—to examine the duties (if any) 
that are owed between parents and children. This is exemplified by the Star 
Trek characters George and his son James Tiberius Kirk, and Spock and his 
parents, Amanda and Sarek.
In “You Can’t Choose Your Family: Impartial Morality and Personal 
Obligations in Alias,” Brendan Shea investigates the extent to which identity 
may be created and altered by one’s familial relationships. The characters in 
the twisty spy show have to juggle loyalties to country, family, lovers, and 
friends that create obligations and betrayals, stretching the boundaries of 
morality and personal responsibility. Each must balance his or her impartial 
moral obligations (e.g., duties toward humanity) and personal obligations 
(e.g., duties toward one’s children), with potentially tragic consequences.
The fifth section is titled scene 5: Metaphysically Speaking, and so these 
three chapters deal with questions concerning the nature of reality. Daniel 
Whiting’s chapter, “Is Abrams’s Star Trek a Star Trek Film?” ponders the 
nature of remakes. As Whiting sees it, the film invites us to ask about the 
extent to which Abrams’s Star Trek has inherited the characteristics of the 
Star Trek series, about the parentage and pedigree of this movie. What does 
it take for the Star Trek reboot to be a Star Trek film? Does this reboot or 
reset make it a prequel or an entirely new series?
In the second chapter, “Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsi-
bility in Alias,” Vishal Garg examines the nature of predestination and free 
Introduction 7
will. He argues that despite the fact that many of the Rambaldi prophecies 
came true, characters in Alias did in fact have free will and are therefore 
morally culpable for their actions.
In the final chapter in this section, “Finding Directions by Indirection: 
The Island as a Blank Slate,” Elly Vintiadis and Spyros Petrounakos revisit 
the complicated world of Lost to contemplate the Lockean concept of tabula 
rasa as it relates to both the characters and viewers. They argue that, for the 
characters, the Island is not as blank a slate as it first appears to be and that 
the audience is required to deconstruct many television-viewing conven-
tions as the plot unfolds over the course of the series.
The sixth section, scene 6: Your Logic Is Flawless, begins with Andrew 
Fyfe’s chapter on an oft-contested scientific and philosophical concept in 
science fiction and fantasy, namely, the logical implications of time travel. 
In “You Can’t Change the Past: The Philosophy of Time Travel in Star Trek 
and Lost,” Fyfe explains the three possible forms of time travel and why logi-
cal paradoxes like the grandfather paradox rule out only one of these three 
possibilities. Using the plots of the film and television series, he explores 
the reasons for thinking that there are forms of time travel that not only are 
logically possible but also are actual parts of our world.
The next chapter is “Rabbit’s Feet, Hatches, and Monsters: Mysteries 
vs. Questions in J. J. Abrams’s Stories,” by Paul DiRado, in which he uses 
several of Abrams’s works—including Mission: Impossible III, Cloverfield, 
and Lost—to examine the true nature of the mysterious. “No answer to any 
question, then, can ever be said to ‘answer’ a mystery. A mystery doesn’t 
need an answer, but to be resolved it needs all of the various propositions 
discovered in a situation to make sense with one another and to cohere with 
previous experiences and expectations about the world.” So claims DiRado 
near the end of his chapter.
In scene 7: Considering Cloverfield, the authors, well, do just that. Jeff 
Ewing starts the section off with “Monsters of the World, Unite! Cloverfield, 
Capital, and Ecological Crisis.” He uses Karl Marx’s criticism of capitalism—
with its inherent greed and overaccumulation of things, which cause many 
problems, including ecological ones—to show how an analogy can be made 
between the awakening and rampage of Clover (as the monster has been 
called in Cloverfield) and the harmful impacts of capitalism.
In “Cloverfield, Super 8, and the Morality of Terrorism” we (Pat Brace 
and Rob Arp) use the Kantian deontological and Millian utilitarian argu-
ments for why terrorism is immoral and should not be pursued as an avenue 
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for expressing grievances in a typical democratic-based republican regime 
and offer (possibly) one kind of case where terrorist activities actually may 
be morally justified.
In a Beatles-ish attempt to be clever (possibly not), the final section of 
this book is titled scene 8: Talkin’ ’Bout a Revolution. Revolution is another 
one of Abrams’s TV series, and it takes place some fifteen years after elec-
tricity—and, as a result, technology—all over the world suddenly becomes 
nonfunctioning. In a kind of postapocalyptic environment, the USA is now 
divvied up into five new territories, one of them called the Monroe Repub-
lic, controlled by the dictator-like Sebastian Monroe and the Monroe Mili-
tia. In his chapter, titled “A Place for Revolutions in Revolution? Marxism, 
Feminism, and the Monroe Republic,” Jeff Ewing uses Marxist and feminist 
theories to investigate the gender, class, and identity relations of the Monroe 
Republic. He ultimately argues that the Monroe Republic, like other real-life 
totalitarian regimes, is doomed to collapse without “serious restructuring 
and a reprioritization of state policy” with respect to these relations.
The final chapter of the book is Michael Versteeg and Adam Barkman’s 
“A Light in the Darkness: Ethical Reflections on Revolution.” Thoughts of a 
postapocalypse will get you to start thinking about moral matters for sure, 
and in their chapter Versteeg and Barkman use stories from Revolution to 
investigate four prominent ethical theories: ethical subjectivism, contract-
arianism, utilitarianism, and natural law theory. After a critique of each 
theory, they ultimately settle on natural law theory as the theory of choice 
for moral matters in an end-of-the-world kind of environment.
The Zeitgeist of Pop Culture
J. J. Abrams’s works have entered the zeitgeist of popular culture and are 
prime fodder for a book like this. In a way, writing about Abrams is like 
trying to hit a moving target. As one may see by taking a look at his profile 
on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), he is a prolific artist. He is very 
hands-on in his direction—he can be seen literally shaking the camera by 
hand in the DVD extras for both Lost and Star Trek to achieve a specific visu-
ally chaotic effect—and clear about his own inspirations. In a now-famous 
talk he gave at the March 2007 TED.com forum, he spoke about his love of 
the unseen mystery, which may be seen throughout his work and which is 
specifically discussed in the chapter by Paul DiRado.
The summer of 2010 saw the opening of the well-reviewed sci-fi thriller 
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Super 8, inspired by his own childhood filmmaking adventures and such 
Spielberg fare as E.T. and Close Encounters of the Third Kind. His direction 
of the film was praised by his mentor Spielberg as “a milestone movie for 
Abrams” in which his “very original and unique voice” shines through.1 
Interestingly, 2010 was also the year when he had a conspicuous failure, the 
TV series Undercovers, which attempted to graft Hart to Hart with Alias by 
having an attractive spy couple engage in secret international adventures. 
The show failed to capture the audience’s interest because it had none of the 
trademark twisty plots, underlying symbolism, and tortured but appeal-
ing characters that usually populate an Abrams production. It was quickly 
cancelled, as was the more typical Abrams series Alcatraz, which failed to 
capture a large enough audience with its one-note mystery about disappear-
ing prisoners reappearing decades later. Every season new TV shows from 
Abrams’s Bad Robot production company continue to premiere, including 
Person of Interest in 2011 and Revolution in 2012, giving critics and academ-
ics alike plenty of opportunities to analyze his ongoing oeuvre.
In the spring of 2013 it was announced that Abrams had been hand-
picked by his boyhood idol, George Lucas, to helm the new series of Star 
Wars films, creating a dilemma for the often antagonistic Star Wars and 
Star Trek fandoms. Some critics have said his more adventure-packed, lens-
flaring, and less-cerebral reimagining of the Star Trek universe resembled 
Lucas’s “galaxy far, far away” more than Gene Roddenberry’s original con-
cept for the show. In the end, however, as Abrams said in his TED.com lec-
ture, “The most incredible sort of mystery, I think, is now the question of 
what comes next.”2
Notes
Patricia Brace: This book is dedicated with love to my parents, Nancy Kay and Marion 
Kent Brace, who showed me by example to love reading and introduced me to science 
fiction, both of which have served me extremely well. Robert Arp: This book is dedicated 
to the other J. J. Abrams (editor of the UPK book The Philosophy of Stanley Kubrick), a 
sharp guy who attended grad school with me at Saint Louis University.
1. Jeff Jensen, “Kids at Heart: J. J. Abrams and Steven Spielberg,” Entertainment 
Weekly, June 10, 2011, http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,20313460_20507915,00.html.
2. J. J. Abrams, “The Mystery Box: J. J. Abrams on TED.com,” transcription by Rob-








Personal Identity in the Fringe Universe(s)
 A. P. Taylor and Justin Donhauser
When you open your mind to the impossible, sometimes you find the truth.
—Walter Bishop
 J. J. Abrams’s other hit sci-fi series, Fringe, presents the viewer with a cen-
tral philosophical puzzle: in the Fringe universe “there’s more than one of 
everything.” That includes people. In the mythology of the show, duplicate 
characters from two alternate universes square off in a showdown. In each 
universe there are copies of the main characters; they look, speak, and think 
much the same as their doubles. How would a friend or loved one know 
whether you had been replaced by a physically identical doppelganger? What 
is it that makes you, you? That is, what makes you the same person today 
that you were yesterday? Or, for that matter, what makes you the same per-
son who experienced losing your first tooth as a child? Certainly, something 
makes you you over time. So what is it? Are we each identical to some body, 
or some mind, or some brain, or some conjunction of all of these things? Or 
are we something else entirely? Philosophers have asked these questions for 
generations. The philosophical study of such questions is called the theory 
of personal identity. It is these questions that form the basis of this chapter.1
Upon first inspection, it appears that different events in the Fringe uni-
verse suggest different answers to this question of what we are. For instance, 
FBI special agent Olivia Dunham is for a time able to communicate with 
her deceased FBI partner and lover, John Scott, whose memories and per-
sonality become temporarily stored in Olivia’s consciousness (season 1, 
“Pilot” and “The Dreamscape”). This appears to imply either that John is 
not a person or that in the Fringe universe(s) other, numerically distinct 
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persons can somehow live within our bodies (which in turn suggests that 
they could survive the loss of their bodies). In contrast, other events sug-
gest that persons are, at least in part, identical with bodies. For instance, the 
show depicts “shape-shifters,” seemingly evil foot soldiers from an alternate 
universe that are capable of becoming other people, like FBI agent Charlie 
Parker, complete with their host’s memories and mannerisms, by somehow 
assimilating their physiology. Moreover, other events suggest that persons 
are essentially either heads or brains. In one episode the foot soldiers are 
charged with stealing cryogenically preserved heads while in search of the 
head of their leader, Thomas Newton. Once they find his head, they suc-
cessfully reanimate Newton, who is presumably a person, by grafting his 
head onto what we later learn is a partially robotic humanoid body (season 
2, “Momentum Deferred”; season 3, “Do Shapeshifters Dream of Electric 
Sheep?”). These and many other events suggest that determining what per-
sons are in the Fringe universe(s) will be quite challenging or maybe even 
that there is not a unified theory of persons underlying the show’s mythology.
Even so, encouraged by the fact that the Fringe Division team often 
attempts the unimaginable and succeeds, we will forge on. It is surely imag-
inable that we could answer the question of what persons are in the Fringe 
universe(s). Moreover, it appears that Fringe presents us with many physi-
cally and psychologically traumatic events that reveal a way to determine an 
answer to the question of what we, persons, are. By analyzing the things that 
people in Fringe can endure, we can attempt to determine what persons are 
by process of elimination. For example, if we determined that persons can 
survive losing a limb, like Nina Sharp for instance, this would imply that 
having the particular limbs we each have is unessential to being the persons 
that we are. That is, we can each imagine maintaining self-consciousness 
prior to, during, and after the loss of a limb. By considering which of our 
parts we could survive losing in this manner, we should be able to discover 
which of our parts are vital to our continued existence as persons. By ana-
lyzing the traumatic events that people survive in the show, we can also 
attempt to determine which, if any, theory of persons appears to be true in 
the Fringe universe(s). For every particular event under consideration, we 
should each ask ourself, “Could I survive that if I were in a Fringe universe?” 
That is, according to what happens in the show, could you, for example, 
survive your bodily death and communicate with Olivia, like John Scott? 
Alternatively, could you survive having your head severed, cryogenically 
frozen, and grafted onto a borrowed human body, like Newton?
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As we have said, each of the distinct events of Fringe may at first seem 
suggestive of a different answer to the question of what we are. Still, given 
that there is an overall trend of connecting the events of Fringe to provide the 
viewer with an ever more coherent explanation for what occurs, we assume 
that there is a coherent theory of persons underlying the Fringe mythology. 
Thus, by considering the answers to the question of what we could survive, 
identifying the account of persons the answer suggests, and then consider-
ing whether that account can explain all other known events of the show, we 
set out to determine what account of persons must be assumed true to allow 
for the happenings of Fringe. Although whether that theory is true of our 
universe will depend on the degree to which the actual universe resembles 
the universe(s) of Fringe, our examination should also shed some light on 
which theory of the nature of persons is most plausible in general.
The Animal Theory: Our Biological Traits
Fringe is often characterized, even by its own creators, as the story of a mad 
scientist. Accordingly, the show strives to capture cutting-edge scientific 
thought while pushing it forward into the realm of fiction. Because the show 
maintains a certain calculated level of scientific plausibility, we should start 
our search for the theory of persons that underlies the Fringe mythology 
by considering those that are scientifically plausible. Many contemporary 
philosophers working on theories of personal identity strive for such sci-
entific plausibility in their theorizing. These thinkers are often inclined to 
look for naturalistic explanations of phenomena and to shun what they see 
as supernatural explanation. An explanation is naturalistic in the relevant 
sense if it involves only those entities, properties, and relations that scien-
tists could verify in the laboratory.
If, for example, you were to throw a baseball as far as you could, as many 
times as you wished, we know that each time it would eventually fall to Earth. 
One could explain this phenomenon in a nonnaturalistic way; for instance, 
by speculating that angels abhor the sight of baseballs flying through the 
air. Thus, every time you throw the baseball, an angry angel grabs it and 
pulls it to the ground. This explanation is nonnaturalistic because its plau-
sibility requires the existence of angels, which science has yet to confirm. 
Alternatively, one could explain the baseballs falling in a more naturalistic 
way. The enormous mass of Earth causes a warping or bending of the space-
time surrounding it, and since the ball is in that surrounding space-time, it 
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gets caught in the “groove” and pulled uniformly toward Earth. This latter 
explanation relies on entities (e.g., Earth, the ball, space-time), properties 
(e.g., having mass), and relations (e.g., warping) that scientists have con-
firmed for us. Thus, in the case of the baseball, a philosopher who wishes 
to establish his or her scientific and naturalistic bona fides will doubtless 
reject the first sort of explanation (involving angels) and prefer the second.
What, then, does a naturalistic theory of personal identity look like? At 
the very least it will be one that uses only those sorts of entities confirmed 
by science. It will not, for instance, follow Descartes in supposing that each 
person is his or her immaterial soul, because scientists cannot empirically 
verify the existence of immaterial things.2 One contemporary theory of per-
sons that fits the bill for being scientifically plausible is the animal theory, 
or animalism (for short). Put simply, animalism is the view that a human 
person is identical to a particular human animal (a member of the species 
Homo sapiens).3 The intuitive argument in favor of this theory is quite strong. 
Whenever you look in the mirror, you see a human animal looking back 
at you. Whenever you are alone in a room, there will be a human animal 
in that room, right where you are. Whenever the animal body you associ-
ate yourself with is wounded, you, and nobody else, feel the pain from that 
wound. Furthermore, the view has scientific merit insofar as it entails the 
claim that persons are an entity familiar to science, namely a certain sort of 
mammalian organism.4
Despite its intuitive and scientific appeal, however, animalism has 
its drawbacks. These drawbacks stem from the core animalist claim that 
each person is identical with his or her animal body. By reducing personal 
identity to the identity of the human organism in this manner, the theory 
constrains the ways in which human persons can conceivably survive. To 
explain by point of contrast, consider the Cartesian theory that we are 
souls for a moment. As mentioned above, according to Descartes, each 
person is an immaterial being, a soul, separable from any physical body. 
Consequently, if the Cartesian view is true, the destruction of the physical 
body need not necessitate the destruction of the person associated with 
that body. Alternatively, if, as the animalist tells us, we are merely human 
organisms and are thus inseparable from our bodies, it follows that the 
destruction of the human organism that is you would entail the destruc-
tion of the person that is you.
Although animalism is scientifically plausible, this implication of the 
view suggests that it is not the theory underlying the Fringe mythology. 
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Rather, many events of the show suggest that animalism is false in the 
universe(s) of Fringe. For one thing, as mentioned, John Scott survives the 
destruction of his physical body, cohabitating Olivia’s mind (or brain). She 
experiences his memories and feelings, recalls things only he knew, and even 
speaks to him during her LSD-fueled sessions in Walter’s sensory depri-
vation tank. If animalism were true in the Fringe universe(s), John would 
have died when the human organism he was identical with died. Moreover, 
what happens between Olivia and John does not stand as the only counter-
example to animalism. Rather, the troubles go further for the theory as we 
are presented with other events that echo fictional brain-transplant puzzles 
of which many contemporary philosophers are quite fond.
The generic version of the relevant philosophical puzzle goes like this: 
imagine that medicine were to progress to the level where it is possible to 
remove a human brain from one head and place it the head of a donor with 
no loss of functionality whatsoever. Now imagine further that you have a 
twin and that you and your twin both suffer a horrific accident. As a result, 
your twin’s brain is destroyed but her body is undamaged, while your body 
is catastrophically injured but your brain is fully functional. The doctor, 
seeing a chance to save at least one of you, opts for a transplant. Your brain 
is placed in the head of your twin. Now, when your family walks into the 
ICU, whom do you suppose they are going to find awake in the hospital 
bed? Most of us have the strong intuition that they are going to find you. 
Accordingly, many philosophers conclude that you go with your psychol-
ogy, and not your body. Assuming that your psychology goes where your 
brain goes, it follows that you are the person who wakes in the hospital bed 
after the operation.
In the Fringe universe(s), this intuition regarding brain transplants is 
echoed in the story of Thomas Newton, the leader from the Other Side. 
Much like in our transplant case, his soldiers frantically search to find his 
cryogenically frozen head, believing that when that head is placed on a donor 
body, the resulting person will be Newton. Of course, they are proven correct 
when Newton’s head is indeed grafted onto a donor body and the resulting 
person is indeed Newton (season 2, “Momentum Deferred”). This too sug-
gests that animalism is not true in the Fringe universe(s), because animal-
ists have a different answer to the transplant case. Since they believe that a 
human person is identical to a human animal, not a brain or a psychology, 
they conclude that in the transplant case you remain the now-brainless 
organism. The animalist denies that you go with your psychology. Rather, 
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according to animalism, losing a brain is no different from losing an arm 
in terms of its effect on identity, if animalism is true.
The opponents of animalism take our strongly held intuitions about 
brain transplants as very strong evidence against that theory. Equally, it seems 
that the writers of Fringe also have a different theory of personal identity in 
mind, given the success of Newton’s head transplant. Though we could each 
conceivably survive the loss of an arm and each remain the person that we 
are, like Nina Sharpe, intuitively we could not survive the loss of our psy-
chology. That is, even if we could survive the loss of our brains by having our 
psychology stored on a hard drive or in a synthetic robot brain, it seems that 
we could not survive the loss of our psychology. In line with these intuitions, 
contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit, for instance, famously argues that 
personal identity is not what we care about when considering questions of 
survival in cases such as transplants.5
Parfit contends that what we are really concerned with is some other 
relation, psychological continuity or connectedness. Thus he suggests that 
persons are just a continuous psychology. If this is true, then it needs only 
to be the case that you have the same psychology in order to remain yourself 
when you awake in your twin’s body. Similarly, if this is true, then the revived 
Newton needs only to be psychologically continuous with the predecapi-
tated and cryogenically frozen Newton to be the same person. Historically 
speaking, Parfit’s sort of theory derives from the philosopher John Locke’s 
(1632–1704) conception of our respective personal identities consisting in 
our own personal psychologies. As animalism appears inconsistent with the 
events of Fringe, the Lockean psychological theory looks to be a contender 
for the theory of persons that underlies the show’s mythology.
The Psychological Theory: Is Walter Bishop Still Walter Bishop?
Among the many questions we face in trying to piece together what is going 
on in the Fringe universe(s), central is that of who Walter is. And this is not 
only a puzzle that we, the viewers, are trying to solve alone, but also one that 
Walter himself often struggles with. After a series of events that left his lab 
assistant dead, left Walter mentally unfit to stand trial for her death, and led 
to his subsequent seventeen-year institutionalization in St. Claire’s Mental 
Hospital, Walter isn’t even himself to himself. This is, as we learn, because he 
has forgotten things—even universe-altering things. Because he is missing 
memories, his psychology, or personal mental life, is incomplete. Though we 
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have reason to doubt even that he has the same body as he once did, given 
the many extraordinary events of the show, by the second season we can be 
reasonably certain that he does have the same body even though we learn 
that he is missing some portions of his brain (season 2, “Grey Matters”).
In any case, in a very important sense the “old Walter” is no longer 
there. To our question, “could I survive that?” Walter’s situation suggests 
an account that answers this in the negative, due to the loss of memories. 
That is, if you were missing many or even all of your memories, if you were 
psychologically incomplete like Walter, it seems reasonable to believe that 
some or all of you would have perished. Thus Walter’s “loss of himself ” is 
suggestive of the truth of what many refer to as the “memory criterion” of 
personal identity, which is more correctly characterized as the psychological 
theory of personal identity. Locke, the progenitor of the psychological theory, 
explains the view succinctly: “To find wherein personal identity consists, we 
must consider what ‘person’ stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intel-
ligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing, in different times and places.”6
According to Locke’s psychological theory, our personal identity consists 
of our self-consciousness. Moreover, it is via each of our personal memories, 
our being cognizant of our thinking at past moments, that we are aware 
that we are the same person now as we were at those times in the past. It 
is improper to call this account the “memory criterion,” as it is sometimes 
called, because it is not just having some particular set of memories that 
makes you yourself to yourself. Rather, it is, as Parfit reiterates in the con-
temporary literature, having a continuous awareness of being you to yourself 
both in the past and right now. Locke explains this central role of continuous 
consciousness with regard to personal identity and also makes clear that we 
can be the same person without having the same body, saying, “The same 
consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity 
depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual sub-
stance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances.”7
It is worth noting that Locke’s view of identity consisting of psychologi-
cal sameness stems from his finding that the identity of things in general 
(regular everyday objects like tables and chairs) results from our noticing 
that there is never more than one thing in one particular place at a particular 
time. From this, he says, “we rightly conclude that whatever exists anywhere 
at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone.”8 This 
is a statement of simple logical identity, that a = a, 1 = 1, Olivia = Olivia. It 
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is instructive to note this feature of Locke’s theory of identity because it is 
consistent with Fringe mythology, according to which “there’s more than one 
of everything.” Recall that even the duplicates of things and people in the 
Fringe universe(s) are distinct, even if not in time, in space (Walter ≠ Wal-
ternate). Even if two things or people appear identical, as with the familiar 
characters and their alters in Fringe, we can tell that they are distinct owing 
to their being located in different parts of space—or in seemingly spatially 
distinct universes.9 Locke finds that our ability to know the identity of any 
particular thing across time comes from comparing our present experience 
of that thing with memories of past encounters of it. Likewise, our ability 
to know our own personal identity comes from comparing our present 
experience of our self with memories of past encounters of it—that is, past 
encounters of our consciousness being “there alone itself.”
Accordingly, it appears that the psychological theory being true in the 
Fringe universe(s) explains why, for instance, Walter is “not himself ” to 
himself. This is because he has lost memories and, for that reason, lacks psy-
chological continuity. Walter cannot compare his present self-consciousness 
with many memories of past events in which he was also self-conscious. 
Rather, there are events that he himself was not present at because he him-
self has no concept of being there. Accordingly, Walter circa 1990 is a dif-
ferent person from Walter circa 2010 because those two Walters at different 
times are psychologically discontinuous. Furthermore, assuming the truth 
of psychological theory allows us to explain other events.
For one thing, we can explain how John Scott survives in Olivia’s mind 
after his bodily death. Remember that before John’s brain dies completely 
Walter synchronizes Olivia’s brain waves with John’s. Subsequently, she com-
municates with him by entering their collective subconscious, connected to 
him via electrodes while in a sensory deprivation tank in a drug-induced 
sleep state. After this procedure, and after John’s body is completely dead, 
we come to learn that he lives on in her. They are two persons in one body—
not unlike genuine cases of multiple personality disorder in the real world. 
Thus it appears that John continues to communicate with Olivia because, 
following the procedure by which they shared consciousness, she retains 
his psychology.
For a time this procedure even results in Olivia mistaking John’s memo-
ries for her own, which further suggests that she is at least partially John to 
herself (season 1, “Safe”).10 Eventually Olivia is able to distinguish her own 
memories from John’s, and by recognizing that she is experiencing John’s 
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memories she reconstructs John’s personal timeline of the events leading to 
his death. This, remember, is how she discovers that he had secretly become 
involved with a bioterrorist group in an attempt to end their attacks. After 
learning this, in her last encounters with him, again in an induced sleep 
state in Walter’s sensory deprivation tank, she seems to find peace in know-
ing that John had genuinely loved her and hadn’t betrayed her (season 1, 
“The Transformation”). There is no indication that Olivia experiences John’s 
memories after this. Thus we can reasonably entertain the hypothesis that 
because she is more psychologically complete, having found some closure, 
she no longer needs John’s memories to make sense of her own memories 
regarding John. Whether or not this is what we are supposed to take away 
from these events, there are many other events in the show that are also 
explainable in terms of the psychological theory.
Midway into the second season we know that Peter Bishop is not Wal-
ter’s biological son, but the son of alternate-universe doppelganger Wal-
ternate. Before this is confirmed, our initial clues to Peter’s true identity 
come in the form of either his lacking certain childhood memories or his 
possessing different memories of his childhood than Walter seems to have. 
For instance, he doesn’t remember being sick and doesn’t remember col-
lecting coins as child to take his mind off of his illness, let alone remember 
his favorite coin (season 1, “There’s More Than One of Everything”). This 
is consistent with the psychological theory, given that Peter and his (now 
dead) alter are distinct people, precisely because they are psychologically 
discontinuous people. Thus the fact that we find out Peter’s true identity by 
learning about the memories that he is missing further confirms that some 
sort of psychological theory is entailed in the Fringe mythology.
Furthermore, it seems that we can tell all of the alternates apart from 
their counterparts, whom we know from this world, only by noticing that 
they each have different memories and, hence, distinct psychologies. Prior 
to season 3 this is implied in a conversation in the finale of season 2 between 
Peter and Olivia’s alternate, let’s call her “Fauxlivia,” as Walter dubs her (sea-
son 3, “Reciprocity”).11 After Fauxlivia delivers Peter to his “real family” 
home, where he stays while on the Other Side, recall that this conversation 
ensues (season 2, “Over There, Part 2”):
Fauxlivia: What’s she like?
Peter: Who?
Fauxlivia: Me.
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Peter: She’s a lot like you. Darker in the eyes maybe. . . . She’s 
always trying to make up for something. . . . “Right” some 
imaginary wrong. Haunted, I guess. Maybe she’s nothing like 
you at all.
In this scene, Peter seems to start by considering how Olivia and Fauxlivia 
are physically similar but quickly realizes that they are indeed different 
people, distinguishable by their respective psychologies. Peter can tell them 
apart because Olivia is somehow “haunted” and Fauxlivia, it seems to him, 
is not—a distinction Peter later blissfully overlooks when he begins dating 
Fauxlivia and unknowingly impregnates her in season 3.12 Accordingly, later 
in the same episode Olivia and Fauxlivia come face to face. As Olivia holds 
her alter at gunpoint while trying to gain her confidence and help, we learn 
that they are in fact not only spatially but also psychologically discontinu-
ous. They each reveal their having different personal memories and, hence, 
being different people, owing to their home worlds being dramatically 
dissimilar. Whereas Olivia is close with her sister, Rachel, and niece, Ella, 
Fauxlivia’s sister died in childbirth. So, too, we learn that Fauxlivia’s mother 
is still alive, though we know that Olivia’s mother has passed. These, among 
other things, have amounted to Olivia and Fauxlivia being different people, 
each with her own unique psychology.
Later, in season 3, Olivia’s and Fauxlivia’s distinctive memories play 
the central role in allowing, and in some cases disallowing, the viewer to 
tell them apart. Even when Olivia and Fauxlivia are made to look exactly 
like each other, undergoing complete physical transformations to remain 
undetected in each other’s respective universe, they remain distinguishable 
via their unique psychologies. They each look like the other, to the point 
that Olivia dons Fauxlivia’s distinctive neck tattoo and Fauxlivia removes 
that same tattoo. Still, even though they are so physically indistinguishable 
that even Peter mistakes Fauxlivia for Olivia and has a romantic relation-
ship with her, believing she is Olivia, for the duration of the third season, 
we can distinguish Olivia and Fauxlivia from each other via their unique 
psychologies.
After she is injected with “B-lymphocytes” and has the majority of 
her memories replaced with Fauxlivia’s, Olivia does live Fauxlivia’s life 
and believes it is her own for a period of time (season 3, “Olivia” and “The 
Plateau”). Thus, in accordance with the psychological theory, it seems she 
becomes Fauxlivia, even to herself, by (almost) fully assimilating Fauxlivia’s 
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psychology. However, it is also because Olivia retains her unique memories 
of Peter and Ella that she is able to recognize herself as Olivia, reclaim her 
real personal identity, and eventually escape Fauxlivia’s universe and return 
to her own.13 Similar suggestion of the assumption of the psychological 
theory is found in the season 3 episode “6B.”
In that episode widow Alice Merchant has been in contact with a man 
she believes is the ghost of her recently deceased husband, Derek Mer-
chant. We learn that Alice is actually in contact with Derek’s alter from the 
other universe and that the haunting physical anomalies experienced by 
the residents of the Rosencrantz Building, where Alice lives, are the result 
of a “crack” between the universes that Alice and Dereknate’s contact has 
begun to open. What is of interest in this case for the purposes at hand is 
how Alice is able to recognize that Dereknate is not her deceased Derek. As 
Dereknate appears as an apparition in front of Alice, Olivia, and Peter, the 
following conversation ensues:
Dereknate: Alice, I miss you so much. And the girls miss you.
Alice: We never had children.
Dereknate: Of course we did.
Alice: No. I’m not your wife. Your wife is gone. And so is my Derek.
How does Alice know that the man she is speaking with, who is identical to 
her Derek in nearly every way, is not in fact Derek? Because Derek would 
have different memories and a different psychology! He wouldn’t know any-
thing of their girls, because they didn’t have any.
Each of these occurrences is consistent with the psychological theory and 
thus suggests that the psychological theory is true in the Fringe universe(s). 
However, as you may have already noticed, there are events in Fringe that 
we cannot explain in terms of the psychological theory. More precisely, 
there are events that we cannot explain without some modification of the 
psychological theory. Perhaps most conspicuous is all of the strange brain 
surgeries that occur, like the removal of pieces of Walter’s brain by Newton 
and Bell, which changes Walter’s psychology. Initially this appears to be 
inconsistent with the pure psychological theory, which allowed for occur-
rences like John’s psychology persisting in Olivia’s brain. This is because 
it implies that our personal psychology is somehow tied to our particular 
brain. That is, Walter’s psychology is altered by physical alterations to his, 
and nobody else’s, brain. However, a variation of the psychological theory 
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seems to make room for the many events of Fringe involving brains and 
brain parts being transplanted.
The Brain Theory: Are We Functions of Gray Matter?
The events of the Fringe universe(s) present us with counterexamples to 
both the animal theory and the psychological theory. In doing so they also 
suggest a hybrid theory of personal identity that some philosophers have 
embraced to capture the benefits of both of those theories while avoiding 
their weaknesses. According to such a hybrid theory, we are identical to 
neither purely psychological nor purely biological entities, but rather some 
conjunction of both (or a conjunction of parts of both). One such hybrid 
view that many contemporary philosophers have found compelling is what 
we will call the brain theory.
According to proponents of the brain theory, we are identical with 
psychologically functioning brains.14 Psychological functioning is central 
to the brain theory. It is important to note that persons are not supposed to 
be identical with just any brain, according to the brain theory. For instance, 
an individual in a persistent vegetative coma lacks personal identity if the 
brain theory is true. This is because such individuals have a brain, but it is 
not a psychologically functioning brain. Thus individuals with vegetatively 
functioning brains are (presumably) not aware of themselves, as their brains 
have lost the capacity for psychology. In such cases, the person who was there 
previously, when his or her brain was functioning normally, has ceased to 
exist, if the brain theory is true.
The brain theory appears to be a more complete theory of the persons 
of Fringe than both of the previously considered theories, because it seems 
to provide tenable explanations for persons surviving as they do in Fringe 
that the other theories cannot. First, assuming that the brain theory is true 
allows us to explain the way in which John Scott survives the death of his 
body and brain. He lives on because his psychology is transferred to another 
functioning brain, Olivia’s, which, at least temporarily, supports his contin-
ued existence. What happens there is—speaking roughly, and in view of the 
fact that we do not know the specifics of the physical procedure involved—
like downloading an MP3 file (John) from an old, “dying” player (John’s 
brain) onto another player (Olivia’s brain). Thus, speaking analogically, his 
psychology can “play” in Olivia’s brain because Walter synchronized their 
brainwaves prior to John’s death, thus endowing Olivia’s brain with this 
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capability. Similarly, though the transfer process is more mysterious, Wil-
liam Bell returns to life as a function of Olivia’s brain after his bodily death 
(season 3, “Lysergic Acid Diethylamide”). The brain theory is also consis-
tent with Walter’s attempt to transfer Bell’s consciousness from Olivia into 
a host computer—a synthetic brain.
Furthermore, the brain theory appears to overcome the difficulties the 
brain transplant case presented for animalism. As we strongly intuit that 
we each go with our personal psychology in such hypothetical scenarios, it 
is consistent that we each go where our psychologically functioning brain 
goes. Since you are, according the brain theory, a psychologically functioning 
brain, it follows that you will go with your brain if your brain is transplanted 
into some other body. Thus the brain theory also implies explanations for 
both the actions of Newton’s soldiers in their frantic search for his frozen 
head and, equally, Newton’s apparent psychological continuity after having 
his head thawed and grafted onto a new body. Furthermore, assuming that 
the brain theory is true in the Fringe universe(s) suggests that the alteration 
in Walter’s personality results from his loss of brain tissue. Walter even sug-
gests that he believes that some variation of the brain theory is true when 
referring to the effects of these procedures on his brain. For instance, he says 
to William Bell, “I’ve lost . . . seventeen years in a mental institution, William. 
Seventeen years! And, even now, I’m still incomplete. I forget things. Uh, 
names. Places. Connections that I used to be able to make so easily. They just 
. . . they just dangle, just outside of my reach. I know what you did to me. I 
know that you cut out pieces of my brain!” (season 2, “Over There, Part 2”).
It is consistent with the brain theory that alterations in the physical 
makeup of the brain will necessitate an alteration of its functioning and, 
ipso facto, an alteration of the person concerned. Moreover, the brain theory 
seems to fit with many of our intuitions about personal identity, both within 
the context of the Fringe universe(s) and also within the context our own 
world. However, this is not to imply that theory is not without its share of 
counterintuitive implications. For one thing, according to the brain theory 
none of us was ever a fetus, or even a very young child. Rather, if the brain 
theory is true we each came into existence much later, when our brains began 
to function psychologically. For another thing, if the theory is true none of 
us has ever seen ourself in the mirror or held a loved one in our arms. This 
is because according to this theory we are functions of brains, and brains 
and brain functions do not have faces or arms.
To proponents of the brain theory, however, these are not serious impedi-
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ments, because the theory’s advantages seem to far outstrip these worries. 
Equally, regarding the Fringe universe(s)—where there are human/creature 
hybrids, shape-shifters, doppelgangers, persons with superhuman powers, 
seemingly eternal children, and so on—these consequences of the view 
are tolerable. This is because assuming that the brain theory underlies the 
Fringe mythology appears to allow us to explain each of the various means 
by which people survive in the show.
Characters as Functions of Gray Matter
Many of the major events of Fringe suggest an endorsement of the brain 
theory. It seems that in the Fringe universe(s) persons are their continuous 
psychologies, a result of the physical functions of their brains or brain parts. 
We seem to be able to explain all of the happenings of the show by assuming 
that the brain theory is true. We can explain how John Scott goes on after 
the death of his body and even his brain. This is because John’s psychology 
continues as a function of Olivia’s brain, made possible by her “brainwaves” 
being synced with his prior to his brain’s cessation of functioning. Likewise, 
we can explain how Newton has a different body, and for some duration 
no body at all, but retains a continuous psychology. He just goes where his 
brain goes, his continuous psychology owing to his retaining the same func-
tional brain. Sure, the functioning of his brain is suspended while his head is 
cryogenically frozen, but it is a plausible assumption that this is just a pause 
in brain function and not a cessation. This assumption is, we imagine, why 
people are cryogenically frozen in the first place. We can even retain our 
explanation of why Peter’s missing memories suggest that he is not Walter’s 
biological son. This is, of course, because Peter and his alter have different 
psychologies, because they have physically distinct brains. Moreover, we 
can retain our explanation for Walter’s being different than he was prior to 
the events of 1991 that left him psychologically incomplete. It accords with 
the events of Fringe, and reality, that alterations to people’s brains result in 
personality differences.
Indeed, not only may we find the truth by opening our minds to the 
impossible, but we may also have found what is true in the seemingly impos-
sible Fringe universe(s) by identifying what is actually possible. There are 
many actual cases of brain traumas causing dramatic alterations in people’s 
personalities, and also cases in which brain surgeries have alleviated symp-
toms of mental illness.15 Thus it is intuitively plausible that the patients of 
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the Fringe universe(s) Hennington Mental Health Institute are miraculously 
cured of their rapid-onset mental problems when Walter’s secretly implanted 
stolen brain portions are disconnected from their brains by Newton. It is 
equally plausible that Walter’s quirky personality is the result of known 
operations on his brain, given that the brain theory is presumed to be true.
We are shown instances of Walter circa 1991’s and Walter circa 2010’s 
very distinct personalities, as the old Walter, Walter circa 1991, returns briefly 
when Newton reconnects all of the stolen brain parts back together with 
the rest of Walter’s brain to retrieve information about opening “the door” 
to the alternate world (season 2, “Grey Matters”). In that moment Walter 
appears to act completely differently to us—he has a different, less humble 
personality and a more continuous psychology. It may be that observing 
Walternate gives us a glimpse at what Walter was like with his brain intact: 
noticeably less quirky and compassionate.16 We might even speculate that 
the purposeful damage to Walter’s brain was engineered, by himself as we 
learn, to make him less cold and diabolical so that he would be able to better 
combat Walternate and save the universe(s). In any case, whether or not we 
can infer anything about the old Walter from observing Walternate, every 
indication is that Walter circa 1991 is a different person from Walter circa 
2010 because those two Walters have physically distinct brain configura-
tions. The former literally has more gray matter than the latter, whom we 
have come to know and love. Because of their physically distinct brain com-
positions, Walter circa 1991 and Walter circa 2010 are both psychologically 
discontinuous and distinct.
All of this fits with the brain theory of personal identity. Given that we 
can explain all of the events of Fringe by assuming that the brain theory is 
true, it appears that the brain theory underlies the Fringe mythology. How-
ever, this may not be the end of the story—and, let’s be honest, it would not 
be all that surprising if J. J. Abrams left us with an open-ended suggestion 
as to what persons are in the Fringe universe(s).
What about Andrew Rusk?
There is at least one series of events that we, your humble authors, cannot 
formulate a feasible explanation for in terms of the brain theory. The occur-
rences in the season 2 episode “Unearthed” undermine our commitment to 
the brain theory. In this episode the teenage coma patient Lisa Donovan is 
taken off of life support, declared dead, and moments later, while a medical 
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team begins to remove her organs for donation, springs to life and begins 
reciting a numerical code in a strange voice. We learn that she is reciting 
alphanumeric code that is Chief Petty Officer First Class Andrew Rusk’s 
personal identification number conjoined with launch codes for intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles.
Later we learn that Lisa and Rusk both died at 5:21 a.m. and that Rusk’s 
“energy” and memories entered Lisa’s body, bringing both of them back to 
life in Lisa’s body. We are never given specific details, but Rusk is implied to 
have gained this ability to inhabit others as a result of being in a submarine 
accident in which he was exposed to high levels of radiation for sixteen hours 
in conjunction with his later being treated with an unknown experimental 
radiation inhibitor. In any case, Rusk is somehow in Lisa’s body, much like 
John is in Olivia’s. However, unlike John, Rusk quickly takes over the girl’s 
mind and body and uses her body to exact revenge on his wife.
Rusk was murdered in what his murderer, Jake Selleg, claims is retribu-
tion for Rusk’s spousal abuse. Selleg claims that Rusk violently beat his wife, 
Teresa Rusk, whom Selleg had befriended, and for that deserved to die. Fur-
thermore, when Selleg murdered Rusk, he told Rusk that it was Teresa who 
was “sending him to hell.” Thus, believing that his own wife ordered Selleg 
to kill him, Rusk uses Lisa’s body to tie Teresa up and attempt to burn her 
alive. Though we might think that this is all explainable in terms of Rusk 
being a function of the brain(s) he inhabits, as in the case of Olivia and John, 
something different is going on with Rusk.
Olivia and John are united through a mechanical process that is con-
trolled by Walter to a large extent, as their functional brains are physically 
connected and their functions synchronized. In contrast, Rusk is far away 
from both Lisa’s body and the freshly dead car accident victim he inhabits 
after being exorcised from Lisa’s body at the end of the episode. Given all 
that we know, it seems that the only thing that connects Rusk to his hosts 
is their incidental deaths overlapping with the time that he becomes dis-
embodied. Moreover, there is no evident scientific explanation for Rusk’s 
body jumping. Rather, in the episode there is talk of personal “energy” and 
“souls.” In fact, the only explanation for Lisa’s personality remaining in her 
body at all after being dead for several minutes comes via Peter reciting a 
passage from The Tibetan Book of the Dead. That passage reads, in Peter’s 
translation, “Innermost subtle consciousness is ever present. It never leaves 
the body, even in death.” This is, of course, far from a clear explanation of 
what has happened and just leaves us more confused.
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Taking the events of “Unearthed” seriously, we might consider that we 
were wrong about the brain theory underlying the Fringe mythology. Maybe 
the events surrounding Rusk, among other things, really suggest that some 
other theory is being endorsed. It is true that there are explicit depictions 
of people altering physical reality with their minds, which initially seem to 
defy naturalistic explanations. For instance, we see haunting documentary 
footage of three-year-old Olivia causing some sort of disturbingly intense 
light after Walter, whom we can hear off camera, fails to calm her down 
(season 1, “Bad Dreams). We later learn that, because she was upset, she 
set the room ablaze with her mind, leaving a charred room with a pristine 
corner where Olivia sat during the incident (season 2, “Jacksonville”). We 
also know of two other Cortexiphan trial subjects, twin sisters Susan Pratt 
and Nancy Lewis, who have similar pyrokinetic abilities: the former dies by 
self-immolation and the latter burns corrupt agent Sanford Harris to death 
before he can kill her and Olivia (season 1, “The Road Not Taken”). 
Likewise, there is the mysterious method by which Walter and the 
remaining Cortexiphan survivors get to the alternate universe to retrieve 
Peter at the end of the second season: they simply stand in a circle in a 
theater, collectively concentrating, and are then somehow transported to 
the other world (season 2, “Over There, Part 1”). We learn that this travel 
between worlds is possible because Olivia is exercising her ability to “open 
a door” between universes; in the first instance the door is held open by the 
energies of the other Cortexiphan trial survivors, and it is later held open 
by the energy created by William Bell’s self-induced molecular disintegra-
tion (season 2, “Over There, Part 2”). This might suggest that the travel 
between worlds has some explanation that is consistent with current phys-
ics. However, we have no apparent explanation for the fact that Olivia can 
travel between universes with the power of her mind alone, as when she 
return to her universe for the second time. This is not explained in terms of 
physical mechanisms; she just takes Cortexiphan, gets in a sensory depri-
vation tank, and somehow ends up in the counterpart tank in Walter’s lab 
(season 3, “Entrada”).17
Nonetheless, this may all be consistent with the brain theory, given 
that our minds are functions of our brains. In the show, all of these events 
are explained as true potentials of the human brain, aided by Cortexiphan 
treatments. Nina Sharp explains this, saying, “Doctor Bell theorized that 
the human mind, at birth, is infinitely capable . . . and that every force it 
encounters, social, physical, intellectual, . . . is the beginning of the process 
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he referred to as ‘limitation’—a diminishing of that potential.” Furthermore, 
she says that Cortexiphan “was meant to ‘limit’ that ‘limitation’—to prevent 
the natural shrinking of that brain power” (season 1, “Ability”). This is why 
Walter and Bell tested Cortexiphan on young children like three-year-old 
Olivia, because their brain’s potential had not yet been fully limited. Not-
withstanding, we remain without an explanation for Rusk’s means of inhab-
iting others. At this point, pending further information, all that we can do 
is speculate.
Thus we might entertain the theory that there is a third world that the 
episode with Rusk stands as a cryptic introduction to.18 Although this is 
plausible, it is unlikely that even if there is a third world it would have a 
completely different basis for what persons are. Rather, there is evidence that 
whatever universe Rusk’s inhabitations are occurring in, it is one that is con-
nected to the others in some way. In the episode, notice that the Observer is 
noticeable in the background as Olivia and Lisa’s mother speak outside of St. 
Brigid’s Church. And remember that he observes events that are significant 
to some overarching “pattern” of interconnected events.
With this “third world” theory behind us, we might speculate further 
that perhaps we are wrong to assume that psychologies or minds are func-
tions of brains in the Fringe universe(s). Maybe we can survive even without 
brains. This would suggest that some other variation of the psychological 
theory of persons, but not the brain theory, is a core assumption of the Fringe 
mythology. We could then speculate even further that all of the business with 
brains and brain parts is, perhaps, owing to the plausible assumption that 
having functional brains is just one means of having a continuous psychology. 
However, then we are left wondering what it is that our psychology consists 
of. Energy? Souls? If so, how does that work? Where is this “energy” in our 
brains? As we have said, the answer to which theory of persons underlies 
the events of Fringe is open to speculation until we have more information. 
We must leave it at that for now and hope that Fringe Division will help us 
figure this out in episodes to come.
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9. It is possible that the two universes are in fact spatially coincident and that per-
haps the inhabitants of each are somehow psychologically blind to the features of the 
counteruniverse.
10. Recall that Olivia has a similar experience with Nick Lane, whom she met as a 
child during Cortexiphan trials and with whom she shares consciousness for a short 
time (season 1, “Bad Dreams”).
11. Since we are entertaining various theories of personal identity, it is worth not-
ing that our employment of the name “Fauxlivia” is not meant to signify that Olivia’s 
alternate is any less real or lacking a distinctive personal identity. Accordingly, we also 
do not intend the usage of “Fauxlivia” to indicate that the character is somehow more 
or less immoral than Olivia.
12. It is implied that Olivia is “haunted” by an event in which she shot her estranged 
stepfather after he beat her mother. At the end of season 3 it remains open whether 
Fauxlivia has done the same and whether she too receives yearly birthday cards from 
her stepfather—whereabouts unknown—like Olivia.
13. The manner in which Olivia is able to travel between worlds and retain her iden-
tity, sanity, and tie to her universe is reminiscent of the manner in which Desmond Hume 
time-travels, or “mind-travels,” in Lost (season 3, “Flashes Before Your Eyes”). Equally, 
Desmond’s need to have a “constant,” which for him is his lover Penny, in mind to retain 
his sanity and identity when traveling between times is echoed by Olivia’s holding her 
memories of Peter and Ella constant in order to reclaim her identity and get back home.
14. For example, see Mark Johnston, “Human Beings,” Journal of Philosophy 84 
(1987): 59–83.
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15. For the history of personality affective brain traumas and surgeries and examples 
of actual cases, see Jack D. Pressman, Last Resort: Psychosurgery and the Limits of Medi-
cine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16. It is worth noting that Walternate is not portrayed as being evil, nor should we 
presume that Walter and his universe are good, while the other is evil. Recall that, unlike 
Walter, Walternate seems to have rigid moral boundaries that guide his decisions. For 
instance, in the season 3 episode “Immortality” we learn that he is adamantly opposed 
to testing on children. When Cortexiphan trials appear to have a more marked effect 
on younger test subjects, the mention of testing on children is quickly met with a stern 
objection from Walternate: “No children. That is not an option.” Later in the same epi-
sode he confides in his mistress, Reiko, “If you had asked me a week ago, I would have 
told you that I would sacrifice anything . . . to save our world. But in fact, there are lines 
I simply cannot cross.”
17. There are various indications that Olivia needs to be in a heightened emotional 
state in order to traverse universes. Accordingly, having heightened emotions is sup-
posed to be what explains Alice and Dereknate Merchant’s coability to begin to traverse 
whatever barrier exists between the universes (season 3, “6B”).




The Machine, Gilles Deleuze, and a Thousand Plateaus of 
Identity
Franklin Allaire
“You are being watched. The government has a secret system, a machine 
that spies on you every hour of every day.” This prologue, spoken by Harold 
Finch (Michael Emerson) sets the tone for fans of the J. J. Abrams–produced 
series Person of Interest (POI). For the uninitiated, this hit television drama 
is built on the premise that a machine, created by Finch after 9/11 to detect 
acts of terrorism, uses our own electronic footprints to see everything. This 
includes violent crimes happening to ordinary people. People like you. The 
government, however, considered these crimes to be irrelevant and wouldn’t 
act so Finch and his partner, John Reese (Jim Caviezel), decided they would 
work to prevent these crimes from happening.
POI is, I believe, the first true post-9/11 series in that the entire prem-
ise of the show would not exist without the tragic events of that fateful day. 
Philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze and Ernest Becker might even go so 
far as to call it an ultimate event in that it was powerful enough in symbol-
ism (both real and existential) to become omnipresent socially, culturally, 
and existentially.1 “The horrific loss of life that resulted from the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 is naturally a severe jolt to us all.”2 Americans’ reactions were 
wide ranging, with many flocking to blood banks, hospitals, and Red Cross 
offices. Sales of American flags, patriotic tattoos, Osama bin Laden rifle-range 
targets (and toilet paper) increased. “For most Americans, paralysis, worry, 
anger, patriotism, and bloodlust have given way to a more sober perspec-
tive and sincere effort to understand what happened and why.”3 Meanwhile, 
government and military agencies turned their attention to the prevention 
of further attacks.
In the POI universe, the aftermath of 9/11 creates an opportunity for 
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Finch, with help from Nathan Ingram (Brett Cullen), to create a machine 
in 2002 capable of using technology and our own electronic footprints to 
watch and ostensibly protect everyone from future acts of terror. (In the 
episode “Ghosts” Finch explains that The Machine uses cameras, electronic 
footprints from debit and credit cards, the Internet, voice and facial rec-
ognition software, government servers, and public and private databases.)
The existence of such a machine in the POI universe provides us with 
an opportunity to explore a wide range of philosophical topics, including 
morality, justice, and person liberties in the real world. My interest, how-
ever, lies with The Machine itself and how its activities relate to postmodern 
philosophical conceptions of our identity. How does the machine identify 
the person(s) in the first place? How does it take the pieces of our lives and 
put them together in such a way that it “predicts” who will be the victim or 
perpetrator of a violent crime? I’m not going to pretend to understand the 
intricacies of computer code, so I can’t imagine what kind of programming 
wizardry Finch performed to enable The Machine to behave as if it has an 
intelligence all its own.
Popping the Hood
Throughout POI we’ve been given hints at the origins of The Machine and 
the processes it uses to identify individuals. Season 1 episode “Super” has 
provided us with the greatest insight into not only what The Machine does 
but how it does it.
In the “present” Finch decides to reveal to Detective Carter (Taraji P. 
Henson) what he and Mr. Reese do by “throwing her in the deep end of the 
pool” when he reveals that Derek Watson is about to commit a violent crime. 
In a flashback to 2005, The Machine provides the Social Security number of 
Gordon Kurzweil, a CIA case officer, who is revealed to be a traitor. In both 
cases, Detective Carter and Deputy Director Weeks want to know how The 
Machine was able to recognize the crimes when their own law enforcement 
organizations could not.
Is The Machine recognizing our identities from externally imposed 
definitions or is it channeling identity models suggested by Gilles Deleuze, 
who insists that our identities are internal self-definitions just as unique as 
we are? In this chapter I will approach The Machine from a philosophical 
standpoint that emphasizes the postmodern concept of multidimensional 
identities and their intersection and interaction over time.
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Flesh and Blood
Who are you? The question seems so simple yet is so very complex. Are you 
one thing? Are you many things? Are you all things at all times? Are you some 
things some of the time? How do you know? More importantly, how does The 
Machine know? Each episode of POI focuses on a victim or perpetrator (or 
both) whose “number” has come up via The Machine. Somehow The Machine 
knows that this person is in trouble and it becomes Finch and Reese’s prior-
ity to figure out what is going to happen and when and to try to prevent it.
At the heart of how The Machine recognizes the need to help someone is 
that individual’s identity. Our identity is a tricky and highly complex thing. 
It’s fluid, dynamic, and ever changing and it is difficult for us to conceptual-
ize more than a handful of our identities at any given moment. In his own 
book Difference and Repetition (1994) and in his collaborations with Felix 
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (2009) and A Thousand Plateaus (1987) Deleuze 
creates an infinitely multidimensional identity paradigm in which what we 
would call our identity can be understood as the result of thousands of sepa-
rate individual occurrences working in conjunction with each other but not 
necessarily bound by a whole (identity).4 The result is a complex array of 
differences that, in Deleuze’s view, society typically subordinates to achieve 
uniformity but instead should fundamentally be the object of affirmation 
and not negation.5
Modernism, from a philosophical standpoint, is the tendency in contem-
porary culture and society to reduce and compartmentalize an individual’s 
identity. Modernism is rooted in the scientific, technological, artistic, and 
philosophical transformation of society during the 1890s and early 1900s. 
Modernist models of identity are represented by frameworks based primar-
ily on binary discourses relating to race (white vs. nonwhite), sex (male vs. 
female), sexual orientation (straight vs. gay), physical ability (able vs. dis-
abled), and class (middle class vs. poor), where those who exist outside the 
dominant discourses are marginalized.6
Postmodernism, on the other hand, can be understood as a result, reac-
tion, aftermath, denial, or rejection of modernism.7 Postmodern philoso-
phy is a school of thought that proposes that identity is more complex and 
dynamic than suggested by the objectivity of modernism. Identity is indi-
vidually constructed and therefore subject to a multitude of factors (social, 
cultural, chronological), leading to similarities and differences that make 
each of us unique.
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To better understand and appreciate how The Machine predicts crimes 
that are about to happen, especially those of Derek Watson and Gordon 
Kurzweil, we must “pop the hood” on what we mean when we say “identity.”
Judgment
The language of identity is ubiquitous in contemporary social science; how-
ever, common usage belies the considerable variability in both its conceptual 
meanings and its theoretical role.8 The term identity falls into three distinct 
and consistent usages:
1. to refer to the single dimension relating to the culture of a person, 
with no distinction drawn between, for example, identity and 
gender (both Watson and Kurzweil are male);9
2. as a method of identification with a collectivity or social category 
(Kurzweil is a longtime case officer for the U.S. government); or
3. to refer to parts of a “self ” composed of the meanings that 
individuals attach to multiple “selves” or roles they typically play 
in a highly differentiated society (Watson is thirty-nine years old, 
male, Caucasian, a father, married [though his wife has left him] 
and unemployed).
This third usage of identity has developed among those who recognize the 
complexity of contemporary society and the need to accurately reflect the 
nature of identity. This postmodern notion of identity has given rise to a 
politics of difference.10 Rather than recognizing universal similarities within 
a society (i.e., human or American) with an identical system of laws, rights, 
and freedoms, particular groups are demanding their unique identities be 
recognized.
As opposed to the more sociological definitions of identity mentioned 
previously, in philosophy personal identity examines how our identity (the 
thing or things that make us who we are) persists through time given that 
“each of us shares our current thoughts with countless beings that diverge 
from one another in the past or future.”11 This is sometimes called the law 
of identity, where an object is the same as itself: A → A (if you have A, then 
you have A).
As we consider all of these definitions together, The Machine’s challenge 
becomes clear. First it needs to identify us as unique individuals, separate 
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and distinct from all others. Then it must also be able to recognize that each 
of us is the same person over some period of time.
Thinking about how our multidimensional differences might interact 
and intersect with each other is enough to tie your brain in knots. For con-
venience, society (and sometimes philosophy) tries to reduce individuals 
to a singular identity (e.g., ethnicity, gender, sexual preference) in order to 
compartmentalize us.
Identity Crisis
“In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as 
an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings 
and expectations associated with that role and its performance.”12 Some 
theorists have proposed that we have distinct components of self, called 
role identities, for each of the role positions in society that we occupy. There 
is some disagreement about whether our ability to switch between, create 
interactions and intersections among, or merge identities to create new iden-
tities happens internally or is externally motivated through personal and 
social interactions and as a product of discourse and participatory action. 
However, there is agreement “that the self must be seen as complex and dif-
ferentiated [and] that the self must be conceptualized as constructed from 
diverse ‘parts.’ One can speak meaningfully of familial identities, political 
identities, occupational identities, and so on, all of which are incorporated 
into the self as that which is an object of self.”13
Although multidimensional intersectionality frameworks represent a 
more flexible and adaptable model in which multiple dimensions of identity 
interact and intersect with one another, they exhibit a point of view found 
in other, more hierarchical, models of identity. That view, according to 
Deleuze, is an outside-in approach through which an individual’s identities 
are understood only through externally generated stratified social categories.
External differentiation, as Deleuze points out, can be both positive—
members of a group focus on what makes them the same—and negative—
members focus on what someone is not. Unfortunately, there is a tendency 
for society, and those within it, to focus on the negative. The common thread 
that runs through the aforementioned identity models is the position of 
primacy afforded to identity. Deleuze proposes thinking of identity as sec-
ondary rather than primary. In doing so, he shifts the paradigm away from 
defining one’s identity in terms of “otherness” when compared to individu-
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als who do not possess (or appear not to possess) that identity. Instead, the 
focus would be on an individual’s relationship with his or her own identi-
ties and the inherent differences between individuals with the same identity. 
In modern and postmodern identity theories (i.e., identity theory, social 
identity theory, and intersectionality), difference is seen as deriving from 
identity and subordinated by identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance.
We recognize X because it is different from Y (or at least from not-X).14 
X could represent any identity, chosen or unchosen, that an individual may 
have.15 Deleuze’s point is that we typically define identity in terms of what 
something is not. In a Deleuzean ontology all identities are effects of dif-
ference rather than the other way around. From this perspective, identities 
are neither logically nor metaphysically prior to difference and “it is not dif-
ference which presupposes opposition but opposition which presupposes 
difference.”16 “Given that there exist differences of nature between things of 
the same genus,” Deleuze argues, it stands to reason that there exist differ-
ences at any and all levels of classification and identification.17
Get Carter
Over the course of season 1 we have seen Detective Joss Carter become a 
central character in the POI universe. First she was a semiantagonist seek-
ing to bring Reese to justice. Then she was a “number” that needed protect-
ing from the very person she was trying to hunt down. Finally, toward the 
end of the season she became a semiaccomplice of Finch and Reese, neither 
condemning nor condoning their actions.
In the episode “Get Carter” we gain some insight into Detective Carter’s 
identity by learning that she is not only a highly principled police officer but 
also a war veteran and a single mother. The Machine, of course, has learned 
much more about her than we will ever know, but this will be enough for 
our discussion at this time.
Let’s imagine that Detective Carter’s “mother” identity is represented by 
M. According to Deleuze, that identity is composed of an endless series of 
differences, where M is the difference between m1 and m2 and m3 and so on. 
In this way, being M is a derivative (as opposed to the derivative) from dm 
where d is the differential between an infinite number of potentially differ-
ent m’s. Can other individuals also be M? Yes. But their M-ness is inherently 
different because of the different m’s they possess. All roads may lead to M, 
but not everyone takes the same roads. Deleuze’s conceptual framework has 
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three conceptual benefits. First, it places an individual’s differences in a more 
positive light, where one must understand the nature of the differences to 
understand him- or herself. Second, it looks positively on both inter- and 
intragroup differences. Last, it creates a framework through which we can 
appreciate the inherent qualities of the differences on their own merits.
Deleuze challenges the typical Hegelian view in which contradiction 
and opposition, distinguishing between m and not-m and M and not-M, 
are the principles underlying all difference and the principle building block 
of identity. In Deleuze’s ontology difference goes all the way to the molecu-
lar level and results in an array of infinite potential identities independent 
of spatiotemporal restrictions derived from inherent differences as well as 
those influenced and shaped through sociocultural, historical, and political 
contexts. “Every organism, in its receptive and perpetual elements, but also 
in its viscera, is a sum of the contractions, of retentions and expectation.”18
In other words, the different is related to the different through difference 
itself, without any mediation by an identity, and that difference should funda-
mentally be the object of affirmation and not negation. Deleuze’s molecular 
perspective denotes the existence of the multiple within the singular, where 
intergroup differentiation arises from consideration that an individual exists 
as a collectivity.19 Framing this point of view, Deleuze insists “that identity 
not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle . . . that it 
revolve around the Different . . . which opens up the possibility of difference 
having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination 
of a concept in general already understood as identical.”20 “Switching to the 
molecular level renders things far more messy and fragmentary than their 
molar representation might suggest.”21 Pure difference is non-spatiotem-
poral—it is an idea. In contrast to his description of the previous identity 
theories, Deleuze does not present us with a model nor does he propose that 
difference transcends possible experience. Instead, differences between M 
and M or m and m are the conditions of actual experience and the internal 
difference in of itself based on that experience. A Deleuzean conception of 
difference and identity is not an abstraction of an experienced thing. It is 
a real system of differential relations that creates actual spaces, times, and 
sensations.22
When The Machine identifies both Derek Watson and Gordon Kurzweil 
as individuals preparing to commit crimes, it recognizes that both “possess 
an identity [that is] a singular, a particular, an exception, that is, in some 
essential way, unlike all others.”23 This level of individuation, or as Deleuze 
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calls it, actualization, is composed of ideas and multiplicities involving dif-
ferential relations among heterogeneous components, whose rates of change 
are connected with each other.
Legacy
The Machine’s actualization of Watson and Kurzweil’s identities in “Super” 
crystalizes various dimensions of their identities to create a concretely exist-
ing real entity out of a set of virtual ideas. The Machine, therefore, follows 
an intensive process tracing differential virtual multiplicities with their 
complex gradients and multiple dimensions within the entity’s overall iden-
tity to produce localized and individuated actual substances with extensive 
properties.24 The actualization (or salience) of a particular individual (or 
individuals) by The Machine ties together Deleuze’s themes of difference, 
multiplicity, virtuality, and intensity based on a theory of ideas, as opposed 
to Platonic essential models of identity, Kantian regulative models of unity, 
and Hegelian models of contradiction. Instead it is based on problematic 
and genetic models of difference.
In practice, The Machine takes all the pieces that make up the idea of 
Watson and Kurzweil to actualize representations of them very near the cor-
poreal Watson, whom Detective Carter prevents from committing a crime, 
and Kurzweil, who is apprehended after arranging to sell weapons-grade 
uranium to the Iranian government.
The Machine’s ability to “predict” crime lies in its capacity to collect 
seemingly disparate multiplicities, gradients, and differentials of our lives 
and to search, collate, and recognize the patterns (repetitions) among all the 
differences. Our human brains are capable of performing the same feat, given 
the appropriate resources, as demonstrated by Detective Carter’s apprehen-
sion of Watson before he can assault John Dalton. It’s just that The Machine 
is faster, more powerful, and has more time and resources.
The Fix
As if this all of this wasn’t complicated enough, we also have to consider that 
our multidimensional identities travel across more than just the axes of x, y, 
and z. They also interact, intersect, and are affected by time. Remember, the 
typical philosophical concepts of personal identity as they relate to time can 
be grouped into two overarching problems. Diachronic problems address 
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the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a person at one time 
and a person at another time can be said to be the same person persisting 
through time. Synchronic problems, on the other hand, are grounded in the 
question of what feature(s) or trait(s) characterize a given person at one 
time. Within these overarching frameworks, there is considerable debate 
with regard to the continuity of bodily substance, mental substance, and 
consciousness over time.
In a Deleuzean ontology, not only is identity viewed differently (no 
pun intended) but time and its impact on identity are deconstructed. The 
idea that we can be grouped and our behavior predicted based on static 
positivist identity frameworks is even more unlikely and runs counter 
to another one of Deleuze’s central tenets: “becoming.” Deleuze used the 
term becoming in conjunction with his concept of a body without organs 
(BwO).25 BwO refers to a virtual dimension of the body that comple-
ments, affects, and penetrates the actual body. The actual body has, or at 
least expresses, the traits, habits, movements, and qualities of our various 
dimensions of identity. The virtual body, on the other hand, is a reservoir 
of potential traits, connections, affects, movements, and qualities that 
exist outside of spatiotemporal limitations. Contact with other bodies (i.e., 
interactions and experiences) and self-activation, in which the individual 
actively experiments with his or her own potentials, are what Deleuze and 
Guattari call “becomings.”
Becomings challenge the notion of “being” and complement the previ-
ously discussed ontology of internal differentiation. What may appear to 
be solid and stable is really “permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by 
flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad 
or transitory particles.”26 Stable dimensions of identity, such as African 
American or military, are actually collections of flows—virtual masses of 
swirling potentialities that can be activated (or actualized) anytime by the 
actual body. The difference between The Machine and us is that our minds 
are capable of actualizing only a handful of these potentialities at any par-
ticular moment. The Machine, however, is capable of actualizing our entire 
identity based on all potentialities.
Deleuze’s deconstructed “body,” with its multiple dimensions of identity, 
reacts, merges, intersects and interacts with time in a nonlinear fashion. In 
his configuration Deleuze (and The Machine, presumably) conceptualizes 
time in terms of three different levels (syntheses) within which repetition 
occurs.27
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Level one is exemplified by habit, which embeds the past in the present 
and gestures toward the future by transforming experience into urgency. 
Level two sustains relationships between more distant events through the 
active force of memory. Memory transforms time and “implies between 
successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, sys-
tems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals, and 
roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions.”28 Level 
three still exists in the present but in a way that breaks free of the simple 
repetition of time. This level refers to an ultimate event powerful enough in 
symbolism to become omnipresent (salient).29
Cura Te Ipsum
The postmodern/poststructural conception of identity as espoused by 
Deleuze is surely as complex as the reality of our own individual identities. 
However, the technological wizardry employed by Finch that enables The 
Machine to actualize individuals in need of assistance is truly remarkable 
when we consider that The Machine’s morphogenetic process has been hap-
pening for each individual within New York City twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week since its inception in 2002. This ability takes Deleuze’s 
themes to a whole new level in that difference, multiplicity, repetition, vir-
tuality, and intensity are not just intersecting and interacting within one 
actualized individual. The Machine is processing, intersecting, and inter-
acting these themes across millions of actualized individuals, each with 
thousands of differentials. And, as Ingram comments, it does this all the 
time to all of us.
The depth of The Machine’s grasp of Deleuzean themes is apparent 
when Finch reveals to Ingram how Kurzweil’s number came up in another 
flashback scene at the end of “Super” (also while reading an Internet article 
titled “Kurzweil Pleads Guilty to Espionage”):
Nathan: Now tell me, what on earth was it that made The Machine 
pick out Kurzweil’s number?
Finch: You want me to pop the hood?
Nathan: Yeah!
Finch: November 2002. This isn’t the first item chronologically, but 
it’s the one that triggered a harder look.
Nathan: A gas station receipt.
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Finch: Eighteen of them. From a Shell station just outside of Towson, 
Maryland. Kurzweil stopped every third Thursday of every even 
month even if he filled up the day before. On three of his eighteen 
visits this SUV was present two hours before.
Nathan: A dead drop.
Finch: The SUV was registered to the wife of a Turkish oil executive 
that paid for plane tickets used by an Iranian suspect from the 
bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994. 
The thinnest thread connect Kurzweil and his contact and The 
Machine could see it. It knew and it was right!
While the thought of such an omniscient machine is, in Ingram’s words, 
terrifying, it is also awe inspiring in that in many ways The Machine is able 
to do something that we cannot. It sees people as complex individuals with 
identities based on untold numbers of gradients, events, differences, and 
ecologies independent of our own spatiotemporal restrictions rather than 
falling into the social and psychological trap of reductionism. In doing so 
it is also able to view society as a much richer tapestry of interconnecting, 
intersecting, and interlocking gradients, ecologies, and happenings that affect 
the identities of both individuals and groups in constant states of becoming 
than we may ever be able to conceive.
As opposed to real people, actualized individuals developed within 
the mainframe of The Machine are threshold people—“they move within 
and among multiple, often conflicting, worlds and refuse to align them-
selves exclusively with any single individual, group, or belief system . . . to 
develop innovative, potentially transformative perspectives [respecting] 
the differences within and among the diverse groups and, simultaneously, 
posit commonalities.”30 These threshold people enable The Machine to see, 
theoretically, all potentialities and hone in on the ones most likely to lead 
to violent acts of crime.
The power that such a machine could give to an individual or organi-
zation is unimaginable, which is why Finch has taken careful measures to 
protect himself and The Machine. In the wrong hands, The Machine could 
be used to inflict an Orwellian nightmare on innocent citizens in an effort to 
maintain the safety and security of society. In the right hands it can cham-
pion the voiceless, give hope to the hopeless, and protect the innocent from 
those who would do them harm. All it takes is someone to act and, as Finch 
notes, “that, Detective Carter, is what we do.”
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are J. J. abraMs’s “LeadInG 
LadIes” reaLLy feMInIst roLe 
ModeLs?
Cynthia Jones
Felicity Porter of Felicity, Sydney Bristow of Alias, and Olivia Dunham of 
Fringe are rather unique female characters, especially when considered in 
comparison to the women seen in previous decades on American televi-
sion. Until recently, even seemingly strong female leads often occupied 
and were defined by very traditional and stereotypical female roles, such 
as homemakers, wives, girlfriends, or mothers. One of the central goals of 
numerous current and historical feminist theorists is to achieve the free-
dom for women to choose their own roles and not have them chosen for 
them by a patriarchal system. Such role models are more important than 
one might imagine. A pervasive and persuasive argument from many femi-
nists regarding role models is that strong female role models, and conversely 
the absence of appropriate female role models, can be very influential for 
young women. Not only do young women need to see powerful female role 
models in general, but entrance into many professions can be restricted by 
the lack of female professionals with whom young women can identify. If a 
young woman cannot see herself in a role because all the instantiations she 
sees are male, like physicists or astronauts, for example, then she is consid-
erably less likely to choose that role when an opportunity arises. It is thus 
a worthwhile exercise to examine Abrams’s central female characters and 
assess their suitability as feminist role models. From a feminist perspec-
tive, a significant question about Abrams’s female leads in Felicity, Alias, 
and Fringe is whether they present positive images as feminist role models 
from the standpoint of three different feminist writers.
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This chapter will explore the three central female characters from these 
television shows and evaluate them from several feminist perspectives, one 
from each “wave” of feminist theorizing. I will also discuss and critically 
evaluate Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia through the lenses, so to speak, of two 
of the central issues brought to light by feminist theorists: the pervasive 
oppression of women and the centrality of the masculine ideal of the impar-
tial observer present in most mainstream Western philosophy. But before we 
can examine these topics, we should address the issue of why anyone should 
care about what feminists think about these characters in the first place.
What Is Feminism?
“Feminism” can be defined in numerous ways. Many people believe that 
feminism is about blaming current males for the past treatment of women 
or that “feminist” is synonymous with “man-hater.” While there have been a 
handful of feminist thinkers who, perhaps somewhat understandably, have 
lashed out against the historically dominant and domineering gender, the 
majority of feminist theorists are not man-haters. My own experiences in 
grappling with this thing called “feminism” and thinkers who label them-
selves as “feminists” have led me to realize that many people are unfamiliar 
with the concepts discussed by feminist theorists and many more wonder 
why they should care what feminists say at all. I will admit at the outset that 
I am not an expert in feminist theories, although I have read many feminist 
thinkers, particularly those in feminist ethics. And I have firsthand experi-
ence with the negative connotations of feminism, as I have gone through 
the struggle myself over whether to call myself a feminist.
When I started as an assistant professor almost a decade ago, a senior 
colleague suggested I teach a course in feminist theories. Convinced that 
this was another way to say, “You’re a female so you should know and teach 
feminism,” I resisted the suggestion. But a few years later I was offered a bit 
of what turned out to be sage wisdom from another colleague that changed 
my mind. “Why should I care about what feminists think,” I asked, “espe-
cially since there is such disagreement among feminist writers and since 
the word ‘feminism’ has such negative connotations for most people?” She 
responded simply that one of the obvious kernels of truth upon which femi-
nism is based is that women should receive the same consideration and have 
the same basic human rights afforded to them as men and that agreeing 
with this was good enough to call yourself a feminist. If this is indeed the 
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case, then anyone who isn’t a feminist according to this minimal criterion 
should be considered morally suspect indeed. Even though this minimal-
ist answer is a good start, feminist theorizing encompasses so much more, 
as I have learned.
So what is feminism? I argue that both a simple as well as a more com-
plex answer can be offered. The complex answer is that feminist theoriz-
ing has occurred in what has typically been described as three “waves” of 
thought and that in each of these waves feminists have been concerned with 
somewhat different problems and have offered somewhat different solutions. 
The three waves of feminist theorizing, along with a representative theorist 
from each period, will be discussed in greater detail in the next section; for 
now, the simpler answer is a better place to start.
The opening lines of Ann Cudd and Robin Andreasen’s Feminist The-
ory: A Philosophical Anthology offers the following definition: “Feminist 
theory is the attempt to make intellectual sense of, and then to critique, 
the subordination of women to men. As such it has a relatively short his-
tory, for the history of seeing subordination as something that needs to be 
understood, rather than simply accommodated, or perhaps given a ratio-
nale, is relatively short.”1 So according to Cudd and Andreasen, feminism 
is at least about understanding and critiquing the oppression and subjuga-
tion of women. I think this suggests the simplest and clearest explanation 
that one can give: feminism is the recognition of the historical and current 
oppression of one gender, and this oppression is problematic. A feminist is 
then someone who recognizes this oppression where it can be found and 
hopefully draws attention to it.
To the question, “why should I care about what feminists think regard-
ing Abrams’s central female characters?” I would respond that we should 
care if recognizing the problematic oppression of women is important. And 
it is. Two of the reasons I am a fan of Abrams’s work are that I appreciate his 
inclusion of strong and intelligent women who occupy nontraditional roles 
as central figures in his programs, and I think these characters represent a 
significant improvement over the stereotypical female television characters 
I experienced while growing up. We should care about what feminists think 
about the female central characters in Abrams’s television programs because 
feminists care about addressing morally problematic gender inequities—
inequities that have been consistently reinforced by most social structures 
and, for the most part, mirrored on television. If Abrams’s female central 
characters represent a change for the better, away from some of these prob-
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lematic and restrictive stereotypes, given that his shows are fairly popular 
and given that television can be very influential on young people’s views of 
the world, then we should care about what Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia are 
teaching young people about gender roles and gender inequities.
Character Critiques from the Three Waves of Feminism
I’ve chosen to discuss and critically evaluate Abrams’s female leads from the 
perspectives of three feminist theorists, each representative of one of the 
three periods, known as “waves,” of feminist thought. From first-wave femi-
nism we have Mary Wollstonecraft, whose most famous work, “A Vindica-
tion of the Rights of Women” (1792), argued for allowing women access to 
the educational, political, and economic spheres that had been traditionally 
reserved for men. As such, first-wave feminists worked mainly to achieve 
some educational, political, and economic freedoms for women. At the time 
Wollstonecraft wrote her essay, women had virtually no access to serious 
education, had no direct participation or voice in the political systems in 
Western countries, and typically lacked the right to own property or earn 
an income of their own. The success of the women’s suffrage movement in 
particular seemed to satisfy some of the basics of the demands for political 
freedoms made by these early feminists, resulting in a significant decrease 
in interest in feminist writings and activism for a few decades.
From what is described as second-wave feminism we see the seminal 
work of Simone de Beauvoir, especially The Second Sex (1949), which is 
typically credited as originating this wave of feminist theorizing. Beauvoir 
argues for more than women’s access to the educational, political, and eco-
nomic spheres. She argues that the denigration of women to the category 
of the “Other,” always the inferior of the male, is maintained through virtu-
ally all aspects of private life, relationships, and social life. Merely attaining 
some minimal access to the educational, political, and economic spheres is 
insufficient to offer any sort of real equality for women, as the oppression 
they face permeates much more than these spheres. It is instead central to 
the female gender and the forced gender roles themselves.
From the third wave of feminism we have bell hooks, whose writings 
include Ain’t I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism (1981) and Feminist 
Theory: From Margin to Center (1984). Hooks criticizes many “civil rights” 
and political movements, including mainstream (second-wave) feminism, 
for their failure to recognize the intersection of oppression from many 
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sources, especially race, poverty, and gender. She also points out the failure of 
mainstream feminism and other movements to recognize the unique plight 
of black women and women of color, instead exacerbating their plight in 
certain ways to advance the agenda of their programs, and their failure to 
recognize that the oppression of women is not singular or shared in the same 
way by all women. Hooks offers persuasive arguments against the exclusion 
of men from the struggle for equality between the genders in which feminist 
thinkers engage, an exclusion she sees in contemporary feminism.
So what would these feminists think of Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia? One 
of the most significant contributions Mary Wollstonecraft offers is her cri-
tique of “sensibilities” as the cornerstone of women’s understanding. During 
her time, and continuing to a lesser extent today, women were encouraged 
to “follow their hearts” rather than their heads—not surprising since the 
prevailing wisdom of the day was that women were not fully possessed of 
rational capacities like men and thus needn’t be educated to make decisions 
like men. In this respect, Sydney and Olivia certainly seem to make largely 
rational and reasonable decisions. (Although a few of the rather outland-
ish pseudoscientific claims and bizarre medical procedures to which Olivia 
consents give me a bit of pause. But since a central premise of Fringe is the 
amalgam of some bizarre pseudoscience and some weird but real actual sci-
ence, and since it is the somewhat insane “mad” scientist Dr. Walter Bishop 
who proposes most of the crazy ideas, this aspect of Olivia’s personality seems 
both unavoidable and forgivable.) Sydney tends to follow her gut instincts at 
times, but this isn’t the same thing exactly as advocating “sensibilities” over 
reason as the guide for the feminine. Instead, cognitive psychologists tell us 
that many well-trained individuals often follow the rational path when they 
follow their gut instincts in situations where a rational and well-considered 
assessment of the situation isn’t possible. Sydney certainly finds herself in 
these scenarios quite frequently.
But what about Felicity? She changed her life plan based on a seem-
ingly spur-of-the-moment decision to follow a teenage crush off to college 
rather than to follow the path her parents chose and that she had previously 
accepted without questioning. This decision certainly seems to put her in 
the category of employing “sensibility” over reasoning. But we gradually 
find out that this seemingly irrational, following-her-heart decision was 
really the best thing for her in terms of developing as her own person, and 
so her decision for independence of sorts wasn’t quite based on sensibilities. 
Instead, the decision to eschew her parents’ plans for her was in many ways 
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a more traditionally masculine decision. But I admit that I wish in the end 
she had chosen Noel over Ben, as I think that would have been a cleaner 
break from her past and its well-meaning oppression. Choosing Ben in the 
end, the young man she “ran off to New York to follow,” seems to reinforce 
the sentimental “female” reasoning that Wollstonecraft spoke against.
First-wave feminists, however, also strove to attain access for women to 
the educational, political, and economic spheres, and all three of Abrams’s 
female characters pass this mark with flying colors. When Nina Sharp offers 
Olivia a job at Massive Dynamic for the first time, she remarks on the male-
dominated roles they both occupy and the significance of their presence in 
these roles. Olivia and Sydney make excellent role models from this perspec-
tive, as does Felicity, albeit to a lesser extent. But it might be argued that, in 
examining Felicity through the totality of Felicity’s four years in college, she 
develops from a more traditionally feminine eighteen-year-old to a more 
confident, worldly, and better-educated twenty-two-year-old, which in itself 
demonstrates a move toward a more positive role model for young women. 
Looking at the character’s progression through time and through college 
thus demonstrates the move toward a more positive female image from the 
standpoint of first-wave feminism.
How should we evaluate these three characters from the perspective of 
second-wave feminists like Simone de Beauvoir? Beauvoir offers compelling 
arguments that women are perpetually the “Other,” subject to the power, edu-
cation, and domination of men, and that the pervasiveness of the oppression 
of women isn’t relegated to just a few areas. Seen from this perspective, all 
three of Abrams’s female lead characters, especially Sydney and Olivia, seem 
to be good role models for demonstrating that women have abilities across 
the board that are the equal of men’s.2 Sydney sometimes demonstrates a need 
for the emotional stability and companionship of her friends, but this tradi-
tionally feminine neediness is balanced by her dedication to her profession 
and her obvious professional capabilities. As Felicity is more of a coming-
of-age story, we can again look at her character throughout her four years 
in college as opposed to early in the show, when she seems to exemplify in 
many ways the meek and weak “good girl” persona. She works through her 
feminine naiveté and weaknesses and comes out stronger on the other end. 
Despite some characteristics of Felicity and Sydney that portray weakness, 
the characters come out well on the other side and seem to have achieved 
the respect of friends and colleagues for their strength and courage. And 
perhaps this is a good thing for a feminist role model, as it demonstrates 
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that even if women start out at a disadvantage, they can overcome it and fill 
roles or choose professions typically reserved for men.
What can we say about our three Abrams heroines from the perspec-
tive of bell hooks? Many third-wave feminists, hooks included, focus on the 
exclusion of women of color and poor women from the feminist movement. 
Third-wave feminists often note that the goals of second-wave feminism are 
really the goals of white, middle- and upper-class women and that not only 
are women of color ignored but their concerns and interests are entirely 
excluded as mainstream feminism strives to demonstrate that the plight 
of the “woman oppressed” is universal. But the oppression faced by poor 
women of color is different and more pervasive than that faced by the white 
women who defined the second wave of feminism, hooks argues. Second-
wave feminists focused on women’s right to work and join the professions, 
for example, to escape unhappy and forced work at home, where they are 
excluded from true participation in social and political life and power. 
Third-wave feminists such as hooks contend that many women of color 
and poor women would fight for the opportunity to stay home with their 
children as a matter of choice—a choice they are denied by circumstances 
or poverty and a choice that is ignored by second-wave feminism. Rather 
than apply hooks’s critiques directly to Abrams’s heroines, it may suffice to 
say that Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia are all clearly white, educated, upper-
middle-class women who, although they seem in general to be good role 
models from the perspectives of first- and second-wave feminism, probably 
offer less in the way of being true role models who can be emulated by poor 
women or women of color. Even though there are a significant number of 
people of color in the three shows in question—for example, Phillip Bro-
yles, Olivia’s FBI boss, and junior agent Astrid Farnsworth from Fringe, as 
well as Felicity’s friend Elena and Sydney’s friend Francie—the three central 
female characters are obviously Anglo.
Pervasive Oppression and the “Maleness” of Self and Autonomy
One of the most significant contributions of feminism to philosophy, value 
theory, and many other academic disciplines is to draw attention to the 
importance of viewing theories, past events, and contemporary problems 
from different perspectives. A popular way to discuss the consideration of 
feminist critiques, or seeing theories or events from the perspective of femi-
nist theorizing, is to suggest that we consider a topic from a feminist stand-
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point or through a feminist “lens.” This same metaphor of using different 
“lenses” to view theories or events has surfaced in other sorts of theorizing 
as well. It has become popular to say that viewing a practice through the 
lens of race, class, or economics can reveal different aspects that might not 
have surfaced without the use of those perspectives. Using a somewhat over-
simplified example to illustrate, we can consider that forty-three different 
people have held the office of president of the United States. If we look at 
this situation through a feminist lens, we would surely notice that all forty-
three have been male. If we consider the same fact through the lenses of race, 
class, and economics we would note that all have been Anglo (except Presi-
dent Obama) and that most have hailed from rather specific and privileged 
educational, economic, and class backgrounds. As a further example of the 
lens metaphor, we can examine some common and seemingly innocuous 
practices in our culture, including male door-opening behavior; the typical 
restaurant waitstaff ’s offering of the check to the man at the table; the female 
titles of “Miss” and “Mrs.,” which express a woman’s marital status, in com-
parison to the singular male counterpart of “Mr.”; and so on. Such events 
and situations may be cultural in nature but viewing them through the lens 
of feminism can shed light on the inherent gender bias in these otherwise 
generally accepted practices.
I will utilize the lens metaphor here by considering the characters of 
Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia in light of two of the recurring and central themes 
in feminist theorizing. These are the recognition of the pervasive historical 
and current oppression of women that shapes and influences societies and 
individuals in both overt and subtle ways and the criticism of the traditional 
Western notions of self and autonomy as being gendered (that is, the impar-
tial, unconnected, and independent observer is a male ideal, many femi-
nist theorists argue). Again, we can use these two central themes as lenses 
through which to examine our three female characters. I’ll call the former 
the “oppression lens,” as it reveals how the systemic oppression of women 
can influence situations and events. I will call the latter the “interconnected-
ness lens,” as many contemporary feminist theorists suggest that people are 
interconnected in ways that cannot be transcended in the manner that the 
traditional independent male ideal of the self suggests.3 So what can these 
two lenses reveal about Felicity, Sydney, and Olivia?
Looking first through the “oppression lens,” we need to remember that 
second- and third-wave feminists argue convincingly that the oppression 
of one gender is considerably more far-reaching than merely their exclu-
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sion from the political, social, educational, and economic spheres (as the 
main goal of first-wave feminism was to gain inclusion for women in these 
spheres). In looking at Sydney, Felicity, and Olivia through the lens of sys-
temic oppression, the first thing I notice is that they are all survivors of sorts 
of some significant manipulation or deception. One of the most interest-
ing features of these three female characters is their “coming out the other 
end,” so to speak, after manipulation at the hands of patriarchy in one form 
or another.
Felicity’s choice of college, ostensibly to follow a man she hardly knows 
and has a crush on, is really a move away from her controlling parents’ 
(mostly her father’s) expectation that she will follow in her father’s path and 
become a physician. We find out early on that he seems to have even manip-
ulated the system a bit to guarantee her access to Stanford in premed. Her 
whole life seems to have been preplanned by her parents (from the “zygote” 
phase on, as Felicity tells us in the first season). Paternalistic manipulation, 
though perhaps loving, is still paternalistic manipulation. Through repeated 
attempts at bribery by her parents to get her “back on track,” she resists and 
remains in New York to find herself.
We can see Sydney’s manipulation at the hands of SD-6, her father, Jack 
Bristow, and Arvin Sloane as clear examples of oppression—examples of the 
male patriarchy dominating a woman’s psyche so completely that she never 
truly acts freely since the “self ” of a person so dominated cannot ever act 
freely. Conceived in this way, when Sydney finds out that she does not actu-
ally work for the CIA or the U.S. government but instead is part of a major 
power working against both, her situation appears somewhat analogous to 
that of a woman who at some point recognizes her oppression and sees for 
the first time the feminist point that the entire political and social system 
within which she has been raised has been indoctrinating her into the patri-
archy. When Sydney turns into a double agent and eventually brings about 
the downfall of the organization that has for so long held her captive, both 
literally and metaphorically speaking, through its lies and manipulation, 
she has in many ways broken free. But she is trained for, and is really quite 
good at, being a spy, and so she goes on in that line, thus trading one kind 
of oppression for another, but at least with her eyes now opened she seems 
to be able to “choose” her allies and allegiances a bit more freely.
Fringe begins with Olivia Dunham recognizing her own manipula-
tion at the hands of her lover and partner, John Scott, whom she kills in 
the pilot episode after she risks her life to save him and he then tries to kill 
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her. Throughout the show, Olivia is a driving force in many ways, rather 
than a follower. Unlike Felicity and Sydney, outside of her manipulation 
by her partner, the manipulation she faces repeatedly in the show is an all-
encompassing power struggle that isn’t as individualized a struggle as the 
other two characters’. But as with Felicity and Olivia, much of what hap-
pens centers on the choices Olivia makes. All three of these characters can 
tell us something interesting and useful when seen through the feminist 
lens of oppression.
Looking through the “interconnectedness lens” we can consider whether 
Sydney, Felicity, and Olivia make decisions through the traditional detached 
male, independent observer approach. (Interestingly, the Observers from 
Fringe seem to personify this separatist and impartial masculine role in 
many ways.) As before, we see Sydney and Olivia occupying more inde-
pendent roles, but interestingly, they do so with a strong support network. 
The three shows in question (Felicity and Alias more significantly) in many 
ways revolve around the choices made by the three female characters. Of 
course, the feminists who argue against adopting the “male” conception 
of the internal self and of “human” autonomy as an impartial and separate 
entity from the embodied and social creature might not see their choices as 
truly free, but I argue that the representation of women making intelligent 
choices that shape the world in meaningful ways is significant. And all three 
of these characters, Felicity and Sydney in particular, demonstrate that these 
decisions needn’t be made entirely from the independent, impartial, male 
standpoint but rather can be made while recognizing the interconnected-
ness that women often more clearly represent.
Sydney Bristow and Olivia Dunham represent strong feminist role models 
in terms of first- and second-wave feminism. Examining Felicity Porter as a 
character across her four years in college (and the show) demonstrates that 
considering her coming-of-age tale as a whole makes her a better example of 
a role model than does examining many of the particular events in the show 
or her specific choices. None of the characters, however, really addresses the 
core of the issues on which third-wave feminists focus. In considering the 
two central feminist themes of pervasive oppression and the genderedness 
of the Western notion of autonomy, Abrams’s three female lead characters 
offer interesting pictures of different aspects of these concepts. In the end, 
Sydney and Olivia are much closer to the traditional male ideal of detached 
independence than Felicity, for good or for bad. I argue that Abrams has cre-
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ated three strong female characters and that feminist lessons can be learned 
in considering their suitability as female role models.
Notes
1. Ann E. Cudd and Robin O. Andreasen, Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthol-
ogy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 1.
2. This is not to argue that men and women should be treated equally in terms 
of sameness but rather that they should be treated equally in terms of opportunities 
afforded them.
3. Of course, not all feminist theorists who note the “maleness” of traditional 
Western notions of self and autonomy as independent and impartial suggest that these 
need to be replaced with the concept of an interconnected self that encompasses the 
feminist notion. Some instead suggest that traditional conceptions of the self and of 
autonomy are the correct concepts, even if rooted in a gendered and idealized “male-
ness.” The notion of self and the corresponding concept of autonomy are significant 
philosophically in numerous ways, the most compelling of which can be found in value 
theory and in political theory. The feminist attack on the genderedness of the impartial 
observer stance can be seen most significantly in the ethics of care approaches and in 
feminist epistemology, where feminist theorists suggest that we cannot be separate in 
order to make ethical decisions or to access knowledge in a truly impartial manner, as 






the end Is nIGh
Armageddon and the Meaning of Life Found through Death
Ashley Barkman
Nearly every influential philosophy or religion speculates on death, since 
life’s meaning often hinges on one’s perception of the afterlife. Arguably the 
four most influential philosophies spanning the East and West—Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Platonism, and Christianity—reveal that death is valuable as a 
means to grasp at a higher reality, to recognize that the real world is not 
this transient, material world of constant flux and decay. Facing imminent 
death awakens us to the weighty things of true worth. J. J. Abrams explores 
this theme in Armageddon. People live ordinary, mundane (we could almost 
say illusionary) lives until the threat of world extinction is discovered. Ordi-
nary people are forced to react to a “global killer” and although there is no 
emphasis on the next life per se, we do see that all the characters have ethi-
cal responses. Such an ethical response is vital to Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Platonism, and Christianity, for metaphysics is part and parcel with ethi-
cal response. In this chapter I will argue that the threat of global disaster 
is valuable as a means to enlightenment, and I will develop this argument 
by examining the perspectives of the four aforementioned philosophies 
on these matters, using examples from Armageddon to support this thesis.
Hinduism: The Imperishable Is the Real
The Hindu worldview perceives life as inextricably intertwined with 
suffering: for every existent pleasure, there is a corresponding pain.1 There 
is no resolution to this dynamic since the soul of every individual, shaped 
by karma, or the ethical choices made in life, is reincarnated to a higher or 
lower life form within the giant cycle of life and death, samsāra.2 In Arma-
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geddon, the working-class men who work on the oil platforms with Harry 
Stampers (Bruce Willis) are clearly not those who’ve reincarnated on the 
peak cycle of samsāra. They are the nonconformists, the rebels, outcasts, 
and criminals; their list of compensatory requests for their volunteer work 
reveals something about their simple and worldly nature: fifty-six park-
ing tickets taken care of, two women friends made American citizens (no 
questions asked), eight-track tapes brought back, an Emperor’s Package 
at Caesar’s Palace, the disclosure of who killed Kennedy, a summer in the 
Lincoln bedroom at the White House, and never to pay taxes again. Ever. 
And yet their journey will change their fate forever. A new cycle of life is to 
unfold, a new entry into samsāra.
This samsāric kind of fate wasn’t acceptable for the Hindus, who define 
happiness as the absence of suffering. Hindus believe that pain—which 
permanently resides in the samsāric cycle—must be obliterated in the end, 
much like the literal Texas-sized meteor headed for Earth in Armaged-
don. The destruction of the latter will prevent annihilation of Earth and its 
inhabitants. For the Hindus, believing that suffering arises out of ignorance, 
in particular, ignorance of reality, one must escape from the deception that 
one has an essential self or soul. Such intentional or unintentional ignorance 
fatefully ensnares the individual in perpetual reincarnation and therefore in 
the clutches of pain. Much like the ignorant person dwelling in the samsāric 
circle, Stampers’s men are initially unable to see the consequences of their 
actions or even grasp at the magnitude of the task at hand—what it means 
for them to volunteer to save the world! Stampers chooses to help because 
he trusts no one else to do it, and the remainder of them volunteer out of a 
filial loyalty to Stampers. Oscar Choi (Owen Wilson) is the exception; his 
bright-eyed enthusiasm indicates that he sees this act on the mythic level—
it’s “deep blue hero stuff.”
The enlightened individual knows reality, understanding the eternal 
truth, which “does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he sees everything as 
the Self, and obtains all.”3 Stampers’s final act of self-sacrifice (detonating the 
nuke manually) shows that he has reached this higher level of understand-
ing, for he gains himself by sacrificing himself; when he says to his daugh-
ter, “We win, Gracie!” he means just that: we—the unity of all reality—is 
revealed by the elimination of the narrow individualistic ego. Stampers 
obtains all by sacrificing all. Like the enlightened individual who, through 
meditation and spiritual exercise, comes to see that at his core he isn’t an 
individual self at all but rather is identical to Ātman—the ultimate self, or 
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totality of all souls—which is another word for Brahman, or ultimate reality, 
Stamper recognizes a greater reality: death in his case is victory, not defeat.
Furthermore, the unenlightened individual is trapped in the illusion of 
samsāra. But the truly happy individual is the one who achieves moksha, or 
freedom from all illusions and delusions—when he realizes that there is no 
self, there is only Self; there is no physical world or cycle of death and rebirth, 
there is only reality.4 Both the body and self/ego are illusionary and belief 
in these is the cause of all the woes of the world: “Fools follow the desires 
of the flesh and fall into the snare of all-encompassing death; but the wise, 
knowing the Self as eternal, seek not the things that pass away.”5
If a Hindu sees death as illusionary in its ultimate sense, then there is 
no fear of dying. The Hindu’s only concern is the realization of the Self. 
Consequently, the Hindu could take the prospect of death—for example, 
the prospect of meteorites destroying the ego and all that it holds on to—as 
a very good thing. It could be, as with Christianity, a chance to wake up to 
the larger concern. Moreover, acts of heroism, though again not valuable for 
their own sake, are still valuable as a means to eliminate the ego by focus-
ing on others, which Stampers and his men are able to do for the chance at 
saving Earth.
Buddhism: Wake Up to Reality
Siddhārtha Gautama, who founded Buddhism, was an Indian prince who 
renounced wealth and family to become an ascetic once he was given the 
Four Signs, which led him to see the reality of old age, sickness, death, and 
most importantly, the possibility of escaping from these inevitable forms 
of suffering.6 Recognizing that suffering threatened to diminish all earthly 
pleasures, the Buddha left everything behind in search of the means to escape 
from suffering. And perhaps this is the case with some of the men who 
volunteer with Stampers. Chick (Will Patton) seems to hold deep remorse 
about his failed relationship with the mother of his child and uses life away 
from society as a coping mechanism, and Rockhound (Steve Buscemi) is an 
academic genius who chooses the life of an oil driller because “the money’s 
good, the scenery changes and they let [him] use explosives.” Life on an oil 
platform is their form of escape from a society that they have difficulty fit-
ting into.
Siddhārtha studied and trained with many Indian philosophers and 
yogis, seeking the means to eliminate suffering permanently; however, the 
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best they could do was temporarily suspend suffering, not obliterate it alto-
gether. Still in search of an end to suffering, Siddhārtha accepted the Hindu 
doctrines of karma (“fruits of action”), samsāra (“the wheel of rebirth”), and 
most significantly, the idea that escape from samsāra and suffering is the 
highest good. When Siddhārtha ultimately achieved enlightenment and 
became the Buddha, he spoke of his own enlightenment as simply the inverse 
of Hindu enlightenment; while the Hindus spoke of enlightenment as the 
realization and experience of the self as Ātman, which is Brahman, or the 
culmination of all substantial things, the Buddha spoke of enlightenment 
as the realization of anātman, or “no-self ”—the denial of any concrete real-
ity—and the subsequent experience of the extinguishing of self, or nirvana, 
through such knowledge.
It’s clear that the Buddha, like the Hindus, defined happiness as the 
absence of suffering since he denied substantial reality, including a substan-
tial self and even a substantial law of karma; all of existence was unavoidably 
linked to pain and suffering. Eliminating all desires ultimately leads to an 
escape from samsāra and into nothingness.
In Buddhism death and dying are, as with Hinduism, illusionary. And, 
also like Hinduism, Buddhism rejects the concept of a substantial self or 
ego. However, while Hinduism says that the self is actually Self, or Ātman, 
Buddhism denies this. All is illusionary. But this doesn’t mean that the 
threat of death has no value. If we restrict our talk to reincarnation within 
samsāra, then it’s clear that moral actions will give us good karma, which, 
when accumulated, will eventually help us get to the point where we really 
understand the nature of existence and can thus achieve enlightenment. 
Moral actions might not be good in and of themselves, but they are certainly 
valuable means of self-eliminating, thus freeing us from a powerful barrier 
to our own happiness.
A great illustration is from the story of two Buddhist monks who saw 
a beautiful woman unable to cross a river. The older monk, without hesita-
tion, picked up the woman and carried her across and then the two monks 
continued on their way. A short while later the younger monk accused the 
older monk of focusing on worldly concerns and pleasures, to which the 
older monk replied, “I have left her behind, but you haven’t.” In Armaged-
don, when Harry Stamper sacrifices himself for his future son-in-law, he 
performs an action that is not egocentric—he leaves himself behind for 
another—and so moves one step closer, in the next life, to the realization 
that there is no ego. Eventually, if he keeps on performing these types of 
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actions in future lives, he may get to the point where he finally realizes that 
all things are illusionary and that taking a shotgun to A. J. for romancing 
his daughter, Grace (Liv Tyler), is quite unnecessary and inappropriate in 
the grand scheme of things.
Platonism: Gazing at Reality
Plato’s Republic attempts to define morality. In the first book, the sophist 
Thrasymachus argues that morality is simply a tool by which (immoral) 
rulers manipulate those below them, a means to an end and not something 
good in and of itself.7 In the second book, this belief that morality is a social 
construct is refined by Socrates’s friend, Glaucon. Glaucon asks, “Is moral-
ity good in all circumstances or the appearance of morality in all circum-
stances?”8 Glaucon agrees with the latter, maintaining that if people can act 
immorally without experiencing any negative effects, such as punishment or 
social instability, everyone would do so since immorality is more beneficial 
than morality. That is, the only reason people act morally is because they 
are afraid of the consequences of not doing so—not because they actually 
think morality is good in and of itself. To make his point, Glaucon tells the 
story of Gyges and his magical ring:
An ancestor of Gyges of Lydia, a shepherd by all accounts, was in 
the service of the Lydian ruler of the time, when a heavy rainstorm 
occurred and an earthquake cracked open the land to a certain 
extent, and a chasm appeared in the region where he was pasturing 
his flocks. He was fascinated by the sight, and went down into the 
chasm and saw there, among other artifacts, a bronze horse, which 
was hollow and had windows set in it; he stooped and looked in 
through the windows and saw a corpse inside, which seemed to be 
that of a giant. The corpse was naked, but had a golden ring on one 
finger; he took the ring off the finger and left. Now, the shepherds 
used to meet once a month to keep the king informed about his 
flocks, and our protagonist came to the meeting wearing the ring. 
He was sitting down among the others, and happened to twist the 
ring’s bezel in the direction of his body, towards the inner part of his 
hand. When he did this, he became invisible to his neighbors, and to 
his astonishment they talked about him as if he’d left. While he was 
fiddling about with the ring again, he turned the bezel outwards and 
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became visible. He thought about this and experimented to see if it 
was the ring which had this power; in this way he eventually found 
that turning the bezel inwards made him invisible and turning it 
outwards made him visible. As soon as he realized this, he arranged 
to be made one of the delegates to the king; once he was inside the 
palace, he seduced the king’s wife and with her help assaulted and 
killed the king, and so took possession of the throne.9
After telling this tale, Glaucon states, “Now suppose there were two such 
rings—one worn by our moral person, the other by the immoral person. 
There is no one, on this view, who has enough willpower to maintain his 
morality and find the strength of purpose to keep his hands off what doesn’t 
belong to him.”10
Socrates, however, disagrees with this belief that absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely. Throughout the remainder of the book, and in his other 
works as well, he attempts to show that morality is something to be valued 
for its own sake. He asserts that power will not corrupt the virtuous man, 
magic rings or not. We see this exemplified in Armageddon—none of the 
men show signs of megalomania (in fact, they seem like eager children dot-
ing on a parent’s response or waiting on gifts from Santa, rather than men 
who feel entitled to all that they’ve requested); none of their requests to the 
government seems unreasonable, and Stampers himself doesn’t seem to have 
particular requests for his service to the world.
Socrates defends his argument of the incorruptible man with a myth-
like story: The eternal world is the abode of all perfections—the source of 
beauty, rationality, knowledge, moral goodness, happiness, and countless 
other “forms.” In our previous lives (a notion shared with Hinduism and 
Buddhism) we were disembodied rational souls who enjoyed perfect hap-
piness insofar as we could contemplate and enjoy the vision of the world of 
forms. However, one day our souls, exercising imperfect control over our 
emotional faculties, looked away from the world of forms and fell far from it, 
deep into the physical world, until our souls were cloaked in matter, which 
caused in us a kind of trauma resulting in an almost complete loss of the 
memory our original home and happiness.11 Fortunately, innate within our 
souls is some knowledge of and longing for our true home and happiness. 
However, though we have some knowledge of our true home, complete 
knowledge of it and the subsequent knowledge of the way to return there have 
been obscured through the devastating effect of following our base desires 
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and emotions rather than our rational desires informed by our knowledge 
of true happiness. Consequently, the goal of this life is to pursue knowledge 
and wisdom—to become lovers of wisdom, philosophers—which in turn 
will give us a better idea about true happiness and how we can recover it.12
Because true happiness is linked to perfect rationality, which is con-
nected with goodness, the happy person is he who acts wisely and thus mor-
ally. The idea is that such a person first knows what is rational and good and 
then uses his desires to effectively apply these principles.13 Desires, in other 
words, are not bad in and of themselves but are bad only insofar as they 
dominate the moral dictates derived from reason. Furthermore, because our 
happiness resides in rational contemplation of the world of forms, includ-
ing the form of the good, morality must be good in and of itself: simply to 
contemplate and enjoy goodness (and the rest of the forms) constitutes our 
very happiness.
So even if the moral person had the power of the ring of Gyges, he 
wouldn’t use it for evil since his happiness resides in valuing morality for 
its own sake. And here we can see how death and dying or the threat of 
dying fits in: no one actually ever dies. Yes, the body will fade, but the soul, 
being immortal, lives on. And moreover, since moral action helps the soul 
to recover its true happiness, when the body is threatened with death, moral 
considerations always remain. Plato would laud Stampers, who selflessly 
gives his life for A. J. Frost (Ben Affleck) as well as for all humanity since by 
performing this act of general benevolence his soul keeps its “eye” on the 
true and beautiful.
Christianity: Since Everything Will Be Destroyed, What Kind of 
People Should You Be?
The impending global annihilation in Armageddon is a direct reference to 
the biblical end times: “basically,” as Dan Truman (Billy Bob Thornton) 
states, “the worst parts of the Bible.” Derived from a Hebrew term meaning 
“Mountain of Megiddo” and mentioned once in the Greek New Testament, 
Armageddon is often ascribed as the place of the apocalyptic battle between 
good and evil.14 If the title Armageddon alone doesn’t conjure up images of 
the four horsemen of the apocalypse, the opening narration by the man who 
played Moses should, as he closes his narration by referring to the ominous 
inevitability of earthly destruction: “It happened before. It’ll happen again. 
It’s just a question of when.”
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Unlike Hinduism, Buddhism, and Platonism, Christianity perceives 
the afterlife as the true and eternal reality while also embracing the present 
reality as good in and of itself: God created the heavens and the earth and 
declared them “good.” Though humanity is fallen because of sin, this does 
not mean that God’s creation is utterly depraved; the story of humanity is 
still unfolding. Beauty and truth are intrinsic parts of existence: “For now 
we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but 
then shall I know even as also I am known.”15 The future reality is far more 
concrete in its clarity and beauty; the present is but a shadow to the object 
of grandeur that is the future, the afterlife.
Whatever is good and true exists in the here and now but is fully unveiled 
in the hereafter. C. S. Lewis illustrates this in his novel The Magician’s Nephew: 
“‘Glory be!’ said the Cabby. ‘I’d ha’ been a better man all my life if I’d known 
there were things like this.’”16 You cannot deny the ever-present good in this 
present reality. The heroic acts of ordinary citizens who risk all for a small 
chance at saving humanity is but a microcosmic reflection of this good.
All eight of the selected men volunteer to save the world. Their sense of 
loyalty and trust toward Stampers runs deep—all accede because they see 
themselves as members of Stampers’s team. And whether out of loyalty or 
duty, these men reflect some of the good of mankind in their willingness 
to sacrifice their lives for the sake of saving humanity from annihilation. In 
this, at least, they are reflections of Christ.
Death: The Great Awakening
From the East to the West, humanity is unified by a singular response to the 
inescapable clutches of death. Death or impending death awakens us to the 
meaningful things in life—obliteration becomes illumination. The transient 
and superficial things that we hold dear show themselves unadorned and 
trivial in the face of death. Things that come into focus are relationships, 
forgiveness, love, and all things that fall under the category of virtue—the 
things of the soul and not those of the illusionary or trivial realm. Hindu-
ism, Buddhism, Platonism, and Christianity all emphasize the importance 
of recognizing true reality. This life is but a journey to a destination of a 
greater reality, an entry into an enduring world more awake than our own. 
Armageddon expounds some of the truths relayed by the aforementioned 
philosophies. It demonstrates the gravity of death and how ordinary indi-
viduals act in the face of impending earthly doom. In the face of death, Harry 
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Stampers’s crew—who’ve often chosen unethical paths in the past—choose 
to act morally and ethically as they see beyond the illusionary world and 
attain a glimpse of the enduring one.
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York: HarperOne, 2009); Warren Matthews, World Religions (Florence, KY: Cengage 
Learning, 2010).
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pain.
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the fear of bones
On the Dread of Space and Death
Jerry S. Piven and Jeffrey E. Stephenson
Angels and ministers of grace, defend us!
—Leonard H. McCoy (also Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.4)
In J. J. Abrams’s masterful revisioning of Star Trek, an unobtrusive, seem-
ingly inconsequential dialogue between James T. Kirk and Dr. Leonard 
McCoy reveals some of the most profound, existential, driving emotions 
of the quest to explore space, as well as the passion we viewers have for the 
show and films. Actually, while this dialogue seems to have been more of an 
homage interpolated to please Star Trek fans who have known and loved the 
cantankerous, irascible, incredulous, irritable ejaculations of Dr. McCoy, the 
content of his unexpected tirade has interesting parallels with arguably one 
of the most frightening existential explorations in the history of Western 
philosophy, Blaise Pascal’s (1623–1662) Pensées.1 Both encapsulate the very 
human terror about mortality. However, whereas Pascal turns desperately to 
religion, in Star Trek the fear gives rise to science, medicine, and the ethic 
that life is precious. Dread can give birth to antithetical existential positions, 
and what may seem an insignificant homage in this film may actually be a 
fascinating encapsulation of a ubiquitous existential struggle.2
Throughout the Star Trek corpus, McCoy is always the emotional and 
compassionate alternative to Spock’s dispassion and logic. McCoy often 
complains angrily about the lives lost by making so many calculated deci-
sions, expresses outrage at the ease with which casualties can be sacrificed, 
and reminds Kirk and Spock that they are dealing with human beings, not 
expendable machines. McCoy is the irrationalist, the one who values life over 
politics and military strategems, the one who calls Spock a “green-blooded 
bast . . . Vulcan” when logic so callously ignores the human element.
72 Jerry S. Piven and Jeffrey E. Stephenson
In the 2009 Star Trek film, Abrams is delightfully true to the character 
developed in the original Star Trek television series and movies. McCoy’s 
temperament and considered views have hardly changed, but in a few brief 
lines Abrams’s film captures what may be most existentially significant in 
the entire Star Trek saga. Consider this brief exchange between Kirk and 
McCoy as they prepare to take flight:
McCoy: I may throw up on you.
Kirk: I think these things are pretty safe.
McCoy: Don’t pander to me, kid. One tiny crack in the hull and our 
blood boils in thirteen seconds. A solar flare might crop up and 
cook us in our seats. And wait till you’re sitting pretty with a case 
of Andorian shingles. See if you’re so relaxed when your eyeballs 
are bleeding. Space is disease and danger, wrapped in darkness 
and silence.
We can find McCoy’s neurotic angst, anger, and cantankerousness amusing 
or endearing (or even annoying at times), but his unguarded, impassioned 
feelings reveal a very human reaction to absurdity, madness, injustice, suf-
fering, and the myriad terrors that we try so hard to avoid. Many of us 
prefer the way Spock can control and master his emotions. Until this film, 
Spock was the character who (except for a few dramatic sexual meltdowns 
and attempts to murder his captain) exuded aplomb in the face of incipi-
ent danger, panic, horror, rage, and heartbreak. We could identify with his 
impenetrability, his utter control of himself, and his ability to be invulnerable 
where we might find ourselves emotionally defenseless.3 Spock is the fan-
tasy of emotional invulnerability that appeals to vulnerable people ashamed 
of our frailties. We also identify with the struggle to control those feelings, 
with that inner tumult, and Abrams provides us with a Spock who suffers 
from deeply human pains and conflicts.
But McCoy is ever exposed, livid, and lacks that enviable capacity to 
mask or conquer his panic. As much as we would like to have a Vulcanic mas-
tery of our fears, needs, and vulnerabilities, we more unnervingly resemble 
McCoy. Real human beings who emulate this mode of Vulcan dispassion and 
utter control are often terrified of their emotionality and vulnerability and 
thus adopt the pose of the coldly intellectual, rational, super-sane person. It 
is the all too human shame of feeling that vulnerable and exposed that impels 
some people to broadcast this posture; but withal, it is that mask that draws 
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attention to the embarrassing vulnerability they are trying to hide. Interest-
ingly, Spock can also be seen to represent one kind of existential resolution 
to the dread of human frailty, where people would rather hide and stifle, 
even punish their own emotions, than suffer the pain of humiliating needi-
ness, embarrassment, weakness, loss, rejection, and imperfection.4 In some 
cases this manifests as schizoid withdrawal, protection from being harmed, 
suffocated, or exposed, and sometimes this detachment resolves into the 
familiar way some intellectuals can become unemotional, cold, and even 
disdainful, revealing rage over their vulnerabilities and failings. In psycho-
analytic parlance, intellectualization can be a rigid defense.5
Contrast this with McCoy, the unadorned face of our existential panic 
and vulnerability. This is why he is so important as the reminder of what 
we really are, or at least what we recognize as our natural responses and the 
emotional turmoil in which these responses are rooted. It is also emblematic 
of the existential angst that makes us human: the dread of death, nonexis-
tence, anticipating our inescapable demise, putrefying into a worm-ridden 
corpse and oozing stench. As Shakespeare lamented, “Shall worms, inheri-
tors of this excess / Eat up thy charge? Is this thy body’s end?”6
Contemplation as a Preparation for Death
McCoy has obviously thought about these things. He is old enough to have 
contemplated beginnings and endings and to have experienced enough 
not to be overly enthusiastic about such grand enterprises as space travel 
and meeting creatures from other planets. Philosophers from Socrates to 
Montaigne maintained that contemplation was a preparation for death. 
As Ernest Becker wrote, “To the self-reflexive animal, death is an absurd 
injustice, which thousands of years and unnumbered systems of thought 
have labored to explain.”7 Becker elsewhere wrote that the fear of death 
haunts the human animal like nothing else: “Everything that man does in 
his symbolic world is an attempt to deny and overcome his grotesque fate. 
He literally drives himself into a blind obliviousness with social games, psy-
chological tricks, personal preoccupations so far removed from the reality 
of his situation that they are forms of madness—agreed madness, shared 
madness, disguised and dignified madness, but madness all the same.”8 The 
great Leo Tolstoy asked in bleak desolation, “Is there any meaning in my 
life that will not be destroyed by my inevitably approaching death?”9 And 
Keiji Nishitani, philosopher of the Kyoto school of Zen, limned, “When one 
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comes face to face with death, the existence of self—one’s ‘self-existence’—
stands out clearly in relief against the backdrop of nihility. Questions crowd 
in upon one: Why have I been alive? Where did I come from and where 
am I going? A void appears here that nothing in the world can fill; a gap-
ing abyss opens up at the very ground on which one stands. In the face of 
this abyss, not one of all the things that had made up the stuff of life until 
then is of any use.”10 These reflective quotes not only capture some of what 
McCoy is implicitly communicating to Kirk as they prepare to take off but 
also are clearly reminiscent of what Pascal intends to communicate in Pen-
sées. Consider the following: “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces 
terrifies me. . . . I see nothing but infinities on all sides, enclosing me like 
an atom, or a shadow that lasts for only a moment and does not return. . . . 
The last act is bloody, however wonderful the rest of the play. At the end, 
earth is thrown upon the head, and that is the last of it. . . . I look in every 
direction, and everywhere I see only darkness.”11 Death is the worm at the 
core of our existence, the irrevocable fate that we try to deny, reject, ignore, 
dissociate, and obliterate through myriad distractions, ambitions, achieve-
ments, obsessions, and doctrines. The despair expressed by McCoy is the 
despair not of the depressed, but of the enlightened.
Existential dread is only exacerbated by leaving the planet and hurtling 
into nothingness. As Pascal himself states, “The eternal silence of these infi-
nite spaces frightens me.” As McCoy’s litany implies, leaving the enwombed 
safety of mother earth is physical and emotional departure from known, 
stable, predictable, orderly, comforting existence where one has nominal 
control over one’s life, moving into the unknown, unstable, unpredictable, 
chaotic, hazardous infinity of caliginous space, where an anomalous hull 
breach, dilithium flaw, or antimatter explosion can hurl one into silent death. 
(Whether one really will putrefy in the vacuum of space hardly matters.) 
And there be monsters too. Not just voluptuous verdant women. Space is 
teeming with all manner of malicious predators, porcine assassins, doomsday 
machines, corrupt apocalyptic probes, gargantuan viruses, honey-scented 
blood-sucking smog, salt-sucking succubi, homicidal brain-bonking infants, 
and Klingon bastards. (For the psychologist viewing Star Trek, it may be 
profoundly beguiling how the crew does not suffer PTSD symptoms, if not 
paranoid psychosis, after being assaulted by hideous space fiends every 
episode.) McCoy was entirely prescient in saying that “space is disease and 
danger wrapped in darkness.”
Some may argue that we don’t fear death, or even that philosophy has 
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made us realize that we don’t know death, have never experienced it, and 
never will (because we will be dead), and thus need not fear it. Socrates cer-
tainly tried to make the case for approaching death with a more humble, 
less fearful attitude, as recounted by Plato.12 It would surely be an exag-
geration to claim that we are all timorous puddles of existential malaise or 
that the idea of death causes us so much panic every second that we are in 
imminent danger of nervous deliquescence. The profound subtlety of the 
philosophers just quoted is that they are describing the despair that lurks 
beneath our oblivion, the ways we flee from thoughts that terrify us, quash, 
reject, or repress our fears, invest in intellectual defenses, discover causes 
or ideas to war against, covet wealth or celebrity, or immerse ourselves in 
beliefs that offer consoling postmortem paradises, all pretending that they 
are not flights from excruciating fears of transience, annihilation, ignoble 
decomposition, and passing into nothing. As Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
aver, we hurl ourselves into oblivion, conformity, and benumbed uncon-
sciousness, refusing to live authentically, rejecting awareness in favor of an 
attenuated, somnambulistic existence, not quite alive but delivered from the 
despair and angst of conscious awareness.
For Pascal, and for countless others, existential despair is resolved by 
hurling oneself into faith. One can obliterate the crushing dread of infin-
ity by merging with God and the euphoric idea of basking in his love, eter-
nally sequestered from pain, aloneness, dread, and decay in heaven. Indeed, 
according to philosophers such as Lucretius, Cicero, Hume, and others, the 
dread of death invented the gods. For Schopenhauer, the terror of death 
inspires religion and metaphysics, and for Freud (whose ideas on death are 
variegated and inconsistent), the fear of death inspires myths of paradisiacal 
afterlives and the illusion (or even delusion) of a benevolent parental God.13 
The existential resolution is toward soothing fantasies. Most recently, Richard 
Dawkins has echoed this analysis by writing of the God delusion, the literal 
belief in ideas for which there is no reasonable evidence but that neverthe-
less inspire, console, and stupefy those languishing in existential despair.
Oblivion or Delusion
This is precisely the point where Star Trek offers an existential choice beyond 
oblivion or delusion. The idea of a vessel departing into the unknown is 
simultaneously a metaphor for the psychological departure from enwombed 
safety, as mentioned previously, as well as an approach to life that seeks to 
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explore the unknown, instead of filling in the empty spaces with deliria about 
God and heaven. For when it comes to the darkness of infinity, one can trawl 
figments of the imagination into those epistemic chasms like silicon into a 
wounded Horta, but such theistic fancies must remain only figments, pup-
pets, and fairies. This is why Melville could say that trying to understand 
God would be like a scallop trying to fathom the sun from the bottom of 
the ocean. Pascal can wager everything in the universe on his faith, but a 
fool and his quatloos are soon parted, from reality at least.
Pascal refers to human imagination as the “mistress of error and falsity.” 
Surely the flight from encountering the real world in favor of imaginative 
figments is not only epistemically unjustifiable, it closes one off from all 
the joys and discoveries of reality. As a ship of exploration and not military 
conquest, the Enterprise sets out to discover the unknown in space scientifi-
cally. As we all remember, its mission is to explore strange new worlds, to 
seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no one has gone 
before. Science and religion are two antithetical modes of resolving existen-
tial desire, anxiety, and dread. The yearning to comprehend the unknown can 
inspire creative imagination, ingenious problem solving, and wish-fulfilling, 
terror-mollifying fantasies.
What is science? Among other things, it is the refusal to believe on the 
basis of hope, as C. P. Snow says. It is exploration that seeks comprehensive 
explanation and drops ideas that are unsupported. Science is methodical 
and unending examination, an epistemological enterprise that continually 
questions its own theories and findings and rejects hypotheses when further 
evidence provides more robust answers. In contrast, religious faith projects 
answers into an evidential vacuum, defends those ideas vociferously regard-
less of robust evidence to the contrary, and regards the possibility of thinking 
differently as some kind of divine test, a sign of wavering, sin, apostasy, blas-
phemy, fall from grace, the work of the devil, or otherwise evil or opprobri-
ous threats to the sacred truth. Whereas science dissects and seeks to refute 
its own tenets, regardless of whether they make one feel anxious, alienated, 
loved, or comforted, faith rejects everything that contradicts it, ignoring or 
repudiating the available facts, using whatever ingenious legerdemain it can 
to ensure that its tenets are preserved and impervious.14
This isn’t meant to revile or caricature all forms of religion. Whereas 
some modes of religion can be ethically or psychologically transformative, 
using metaphor, meditation, ritual, and reflection to change the self, this 
article is focusing on the flight into literal faith and belief as an existential 
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resolution to terror and dread. Some would argue that the gods of Hinduism 
are metaphoric stepping-stones to deeper realization, as does Huston Smith. 
One may or may not describe Buddhism as a religion, but certain forms of 
this philosophy are directed at divesting the self of attachments that cause 
oneself and others pain and do not inculcate literalistic beliefs in salvation, 
hells, demons, and so forth. Certain forms of Christianity, such as negative 
theologies, refuse the diminution of God and reality that literalism entails. 
And yet for untold numbers of people, the Abrahamic faiths, and even 
Buddhism and Hinduism, are forms of salvation, deliverance from death, 
and obeisance to divine entities. If Pascal were imploring readers to devote 
themselves to a deeper understanding of life, or themselves, in the face of 
their own greed, gluttony, and destructiveness, that would be one thing. But 
Pascal admonishes people to move from terror to faith, not in humanity or 
love or humaneness, but into the comforting faith in God, taken literally. 
As Pascal himself put it, “The Author of these wonders understands them. 
None other can do so” because the beginnings and ends of things are “hope-
lessly hidden” from us as an “impenetrable secret.” And further, one of the 
final reasons for this is the possibility of going to hell if they don’t believe.15
What we see in the distinct reactions to existentialist angst expressed by 
Pascal and McCoy is a commitment to literalistic faith in a deity as existential 
flight from encountering those elements of (perceived) reality one dreads, 
and as such an avoidance of the manifold complexities, ideas, and experi-
ences of life, versus a more epistemologically humble and at the same time 
more robustly engaged commitment to comprehension of the complexity 
of life and existence. In other words, a kind of inauthentic escapism into 
the absolute as opposed to a less psychologically secure but more authentic 
exploration of contingency. Faith as defined by Pascal absconds from every-
thing that inspires terror and manifests itself as that Heideggerian closing 
of the intellect, emotions, and awareness, of all the variegated splendors 
of experience, living a submerged, somnolent life. As Jung phrased it, this 
kind of religion is a defense against the experience of God.16 For the liter-
alistic belief not only excludes the unknown outer world that is so dreadful 
and intimidating, distorting all perceptions and experience to conform to 
that theological vision but also repudiates all thoughts, realities, and sexual 
experiences that are forbidden, sinful, provocative, and precluded from that 
rigidly defined reality. It distorts the world, inoculates one against it, forces 
one to interpret everything according to its fantasies, condemns all man-
ner of other ideas and experiences, and further, disallows that discovery of 
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the inner self, and its complex feelings, that might tear someone away from 
the doctrine and faith into new discovery. Literalistic belief means defining 
reality rigidly and unalterably, excluding and rejecting, if not condemning, 
all that threatens its veracity.
Vehicles to Explore the Unknown
McCoy’s movement in the world embodies the existential attitude of the 
scientific explorer embracing the unknown as discovered, not invented. Not 
content with figments of the imagination, McCoy and his scientific ken use 
the imagination to create real vehicles to explore the real unknown. More 
than a method of inquiry about the world, it is an existential attitude toward 
oneself. It refuses pleasing answers and is willing to tolerate the uncertainty 
and despair of unknowing, the anxiety of having one’s truths shattered by new 
discovery, the terror of leaving safe answers and environs for the probable 
hazards of space. It is openness toward the alien and unknown. It embraces 
the unknown with anticipation and even some excitement (contra McCoy’s 
expressed opinions on the matter, and even the impenetrable Spock feels 
a deep curiosity about the unknown). Starfleet cadets can’t wait to get into 
space, and their imagination fuels their desire to encounter infinite pos-
sibility, whereas Pascal and his faithful crew dread the unknown, despair 
at infinity, and rush into the dreamland of a theological fantasy protecting 
them from the outer world like a level-five force field deflecting perilous 
reality missiles off its sheer, invisible surface.
McCoy is hardly joyous about infinity, space, and death. But this is why 
he is so heroic. He steps onto the shuttle anyway. He is a man of science and 
medicine, physic not mystic, and rather than confining himself to the com-
forts of the cathedral (or converting the cosmos), he braves the unknown, 
complaining vociferously as he may. Considering the real horrors of space 
(with the aforementioned monsters), his cacophony is entirely understandable 
and the crew’s insouciance rather perplexing. McCoy is incredulous at their 
joie de vivre, as they warp happily into a space inhabited by the unknown.
Star Trek emblematizes the existential resolution of exploration in an 
even deeper way. While the Enterprise explores space, the crew discover 
the depths of their humanity. They seek bonds with other races, as well as 
a community of people who embrace life and exchange ideas and cultural 
wisdom. It sounds nauseatingly idyllic, but it is a vision of learning from 
the other instead of repudiating the other. The ongoing voyages are nour-
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ishment for the intellect and the humane part of the self that seeks growth. 
And each encounter enriches the self and encourages self-reflection, reex-
amination of one’s values and perspective, and a perpetual deepening of 
the self through experience with alien others, along with the trials that test 
one’s morality, compassion, and commitment to preserving their lives and 
identities. When Abrams has the Enterprise struggle against the schismatic 
Romulans, for example, it is not merely yet another battle with evil villains 
(fun as this is), but if readers will pardon the hyperbole, a mythic struggle to 
forge human (and Vulcan) bonds, overcome fear, work through the frailties 
that have inhibited or sabotaged them throughout life, and break through 
those self-imposed boundaries that have prevented them from growing via 
mutual nourishing. Kirk and Spock become deeper, better people by strug-
gling through their own crippling conflicts and failings. As sappy as it sounds, 
they discover an I-Thou relationship, the ardent embrace of the other that 
dissolves individual alienation and leads to real psychological development 
and real knowledge. It is actual human gestation and discovery through the 
other, rather than Pascal’s flight from the unknown and feared alien into an 
unchangeable and rigid faith and an imaginary other, or the fanatical repu-
diation and destruction of the other.17
This leads to an insidious extension of the theological resolution to 
existential dread. Terror can lead one not only into rigid, dogmatic, liter-
alized belief. It can also lead one to fear and despise other ideologies and 
cultures, anything unknown or different that threatens the veracity of one’s 
protective conceptual armor. Fear and dread can inspire a flight into faith, 
but they can also inspire fanatical adherence to any self-soothing thought 
system, a metaphysics of psychological salvation and deliverance from the 
despair of annihilation and unknowing.18 The existential antithesis of the 
Star Trek ethic of embracing and protecting the other is the paranoid, hos-
tile, authoritarian repudiation of otherness and difference. This can mani-
fest itself as orthodoxy, fundamentalism, inquisition, or terrorism, where 
other ways of life are so abhorrent that, as Nietzsche says, unbelievers have 
no right even to exist, anywhere. Terror may lead to faith, but it also leads 
to sanctimony, hostility, and violence. Over the past few decades studies in 
terror management have proved comprehensively that reminders of death 
engender worldview defense and increased aggression toward those deemed 
different.19 There are a variety of motives for violence, but the terror of death 
fuels the urge to adhere rigidly to a protective worldview and incites hostility 
toward those who are different. As Gregory Zilboorg writes, sadism absorbs 
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the fear of death.20 Where fundamentalist religions demand adherence to 
belief, threaten people with hellfire and excommunication, or even initiate 
pogroms, inquisitions, witch hunts, holy wars, and terroristic violence, the 
existential position of the Star Trek ethos is preservation of the other and 
inward discovery.
Abrams knows this. The Romulans are predatory and remorseless, but 
they also lack the capacity to understand their own pain, relinquish their 
anger or blame, and deracinate their malicious fantasies about the imagined 
calumny of Spock and the Federation. In fact, Spock raced to save Romulus 
from disaster. He boarded the fastest ship to save a people who had spent 
centuries engaged in conquistadorial violence and terrorism against inno-
cent people and the Federation. Spock’s failure was not callous disregard for 
Romulan life or an act of malicious violence against them. This failure was 
nevertheless perceived that way. The miner Nero was aboard his ship in space 
and was spared the obliteration of Romulus. Having lost his wife with the 
destruction of the planet, Nero became “a particularly troubled Romulan.” 
He held Spock accountable anyway, and in his cold hatred, sought to tor-
ture Spock by destroying Vulcan. Contrary to all evidence, even to Spock’s 
repeated lamentations over the events, Nero’s rage refuses to permit even 
the possibility that Spock’s motives were honorable. What is so fascinating 
philosophically, psychologically, and politically is that Nero’s perceptions of 
the events don’t correspond with their actuality. Though he howls bitterly 
that he saw the events happen, here we have a parabolic example of how the 
act of observing or experiencing an event doesn’t mean one will intuit its 
reality: a seemingly obvious and banal notion, but one that seems so weirdly 
quiet when we discourse on history, current events, and political grievances.
An Intrepid and Painful Encounter with the Self
We often assume that our perceptions are lucid and rational representations 
of what really happened, but Abrams illustrates how utter conviction in one’s 
perceptions means nothing. They can still be imbued with the deformative 
contaminants of rage, grief, and all manner of unseen psychological detri-
tus that distort reality. Applied to history and political events, this means 
recognizing that accusation, blame, certainty, and ascription of evil may be 
no more rational or accurate than the conviction that African Americans 
were innately inferior, that women were secretly spell-casting witches (or 
just that they were sexually and intellectually demented), that Jews were 
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evil syphilitic vermin hiding in dark alleys waiting to contaminate pure 
Aryan women, that John Lennon was conspiring to bring down Nixon, or 
that every Muslim is an insane, ululating terrorist bent upon destroying 
America in a sacred, self-immolating apocalypse. On an individual level, this 
means acknowledging that the perceptions one takes for reality may also be 
distorted, that our own convictions of truth may be similarly imbued with 
unknown psychological shrapnel. Like Nero (even if not as enraged), we 
may also be a few crystals short of a full dilithium chamber, protest as we 
may because the thought of being irrational or crazy hurts our self-regard 
and calls our worldview into question.
Hence the existential position envisioned in Star Trek is not merely that 
of the scientist but that of the philosopher whose ethical mandate is deraci-
nation of one’s own detritus, conflicts, and pain through an intrepid and 
painful encounter with the self. Walter Davis defines deracination as “the 
process of actively reversing one’s psyche from within by eradicating every 
belief, value, and need that stands in the way of taking up one’s responsi-
bility to history.”21 One must be willing to dissect oneself and fathom the 
wounds and crises that distort perceptions and lead to suffering for the self 
and others. The encounter with the other requires such self-examination and 
vivisection, unless one is merely to perceive the other through the lenses of 
one’s own psychological baggage. Thus Nietzsche declares, “One must wrestle 
for truth every step of the way, one must abandon almost everything which 
otherwise our heart, which our love, our faith in life hangs on.”22 He further 
states, “Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived it, is a voluntary 
quest for even the most detested and notorious sides of existence.” Nietzsche 
is conflating truth about the self and the world, for indeed, our beliefs, our 
truth-warping fantasies about self and others, are psychologically crucial to 
us. Reality distortion is not merely human error or fallibility. It is often an 
existential avoidance of knowing oneself, one’s painful scars and conflicts. 
Unknowing the world appeases our own suffering but distorts what and 
whom we see, inhibits our own growth, and all too often inflicts suffering 
on others—friends, family, lovers, and “enemy” innocents—as recipients 
of our own displaced anguish. “How much truth can a spirit endure, how 
much truth does a spirit dare?”23
As Freud and Ricoeur say, the cosmos is psyche symbolized, displaced, 
and projected, often vengefully. No real discovery is possible when thought 
and perception are distorted to fit one’s own perverse fantasy about the 
universe, nor will one be open to the other. Without that excruciating self-
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deracination we succumb to the kinds of havoc, racism, sexism, speciesism, 
colonialism, imperialism, and genocide inflicted throughout history. Abrams 
shows us even in the confines of his film that such psychological detritus is 
self-consuming and that emergence from the encumbrance of such gravid 
distortions is necessary for individuation. We see Spock’s father guiding his 
aggrieved son through the pain of loss and all the wounds incurred by sadis-
tic Vulcan children and a society that coldly inflicts lacerating cruelty while 
pretending to be merely logical. Those injuries become the fault line of a 
volatile psyche ceaselessly tormented by the rage he feels toward the Vulcans 
who see his mother as contemptibly inferior and, perhaps, the catastrophic 
anxiety that his mother’s humanity might have impaired him at the core of 
his being.24 No matter how logical and scientific Spock becomes, he feels 
like a tormented child again when that wound is opened, as he confesses to 
his father after exploding in homicidal rage against Kirk, who might have 
been suffocated to death were it not for the admonishing voice of Sarek. 
Only when Spock really experiences the crisis of that loss and the conflicts 
over his mother’s humanity does he shift existentially from a wounded ves-
sel easily shattered by violent rage to a centered, more humane, brilliantly 
logical being who can finally encounter the mercurial passion and ingenu-
ity of Kirk, which were anathema before.
The Recesses of Human Anguish
Abrams’s vision of Kirk is similarly astute and complex. Kirk too needs to 
transcend his self-limiting conflicts, the losses and encumbrances that have 
impelled him to become a space-age James Dean who rebels against author-
ity, destroys property, swaggers around and seduces countless women in 
annoying self-adoration, induces hostility in others, invites beatings, and 
squanders his own life as a way of expressing anger and avoiding his own 
individuation. That is, until Captain Pike tempts Kirk into Starfleet.
The rebellious posture is a clumsy attempt to impress others with one’s 
individualism and cool disregard for social mores, but it actually broadcasts 
the need for attention, the anger and anxiety of a hapless child deprived of 
his father, who must always compare himself negatively to that heroic figure 
and mourn his absence while suffering the provincial tyranny of a pathetic 
man trying to fill the shoes of that deceased astronautical legend.
Kirk’s swagger is a performance, and an overcompensation, as is his 
hypersexuality. Though this gargantuan libido is also true to the celebrated 
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Kirk legend, Abrams locates those behaviors in the recesses of human 
anguish. The egotism, self-sabotage, and sexual voracity have a history. 
Shatner may have been overacting, but Kirk is acting out. His attitudes and 
impulses manifest the existential crisis of a person compulsively seeking 
sexual pleasure, seduction, and conquest as a way of masking and soothing 
his own losses and feelings of being unlovable. Kirk compulsively repeats 
the seduction that affirms he is loved, magically reverses the trenchant pain 
of feeling unloved, unlovable, and abandoned.
With the marvelous aplomb and compassion of Captain Pike, Kirk also 
has a benign parental influence that ushers him toward the uneasy and men-
acing task of emulating a heroic father. Here Kirk faces the dread of failing 
to measure up, of being a limpid failure.25 At the academy Kirk philanders 
and cheats. He reprograms the computer simulation to defeat the Kobayashi 
Maru. On board the Enterprise, he cannot accept hierarchical decisions that 
offend him and thus becomes so irate that the guards have to restrain him, 
after which he pummels them until rendered unconscious by a Vulcan neck 
pinch and tossed off the ship. The elder Spock is the final parental influence 
that, at long last, instills the notion that Kirk needs to embrace his young 
Vulcan nemesis, that rebellion and impulsiveness will not save human lives. 
Only with that elusive existential realization can Kirk begin the task of devel-
oping a mode of seriousness that the Star Trek ethos requires. It took only a 
severe beating, exile to a frozen planet, a near-death experience at the claws 
of a colossal ice-crustacean, and the wisdom of an archetypal sage.
What of Bones? When he first boards the shuttle he bellows about having 
aviaphobia, “the fear of dying in something that flies.” His existential state is 
captured by the brief bio he imparts to Kirk, saying that he was forced into 
Starfleet to pay his ex-wife alimony. All she left him was his bones. Abrams 
doesn’t merely give the genealogy of McCoy’s nom de scalpel, he provides 
an existential genealogy as well. McCoy likens himself to a denuded skeleton 
whose organs and tissues were savagely gnawed or ripped away by a vora-
cious witch. That is his Kafkaesque metamorphosis, his self-embodiment, 
an existential condition of flayed, eviscerated, victimized death. If Bones is 
denuded of flesh and humanity, forced into alimonial slave labor, he under-
standably wears a perpetual expression of exasperation. Bones remains a 
healer, however, rooted in the real and concerned with human affliction. If 
anything his pain has laid bare the fragility and evanescence of life, no longer 
honeyed over but now ravaged of illusions. To quote Charles Winquist, “An 
insistent sense of finitude . . . is the only credible sense of reality after serious 
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reflection on the experience of what it means to be human.”26 That shock of 
recognition, that all he has is his bones, renders life all the more precious, 
reminds him that it is fleeting and should not be squandered. Bones may live 
with the fear of dying in darkness and space, but he moves from despair to 
existential engagement with people and their suffering. He doesn’t flee from 
pain and despair into stupefaction, genuflection, or genocide.
Theologian and Terrorist
This existential and ethical position is a striking divergence from the theo-
logian or terrorist. Pascal responds to angst and despair by turning to God, 
even claiming that human reason is “futile.” His existential response to the 
dread of death is unequivocal abdication and deliverance of his own intel-
lectual judgment and autonomy to the manic fantasy of some imagined deity 
out there in the universe supposedly watching over him. This is the decision 
every theist makes when believing that one must abandon autonomy and 
turn meekly to a divine being (or priest, or text) for truth, morality, guid-
ance, or judgment. In that genuflection one acknowledges that one’s own 
attempts at reason are so futile and arrogant that one willingly sacrifices 
them at the altar and expects a fantasy to do one’s thinking (for oneself as 
well as others, which is even more ominous). Epistemological humility is one 
thing; refusing reason in favor of receiving commands and judgments from 
a divine figment is another. This is why the anthropologist Weston La Barre 
could call every fundamentalism an intellectual lobotomy. The irony is that 
all those divine judgments are projections anyway and reflect the existential 
crises and fantasies of the pious. Fundamentalists have forsaken indepen-
dent thought to receive commands from their own disgorged fantasies. At 
its most innocuous this means refusing to question and really assess that 
sacred reality or moral judgment, and at its most sinister, it means passing 
judgment on others, condemning or coercing them, or even slaughtering 
them under the auspices of a divine being whose desire and rage can only 
be their own.27
Unlike the existential position that seeks to understand the other and 
embrace the capacity to look inward, to examine the self and one’s own 
psyche, the terroristic position of Nero is so fanatically wedded to its fanta-
sies that it becomes devoid of the capacity to examine one’s own beliefs or 
relinquish one’s insidious dogmas and paranoid accusations. It is a position 
that is seduced by the malign pleasure of blame, condemnation, and ven-
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geance, a position that recoils violently from loss, dread, and despair. The 
Romulans envisioned by Abrams are not one-dimensional evildoers but 
those so desperate to flee the excruciating pain of death and bereavement, 
so on the brink of desolation, wretchedness, and abjection from their suf-
ferings, that they rage against others who are not actually to blame.
Nero abdicates reason and rationality to gratify his paranoid fantasy, 
and he becomes a genocidal monster. His use of the red matter to create a 
singularity that implodes planets is symbolic of his existential state of inner 
death, a cold vacuum and lifeless void. Like so many who inflict terroristic 
violence, Nero is obsessed with inflicting this soul-collapsed void on others, 
making them suffer the same torment and inner implosion he experienced, 
pulverizing them into icy death by forcing them to witness the collapse of 
a planet and experience his own extinction.28
Ultimately, Nero’s consuming hatred is far more important than the 
extinguished Romulans he claims to mourn, for even in the midst of being 
swallowed by death, he declares that he would rather watch Romulus die 
a thousand times than accept compassion from such loathsome enemies. 
And this may well be a poignant and astute parable of so many throughout 
history (and more recently) who murdered those who were not responsi-
ble, who evacuated and disgorged rage onto those who weren’t despicable 
enemies, who would rather inflict terror than experience their own human 
anguish and vulnerability.
Beyond terror, vengeance, and the escape from ourselves into fanatical 
fantasies, we may still feel dread with McCoy and choose to explore and heal 
instead. Throughout the Star Trek corpus the compassion and humanity of 
Bones never decay. However outraged or even tortured, Bones’s passion is 
human life, the safety of his friends, and the categorical imperative that no 
sapient being is expendable.
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do We aLL need to Get shot In 
the head?
Regarding Henry, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Ethical 
Transformation
Adam Barkman
Regarding Henry, J. J. Abrams’s first solo attempt at writing a screenplay, is one 
of the most underrated films of the nineties. Not only does it feature Harri-
son Ford at his best (which already makes it worth the price of admission), 
but also—more importantly—it has a clear, powerful storyline concerning 
one of the most important philosophical topics of all: ethical transforma-
tion. Consequently, what I’d like to do in this chapter is to examine ethical 
transformation—especially the ethical transformation of Henry Turner, 
Regarding Henry’s protagonist—vis-à-vis philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff ’s 
theory of justice. Ultimately my goal is to answer the question posed in this 
chapter’s title: Do we all need to get shot in the head (in order to become 
better, happier people)?
You Never Apologize
Henry Turner is a man who at the beginning of the movie seems to have it 
all: he’s a successful Manhattan attorney with a beautiful family and all the 
worldly goods one could hope for. If pleasure were the same as happiness, 
Henry would be a happy man indeed. However, they aren’t the same, and 
Henry isn’t happy.
According to Abrams’s screenplay, the chief source of Henry’s unhappi-
ness is his unethical behavior. Henry’s injustice extends to his wife, Sarah, 
whom he cheats on and to whom he “never apologizes”; his daughter, Rachel, 
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whom he neglects; and those on the opposite side of the legal bench, whose 
cases he distorts. While few will disagree that these are in fact instances of 
injustice, most can’t clearly articulate why. Thus, justice needs to be defined 
to get at the precise nature of Henry’s immorality and subsequent misery.
In Justice: Rights and Wrongs (2008) Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that 
justice is ultimately grounded in rights, wherein rights are normative social 
relationships or proper bonds between persons and things.1 People have 
rights to certain goods, and justice means rendering to each his, her, or its 
rights—treating each person or thing as he, she, or it ought to be treated.2 For 
instance, Sarah Turner has a right to the good of being apologized to when 
she has been wronged, and Henry acts unjustly when he denies her this.
We’ll notice from this that Wolterstorff thinks it’s better to approach 
justice from the point of the recipient (rights) than from the point of view 
of the agent (duties and obligations) since “if one thinks exclusively in terms 
of obligations, and if, furthermore, one thinks of guilt as guilt for violat-
ing the moral law rather than guilt for wronging the other, then the person 
who has been wronged falls entirely out of view.”3 This is a helpful observa-
tion (especially if we remember that he is not denying that there are obli-
gations and a moral law as well). Let’s say that after cheating on his wife, 
Henry felt bad about it, but let’s say that he felt bad because he violated the 
universal moral law that states that a person should, all things being equal, 
keep his promises (in this case, keep his marriage vows). While this sense 
of violating basic moral injunctions is extremely important, it’s incomplete; 
something more needs to be said. For the sake of argument, let’s agree with 
Wolterstorff that breaking the moral law by performing such acts as lying 
is to wrong God, who is the lawgiver behind the moral law and who has the 
right to be obeyed by his creatures. Yet even here if Henry were to ask only 
God for forgiveness, he would—if this were all there is to it—still be act-
ing imperfectly since he has wronged his wife and justice demands that her 
rights be respected and upheld as well.4 In other words, in order to be just 
Henry must somehow make things right with not only God (whose rights 
as the creator he has trampled on) but also his wife (whose right to have 
a faithful husband Henry has disregarded) and even, if we wished to push 
the case, his daughter (insofar as children have the right to be raised in a 
stable household).
While some may say this is all fine and well, others may want more 
clarification on the matter, namely, to know what kind of rights Henry has 
violated. Has he violated (leaving God aside for the moment) his wife’s and 
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his daughter’s socially conferred rights or natural rights? Socially conferred 
rights are rights that people have been given by society. For instance, my 
being free to give my students the grade they deserve has been conferred 
on me by my university. In contrast, natural rights are rights with which 
people are born. While all agree that there are socially conferred rights, not 
all agree that there are natural rights. Since I want to argue that Henry has 
violated the natural rights of his wife and his daughter, we need to see why 
there must be natural rights.
Wolterstorff argues for natural rights by distinguishing objective obli-
gations, which are obligations that hold in general, such “do not lie,” from 
subjective obligations, which are obligations attached to a subject or person, 
such “Henry should not lie to his wife.” Wolterstorff then argues that all who 
accept that there are objective obligations (he has nothing to say to those who 
don’t) will also accept that there are subjective obligations, since obligations 
aren’t given in a void. Following this, Wolterstorff introduces his “principle 
of correlatives,” which states that “if Y belongs to the sort of entity that can 
have rights, then X has an obligation towards Y to do or refrain from doing 
A if and only if Y has a right against X to X’s doing or refraining from doing 
A.”5 For instance, if Sarah is the sort of entity who can have rights (and pre-
sumably, as a human being, she is), then Henry has an obligation to refrain 
from lying to her if and only if Sarah has a right to Henry’s refraining from 
lying to her. What this means, of course, is that if Henry’s subjective obli-
gation not to lie to Sarah is natural, then the correlative subjective right—
Sarah’s right not to be lied to by Henry—is also natural.
So Henry Turner begins the movie as a man of the deepest kind of 
injustice—a man who doesn’t respect the natural rights of others, a man 
who doesn’t treat each person as he or she ought to be treated in the depths 
of his or her very nature. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen why this 
makes Henry miserable, which is to say it still remains to be seen how hap-
piness is connected to justice.
Starting from Scratch
One evening Henry runs out to a convenience store to buy some cigarettes 
but in the process interrupts a robbery, resulting in his getting shot. One 
bullet enters his chest, which causes internal bleeding, and another pierces 
his frontal lobe, which controls some rudimentary behavior. Combined, this 
causes anoxia or a lack of oxygen to the brain, resulting in brain damage. 
92 Adam Barkman
Henry survives but experiences total memory loss. However, with the help 
of his physical therapist, Bradley, and his family, Sarah and Rachel, Henry 
starts to recover physically. But that’s not all. Henry, we are told, is “in some 
ways . . . starting from scratch,” meaning that Henry’s having been shot in 
the head affords him the opportunity to look at ethical situations from a 
proper perspective and choose do to what is right. And this is what we see 
happen in three instances.
First, Henry starts to spend time with his daughter, which is to say that 
he respects her right to enjoy quality time with her father. Both Henry and 
Rachel, moreover, like spending time with each other, which suggests that 
there is some connection between happiness and justice. The final scene in 
the movie, when Henry essentially rescues Rachel from the boarding school 
she hates, says it all.
Second, Henry discovers that the malpractice suit he won in defending 
a crooked hospital against an elderly plaintiff is unjust since the plaintiff did 
in fact warn the hospital of the problem and so had a right to compensation. 
After turning his back on his own firm for the sake of justice, Henry is told 
by the plaintiff, “I like you much better now.”
And third, Henry is shocked to discover both that Sarah had cheated 
on him and that he had also cheated on her. Nevertheless, now free from 
the stranglehold of vice, Henry sees that such behavior is unjust and so 
apologizes to his wife, who reciprocates. This leads to a renewed marriage.
Abrams’s point in all this is to show that ethical transformation toward 
justice leads to happiness. Nevertheless, it’s not clear from Abrams’s screen-
play what exactly happiness is, nor whether the desire for happiness is prior 
to the desire for justice or whether the desire for justice is prior to the desire 
for happiness. Both of these questions need to be answered.
I Don’t Like Who I Was
Happiness is a difficult word to define, but the ancients weren’t so far off when 
they spoke of it as “flourishing.” A happy life was a “flourishing life”—a life 
wherein one becomes one’s true self and, at least in the case of Aristotle, 
actively enjoys certain physical or worldly pleasures as well. Because one’s 
true self is a rational soul, one is most one’s self when one acts rationally. 
And because reason teaches us that we ought to obey the moral law and cul-
tivate virtue, the happy person is he who is moral and just (plus, according 
to Aristotle, also enjoys certain pleasures of the body as well). Already on 
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this model it’s easy to see why Henry becomes happier as he becomes more 
just—why he speaks truly when he says, “I don’t like who I was.” Neverthe-
less, Wolterstorff thinks that such an account of happiness—even the Aris-
totelian account, which would make Henry’s renewed health and beautiful 
family genuine factors in his happiness—is incomplete.6 Why?
To begin with, rights are what philosophers call “states of affairs,” which 
in English grammar typically take the form of gerunds, such as “Sarah’s not 
being lied to” or “Rachel’s receiving quality time with her dad.” More spe-
cifically, rights are states of affairs of which a person is a constituent. For 
example, Sarah doesn’t have a right to the sun setting. But she may have a 
right of being free to watch the sun set. Additionally, not all states of affairs 
of which a person is a constituent are legitimate rights. For instance, Sarah 
doesn’t have the right of being happy. But she does have the right of being 
free to pursue, and of possessing a legitimate means to achieve, happiness.7
To go deeper, it needs to be stressed that rights are not purely individ-
ualistic. Consider Henry’s treatment of his wife. By cheating on and lying to 
her, Henry violates Sarah’s right of being told the truth and having a faith-
ful husband. Yet, as I suggested earlier, when Henry violates Sarah’s rights, 
their marriage becomes unstable. This instability in turn affects Rachel, who 
has the right of enjoying a stable family and respectable parents. Henry’s 
injustice toward one indirectly affects another. Truly no man is an island.
Wolterstorff, as I said, thinks the ancients’ understanding of happi-
ness is incomplete. We can now start to see why. When Henry was shot 
by the robber, the robber didn’t just violate Henry’s rights; he also violated 
the rights of Sarah and Rachel in that he deprived them of a husband and 
father and all that those offices entail. Sarah can’t be completely happy if 
her husband is injured by another. But that’s not all. When Henry’s lawyer 
friends slander him behind his back (that is, without Henry having any 
knowledge of it), Henry has been wronged (even if he hasn’t been hurt) 
since he has the right of not being slandered, period. Or again, if Henry 
and Sarah hadn’t reconciled, then they would have wronged their future 
(unborn) grandchildren, whose rights of having a stable extended family 
would have been violated.
Thus, because the ancient (so-called eudaimonian) conceptions of hap-
piness are strongly agent centered, they fail, or so Wolterstorff argues, to 
account for many of the recipient aspects of happiness.8 We should say, then, 
that happiness entails not only being a virtuous person—which is the most 
important aspect of happiness—and possessing certain worldly goods, such 
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as health, money, and so on, but also enjoying the goods to which one has a 
right, which is to say, being treated as one ought to be treated.
If all this is required in order to be happy, then who could ever be happy? 
It’s true we can’t speak of any person being perfectly happy since every per-
son has, at the very least, been slandered unapologetically once in his or her 
life.9 Nevertheless, we can state the obvious truth, namely, that the closer one 
comes to being perfect and enjoying the goods that constitute happiness, 
the happier he or she will become. Thus, since Henry manages to reform his 
character, he has achieved the most important aspect of happiness. Indeed, 
even though he suffers financial problems as a result of quitting his job at 
the law firm and endures ridicule by his former colleagues, Henry is still 
happier than when he was immoral but rich and well liked by his peers. In 
this way, getting shot in the head was a bad thing (a violation of his right of 
not being shot) but it resulted in a greater good: a more moral life.
On Buying Puppies
Before we can conclude, there remains an important question that has been 
raised but not answered: Is the desire for justice (the desire to treat each as 
he or she ought to be treated) prior to the desire for happiness (the desire to 
be a certain kind of person and enjoy the goods to which one has a right), 
or vice versa?
Those who say that the desire for justice should be prior often deem 
those who consider the desire for happiness prior to be somehow selfish or 
egotistical. Conversely, those who think the desire for happiness is prior often 
consider those who think the desire for justice prior to be cold, robotic, and 
frankly, inhuman.
Although Wolterstorff doesn’t equate selfishness and self-interest, he 
doesn’t provide a clear solution to this problem. Thus I suggest we take a 
page from C. S. Lewis, who develops the critical distinction between self-
ishness and self-interest.
For Lewis, selfishness is a form of injustice: it’s an instance of taking 
or desiring to take what doesn’t belong to oneself, which, of course, entails 
violating the rights of others. Nonetheless, it doesn’t follow from this that 
unselfishness is a virtue: simply to deny oneself goods and pleasures that one 
may have a legitimate, natural right to is good only in certain circumstances, 
such as if Henry gave up his right to eat his lunch so that Rachel could eat; 
such unselfishness is not good in all circumstances. To defend one’s rights, 
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to desire that one’s rights be respected and thus to desire one’s own happi-
ness, is hardly selfish or unjust in and of itself.10 For instance, if Sarah mar-
ried Henry simply for his money, we could say that Sarah would be selfish 
or unjust, since she wouldn’t be treating Henry as he ought to be treated, 
namely, as an entity that is more than a means to money. However, it’s hardly 
selfish or unjust of Sarah to make financial stability one of the considera-
tions in her decision to marry Henry, since it’s proper that a husband take 
care of his wife and having money is one of the ways he can achieve this.
Because happiness has to do with both what one does (especially the 
performance of one’s obligations to develop a virtuous character) and what 
one receives (especially, though not exclusively, having one’s rights safe-
guarded), it seems odd to speak about the desire for justice and the desire 
for one’s own happiness as being totally different things. The desire for jus-
tice is part of the desire for happiness. For example, Henry is shown to have 
a desire to make Rachel happy, a desire that ultimately leads him to buy her 
a puppy. However, this desire to treat Rachel justly—that is, to respect her 
right of being loved by her father—is, of course, on one level connected with 
Henry’s own desire to be happy, since he can’t be happy without being just. 
My sense is that language is the problem here. If we say Henry shows love 
to his daughter out of a sense of justice, then we applaud; but if we say he 
does it out of a desire for his own happiness, we pause. This, however, just 
goes to show that we still falsely think that to desire our own happiness is 
always selfish, rather than properly self-interested. Perhaps this is unavoid-
able. More than a few of the greatest philosophers and religious leaders see 
man in a broken condition such that man, naturally unnaturally so to speak, 
desires not proper self-interest (and hence justice) but rather selfishness (and 
hence injustice). Perhaps in this kind of situation Abrams is wise, for by not 
saying what desire motivates Henry’s acts of justice, he can show everyone 
the obvious and all-important truth, which is that justice and happiness are 
inextricably linked.
It Was a Test . . . I Had to Find My Life
After discovering that his wife cheated on him, Henry, in a moment of con-
fusion, seeks out the company of his physical therapist, Bradley, who tells 
Henry a story of how he, Bradley, had his dreams of being a football player 
crushed by a bad knee injury. He goes on to tell Henry how he used this bad 
situation for ethical transformation, saying, “It was a test . . . I had to find my 
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life.” This, we know, Bradley did, for he became a brilliant physical therapist 
and, by doing his job justly (that is, well), he also found a lot of happiness. 
Bradley’s story, of course, foreshadows Henry’s own story of ethical trans-
formation—of being shot in the head, only to become a better man, which 
is also to say a happier man, for it.
Now at last we come to the question asked at the beginning of this chap-
ter: Do we all need to get shot in the head (in order to become better, hap-
pier people)? In a perfect world—in a world where love of justice is strong 
enough—then the answer is certainly no. But we don’t live in such a world; 
in our broken world, where legitimate self-interest usually becomes selfish-
ness, most of us would probably do well to be shot, as Henry was, in the head.
Notes
1. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 4.
2. Wolterstorff traces a version of this definition all the way back to the Old Testa-
ment, though such a definition also has its roots in Aristotle’s proportionate equality 
and, most clearly, in Augustine, who writes, “The righteous man is the man who values 
things as their true worth; he has ordered love, which prevents him from loving what 
is not to be loved, or not loving what is to be loved, from preferring what ought to be 
loved less from loving equally what ought to be loved either less or more, or from loving 
either less or more what ought to be loved equally.” Augustine, On Christian Teaching, 
trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27.28. For both Augustine 
and Wolterstorff, God is the ground of ontology and axiology; it is God who created 
all things and his creational laws—the universal moral law being just one instance that 
reveals to the righteous man or the man of prudence how each thing ought to be treated.
3. Wolterstorff, Justice, 9. This is partly what C. S. Lewis means when he says of the 
universal moral law, “Only a Person can forgive.” C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Lon-
don: HarperCollins, 1999), 339.
4. Although he doesn’t discuss it, Wolterstorff, as a Christian, must somehow 
deal with the dynamics of rights being violated by one person yet being made right by 
another. For instance, even if Christianity is correct in maintaining that God, in Jesus, 
can forgive people for violating his right to be obeyed, what can be said of the person 
who has been wronged but never made right by the person who has wronged him? Is 
injustice thus ever enduring? I expect that Wolterstorff would like to say that God rights 
the wrongs that have been inflicted. This may work if we think of it in this way: if per-
son A stole ten dollars from person B and person C gave person B the money to make 
up for the loss, person B’s wrongs seem to have been made right. However, there is still 
a sense—perhaps an unreasonable sense—in which person B is still in a state of being 
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wronged. Perhaps this sense is that the emotional damage hasn’t been made right; there 
is a sense that person B is owed something, namely, an apology from person A. Again, 
Wolterstorff could say that person C’s surplus of kindness is both financial and emo-
tional and hence in both ways it makes up for the deficiency felt at the hands of person 
A. This seems to be a tolerable solution to the problem, but obviously even if there is a 
God who is willing to forgive all things and right all wrongs in the next life, this hardly 
changes the fact that people in this life ought to have their rights respected by all people.
5. Wolterstorff, Justice, 34.
6. Ibid., 136.
7. See C. S. Lewis, “We Have No ‘Right to Happiness,’” in C. S. Lewis Essay Collection 
and Other Short Pieces, ed. Lesley Walmsley (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 388–92.
8. Wolterstorff, Justice, 176.
9. Moreover, if Wolterstorff is right, then it’s not clear to me how he would be able 
to maintain that God is the perfection of happiness, since surely God has been wronged 
many times. I suppose he could argue that because God is simple and impassable, God 
can’t be affected by others. But this, then, would mean that God couldn’t have a real 
relationship with his creatures: He could relate to them only via his ideas of them. While 
it’s not the purpose of this chapter, I’d suggest that the problem Wolterstorff ’s position 
raises is one that is best left unresolved. It’s best to take a page from the sceptics who 
would suggest temporary agnosticism in this matter since it seems equally intolerable 
to deny both that rights and material objects are goods and that God doesn’t actually 
relate to his creatures in a genuine way.






frInGe and “If sCIenCe Can do It, 
then sCIenCe ouGht to do It”
Phil Smolenski and Charlene Elsby
Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal. 
—Albert Einstein
For the sake of one life, you will destroy the world. Some things are not 
ours to tamper with. Some things are God’s.
—Carla Warren (Walter’s assistant in 1985)
This chapter will focus on the broadening range of what is ethically signifi-
cant when we take into account advancements in science. On Fringe, we 
encounter scientific and technological advancements that range from the 
plausible to the impossible, at least as we gaze upon it from within our cur-
rent context. The particular examples we see on the show do resemble our 
own advancements to the extent that they present ethical dilemmas where 
technology is concerned, for while our technologies might be different, the 
constant development of new technology broadens the range of ethically 
significant action in both the real and fictional universes.
The first part of this chapter will provide a discussion of the benefits of 
technological advance and the cautiously optimistic attitude we must take 
when producing technology that, depending on how it is used, could be 
detrimental to society as a whole. Using Hans Jonas’s imperative of respon-
sibility, we will examine the desirability of restraining science, in effect 
discouraging certain types of innovation. The imperative of responsibility 
teaches us that we should act in ways conducive to continuing human life 
and not destructive to it. Jonas’s dual imperatives should teach us to call 
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into question the familiar scientific credo of “if science can do it, then sci-
ence ought to do it.”
The second part of this chapter will examine our own ethical tenden-
cies when confronted with the situations we meet in the show, taking into 
account our relationship to the fictional characters with whom we have 
become familiar over several years and assuming that we would react to 
the fictional situation in the same way we would react to a similar ethical 
scenario in the real world. Thus in the second section we consider how our 
experience of the ethical dilemmas on Fringe can give us an indication of 
what we would do, whereas the first section focuses on what we should do. 
We conclude that, in facing our natural tendency not always to use tech-
nology to the benefit of all, the restrictions suggested in the chapter’s first 
section are justified.
Science Should vs. Science Can
We want to cast a cautious gaze on the role that science and technological 
progress play on Fringe by looking at their effects on society through an 
ethical lens. We will begin with a discussion of the benefits that technology 
can bring us, because there is a strong sense of optimism within our society 
when it comes to technological progress and the good that may come as a 
result. New technologies expand the realm of what is possible and have the 
potential to enhance our lives in innumerable ways. But alongside these 
developments, and our desire to push the limits of what is possible, come 
developments that should rouse strong feelings of suspicion and apprehen-
sion. Here we shall discuss the desirability of putting constraints on science 
in order to temper our appetite for innovation and discovery in an attempt 
to articulate Han Jonas’s imperative of responsibility through his ethics of 
responsibility.
Then we will shift the discussion toward two specific examples from 
Fringe: Massive Dynamic’s development of nanotechnology and the Observ-
ers’ use of advanced technologies to save their society from planetary 
destruction. While both cases may initially seem far removed from our own 
scientific realities, properly relegating such developments to the realm of 
science fiction, our aim is to draw an analogy between the fanciful world 
depicted on Fringe with our own prospects in the not so distant future. The 
imperative of responsibility teaches us two things: to act in ways that are 
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life and to act so that 
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the effects of your action are not destructive to the possibility of such life. 
Jonas’s dual imperatives call into question the ethos of “if science can do it, 
then science ought to do it.”
Technological Progress and Its Benefits to Society
Before getting into the doom and gloom portion of this chapter, we would 
like to look at the ways in which science and technology have benefited us. 
We may not have the hover cars and colonies on the moon that our parents’ 
generation was promised with the dawn of the twenty-first century (neither 
in our own world nor in the Fringe-verse), but nevertheless we still encoun-
ter some astonishing technologies on Fringe. One piece of technology that 
is of particular interest is the transdimensional window, a portal of sorts 
that allows us to peer into the alternate universe.
We learn that by 1985, Walter had developed a window to look into the 
other side. The society he found there was very similar to ours but more 
advanced in some areas. Although he is unable to cross into the alternate 
universe at this time, Walter is able to copy its advanced technology, some 
of which was sold to the military to benefit the world at large. Those whose 
well-being would be significantly diminished without their beloved smart-
phones have Walter and his window to thank for that. In 1985 Walter men-
tions that the technology for a digital cell phone is thirty years away in our 
universe, yet by 1988 we already have the first digital cell phone on our side; 
kudos, Dr. Bishop!
But when we are discussing Fringe and technology, we can’t help thinking 
of Massive Dynamic. On the show, Massive Dynamic represents the pinnacle 
of technological progress. It was founded by William Bell, who aspired to 
“satisfy the technological needs of this century and the next.” One of Mas-
sive Dynamic’s early contributions was new developments in prosthetics; in 
fact, Nina Sharp’s robotic replacement arm was an invention by Bell himself. 
This innovation couldn’t have come at a better time. The Persian Gulf War 
had just concluded, and with the help of these new technological advances, 
Massive Dynamic (then named BELLMEDICS) gave a new sense of hope to 
soldiers who lost their limbs in conflict.1 When technology is viewed from 
an instrumental perspective like this, it generally implies a positive ethical 
assessment: technology’s ability to increase the possibilities and capabilities 
of humans generally seems desirable.
What we should take from this discussion is that we do not necessarily 
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have to oppose increased industrialization or new technology. Nor should 
we concern ourselves with Martin Heidegger’s hostility to technology as a 
threat to essence, preventing us from seeing a more primal truth. Modern 
developments in technology can help increase someone’s well-being and 
allow them the means to function, something that wouldn’t be possible for 
those soldiers had it not been for the innovations in prosthetics made at 
Massive Dynamic.
However, we should not dismiss outright all critiques of technological 
progress just because they do not share our technoenthusiasm. If we get 
bound up in a narrow focus on scientific discovery, we may get caught up in 
our own hubris. Traditionally, scientists view scientific progress and discov-
ery as an unqualified good that should be exploited at all costs. We do not 
deny that we should strive for progress and development, only that we should 
critically reflect on whether technological progress is an unqualified good.
Science as an Unqualified Good, or in Need of Constraints?
In an impassioned speech at U.S. Army Research Headquarters, Walter 
explains, “Our success thus far should serve as an example of our ability to 
achieve that which most can’t even imagine. What you must understand is 
that, as scientists, we must embrace every possibility. No limitations. No 
boundaries. There is no reason for them.” Implicit in Walter’s argument is 
an endorsement of the neutrality thesis, which holds that technologies are 
value-neutral tools. They are used to perform valued functions, but the moral 
characteristics that we attribute to them can be attributed only to the use of 
technology, not to the technologies themselves or their creators. Certainly 
Walter would not deny that technologies can be put to good or bad uses, but 
he holds that there should be no constraints on scientific discovery. Wal-
ter is trying to express the worry that governmental—and, for that matter, 
moral—regulations would stifle scientific research and potentially inhibit 
the development of beneficial innovations.
A philosopher who would be leery of Walter’s enthusiasm about scientific 
discovery is Han Jonas, whose book The Imperative of Responsibility calls into 
question the neutrality of science and technology, in effect imposing moral 
responsibility on scientists and their research.2 Drawing on a philosopher 
who wrote about technology in the 1970s may seem curious in light of all 
the developments in technology since then, but this discussion is meant to 
illustrate the importance—if not a growing importance—of Jonas’s pleas.
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Jonas begins with the observation that the promise of modern tech-
nology has turned into a threat of disaster. New and unknown forces have 
been conferred upon us by science, which has allowed power to become its 
own master. We have turned the perspective of salvation into apocalypse 
through the ability of a single life form—humankind—to endanger all life 
forms. According to Jonas, this calls for a new ethical theory. Traditional 
ethical theories prove deficient because they are limited to interactions with 
individuals, while the power of modern technology bestows upon us control 
over nature. In the Fringe-verse, that includes power over alternate universes.
Crossing Over to the Other Side: The Case for Moral 
Responsibility
New dimensions of responsibility come into play with modern technology 
because of the irreversible and cumulative character of our actions on the 
living world. For moral responsibility to apply, however, three conditions 
must be met: first is casual power, so that action can have an impact on 
the world; second, the action must be under the agent’s control; and third, 
the agent must foresee the consequences to some extent. We see a prime 
example of this when Walter seeks to cross over into the alternate universe 
to save their Peter.
Watching his son die for a second time through his transdimensional 
window, Walter presses on with his research to find a gateway to the other 
side. Even before Walter attempts to cross through the bridge, we know 
of the potential dangers in crossing over. Walter’s assistant, Carla Warren, 
urges him not to go through with it, reminding him that shattering the wall 
between the universes could rupture the fundamental constants of nature. 
In a somber voice, Walter acknowledges the threats but seems willing to 
disregard them, saying, “It’s a theory, and we don’t know that to be true.” 
Walter’s attempts to dismiss the dangers as purely theoretical seem to skirt 
the implications of the consequences.
At later points in the show—once we discover the actual effects Wal-
ter’s crossing had on the alternate universe—we find that Walter was more 
aware of the potential consequences than he let on. Here we find all of Jonas’s 
conditions for responsibility met: Walter’s crossing over creates tears in the 
alternate universe; his actions were clearly his own, motivated by his desire 
to save the alternate Peter; and the potential consequences were at least fore-
seeable (if only in theory, but a good theory, Carla would add). By denying 
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that there is a line that cannot be crossed, denying that there is a threshold 
of danger that should urge us to take heed, and denying that there are some 
matters that belong only to God, Walter embodies the drive for unbridled 
scientific discovery. But despite his violation of the imperative of responsi-
bility, perhaps we can find grounds to excuse Walter for his actions.
The Desire to Play God, or the Need for Humility in Science
The Walter we meet delivering the speech at U.S. Army Research Headquar-
ters presents a stark contrast to the gentle old man that we are introduced to 
in the Fringe present. Here we find a man humbled by experience and the 
sheer power that science can have on the world, much like what happened 
to Robert Oppenheimer when he witnessed the destructive effects of the 
atomic bomb. We can contrast this response to that of Walter’s former col-
league, William Bell.
In the season 4 finale (“Brave New World”) we discover that David 
Robert Jones and the members of ZFT are actually colluding with Bell in 
an effort to realize Bell’s sinister plans to destroy both universes. Bell, slowly 
dying of cancer despite effects of Cortexiphan, became disillusioned with 
his condition and began to reflect on the younger, more naïve Walter’s sci-
entific outlook. It occurs to him that Walter’s earlier pronouncements about 
science were right: there should no limitations, no boundaries—there is no 
reason for them. Bell believed that “if we are capable of being Gods, then it 
is our destiny to do so.” Here Bell embodies the scientific ethos of if science 
can do it, then science ought to do it.
After losing Peter twice, Walter comes to question how any God could 
allow for so much suffering. He embarks on a path to create a universe that 
would operate by his own rules. The experience also changes Walter’s dis-
position regarding unbridled scientific research and its (inevitable) appli-
cation. Jonas would explain this as the beginnings of a new consciousness 
awakened by the euphoria of big victories, which allows for the harsh day-
light of dangers to impose on us the barriers of responsibility.
According to Jonas, our arrogance needs to be replaced by humility, 
which stems from the discrepancy between our power to harm and destroy 
and our incapacity to predict and take responsibility for the consequences 
on the other. Fear and trembling will keep our power from overwhelming 
us or those who follow us. It was this realization on Walter’s part—that he 
was smart enough to actually construct his own universe—that frightened 
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his past hubris out of him. This stark realization induced Walter to ask Bell 
to cut out a portion of his brain to prevent Walter from bringing his uni-
verse to fruition: “We cut those ideas out of your head to literally put ‘the 
Genie’ back into the bottle.”
Walter’s story shows us that the traditional claim by pure science to 
freedom of research cannot be maintained. The distinction between pure 
science and applied technology is being increasing blurred, according to 
Jonas. A further lesson that we can take from Walter’s story is that it should 
behove us to refute Nina Sharp’s prediction that “suffice to say, we’ve reached 
a point where science and technology have advanced for such an exponential 
rate for so long, it may be beyond our ability to regulate and control them.”
Instead, we should promote Jonas’s dual imperative for responsibility to 
“act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence 
of genuine human life” and to “act so that the effects of your actions are not 
destructive to the future possibility of such life.” The final two sections of 
this part of the chapter take up each imperative in turn, first considering 
nanotechnology and then the case of the Observers.
Is Nanotechnology Incompatible with the Permanence of 
Genuine Human Life?
Developments in nanotechnologies have the potential to pose profound 
challenges not only to our traditional ethical notions, but also to human 
life as we know it. Advocates hail the development of nanotechnology for 
its potential to solve environmental problems, offer alternative fuels, and 
provide innumerable medical benefits. Critics warn of the potential nega-
tive effects on human health and the environment and the social disruption 
that nanotechnology may cause. 
On Fringe, commenting on the development of nanotechnologies, Nina 
Sharp says to a room full of board members: “Nanotechnology—the bloom 
is not off the rose. Because of the far-ranging claims that have been made 
about potential applications of nanotechnology, a number of serious con-
cerns have been raised about how this will affect our society if realized, and 
what actions, if any are deemed appropriate, might be needed to mitigate 
these risks. This is not Massive Dynamic’s concern. We create technology. 
How it is used is not our concern. We just own the patents.” Nina’s remarks 
express that scientific ethos of uninhibited pursuit of research and develop-
ment with complete and utter disregard for its societal impacts. What we 
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have been urging throughout this chapter is the need for some sort of con-
straints on science and technology, not a condemnation of scientific progress.
As shown on Fringe, nanotechnologies have tremendous potential to 
contribute to medical research. When the two Fringe teams encounter each 
other for the first time in the alternate universe, Agent Lee is left with third-
degree burns over 90 percent of his body. If this happened on our side, he 
would not have much of a chance. In the alternate universe they developed 
cellular regenerative nanotechnologies that were able to heal Agent Lee in 
a matter of days.
Yet we also encounter a more malicious side of nanotechnologies when 
they are weaponized and targeted against civilian populations. On the sea-
son 4 finale, the Fringe team is sent to investigate a case where two dozen 
people appear to have spontaneously combusted. Turns out Bell created 
nanites that embedded themselves into people’s bodies and caused the body 
to overheat as the nanites reacted to the body’s kinetic energy. However, the 
same type of technology can be put to positive uses: research is currently 
being conducted on the possibility of running a cellular phone battery off 
nanites, which would recharge the battery from the body’s kinetic energy.
While the potential dangers that come from nanotechnologies can have 
a highly destructive impact on human life as we know it, this does not mean 
that we should put an end to the development of nanotechnologies. Not even 
Jonas would call for complete abolishment; rather, nanotechnologies should 
be developed with Jonas’s first imperative in mind, so that they are consistent 
with the permanence of genuine human life. What Jonas tell us is that the 
scientists at Massive Dynamic themselves must be held morally responsible 
for their research. Responsibility does not fall merely on the user but resides 
with the scientists and the corporations that develop the technology. What 
we can derive from this claim is that we may pursue research that has the 
potential to enhance human life. If we were able to use the Fringe alternative 
universe’s advances in medical research, it might be possible to regenerate 
organs and limbs for individuals in need, for example.
The Observers and the Destruction of Human Life
In Fringe, we learn that by the year 2609 the Observers had made our planet 
uninhabitable. The Earth was destroyed ecologically, making the air and 
water toxic. By utilizing technology from their time period, the Observers 
were able to exist “outside of time.” Having ruined their planet, the only 
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option they had was to travel back in time to a healthier planet. The year 
2015 became known as the purge, as that was the year that the Observers 
arrived on “present-day” Earth, enslaving humans. Whereas Jonas’s second 
imperative holds that our actions should not be destructive to the future 
possibility of life, we find an inversion of the imperative operating here on 
past human life.
The arrival of the Observers themselves would not have been problematic 
in itself. Perhaps their futuristic cell phone technology and their collapsible 
binoculars would be useful. But their arrival on Earth proves to be destruc-
tive to potential future human life. Finding the planet’s air too oxygenated 
during our time, they emit extra carbon monoxide. Henrietta Bishop tells us 
that the effects will soon be irreversible and lower the average age of natives 
(the human population) to approximately forty-five.
According to Jonas, we have mortgaged future life for our present short-
term gains and needs. What we do in our present—whatever time that may 
be—has a massive effect on countless lives who have no say in the matter. 
Jonas concedes that perhaps this is inevitable and there is no way of avoid-
ing our impact on the future (or the past, in the case of the Observers), so 
our actions should express a concern for posterity, “namely in such a way 
that their chance of coping with that mortgage has not been compromised 
in advance.”
A further lesson can be drawn from the case of the Observers. When 
Windmark—the Observer who seems to be in charge of native affairs—gets 
asked by Colonel Broyles, “What did you do up there in the future to get 
yourself such a ‘crap detail’?” Windmarks responds with an amused tone in 
his voice: “I like animals.” Fringe is suggesting that according to the Observ-
ers we are nothing but a bunch of animals. This draws an interesting parallel: 
if we feel so morally violated when the Observers enslave us and proceed 
to destroy our own planet, why do we not feel the same way when the same 
happens to animals?
Our traditional anthropocentric ethics are being challenged here. What 
we should take from this case is that when we are developing technologies, 
perhaps we should expand our circle of ethical concern to include animal 
life. Jonas highlights the need to broaden our ethical concern because of how 
the power that technology gives us expands our dimensions of responsibil-
ity. Our concerns should then include, at least, any living being’s interests—
past, present, or future—when our powers of action have a causal effect on 
their well-being.
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What We Want to Happen
In the Fringe universe, we regularly encounter scenarios where scientific 
advances may be used for the good of the many and the detriment of the 
few, or conversely, for the good of the few and the detriment of the many. 
There is a certain sense in which these scenarios, as presented in the show, 
are no longer hypothetical. The rational “What would you do?” question of 
the hypothetical situation becomes a visceral “What do you want to hap-
pen?” We feel for these characters; we get anxious when they are in danger, 
and we want them to always succeed. If we didn’t, we would be watching 
very bad television. No one would care what happens next, and all the char-
acters might as well get hit by buses.
So it is safe to assume, based on the fact that we watch the show at all, 
that we do care about the characters, we do care about what’s going to happen 
next, and we don’t want them to suffer. And so it is often the case that our 
rational considerations about what would be best for the Fringe universe(s) 
become subordinate to our visceral response to their plights. And we want 
the best things to happen to the characters we’re most used to; we like them 
the best, and we favor their happiness over others’. We want to save Peter, 
other universe be damned.
We also cannot dismiss this reaction by telling ourselves this is only a 
TV show. By the same logic that would permit our favoring the main char-
acters, we should not care about them at all. But that is certainly not the 
case. And so we take it as given that we do care about what happens in the 
Fringe world and we favor the main characters over any random extra (they 
were probably introduced only to be sacrificed anyway). The fact that we do 
this is analogous to how we normally live. The purpose of this portion of the 
chapter will be to take a look at why we look at Fringe with these particular 
goggles on and how it is possible to do so in the first place.
We will examine some common notions first of all as to why viewers 
seem to enjoy television, particularly why we prefer certain characters over 
others and how we react to the situations we’re presented with, far removed 
from our daily experience as they may be. We have probably all heard that 
we like characters we can relate to, but this is a simplification of what’s really 
going on. We’ve also probably heard that we like to see familiar scenarios (it 
can’t all be techno wars, where’s the romance?). Here we’re getting closer to 
something coherent. And more recently, we’ve heard that watching reruns 
of your favorite TV show produces the same mental benefit as hanging out 
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with old friends—Olivia Dunham is awesome and I can predict exactly what 
she’s going to do—way better than real people.3 There’s a better philosophi-
cal interpretation of this phenomenon, though the common theme of our 
analysis is identified, one that constitutes a broader philosophical issue: how 
we deal with fictional worlds, how we relate to the people in them, and what 
we can learn by examining our relation to the fictional. The individual exami-
nation should have generalizable conclusions: how we form preferences that 
influence our decisions is by no means individual. By looking at ourselves 
with a critical eye, we can infer similarities with other people by analogy.
Our Relationship to Fictional Characters
Our relationship to fictional characters is analogous to our relation to actual 
people. Though they seem like simplified versions of real people, we can 
imagine any number of ways in which their being can be complicated, and 
it is often the case that they are. For instance, sometimes we introduce a 
back story that happens to explain why so-and-so acts in a particular way 
in situation X. We undergo the same process in getting to know a fictional 
character as we do a real person. And we like them.
This introduces a philosophical problem: Why do we like the people we 
do? And there’s a corresponding problem for fictional characters: Why do 
we prefer certain characters over others?
As we stated earlier, we prefer familiar characters over unfamiliar ones. 
We feel closer to Peter Bishop than we do to office worker number four, even 
though we are not international criminals of boundless genius. Familiarity 
is an important factor in why we prefer certain people (fictional or other-
wise) over others, and this may be just a function of how often we see them 
on-screen. Nevertheless, this familiarity determines whether we think Peter 
should sacrifice himself for the good of humanity or stick around. Consider, 
for instance, when Peter disappears into the Machine in order to save both 
universes. The fact that he does so willingly certainly helps us to feel better 
about his doing it, but we also want him to come back. And when he does, 
we want the old Peter back, not the one who has no place in the current 
universe. We want him to be happy.
But this contradicts some of our basic assumptions about the people we 
like. We assume that we like the characters who are most like us, but Fringe 
introduces such a diverse range of possible character traits that it seems 
impossible one should find one’s television doppelganger among its cast. 
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We take this as evidence that the most important factor in our relationship 
with fictional characters is not that we feel we have the most in common 
with them with respect to the attributes of their character. Most viewers are 
not mad scientists, nor telepathic FBI agents, nor international men of mys-
tery. Therefore, we’re looking for something more basic. This observation 
extends to real people as well; it is not always the people with whom one 
has the most in common that one becomes friends. And so if we cannot say 
that the only reason we care about fictional characters is because we think 
we have so much in common with them (at this superficial level), we must 
entertain another possibility.
The second contender for the reason why we care about fictional char-
acters is that we think of them not as television versions of ourselves but as 
(imaginary) friends. Perhaps we don’t think we are closely related in charac-
ter to the people we are watching, but we find their characters likeable and 
fun to be around. Walter Bishop is totally awesome, and we should hang 
out. While this certainly is true (call me, Walter, we’ll set something up), this 
still doesn’t completely account for our relationship to fictional characters. 
The analogy to real friends is once again enlightening. Where we interact 
with real people, we are an important part of the relationship. We have some 
relationship with our real friends, something that is most definitely lacking 
within our posited relation to a fictional character. When something bad 
happens to them, we are there to comfort them, and we ask for their opin-
ions on particular things relevant to our lives. But our television friends act 
of their own accord, no matter what we think they should do. They don’t 
even ask us. (How rude; frankly, they’re putting our friendship in jeopardy.)
Nevertheless, we do care about them in some way. If it’s not because 
they represent ourselves or that we relate to them as friends, we submit that 
it is only a function of familiarity that we care what happens to our char-
acters. But this raises another issue: Why do we get so attached to familiar 
things? We might say we simply hate change, but you’d think, what with 
the world changing all the time around us, coupled with the fact that we’re 
not currently suffering as a result of it, that change is not the monster here. 
At least, not change in an unqualified sense. What our television viewer-
ship can teach us is that we’re absolutely fine with change; what we hate is 
change we can’t anticipate. Once we become accustomed to a character, we 
can predict what he or she will do in a given situation, and we’re happy that 
we can. If Peter is running around killing shape-shifters, he probably has a 
good reason. We base this judgment on our past experience of the character, 
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and we’re angry if television writers have our characters do something that 
doesn’t fit with the sense we’ve acquired of them. The fact that familiarity is 
primary in a fictional world as well as a real one evidences a more general 
claim: given that nothing that happens on Fringe can be to our personal 
detriment in any way, and yet familiarity seems important to us, we cannot 
claim that we as human beings fear the unfamiliar; rather, we just like the 
familiar. That’s all there is to it.
So no matter what kind of man Peter is, we want him around, and we 
want him to be Peter. We’ve grown attached to him as he is. And this is why 
we get that visceral reaction to his being endangered, despite the fact that in 
the Fringe universes there are billions of people we could also just as easily 
have come to know and like; but kill them all if our Peter is threatened—
unless, perhaps, we’re shown a very sympathetic shot of some particularly 
sympathetic person about to be harmed by our choices.
Our Relationship to Fictional Situations
In addition to having empathic relationships with fictional characters 
(regardless of their being similar to ourselves or being some kind of analog 
to real friends), there are certain situations in which we feel an immediate 
reaction. And the strength of our reaction is dependent on our proximity 
to the situation. We can all look at a poverty-stricken child on television 
(especially a particularly cute one) and get all weepy-eyed. “Help them!” 
our empathic response cries out; then another commercial comes on and 
we develop a sudden craving for toaster strudel.4
The reason that they show you one child suffering is because you will 
have a greater reaction to one child that you can see than one million that 
you cannot. Perhaps it’s a very simple corollary of what we concluded in the 
previous section: our caring is a function of our familiarity. You’ve known 
that television child for thirty seconds now, and those other million you’ve 
never even seen. The point is that when we are presented with a particu-
lar situation we find troublesome, and with someone in that situation, we 
have an immediate response, regardless of whether we’ve gotten to know 
that individual over the past four seasons. Somebody is suffering; but they 
have to be a definite somebody in order for us to have a visceral reaction 
(as opposed to a purely rational, “Gee, that sucks for them”).
This is where our analysis might be able to say something about ethi-
cal motivations in the application of scientific technology in general. In the 
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vast majority of situations, all we can have is a rational response. Yes, we 
should improve agricultural techniques so that the world’s resources become 
sufficient to provide for its entire population. Of course we should reduce, 
reuse, and recycle to protect the environment, even though the landfills 
are currently far from my own backyard. And even though we don’t know 
anyone from Hiroshima, we know the guy who pressed the button on that 
one was a murderous jerk.
Fringe provides us with the opportunity to see how very abstract ques-
tions about the ethical significance of scientific advancement may come 
down to personal considerations. Because we’re aware that the closer we get 
to a situation, the more our opinion of the ethicality of that situation will 
change. Twelve children were drugged—okay, we’ve got plenty more of those 
around, at least they’re not starving to death and working in sweatshops. 
Olivia was drugged—Oh no! Those bastards. The general observation we 
can make here is that, when it comes to making ethical decisions, we tend 
to take ourselves out of the situation we’re evaluating, unless we’re forced 
into it. Our relationship to fictional characters is forcing us into the situ-
ation, and if we take a second to think about it, it’s scary to think what we 
would have done to the universe to help those few fake people. And we’re 
certainly not alone on this one.
What We Can Deduce about Scientific Ethics from Our 
Experience
If we constantly made rational decisions about using science for the benefit 
of humankind as a whole, we would all be watching a television program 
where the characters seem to do nothing but make horrible decisions that 
are an affront to our better judgment. And nobody wants to watch that 
show. Nor would we want to watch it if they constantly made decisions 
that disregarded our empathic affiliation with the characters we like. It is 
the tug-of-war between our rationality and a natural empathic response 
that makes Fringe interesting, dramatic, and, in the end, frightening. For 
the fact is that it is not the general public that decides what is an appropri-
ate use for technology. We have to trust in a small set of individuals who 
do have that power, and if they’re anything like us, we wouldn’t extoll them 
as pinnacles of rationality with our best interests at heart. More likely they 
respond to ethical scenarios in the same way that we do: inconsistently and 
with the interests of those closest to them in mind, taking risks that would 
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seem completely inappropriate to anyone looking in from the outside but 
that make perfect sense from an alternate perspective.
But we also see, every so often, what an individual does do when the 
burden is placed on him or her to consider his or her own benefits when 
compared with those of a much larger group of individuals: in the end, 
Peter gets into the machine. We can also imagine, then, that when the 
burden is placed on us to decide what we should do (what some abstract 
individual should do), whether it would be better to do something hor-
ribly unpleasant for the sake of others or to live with ourselves as moral 
scum. This example seems more representative of what the average per-
son might do when encumbered by some moral burden than some other 
examples we’ve seen (for example, William Bell destroying the universe 
because he thinks it would be fun). A large part of how we define the 
heroes and villains of our story is how well their motivations fit with our 
own; and if we take this into account, the fact that we identify with the 
self-sacrificing Peter to a much greater extent than the self-worshipping 
William Bell means perhaps there’s hope for humanity after all in the face 
of a potential doomsday. But we cannot take this as an indication that we 
should be comforted by the immediate moral response of the average per-
son (assuming it’s the “good” choice); what William Bell’s exploits have to 
tell us is that, if we’re going to use some fictitious or future technology to 
destroy the universe, it only takes one. Now it seems like a more palpable 
problem, for certainly we can imagine there existing one individual some-
where in the world who would use scientific advancements to do horrible 
things to us, no matter how loudly and often we tell them they’re defying 
moral principles.
Einstein’s words in the epigraph to this chapter serve as a sobering warning 
about the potentially devastating effects that science and technology can have 
in the wrong hands. Through technological progress science has brought us 
some of our greatest achievements, such as insulin and the Special Theory of 
Relativity. But our history of technological progress is not without its darker 
moments, one of the most regrettable occurrences being the development of 
the atomic bomb.5 On Fringe we encounter science and technology that sit 
on the brink of what is plausible, sometimes bordering on the improbable, 
and often delving into the downright impossible. Sitting around at home, 
we are left wondering (and hoping sometimes) whether there is someone 
out there working on this new technology.
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an InConsIstent trIad?
Competing Ethics in Star Trek into Darkness
Jason T. Eberl
While surveying the planet Nibiru, the crew of the U.S.S. Enterprise discover 
that the primitive native population is threatened with extinction by the 
imminent eruption of a massive volcano. Our spacefaring heroes, under the 
command of the young and impetuous Captain James T. Kirk, decide they 
could save the natives by detonating a cold fusion device within the heart 
of the volcano. They construct a plan to accomplish their Good Samaritan 
mission while at the same time disguising their presence in keeping with 
Starfleet’s Prime Directive: “No identification of self or mission. No inter-
ference with the social development of said planet. No references to space 
or the fact that there are other worlds or civilizations.”1 Unfortunately, we 
all know what may happen to even the best laid plans, and the Enterprise’s 
first officer, Commander Spock, is trapped in the heart of the volcano with 
a mere thirty seconds until the cold fusion device will go off and, in addi-
tion to extinguishing the volcano, “render him inert.”2
The only means of saving Spock is to fly the Enterprise, which has been 
hiding at the bottom of the Nibiru ocean, to the volcano and beam him out 
within line of sight. Spock, however, objects:
Spock: The Enterprise is too large. If utilized in a rescue effort, it 
would be revealed to the indigenous species.
Kirk: Spock, nobody knows the rules better than you, but there has 
got to be an exception.
Spock: No, such action violates the Prime Directive.
McCoy: Shut up, Spock! We’re trying to save you, damnit!
Spock: Doctor, the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.
Kirk: Spock, we’re talking about your life!
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Spock: The rule cannot be broken under any circumstances.
[Communication is lost.]
Kirk: If Spock were here, and I were there, what would he do?
McCoy: He’d let you die.
Kirk decides that “the needs of the one outweigh the needs of the many” 
and saves Spock just in the nick of time.3 Safely beamed into the Enterprise’s 
transporter room to a smiling Kirk, Spock immediately protests, with a cer-
tain degree of shock, “You violated the Prime Directive!” As the Enterprise 
flies away from Nibiru, the indigenous chieftain is seen drawing an image 
of the grand starship that lifted out of the water like a giant leviathan, flew 
into the heart of hell itself, and stopped the fiery eruptions from killing them 
all. Is this a new religion being born?4
Clearly, the Enterprise crew’s actions that day will have a profound 
impact on the people of Nibiru. Even detonating the cold fusion device 
to stop the volcanic eruption in the first place interfered with the natural 
course of events on that planet, although it arguably makes little sense to 
follow a rule concerning noninterference with an indigenous society if that 
society will be rendered extinct unless one takes action. The wisdom of the 
Prime Directive is aptly described by a later captain of the Enterprise, Jean-
Luc Picard: “The Prime Directive is not just a set of rules. It is a philosophy, 
and a very correct one. History has proven again and again that whenever 
mankind interferes with a less developed civilization, no matter how well 
intentioned that interference may be, the results are invariably disastrous.”5 
The various attitudes portrayed concerning the Prime Directive and what’s 
at stake whether it is adhered to or not in a given situation illustrate three 
distinctive moral viewpoints. First, there is Spock’s absolute adherence to 
the Prime Directive, a duty for which he’s willing to sacrifice his own life. 
Second, the Prime Directive itself is justified by a utilitarian concern to 
maximize the best overall consequences, even if doing so involves sacrific-
ing the interests, or even the lives, of a smaller number of people. Finally, 
there is Kirk’s motivation in violating the Prime Directive to save Spock, 
which the latter learns about only when faced with Kirk’s own sacrifice to 
save the Enterprise and her crew:
Kirk: I wanted you to know why I couldn’t let you die . . . why I went 
back for you . . . 
Spock: Because you are my friend.
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Loyalty is what binds family, friends, and communities together. Kirk’s loy-
alty to Spock is what motivates him to violate the Prime Directive. Kirk’s 
loyalty to his ship and crew is also what motivates him to give up his own 
life later on.
Duty, utility, and loyalty . . . these ethical values and the theories built 
around each are often understood as contrary to one another, and typically 
taught that way in undergraduate philosophy courses. But perhaps they 
may be successfully combined into a coherent ethic. The attempt to express 
these multiple moral attitudes simultaneously is, I believe, at the heart of 
the philosophical drama that unfolds throughout J. J. Abrams’s Star Trek 
into Darkness (STID).
KAAAAANT!!!
Although Spock is grateful to his captain for saving his life, he neverthe-
less files a report on the Nibiru mission to Admiral Christopher Pike that 
describes in detail what Kirk decides to omit from his captain’s log. Pike 
is understandably upset at Kirk on two counts: (1) he violated the Prime 
Directive, and (2) he falsified his log entry. He tells Kirk, “You think the rules 
don’t apply to you because you disagree with them. . . . I saw greatness in 
you, and now I see you haven’t got an ounce of humility.” Kirk retorts that 
his penchant for “changing the conditions” in his favor is exactly what Pike 
thought Starfleet had lost and why he recruited Kirk to enlist in the first 
place. In fact, Kirk hadn’t even made it out of Starfleet Academy when he 
cheated on the Kobyashi Maru “no win scenario” test. Pike and the rest of 
the Starfleet admiralty overlook the fact that Kirk’s academic misconduct 
hearing was interrupted when the Romulan Nero attacked Vulcan. Appar-
ently, Kirk’s leading the Enterprise to save Earth, rescue Pike, and defeat 
Nero excuses his earlier indiscretion. However, his present violation of the 
Prime Directive on Nibiru can’t be so easily dismissed. Kirk is stripped of 
his captaincy and is initially going to be sent back to Starfleet Academy, 
where he will learn to “respect the chair,” which includes strict adherence 
to the Prime Directive.
Some philosophers are as much sticklers for the rules as the Starfleet 
admiralty. Deontology is a moral theory in which one is bound to fulfill cer-
tain duties—the Greek word deon means “duty”—and not to violate such 
duties even if doing so would result in better overall consequences. Certainly, 
the consequences would’ve been dire if the Enterprise crew hadn’t interfered 
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with the Nibiru at all by attempting to stop the volcano from erupting—
which is what Admiral Pike says he’d have done in that situation. But even 
the consequence of the loss of one life suffices in Kirk’s conscience for him 
to violate his sworn duty as a Starfleet officer.
Furthermore, while deontologists may disagree on what our specific 
moral duties are, some hold that we have a strict moral duty not to lie, even 
from an altruistic motive intended to spare someone’s feelings being hurt or 
to save an innocent life. The “father” of deontology, Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804), is quite clear in stating his absolute prohibition on lying: “By a lie a 
human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human 
being. A human being who does not himself believe what he tells another . . . 
has even less worth than if he were a mere thing.”6 Kant isn’t simply being 
melodramatic in portraying his ethical distaste for lying. Rather, the prohi-
bition is premised upon his concept of the intrinsic dignity human beings 
possess as rational and autonomous beings who are capable of understand-
ing their moral duties and self-legislating their own actions: “What has a 
price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other 
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a 
dignity . . . morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is 
that which alone has dignity.”7 We’ll return later to discuss further implica-
tions of Kant’s view of human dignity, but the point here is that our dignity 
is founded upon our existence as moral beings. Those who fail to use their 
reason or autonomy properly—that is, in order to understand and govern 
their behavior by moral duties—violate the very foundation of their dignity. 
If we agree with Captain Picard that the Prime Directive represents a “very 
correct philosophy,” then Admiral Pike is correct that Kirk fails Kant’s test 
of moral virtue twice over: by violating the Prime Directive and by lying 
about it in his log.
But wait just a goddamn minute! (As Dr. McCoy might say.) Kirk didn’t 
“lie” per se in his log. He merely omitted the truth of all that happened on 
Nibiru. Well, he did report that the mission was “uneventful,” and that word 
certainly doesn’t seem to capture accurately the opening scenes of STID. 
Furthermore, while Kant does distinguish telling a lie from omitting the 
truth, he allows for the latter only in a particular type of situation: “If an 
enemy, for example, takes me by the throat and demands to know where my 
money is kept, I can hide the information here, since he means to misuse 
the truth. That is still no lie, for the other knows that I shall withhold the 
information, and that he also has no right whatever to demand the truth 
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from me.”8 One may justifiably omit the truth from a person who has no 
right to the truth and intends to misuse the information. Spock Prime is 
thereby justified in “exaggerating” in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982) 
when he substitutes “days” for “hours” in reporting to Kirk on how long it’ll 
take to repair the Enterprise while suspecting that Khan may be eavesdrop-
ping.9 He avoids lying to Kirk by referring to the fact that he’s going “by the 
book,” meaning that he’s dutifully following regulations against uncoded 
transmissions during battle; thus, Kirk is able to easily discern the truth that 
Spock is clandestinely communicating. And while Spock is arguably lying to 
Khan, as pointed out by his protégé, Lieutenant Saavik, Khan has no right 
to the truth of the Enterprise’s condition and would misuse that informa-
tion to destroy the starship. Unfortunately for Kirk in STID, Admiral Pike 
isn’t Khan and doesn’t fit the bill as someone who has no right to the truth. 
Thus his falsified log is nothing more than an ass-covering maneuver that 
unequivocally falters under Kant’s strict test of moral behavior. No way to 
“change the conditions” of this test.
“I’m Not Going to Take Ethics Lessons from a Robot”
Spock, on the other hand, looks to be a thoroughgoing Kantian insofar as 
he rigidly adheres to the Prime Directive, even to the point of sacrificing 
his own life, and, as he likes to remind everyone, Vulcans are incapable 
of lying—although they do “embrace technicalities” and, as noted above, 
may “exaggerate.” Spock’s adamant refusal to violate the Prime Directive, 
however, is premised upon consequentialist reasons, and his willingness to 
give up his life is based upon a calculation of benefits and harms in accord 
with the Vulcan dictum that “the needs of the many outweigh the needs 
of the few.”10
For Kant, because of our inherent dignity, individual persons cannot 
be weighed in the scales such that the interests or lives of a smaller number 
of people could be sacrificed for the sake of a larger number. Rather, each 
person is of infinite value, such that the life or well-being of one person can’t 
be mathematically compared to that of one or more others. Spock’s life, sin-
gular though it is, has a value of ∞, as does each Nibiru life; let’s say there 
are five hundred Nibiru Spock will save by detonating the cold fusion device 
while still trapped in the volcano. 500 × ∞ = ∞, but 1 × ∞ = ∞ too! This 
premise underwrites one of Kant’s formulations of his own version of the 
Prime Directive—the Categorical Imperative: “So act that you use human-
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ity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end, never merely as a means.”11
Utilitarians, however, disagree with Kant and other deontologists on 
this score. As consequentialists, utilitarians contend that each moral deci-
sion should result from a calculus in which all benefits and harms, and the 
number of people who will receive the benefits or suffer the harms, is evalu-
ated for each possible action one may take in the given circumstances. Or, 
alternatively, a rule may be devised that guarantees the maximization of the 
best consequences over time—which is evidently the purpose of the Prime 
Directive. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), one of the two founders of utili-
tarianism, states the theory’s moral axiom thus: “The creed which accepts 
as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, 
holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happi-
ness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness 
is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
privation of pleasure.”12 In calculating which action or rule can be reason-
ably expected to produce the greatest amount of happiness, the well-being 
or life of each person who may be affected positively or negatively has to be 
taken into account, but no person’s well-being or life should be considered 
any more important than another’s: “[T]he happiness which forms the utili-
tarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, 
but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of oth-
ers, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested 
and benevolent spectator.”13 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), Mill’s mentor, 
in describing the mathematical values of the utility calculus—that is, how to 
estimate the overall positive or negative value of each benefit or harm—states 
that the well-being or life of each person potentially affected by one’s action 
is to count as one and no more than one.14 Unlike Kant, then, utilitarians 
hold that individual persons don’t possess infinite value but rather a value 
of one, which may thus be multiplied in terms of the number of individu-
als affected by a moral action. Hence, when comparing Spock’s life to that 
of five hundred Nibiru, a simple calculation shows that the lives and well-
being of the Nibiru outweigh that of a single individual.
While the utilitarian principle of strict impartiality may lead to heroic 
self-sacrifices such as Spock’s, or Kirk’s at the end of STID, there is a dark 
side of the theory that leads some critics of utilitarianism to charge its 
adherents with moral corruption.15 Admiral Alexander Marcus betrays his 
“corrupt mind” by utilizing the historical arch-villain Khan Noonien Singh, 
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cryopreserved for over three hundred years since he and other genetically 
enhanced “supermen” were exiled after controlling more than three-quarters 
of the world during the Eugenics Wars.16 Concerned about the advanced 
weaponry displayed by the Romulan Nero’s future warship (Star Trek [2009]) 
and an impending war with the Klingon Empire, Marcus has Khan revived 
and holds the rest of his people, seventy-two in all, hostage so that Khan 
will help him protect the Federation:
Khan: Alexander Marcus needed to respond to an uncivilized threat 
in a civilized time, and for that, he needed a warrior’s mind—my 
mind—to design weapons and warships.
Spock: You are suggesting the Admiral violated every regulation 
he vowed to uphold, simply because he wanted to exploit your 
intellect.
Khan: He wanted to exploit my savagery! Intellect alone is useless in 
a fight, Mr. Spock. You can’t even break a rule, how can you be 
expected to break bone?
With Khan’s help, Marcus designs a savagely lethal Dreadnought-class star-
ship, the U.S.S. Vengeance, and is prepared to use it to destroy the Enterprise 
to safeguard his secret war machine. When confronted by Kirk, Marcus 
declares unapologetically, “War is coming! And who’s gonna lead us, you? 
If I’m not in charge, our entire way of life is decimated!”
Unlike Khan, Marcus isn’t “homicidal, power-mad, despotic.” He truly 
believes that he’s doing what’s best for the Federation and is willing to sacrifice 
not only the lives of the Enterprise crew and Khan’s own people but even the 
respect and love of his daughter, Carol, who can’t believe that the dad who 
raised her would be willing to take such drastic action. Marcus threatens 
Khan with the lives of those he considers family—his fellow “augments”—Kirk 
sacrifices his own life to save those he considers family—his crew—and the 
tragedy of Admiral Marcus is that, even before he’s brutally killed by Khan, 
he suffers the loss of his own family when Carol slaps him in disgust.17
“Is There Anything You Would Not Do for Your Family?”
We’re first introduced to Khan in STID, offering to save the life of a little 
girl dying in a hospital. Being genetically enhanced, Khan’s blood contains 
advanced healing properties. The girl’s father, a Starfleet officer, strikes a Faus-
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tian bargain to save his daughter at the cost of his own life when he becomes 
a suicide bomber, destroying a secret Starfleet facility run by the shadowy 
Section 31.18 Clearly, a father’s love is a powerful motivator that could drive 
one to commit even the most heinous of crimes, blinding a person to his 
moral obligations to others—hence, the utilitarian doctrine of strict impar-
tiality. But even nonutilitarians, such as contemporary philosopher Marcia 
Baron, agree that “moral reasoning and moral conduct demand that one be 
impartial, that one not play favorites.”19 Famed Scottish philosopher David 
Hume (1711–1776) goes even further in asserting that loyalty to one’s fam-
ily, friends, or nation is a matter of “bigotry and superstition.”20
Other philosophers, however, such as American philosopher Josiah 
Royce (1855–1916), consider loyalty to be a bedrock of morality. Royce 
defines loyalty as “the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of 
a person to a cause.”21 This definition isn’t complete, however, as loyalty to an 
abstract “cause” often goes hand in hand with loyalty to one’s fellow adherents 
to the cause, and especially the leaders of the cause. Soldiers who fought in 
World War II were willing to go into harm’s way both for the cause of their 
country and for the sake of the “band of brothers” formed among groups 
of infantrymen, sailors, and pilots. They were also willing to follow certain 
military leaders without question. One U.S. Navy sailor, not realizing that 
famed admiral William “Bull” Halsey was walking right behind him, said 
to his fellow sailor, “I’d go to hell for that old son of a bitch.”22 Of course, not 
every cause, group, or individual to whom one may be loyal may be morally 
worthwhile, but the question remains whether loyalty is something we ought 
to value despite it being loyalty to a disreputable cause, person, or group.
One view is that loyalty can be a virtue only if it’s a bond between vir-
tuous individuals. In other words, I must be loyal only to persons or causes 
that are themselves virtuous—while being virtuous myself. Thus, contempo-
rary ethicist John Ladd contends, “A loyal Nazi is a contradiction in terms.”23 
Khan, while apparently loyal to his fellow augments, cannot be truly loyal 
to them given his evident ruthlessness and brutality, nor would it be virtu-
ous for them to be loyal to him, as many sailors were to Admiral Halsey, if 
he were to unfreeze them. R. E. Ewin counters Ladd, though, arguing, “The 
question to consider is this: is a disloyal Nazi better than a loyal Nazi? There 
are problems in the Nazism, but is there anything wrong with the loyalty? 
A disloyal Nazi, after all, still has all the vices of Nazism and has added 
disloyalty to them. . . . It is yet another thing to be held against him and 
yet another reason for us not to trust him.”24 On this view, the tears Khan 
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sheds for his fellow augments may be his one saving grace, the one virtue 
that, while perhaps not justifying, at least reasonably motivates his actions 
against Starfleet, and Admiral Marcus in particular. We don’t have to agree 
with Khan’s actions to be sympathetic to his motives.
On the flip side, Kirk’s loyalty to Spock, which motivates him to violate 
the Prime Directive, and his loyalty to his ship and crew, which motivates 
his own self-sacrifice, is a clearly laudable virtue—even if strict Kantians or 
utilitarians might have let Spock die in the volcano. Part of Abrams’s pur-
pose with STID, in fact, is to cement the bond of friendship between Kirk 
and Spock, a bond already well-established in Spock’s heart-wrenching 
death scene in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. Kirk’s and Spock’s respective 
deaths in the two alternate timelines—and miraculous resurrections, thanks, 
in both cases, to Khan (detonating the Genesis device in one timeline and 
possessing “super-blood” in the other)—poetically bookend their friendship.
The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 b.c.e.) argues that friend-
ship is an essential component of human happiness and living a virtuous 
life: “Further, [friendship] is most necessary for our life. For no one would 
choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods. Indeed 
rich people and holders of powerful positions, even more than other peo-
ple, seem to need friends. For how would one benefit from such prosperity 
if one had no opportunity for beneficence, which is most often displayed, 
and most highly praised, in relation to friends?”25 He goes on to define three 
distinct types of friendship. The first are friends who are merely useful to 
each other. While it would certainly be a stretch to call Admiral Marcus 
and Khan “friends,” whatever level of relationship existed between them 
that allowed Marcus to benefit from Khan’s intellect and savagery is based 
merely on utility. The second is friendship merely for the sake of pleasure. 
Kirk’s numerous sexual liaisons—including Uhura’s Orion roommate in 
Star Trek (2009), a Caitian double-team in STID, and, apparently, Christine 
Chapel—involve only shared pleasure. The third, true friendship, involves 
“those who wish goods to their friend for the friend’s own sake” and can 
only be shared, according to Aristotle, among the virtuous.26 This is the type 
of friendship Kirk and Spock are cultivating.
A similar distinction also separates true romantic relationships, as we 
see between Uhura and Spock, from Kirk’s hedonistic dalliances—when 
Carol Marcus mentions Chapel, Kirk doesn’t even remember her. Aristotle 
claims that a person can’t be in love with many people simultaneously, as 
erotic love involves excessive feeling toward one person.27 When Spock is 
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facing imminent death in the volcano on Nibiru, his love for Uhura actually 
motivates him to close off his feelings at that moment. Uhura is upset that 
Spock would allow himself to die and leave her behind without any thought 
to her grief, but Spock explains that the excessive feeling she arouses in 
him—especially given that Vulcan emotions are more intense than humans 
experience—necessitated that he render himself emotionally numb; other-
wise, he wouldn’t have been able to perform his duty and face his death with 
equanimity. Later, he does allow himself to express excessive feeling at the 
moment of Kirk’s death.
Another key relationship Aristotle discusses is between parents and 
children: “The friendship of children to a parent . . . is friendship toward 
what is good and superior. For the parent conferred the greatest benefits 
on his children, since he is the cause of their being and nature and of their 
education once they have been born.”28 This is depicted most clearly in STID 
between Kirk and Admiral Pike. Having lost his biological father when he 
was born, a rebellious Jim Kirk needed a straight talking-to from someone 
“good and superior” after the “epic beating” he provoked with some hot-
headed Starfleet cadets (Star Trek [2009]). Pike challenges Kirk to an even 
greater degree of heroism than his father; yet it’s Pike himself who becomes 
Kirk’s inspirational “father figure” to meet that challenge—believing in Kirk 
even after dressing him down for what happened on Nibiru.
Aristotle contends that parents know their children better than the lat-
ter know themselves, and Pike persistently trusts in Kirk’s character and 
ability—from initially making him first officer of the Enterprise, to sup-
porting his promotion to captain, to reinstating him as first officer after the 
Nibiru incident.29 While Pike isn’t literally responsible for Kirk’s “being and 
nature,” he’s instrumental in Kirk’s becoming the captain we all know he’s 
destined to be—as well as being literally responsible for Kirk’s education to 
help him achieve his future destiny. When Kirk recites the “Captain’s Oath” 
at the Enterprise’s recommissioning ceremony, he admits that he didn’t fully 
appreciate the words the first time Pike had him recite them; now, having 
“acquired some comprehension, or [at least] perception” due to the events 
in STID, Kirk can better appreciate the paternal lessons of his elder.30
“You Seem to Have a Conscience, Mr. Kirk”
We’ve seen how duty, utility, and loyalty motivate our moral behavior and 
could lead to both laudable and condemnable actions. And while these 
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motivations may lead to divergent moral decisions, sometimes they coin-
cide. When Kirk enters the irradiated warp core to repair it and save the 
Enterprise, his action is praiseworthy from all three moral perspectives: he’s 
fulfilling his duty as a starship captain to put his ship and crew first, he’s 
putting the needs of the many ahead of those of the one, and he’s express-
ing his loyalty to his “family.” Unfortunately, not all moral decisions will 
combine these three motivations in such a tight package; Kirk did have to 
violate his duty to the Prime Directive and the utility maxim to save Spock 
out of loyalty to his friend.
By the end of STID, having seen how Marcus’s loyalty to the Federation 
and Khan’s loyalty to his fellow augments have morally corrupted them, Kirk 
is able to give the first of what will surely be many “soapbox” speeches during 
the Enterprise’s ensuing five-year mission: “There will always be those who 
mean to do us harm. To stop them, we risk awakening the same evil within 
ourselves. Our first instinct is to seek revenge when those we love are taken 
from us. But that’s not who we are.” Khan deliberately destroys a Section 31 
facility, attacks Starfleet headquarters, and crashes the Vengeance into San 
Francisco—potentially killing thousands of innocent people to avenge what 
he falsely believes was the death of his fellow augments. Kirk himself imme-
diately wants to hunt down Khan to avenge Pike’s death. Only Spock’s con-
stant moralizing, along Kantian lines of never using a person—even an evil 
person like Khan—merely as a means toward the end of satisfying one’s desire 
for vengeance, leads him to capture Khan instead of killing him outright.
Spock’s ability to stand up to Kirk and remind him of his moral duty is 
a sign of his loyalty to his captain, which is not the same as blind obedience 
to authority. We also see this virtuous form of loyalty when Scotty refuses 
to sign for the top-secret torpedoes being loaded onto the Enterprise with-
out any technical schematics. Not knowing how they might interact with 
the warp core, Scotty exercises his primary duty to safeguard the ship, to 
the point of resigning his post when Kirk directly orders him to authorize 
loading the torpedoes. Despite this seemingly disloyal act on Scotty’s part, 
he’s ready to come to the aid of “Captain James T. ‘Perfect Hair’” when the 
latter comes calling—leading him to be at just the right place at the right 
time to save the Enterprise. Scotty isn’t disloyal to Kirk, the virtuous cap-
tain, but only refuses to obey the morally blind captain who’s hell-bent on 
vengeance no matter the risk to his crew.
When Kirk welcomes Carol Marcus aboard the Enterprise as “part of 
the family,” we can easily imagine future violations of the Prime Directive 
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when the life of one or more of Kirk’s crew is at stake. But that might be okay 
so long as the intrepid crew of the Enterprise remain virtuous and thereby 
worthy of the loyalty they share among themselves. Khan’s loyalty fueled 
wrathful vengeance; Kirk’s will fuel only self-sacrifice and the occasional 
rule bending. Who’d you rather have as the head of your family?
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the Monster and the MensCh
Randall E. Auxier
Why save the best bits? J. J. Abrams’s film Super 8 reaches its climax when 
the young hero, Joe Lamb, and heroine, Alice Dainard, are being chased 
through the subterranean nest of an escaped alien being—a being something 
like a giant spider. We have had the grand moment set up for well over an 
hour with various characters indicating that the “monster” is empathic and 
it communicates by touch. We have also been prepared to assume that Joe 
really understands monsters. He spends his free time building models of 
them, and when it is time for Alice to play a zombie in the kids’ own Super 
8 film, she asks Joe how to do it. His description, while still kid-like, is on 
the money and Alice turns out to be a natural.
We also have the information that our monster (1) is hungry, (2) is ter-
rified, and (3) wants to go home. I felt that way when I saw the first Alien 
movie. That isn’t a good combination for anyone, least of all an intelligent 
being that has been imprisoned for over twenty years and held among aliens 
it regards as hideous insects (i.e., we humans). And our Super 8 monster has 
every reason to see us this way. After all, we never touch the creature except 
with probes and prods, and for it, touching is the basis of communication, 
and hence the primary evidence of the existence of a moral conscience. As far 
as the monster can discern, humans have no such capabilities. To analogize, 
at best we seem like reptiles to this being, and at worst, yes, cockroaches. In 
twenty years of imprisonment, the alien has never had the opportunity to 
discover that we have any moral feeling at all.
Thus, in the key moment, the alien catches Joe, scoops him up, and 
starts to eat him, but feels (and thereby notices) that Joe, while perhaps 
afraid, is trying to see the monster, to study the monster’s face. Studying 
faces is another thing Joe does, as is made abundantly evident in his work 
as a makeup artist. In that crucial instant, the monster pauses, ponders, feels 
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Joe seeing him, offers his own eyes for Joe to look into, and then suddenly 
grasps that human beings do with their eyes what the alien beings do by 
touching. The alien realizes that Joe is “touching” with his eyes, and while 
it is a strange thing, and hard to understand, the alien is, after all, far more 
intelligent than a human being, so the matter is puzzled out. The alien is 
able to grasp, in that moment, why all the humans have responded as they 
have. To them, the visual appearance of such a spiderly alien is terrifying, 
while to the alien, the withholding of touch is barbaric, a kind of unimagin- 
able torture. But now the alien knows that humans did not understand, could 
not understand, its own moral frame of reference.
In that climactic realization, the alien becomes aware that it is wrong 
to feed on these beings and that its first and only imperative is to get off this 
planet and go home. And what is more, the alien being now knows how to 
do it—how to build a ship that will take it home. It may not be obvious to 
those who haven’t reflected on the matter, but the motive force that creates 
the alien’s spacecraft is a kind of love, in the form of desire to touch, to hold, 
to be near, to possess. The parts are drawn together by empathy. That is why 
the sad little piece of the alien spaceship that Joe takes home from the site 
of the train wreck “wants” to be with the other pieces. The ship is made of 
and powered by something like longing.
When the alien becomes aware that humans actually do have love, or 
more precisely, longing within themselves, it also realizes that it can use 
anything that anyone loves (in the relevant sense) to rebuild its craft. That 
is why, in the denouement, only some things are drawn upward into the 
water tower and fused into the ship. The things being drawn up are things 
that someone loves. That gun the soldier won’t relinquish, that cool car, 
and yes, the necklace that Joe’s mother wore and that he has invested with 
every ounce of his personal longing. Giving the locket to the alien is, as 
we know, a “Spielberg moment,” but I think the philosophy transcends 
Steven Spielberg’s typical (and unhappily simplistic) moral messages. In 
Abrams’s hand, it isn’t actually unselfishness or agapic love that is rel-
evant, nor is it eros of any kind. He has thought this through more care-
fully. The operative kind of desire is, as I said, longing. But what is that? 
Abrams tells us, by way of Alice Dainard, who, unlike Joe (who depends 
on his eyes for understanding), is an empath. It does not occur to Alice 
that not everyone who is touched by the monster comes to understand 
the monster. Only some people do, like Alice and Dr. Woodward. Alice 
gets it and reports it to Joe, just before he is scooped up. It is crucial for 
The Monster and the Mensch 133
the story that Joe believes Alice completely, even if he can’t feel it himself. 
He has seen what she can do. She says longing is a mix of (1) hunger, (2) 
terror, and (3) wanting to go home.
The thematic suggestion made by the movie is, therefore, that when it 
comes to making the monster into a mensch (that favored trope of the mov-
ies endowed to us by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein), the trick is to grasp that 
longing is the connection we have with the monster. And beyond Abrams’s 
insight about longing there looms a really tough philosophical question. 
Is this “longing” what empathy really means? Can we, as humans (or even 
including other species), share, at any equally profound level, any other 
form of desire? Or is the bottom line that we can all be afraid, hungry, and 
far from home together, and that’s about the long and short of who we are? 
Can agapic love or friendship or erotic attraction go deep enough to con-
tribute anything to empathy? Or is empathy really just a power to develop 
that moment of longing within ourselves by sharing it with others? In my 
view, that is what Super 8 is about, and it’s a little more far-reaching than 
the usual Spielberg questions.
Now that you know what this essay is about, let me take a few steps back 
to examine how Abrams accomplishes his aims. There are many monsters in 
Abrams’s head, and not all follow the patterns established in Super 8. I will 
privilege this movie and this monster in what follows, as a clue for under-
standing Abrams, and I will not argue for that assumption apart from say-
ing that I feel this movie and this monster are special for him. I think they 
show something about the man that he hasn’t put into his other projects, at 
least not so fully as this one.
Hunger: The Peculiar Appetite of Film
Quotationalism is a word culture critics created to describe the (apparently 
infinite) capacity of mass culture to digest and regurgitate itself in allusions 
of allusions, parodies of parodies, and tributes of tributes.1 Perhaps televi-
sion is most gluttonous among the various media, but long before the advent 
of television or even commercial movies, books were already about other 
books. What has changed in the last hundred years is that a new feast of 
morsels for quotation has been cooked up in appetizing visual images and 
delicious lines that make memorable sound bites (rather than highbrow fare, 
where people show off their stale Shakespeare or their crusty Byron). And 
for dessert, there is recorded music in general, which, please recall, didn’t 
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exist until a little over a century ago (so yes, it’s a processed food, but who 
can resist Twinkies and Ding-Dongs?).
Yet the appetite isn’t limited to the content of mass culture. Everyone 
knows, I think, that movie making has the advantage of consuming every 
other artistic form and commercial medium, using them to their fullest as 
dependent art forms. In the same way that sculpture was absorbed into archi-
tecture during the Middle Ages but then broke free again in the Renaissance, 
many art forms are simply absorbed by other art forms for a time, and no 
art form ever existed that is more voracious than the movies. Obviously, a 
symphony, created independently and aimed only at its own musical tar-
get, can accomplish artistic ends that a film cannot. And that is also why we 
often comment that a movie “wasn’t as good as the book,” and so on. What 
we mean is that a book can tell a story in a way the movies cannot equal. 
No major medium of artistic expression is at its very best when it becomes 
a mere ingredient in another, but it has to be admitted that feature-length 
movies can preserve more of what makes another artistic medium valuable 
in its own right than any other art form. What a canvas of space, time, image, 
word, and sound! Makes me sort of hungry.
And in a way, we go to the movies because we are hungry for something—
not just images and stories, but the sequence of feelings these evoke when we 
eat them with our eyes and ears. We want to devour all the forms at once. A 
feature film can bring to the table an orchestral piece or song, for example, as 
the music it really is—there is enough time for that in a full-length feature. 
I savor, emotionally speaking, the scores of John Williams—especially the 
only two scores that ever actually made me cry, which were Goodbye Mr. 
Chips and Amistad—and I wonder, would these amazing works of orches-
tral music exist without the films? No, I don’t think so; although it is true 
that the music is subordinated to the film, it is also the case that sometimes 
the music swells and overtakes the film and seems to drive the whole flavor.
Of course, the genre of the musical adds in so much music that it 
becomes the main course. When one considers a smorgasbord like the long 
scene in An American in Paris, in which Leslie Caron and Gene Kelly dance 
their way through a dozen styles of French painting to the strains of Gersh-
win, well, I don’t need to say more about this phenomenon. My point is that 
emotional and aesthetic desire fall within the limits of hunger, humanly 
understood. There is, as Kant insisted, a subjective universality that con-
nects at this level any being worthy of the name “human” to all the others.2
And the fact is that because the film industry has been able to spend 
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hundreds of billions of dollars on art during its great commercial century, 
artists who wanted to make a living have been drawn to and have been will-
ing to develop their gifts and expend their creativity in service of the meta–
art form of movie making. People who would have gone into different arts 
or who wouldn’t have had artistic careers at all were drawn into the movies. 
The simple fact that people were willing to pay handsomely to dine on the 
results of all that cooking did most of the work.
When we consider the auteur director in this light, a sort of magnificent 
chef of images and emotions, it is tempting to wonder what any one of our 
famous directors might have done for a living in the centuries before the 
invention of film. I think Spielberg, for instance, belongs to the Hans Chris-
tian Andersen and Brothers Grimm line of writers and story collectors. It 
is clear to me that for all his imagistic prowess, Spielberg is no painter. He 
really is a storyteller first, but he might also have found work as an illustra-
tor. The kinds of stories he tells are fairy tales, in the best sense of the word. 
I think it is pretty clear that Hitchcock would have directed plays and run 
a theater. I think Tarantino would have been a playwright. And Abrams? 
What of him? I will answer that question at the end of this essay. If I say it 
now, it invites controversy. Yes, all this is just my opinion, but, as with the 
three opinions I expressed about those other directors, there is a case for 
the opinion.
But where it concerns quotationalism, every art form consumes every 
other in the feeding frenzy of global mass culture. Abrams seems to under-
stand this and has indeed begun the process of perfecting it, but his use of 
the film within a film device as the B-story in this movie shows that he wants 
to be lighthearted about this part of the structure of the film and its narra-
tive. Like Tarantino, Abrams understands that what you quote becomes part 
and parcel of the Warholian identity you beget in the public mind. Abrams 
is crafting his own image in his choices. It’s a kind of artistic styling made 
from lots of little squeals that say, “I like this!” I think of the moment in Super 
8 when a Starsky and Hutch 1974 Gran Torino crosses a distant intersec-
tion just as the camera fades away from a scene. That is playful. The movie 
is literally made of such quotations.
So it is an artistic styling made in little squeals, sideways whispers, and 
elbows nudging at your ribs. In the same way that Kid Rock can assert his 
redneck credentials, his love of redneck Michigan, and his redneck conser-
vatism by combining, of all things, a groove from Warren Zevon, a guitar 
lick from Lynyrd Skynyrd, and a piano tinkle from Bob Seeger into a musi-
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cal manifesto . . . well, let’s just say that if a dim bulb like Kid Rock can pull 
that off, even if it makes me want to barf, someone with Abrams’s cultural 
background has plenty to choose from. But when you’re hungry for a series 
of feelings, there’s nothing quite like going to the movies—or making one.
Fear Itself: 1979
As we know, Abrams wrote, directed, and produced Super 8, but he took his 
baby boomer adoptive Uncle Steven along for the ride. Abrams’s penchant 
for quoting Spielberg in images, in cinematic style, in script style, and in 
theme has been commented on by everyone. Some people can’t stomach this 
level of hero worship. To be honest, if I personally believed that was the real 
story, I wouldn’t be writing this essay. I like Spielberg’s films just fine, and I 
never miss one, but he annoys me enough to discourage any writing from 
my end (I’m sure he’s devastated . . . ). Spielberg’s simplistic moralizing, his 
inability to recognize when he’s said enough, the out-and-out obviousness 
of his symbol choices, the total absence of subtlety, and most of all the self-
serious self-indulgence . . . well, I have said enough, but he insults the intel-
ligence of his audience and leaves nothing to their imaginations. Yet I prefer 
him to most of his generational cohort, since it doesn’t look like he sold out.
On the other hand, I like Abrams’s version of Spielberg better than 
Spielberg. There is a deconstruction of Spielberg in Abrams (I am far from 
the first to say this, of course). Part of the reason I like Abrams is that, in a 
way, the Goonies are better the second time around. The setting of Super 8 
is exactly calibrated with Abrams’s own childhood (more on that shortly)—
it was a weird, in-between time to grow up. Abrams is too young to be a 
baby boomer, but as the oldest of the Gen Xers, he really isn’t quite a child 
of the eighties either. The year 1979, when this movie is set, was a cultural 
void. Disco and southern rock had gone rancid, Zeppelin was moribund, 
Springsteen was on hiatus, and we were still listening to Hotel California. 
Stirrings of the eighties were under way, for sure, but Abrams chose not 
to bring in the music of 1979. That was a conscious decision, I’m sure. He 
must have judged that it would detract from the mood he wanted to cre-
ate. This was not primarily about nostalgia for that year. It was more about 
what was scary that year.
The Iranian Revolution was under way (but no one understood what it 
meant). Carter was still president, but the country wasn’t going to be recov-
ering from Vietnam, Watergate, and the oil crisis. The president had given a 
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speech, now dubbed the “malaise” speech, in which he told us that we were 
living beyond our means and that if we didn’t make sacrifices now, consume 
less, and pay down our debts, our economic future was very uncertain. That 
displaced feeling of being betwixt and between, a sort of aimlessness as the 
nation’s industrial base disintegrates, pervades Super 8. One hardly knows 
what to think today, as the film opens with a scene of a still-functioning steel 
mill, something that would be extinct before too many more years elapsed. 
Abrams said in an interview that the whole film grew from the idea of hav-
ing someone change the safety sign at a steel mill. If that writing decision 
doesn’t give us a clue that this movie is about truly scary stuff, then we are 
pretty slow.
But fear isn’t the same as terror. They are related, but it isn’t easy to 
understand how vague fears grow into total terror, especially for kids who 
haven’t got enough life experience to have their fear generalized into exis-
tential angst. As every storyteller knows, things have to come apart gradually 
and build into an apocalyptic moment. You can’t escalate fear into terror by 
having things jump out from behind trees. Terror takes time.
Abrams wanted to capture that transitional time in our history, a time 
almost no one takes the trouble to remember—post-seventies, pre-eighties 
—and to make it vaguely scary. Not much was going on, but there was one 
thing good about 1979: the box office. It is important to remember that 
Abrams grew up in L.A., in a movie-making family. It was a big year out in 
L.A. There was Apocalypse Now and the (very) first Star Trek movie (ironi-
cally), and Kramer vs. Kramer, and most importantly, this was the year Alien 
came out. Our monster in Super 8 is modeled on the monster from Alien, 
and the camera technique of Ridley Scott and Derek Vanlint, showing parts 
of the alien without allowing the audience to get a sense of the monster as 
a whole, is repeated in Super 8. Obviously they weren’t the first to come up 
with the idea, but the technique had become a cliché by 1979. Scott and 
Vanlint resurrected it with powerful effect.
Many writers and critics have remarked that Alien signaled a real change 
in Hollywood. It had been foreshadowed with Jaws (1975) and Dawn of the 
Dead (1978), but with the release of Alien, no longer would moviegoers be 
bothered with the complexity of needing to empathize with the monster. In 
1979 the requirement of conscience that marked the sixties and seventies, 
in which Mary Shelley’s softer sensibilities about monsters would domi-
nate, suddenly retrogressed to the fifties (taking Sigourney Weaver’s pants 
along with it—so not everything would be like the fifties . . . ). Back in the 
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duck-and-cover fifties, you were allowed, nay, expected simply to be horri-
fied at the alien invaders, at their shear otherness. You weren’t expecting the 
Frankenstein scenario, the misunderstood-monster-is-the-mensch moment. 
Weaver’s nemesis in Alien wasn’t misunderstood, it was evil, violent, and 
planning to eat us all.
The residents of 1979 live on the cusp of Reagan’s cruel world, and they 
don’t know it. The slow creepiness of the eighties hasn’t yet poked its way 
out of their bellies and into their consciousness. These characters still think 
it’s the seventies, and in a way it is. But the struggle for the souls of mov-
iegoers was well under way (after all, one last monster-mensch needed to 
phone home, in 1982, before the good guys lost), and the main change was 
that the public was given permission to refuse the moral chore of seeking 
the monster’s point of view. Abrams remembers all this. In retrospect he has 
also been able to see something of its meaning, so the writing, set decora-
tion, art direction, and even the acting in Super 8 capture that time and its 
insensibility of the future. It’s a world with no war-mongering neoconserva-
tives, a world in which airlines and utilities and the telephone company are 
regulated by the government in the public interest, and a time when steel 
mills still made steel. No Wal-Mart, no Internet, no stadium seating at the 
movies, no MTV, and, by the way, no Rubik’s cubes (Abrams missed that 
detail—but the geek squad on imdb.com has several dozen other anachro-
nisms you might want to note; none of them hurts the film). The more you 
study the details of the movie, the more you’ll be able to grasp the compara-
tive innocence of the moment.
(What’s So Funny ’Bout) Peace, Love, and Understanding?
So, if that’s 1979, then why 1979? The movie is autobiographical in many 
ways, and Abrams came from a movie-making family and started making 
Super 8 movies when he was about eight years old, so by the time he was 
thirteen, he was probably pretty far into what he would do for a living. He 
did enter film contests when he was a kid, and I wouldn’t be shocked if there 
was a Super 8 zombie movie in a can somewhere from, oh, about 1979. 
But nothing depends on that hypothesis. Instead, I stake my case on this: 
we all have to concede that age thirteen is the paradigm for the last year of 
innocence. Many critics have remarked how good this movie is at making 
them feel like kids again, and there is the gotcha device that the film uses 
to make you care, to evoke not just your sympathy but your empathy, your 
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identification with the characters. Not all of us lost our mothers or had 
drunk fathers, but we all were thirteen once. If I were a writer-director and 
I wanted to capture thirteen, I would use my memory rather than just my 
imagination. Setting this film in 1979 enables Abrams simply to remember 
his way through a million decisions.
But I think there is more. I see the middle-aged man Abrams, at the 
height of his artistic powers, reflectively at work here too. There is a retro-
spective understanding that intensifies this particular year, this time, and 
it isn’t nostalgia. These kids are the first Gen Xers, but of course, they also 
don’t know that yet. Capturing this variable innocence and ignorance in his 
characters as well as his setting was, in my view, important to the message 
Abrams wanted to convey, and it is the retrospective understanding that is 
crucial to building the terror. I think most thirteen-year-old kids in America 
during that year heard Elvis Costello ring out the death knell of the seven-
ties with the following repeated lament:
So where are the strong?
And who are the trusted?
And where is the harmony?3
I suppose one could say that 1979 was the year that we collectively ceased 
pretending to care about the absurd Age of Aquarius and the ridiculous 
promise of Woodstock. It was the year the baby boomers became honest 
with themselves about wanting a lot of money. Not everyone went along, 
of course. Spielberg didn’t, for example. But for Abrams, the experience of 
Gen X was beginning. The baby boomers were too self-absorbed to notice 
the path of cultural and political destruction they were leaving in their wake. 
There was nothing but scraps and hair bands for a boy like Abrams, born 
in 1966. But my oh my, there were scraps. Super 8 doesn’t just quote them, 
it is made of them.
Tom Wolfe famously described the 1970s as the “Me Decade,” in con-
trast with the sixties, and with some justice. But if that was true of the sev-
enties, then the eighties must have been the “not you” decade, for then, in 
our boredom, we took the opportunity to ignore interests beyond our own 
narrowest ones, deregulating everything and everyone, declaring war on 
labor, taxes, public support for education. Our free-market fundamentalists 
opened the gates to global exploitation of the poorest of the poor so that we 
could send domestic working-class jobs to places with no laws or unions 
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protecting the men, women, and children who took on the work—often suf-
fering on the brink of starvation, but conveniently out of sight. We decided 
to arm any group of thugs who would do our bidding in tiny countries too 
poor to resist their tyranny and, unsatisfied with doing this sort of thing 
passively, we organized coups to take down independent-minded democ-
racies. Yes, all was done with the cooperation and full approval of the baby 
boomers. They didn’t want jobs in the steel mills, they wanted executive 
salaries, and they didn’t want to think about what some child was doing for 
food in Bangladesh or Indonesia. By 1989 it was over—both the Cold War 
and the transformation of the Third World into the unseen, unheard, and 
underfed sweatshop to sate our consumerist appetites (not that they ever 
can be sated, really).
In short, in 1979 we were about to take our selfishness global in a neo-
imperialism aimed at making others pay for our party back here at home. 
That was the alternative Carter failed to mention in his malaise speech.4 
There may have been better parties had on the backs of oppressed and starv-
ing people, under the reign of Caligula, for example, but I doubt there has 
ever been a bigger one. I give you genuine human terror. We have met the 
enemy. We looked in the mirror and failed to recognize that Ridley Scott’s 
alien was looking back at us. It was a baby boomer’s reflection, a selfish, vio-
lent, inhuman consumption machine. It was the USA, in the hands of 78.3 
million spoiled fools who have yet to turn loose and probably never will. If 
I weren’t a baby boomer myself, I’d be pretty cynical.
Generation X watched helplessly and tried to understand. They still do. 
This younger group collected a reputation for cynicism, for being without 
ambition and without distinct achievement. Still, it isn’t easy to imagine what 
they could have done, and many have not been slow to wag a finger at the 
boomers and say, “Look at the mess you made of everything, you unfeeling 
murderers of all hope.” And here, here I believe we reach the heart of the 
matter. The problem that constitutes the moral backdrop for Super 8 just is 
the problem of empathy. The baby boomers lack it in Super 8—although the 
only examples we are given would be chubby Charles Kaznyk’s sexpot older 
sister, Jen, and her drugged-out, lusty admirer, Donny. These fine citizens 
will soon be in charge of everything.
The adults in the movie are people born during the Depression or dur-
ing the Second World War itself. They have lost their power of empathy, 
not due to hunger for the pleasures of the flesh and pure consumption but 
from fear itself. The Depression, the war, and the Cold War have done them 
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in. They were the officers in the Vietnam era, taking their orders from vet-
erans of the Second World War and carrying them out without asking too 
many questions. After all, their elders won the big war and they knew what 
is best. Not one of the Depression babies would ever serve as U.S. president. 
They are a silent and lost generation, and the movie captures this, but it also 
provides one exception: the science teacher, Dr. Woodward, who essentially 
sacrifices his life to help an alien creature. His last words, to the evil air force 
colonel Nelec, is an assertion of the primacy of empathy, which comes down 
to saying that the alien is in him and he is in it. Nelec is unmoved and orders 
another black soldier to execute Woodward. That’s pretty much how you 
kill conscience.
It is fair to note that if Dr. Woodward had a Ph.D. in some sort of bio-
logical science in 1958, when he was among the scientists the air force chose 
to study the alien, he was something of a pioneer. There were precious few 
black Ph.D.s in that day, and those who were around had reason to under-
stand the alien’s predicament. Being surrounded by white people who were 
completely unconscious of their privilege and in deep denial about their 
racism must bear some analogy to the predicament of the alien. Woodward 
is transformed by the alien’s touch, but we are not told whether the alien is 
aware of it—an important detail.
In any case, Dr. Woodward understands that the basic moral require-
ment in this situation, for any intelligent being, is that the creature must be 
set free, at any personal cost. That alien’s treatment is thus a symbol of what 
fear does to us over time. In short, Dr. Woodward becomes conscious of the 
genuine terror, and that is the idea of a world full of pod people, people who 
refuse to feel the longing of others, who would defend their own physical 
safety, and their power and privilege, at the cost of their souls. Being robbed 
of peace and love for two generations, we lost our capacity for understand-
ing. It isn’t funny.
Thus the terror relevant to longing is the way in which we can come to fear 
losing ourselves, our very souls, to any set of social protocols that requires 
us to be, well, zombies. The kids in Super 8 are surrounded by zombies—
hunger zombies and fear zombies, like those in the military. What are they? 
As Joe says to Alice, “Pretty much be a lifeless ghoul, with no soul. Dead 
eyes. Scary. Did you ever have Mrs. Mullin?” All the adults they know are 
terrifying and terrified, even though no one knows it, because that is what 
fear will do over time. The Cold War was so old by 1979 that no one could 
even remember what it was like not to live on the brink of apocalypse, and 
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so in Abrams’s script, the zombie apocalypse did happen. But it was gradual, 
so no one knew when to declare it openly. The effect of two generations of 
Cold War was that no one noticed when our souls were gone and we just 
became hungry, frightened, consumerist pod people. We were ready for 
Wal-Mart. And so Abrams did actually make a zombie movie, in the scari-
est sense of the word.
So Far from Home: Empathic Longing
The problem of empathy doesn’t have a long history in philosophy—at least, 
not when compared to other long-standing problems in Western thought. 
For most of our history in the West, the prevailing view was that the power 
of reason is the distinguishing trait of humanity. In all fairness, people in 
the Eastern world were talking about whether the power of sympathy might 
be the distinguishing trait of humanity for over two thousand years.5 And 
there were certainly wise ones in the West who placed great value on fellow 
feeling. But in the West, somehow these common-sense observations never 
became a central part of the philosophical conversation.
Philosophers from Plato onward were critical of anyone who deployed 
human intelligence or persuasive speech for the purpose of stirring up the 
emotions of those who heard or read such rhetoric, and over time the gen-
eral opinion came to hold that emotion in general degrades and distorts our 
powers of reason. One could say we chose to philosophize like zombies, and 
having developed the habit of doing so, we came to be unfamiliar with the 
very real (and positive, constructive) relations between feeling and reason-
ing. It’s kind of scary, actually, but we got used to it.
So it came as something of a radical suggestion in 1755 when Jean-
Jacques Rousseau asserted that our power of sympathy (along with our power 
of healthy self-love) is essential to our humanity.6 Obviously there is a very 
great difference between sympathy—the pity we feel when we witness suffer-
ing—and empathy, which is feeling exactly what another person (or being) 
feels. But the question of empathy doesn’t arise philosophically in the West 
until the questions of sympathy and healthy self-love are under discussion.
Most of the attention of philosophers in the nineteenth century, inso-
far as they addressed this question at all, was devoted either to justifying 
or attacking self-love and sorting out the good from the bad kinds of love. 
There was significant discussion of sympathy, but the prevailing opinion 
among those Europeans who had colonized the world, and who intended 
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to exploit and oppress it further—almost like alien invaders—was that sym-
pathy makes human beings weak and unable to do what is necessary for 
the advancement of the race. (Granting that the British, French, Spanish, 
Portuguese, Dutch, Italians, and Germans had very different ideas of what 
would advance the human race, they seemed to agree that sympathy was a 
luxury no powerful nation could afford.) The colonizers had Herbert Spen-
cer and August Comte and Charles Darwin and T. H. Huxley and Arthur 
Schopenhauer to gird up their colonizing loins and assure them that all the 
invasion and murder of less civilized people was absolutely necessary, or at 
least not morally significant. The Marxist reaction to all this slaughter and 
misery wasn’t exactly characterized by an emphasis on compassion. Thus, 
after Rousseau’s assertion, it took another 150 years before any major West-
ern philosopher took up empathy as a subject.
The group of thinkers who finally examined the question were phenom-
enologists. They were committed to giving reflective descriptions of sub-
jective experience. They took for granted that, as a matter of necessity, my 
experience is mine and yours is yours, so the issue of whether we could have 
“the same feeling” posed a number of formal problems. Since your feeling 
is in you and mine is in me, so the story goes, they can’t be “identical,” and 
so if they are somehow the “same” feeling, they must have either the same 
form or the same content, or both, but they are different instances—in sort 
of the way that two sisters can belong to the “same family” or the “same par-
ents.” But obviously siblings are also different. By analogy, wouldn’t there 
be differences between my version of, say, feeling your suffering and your 
version of it or of your version of feeling my suffering and my version of the 
same? And would the difference be greater still if someone steps on your 
toe and I say “ouch” and reach for my own toe in empathy? At what point 
do we simply just admit they are different, or different enough that empathy 
is not real, just a story we tell ourselves?
Questions such as these are addressed in the writings of Max Scheler 
(1874–1928) and Edith Stein (1891–1942). In 1913 Scheler criticized in detail 
those thinkers after Rousseau, from Adam Smith to Sigmund Freud, who 
collapsed sympathy into self-love and insisted that the roots of sympathy 
lie in self-interest. That, Scheler believed, was a very great mistake. Scheler 
sorted out the various modes and types of sympathy, including fellow feel-
ing, identification, egoism, love, hate, emotional infection, and empathy.7
In 1916 Stein (who subsequently was canonized by the Roman Catholic 
Church) framed and published her theory of empathy—the word in German 
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is revealing: Einfühlung, or single-feeling. Stein believed that the questions 
associated with the experience of empathy were among the most reveal-
ing philosophical questions we can ask. The very structure of all human 
experience is bound up with feeling what others feel. Without belaboring 
the subtle story, Stein claims that what I experience, what is truly mine in 
an experience, is the act of experiencing. The content of my experience, 
whether it is a memory, a fantasy, an anticipation, or a feeling, is not exclu-
sively mine—even if it is my memory, the immediate mine-ness is in the 
act, not in the content. The content, whatever it may be, “announces” itself 
to the act of experiencing. So even my own memories must be announced 
and relived to be experienced at all.
If this is right, then there is no requirement that any content of expe-
rience must be the private possession of the experiencer. When we empa-
thize, then, we do not infer what another is feeling (by interpreting bodily 
responses or facial expressions), and we do not project our so-called private 
feelings onto others, and we do not make conjectures or guesses. Rather, 
the content of the experience “announces” itself to the act of experiencing. 
Hence, we really could share a memory, an anticipation, or a fantasy as well 
as a feeling. In empathizing, we actually share the same feeling in two dif-
ferent acts, yours and mine (which need not even be simultaneous). Stein 
does not claim that the feeling content is identical in every respect, but she 
does claim that ideally it could be.8
This brings us back to Abrams’s exhibition of empathy in Super 8. What 
is it, for him? It isn’t the self-sacrificing love Christians call agape. Agapic 
love is not a kind of understanding, it passes understanding. It is self- 
sacrifice for those who cannot understand, either what they are doing or 
what is being done for them by a being that is morally superior. Neither our 
Goonies nor our alien is in any such frame of mind. Dr. Woodward might 
be, but he dies vowing revenge, and Abrams makes sure he gets it, so I don’t 
think this is agape.
Is it friendship? Friendship (philia in Greek) in the highest sense is based 
on equality, Aristotle says; one discovers a sort of “second self,” and the two 
souls are alike not just coincidentally but in their moral achievements and 
judgments. They are alike in virtue, and that is the basis of such friendship.9 
One would expect an ideal empathy in such friends, and I think that is what 
happens. But the interesting thing about empathy is that it can exist across 
great distances and differences—in time, place, virtue, even species. What-
ever it is that enables us to share the same feeling, it does not require very 
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much sameness of circumstance, or of past experience, or even of physiol-
ogy. Empathy is not a kind of friendship.
Is it erotic attraction? Not in Abrams’s view. First of all, Abrams is very, 
very careful not to objectify or sexualize any characters in the movie except 
Jen Kaznyk and lusty Donny. The relationship between Joe and Alice is basi-
cally nonerotic—yes, he thinks she is sad and beautiful, but he is awestruck, 
not enamored. Abrams is very careful in how he frames the shots Alice is in 
so as never to do with her what (male) directors always do with pretty young 
girls, which is to make sure we lecherous men can gawk at their bodies. And 
even on a set with an entire passel of young boys, Abrams steers away from 
having them even so much as notice how attractive she is; they are amazed 
by her acting ability and that she has the guts to take off in her father’s car.
No, Abrams refuses the standard moves and that is because he wants to 
show us the person, not the thing that Alice is. So she sneaks out to see Joe, 
knocks on his window, and the romantic possibilities become an empathy-
fest. That, friends and neighbors, is deliberate on Abrams’s part. It blocks our 
voyeuristic efforts to sexualize Alice. He is saying, “Hey, you, zombie pervert 
in the tenth row, yeah you with your mind in the gutter, I’m talking to you. 
Would you give your lizard brain a rest and think about something else for 
the balance of this movie?” And this shows, pretty clearly, that Abrams is 
aware that erotic feeling really isn’t empathic at all; it takes us beyond our-
selves, projects us into a realm of desire that seems to be shared with another 
for a time, but that relation turns out to be unsustainable. Yes, the soul grows 
wings under the sway of eros, but the wings get tired and the soul descends. 
We do not know whether the alien is male or female, or whether gender 
applies to it at all. The reason is simple. This isn’t about eros.
And empathy is not self-transcendence and it is not ecstatic or mysti-
cal. There is just no religion or spirituality in this film. No preachers, no 
prophets, and no churches. The funeral scene at the beginning of the movie 
would have been the obvious moment for at least a shot of a church, whether 
interior or exterior. Abrams explicitly avoids this. It’s a conscious decision. 
There will be no revelations in Lillian, Ohio, in 1979. The people will have 
to solve their problems without that kind of help.
For Abrams, empathy is centered in the body, not the soul, and it does 
not, by itself, cause action. Yet empathy is also not strictly passive or a pas-
sion of any kind. It is not something we suffer. What the devil is it, then? 
It is clear rather than cloudy, a clear moment of understanding of some 
sort. It doesn’t lift us up and it doesn’t bring us back down, so it isn’t levity 
146 Randall E. Auxier
or gravity. It’s a moment of presence. I think Abrams thinks that we come 
to recognize empathy when together we find that we are, together, hungry, 
afraid, and homesick. The solidarity of the friends in The Wonderful Wizard 
of Oz provides a paradigm.
We recognize that combination in others, across the most varied of cir-
cumstances, but it is difficult to do so when we are sated, secure, and home. 
In fact, the killers of our empathy for others are just those three things, 
which is why Americans of the Second Gulf War era don’t give a tinker’s 
damn about their own troops, either when they are fighting or when they 
come home ruined. There is something cloudy and grave about satiety and 
security, especially when we think that home is something we can possess 
and defend. I, for one, would sooner be homeless than call the United States 
the “Homeland.” Who cannot see that this view of “home” is the essential 
ingredient in fascism? No, we shall have no homeland, and here I am pretty 
sure that I simply state Abrams’s (and Spielberg’s) view of the matter.
And it is good to be aware that the hunger without the terror is just as 
dangerous as the terror without the hunger. I think I just described the two 
American political parties, but they seem to agree on the homeland idea. 
What have we become? Yet at the very bottom of the well of longing is the 
absence of home. The truth is that humans are vagrants on the doorstep of 
being; we are frail, stupid, dying creatures with nothing to guide us back to 
our cosmic Kansas except our own pathetic cries and yelps of pain. That is 
why we can feel each other’s feelings. It isn’t our intelligence, it’s our empti-
ness, our homelessness, that we can share.
Go home again? But we have no homes, at least not after about age 
thirteen. I guess 1979 was the thirteen of U.S. history. Sometimes we do 
feel, together, that there is no home, no place where the steel mills are still 
open, no way back to Lillian, Ohio. The only aftermath of the zombie-alien 
apocalypse we get in Super 8 is the kids’ movie itself. It lacks much in the 
way of “production value,” but it’s innocent. We notice our homelessness 
when we reflect on lost innocence. And we wouldn’t want to have known 
then what we know now. And we are in the frame of mind to make this leap 
into the emotional arms of others mostly when we are hungry and fright-
ened and far from home, in some sense of those words. I think this is why 
we still like to leave home and go to the movies, with strangers, and munch 
on overpriced popcorn, and get the shit scared out of us by monsters, and 
feel the same things everyone else is feeling, alone, in the dark, with our 
friends, and with others.
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The longing that brings us out of our homes is what we really share, it is 
our civic bond, a resoluteness to come clear about our weaknesses and that 
is what makes us human. Obviously the twist in Super 8 is that the alien’s 
moral decency is never really in question: ours is. Any being, whether divine 
or alien, that can see the longing in us can also know that our weaknesses 
are understandable. And that isn’t redemption, exactly, but it isn’t damna-
tion either. Once the alien understands that the monsters are the menschen, 
it’s time to go home, and that’s true whether you’re in the movie or you just 
went to see it.
And, as promised early on, here is the opinion: I think Abrams would 
have been a healer of some kind, perhaps a veterinarian, if there were no 
movies. I leave it to you to puzzle out why I might think that, but I will offer 
this much of a hint. Abrams has a whole stable of monsters, and he seems to 
be responsible for their care and feeding, and when they get sick, monsters 
can’t tell you what’s wrong with them. They don’t know. But remember, as 
you consider this opinion, who the monsters are in Super 8.
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abraMs, arIstotLe, and 
aLternate WorLds
Finding Friendship in the Final Frontier
Joseph J. Foy
In 2009 J. J. Abrams successfully engaged in a reboot of the Star Trek fran-
chise, freeing him from the canonical constraints of the classic original series 
and allowing him to re-create the iconic figures of Captain James T. Kirk and 
Mr. Spock. However, rather than radically departing from the well-known 
narrative, Abrams instead reaffirmed the importance of the friendship that 
defined Kirk and Spock and provided insight into the significance of com-
munity in the final frontier.
In this chapter I will explore the philosophies of Aristotle (384–322 
b.c.e.) on friendship and virtue that underlie Abrams’s Star Trek.1 Using 
an alternate timeline to enable a look into the formation of community 
among the crew, Abrams reveals how critical friendships formed gener-
ally, and between Kirk and Spock in particular. His film suggests that it is 
the bonds developed at these formative stages that lead to the success of 
the heroic mission of exploration and the quest for knowledge aboard the 
famed U.S.S. Enterprise.
In the vernacular of popular culture studies, a “reboot” is when an artist 
takes a known franchise and gives it new life, all but dismissing any previ-
ously established continuity or storyline commitments. Abrams successfully 
accomplishes a reboot of the original Trek through the creation of a parallel 
universe formed from time-travel through a black hole. This enables him to 
engage in a type of counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditional analysis of the 
development and nature of the relationships aboard the starship Enterprise.2
In the timeline set in the original Trek canon, a star goes into supernova, 
threatening to destroy the galaxy. Using red matter, Spock Prime creates a 
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black hole capable of absorbing the explosion.3 While he is able to fire a drop 
of the red matter into the exploding star, he is not fast enough to save planet 
Romulus. Immediately following the creation of the black hole, Spock Prime 
is intercepted by a Romulan named Nero, who holds the Vulcan account-
able for the destruction of his home world. While Spock Prime attempts to 
escape the Romulan intent on revenge, both Spock Prime’s and Nero’s ships 
are pulled into the black hole, which opens a door to a time 129 years in the 
past. It is there that Nero destroys the U.S.S. Kelvin, a ship whose command 
is assumed by George Kirk (James’s biological father) after the Romulan kills 
its original captain for professing no knowledge of an “Ambassador Spock.” 
The destruction of the Kelvin upsets the known timeline, effectively creat-
ing an alternate universe in which Abrams is able to recast the adventures 
of the crew aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise.
Of course, the parallel universe concept is not unique to the Star Trek 
franchise. For example, fans will likely recall that in Star Trek: The Origi-
nal Series, an ion storm causes a transporter malfunction that sends Kirk, 
McCoy, Scotty, and Uhura to a parallel universe in which the Enterprise is 
a cutthroat vessel carrying out the dictatorial orders of the savage Terran 
Empire.4 However, Abrams’s film uses the possibility of parallel universes in 
a manner otherwise unexplored in any other Trek series. Rather than using 
the alternate reality as a plot complication in which the heroes ultimately 
return to their own universe, Abrams’s Star Trek is based in a parallel uni-
verse, which allows Abrams to reboot the franchise and recast the lives of 
the familiar characters.
While the use of the alternate timeline allows Abrams to depart from 
the known Trek storyline, he remains faithful to the essence of the charac-
ters portrayed in The Original Series. It is here that Abrams inserts himself 
into the rich philosophical discussion about the nature of “transworld iden-
tity” and whether an individual might maintain similar identity properties 
across possible worlds. In this case, is it possible that James T. Kirk in one 
universe will necessarily share most major identity characteristics with a 
James T. Kirk existing in a parallel universe while having a few somewhat 
different qualities and properties?
This question is not a simple one to answer. In fact, the Trek franchise 
gives multiple accounts of possible worlds that only seem to confuse the 
debate. In The Original Series episode “Mirror, Mirror,” the Kirk shown to 
exist in the parallel universe shares some traits and characteristics with Kirk 
in the prime world. However, this other Kirk is also sadistic, self-serving, 
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and dictatorial, which is a radical departure from the Captain Kirk we are 
familiar with in the prime universe. In his film, however, Abrams suggests 
that it is possible that the crew of the Enterprise will share similar, significant 
properties in both worlds (which accounts for Sulu’s fencing expertise and 
Chekov’s pronunciation of the word vessel as “wessel,” as well as the fact that 
the crew all maintain their respective duties and functions on the Enterprise 
in both worlds). Although this is likely a controversial position among some 
philosophers who posit a theory of multiple worlds, Abrams attempts to 
create an identical world up to the point where Nero’s vessel passes through 
the black hole, creating divergence. This would mean that there are similar 
biological and environmental influences among the crew members in both 
worlds to that point of deviation from the established timeline.5
This exploration of transworld identity is important for understanding 
the philosophy, and primary purpose, underlying Abrams’s revisioning of 
Star Trek. Through his counterfactual timeline, Abrams suggests that while 
the experiences of the crew of the Enterprise in their early years did shape 
and influence them in some ways, it is actually their interactions with one 
another that formatively define their identities and characters. For Abrams, it 
is possible for Kirk to develop into the noble captain he is commonly under-
stood to be even absent the influence of his biological father as long as he 
develops his relationships with Spock and the rest of the crew. To understand 
why, however, we must better understand the nature of their friendship and 
the nature of the community that forms aboard the Enterprise.
I Have Been, and Always Shall Be, Your Friend
When rewriting the history of the characters of Kirk and Spock, Abrams is 
committed to providing a backstory that sets up the important relationship 
and friendship that will ultimately shape both of their lives dramatically. 
The focus on the emerging friendship between the future captain and first 
officer (and science officer) of the U.S.S. Enterprise was, for Abrams, the 
foundation of his film. Speaking about the film prior to its release, Abrams 
explained, “I never saw how Kirk and Spock became so connected. That’s 
what this movie does.”6 As a filmmaker, Abrams sought to explore the origins 
of the familiar bond between the captain and his first officer. In doing so, he 
offers a narrative for understanding the bourgeoning friendship between 
Kirk and Spock that reflects principles elucidated by the ancient Greek phi-
losopher Aristotle. For Aristotle, friendship constitutes a bond that is “most 
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necessary with a view to living.”7 Abrams demonstrates elements of this line 
of thinking while portraying the development of the partnership that will 
define Kirk and Spock in the future.
The friendship between Kirk and Spock is well established in the canon 
of the Star Trek franchise. In Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, Spock twice 
tells Kirk, “I have been, and always shall be, your friend.” It is clear through-
out that when Spock uses the term “friend” it is meant to carry significant 
weight. Spock Prime repeats this sentiment in Abrams’s film after saving 
the young Kirk from an alien creature on Delta Vega (the ice planet upon 
which he was marooned). However, the tension and competition that develop 
between the young Kirk and Spock in Abrams’s movie make Kirk doubtful 
that these two could ever have the deep respect and care for one another 
that are the hallmarks of true friendship. As Kirk responds to Spock Prime, 
“If you were Spock you would know that we’re not friends, at all. You hate 
me. You marooned me here for mutiny.”8 Interestingly, however, the hos-
tilities and conflicts between the young Kirk and Spock seem to be setting 
the foundation for a mutual respect that will later form between them. As 
Aristotle notes, “Such friendship requires time and familiarity . . . nor can 
they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found 
lovable and been trusted by each.”9
The relationship between Kirk and Spock mirrors Aristotle’s understand-
ing of the soul as being divided into two distinct parts, the rational and the 
nonrational. He argues that while the rational part of the soul is superior 
because it is based in reason, the nonrational part, defined by appetites and 
desires, “exists for the sake of the better or superior.”10 The nonrational part 
of the soul is capable of being controlled via deliberative rationality, but it is 
important to the moral growth of the individual that both parts are properly 
cultivated. Aristotle suggests, “We call a man in any way good because he 
has the virtues of these two parts.”11 While both Kirk and Spock have the 
capacity for the development of excellence of the soul through self-mastery 
and the learning and practice of virtuous behavior, it is clear that prior to 
their friendship their lives are dominated by improperly balanced souls. 
That Abrams picks up on their lives when they are younger may account for 
such imbalance, as Aristotle suggests that no youth can be virtuous because 
they lack experience.
Abrams’s Kirk shares similarities with but is different from the admirable 
Captain James Tiberius Kirk of The Original Series. In the Abrams recast-
ing, Kirk is rough and impetuous, lacking clear or deliberative thinking. In 
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Iowa, he is arrested as a youth for stealing his stepfather’s antique car, driving 
with reckless abandon, and ignoring the police. He is discovered by Cap-
tain Pike after he gets into a fight with four Starfleet Academy cadets at a 
bar after drunkenly (albeit playfully) harassing Uhura, and while Pike tries 
to convince him to join Starfleet he describes Kirk as being a “genius-level 
repeat offender” whose “instinct to leap without looking” was one that was 
shared by Kirk’s father.
Kirk is a man controlled by appetite, which overwhelms his “off-the-
chart” aptitude tests and rational self. Yet, despite his drunken shenanigans 
and run-ins with the law, Pike sees in Kirk—even if from wishful think-
ing rather than clear insight—the same nobility of spirit he knew in Kirk’s 
father. To reach the youth, he makes an appeal to his noble sense of honor 
and virtue by reminding Kirk of his father’s heroism aboard the Kelvin. He 
tells Kirk, “You know, your father was captain of a starship for twelve min-
utes. He saved eight hundred lives, including yours and your mother’s. I dare 
you to do better.” The words awaken in Kirk that desire to make something 
more of himself, something he simply cannot do outside the company of 
others who will challenge him to become great.
Similarly, Spock embodies another extreme. Trained in the Vulcan ways 
of logic and the suppression of emotion, Spock seemingly represents a life 
consisting entirely of rationality. On one level this commitment to logic and 
reason is consistent with Aristotle’s notion of rationality being the higher 
form of the soul. In book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle finds the life 
of contemplation, what he considers to be a God-like life, to be best. Spock’s 
father suggests as much to a preadolescent Spock after he has just gotten 
into a fight with three bullies who insulted his human mother, calling her 
a whore. His father offers him advice that echoes the wisdom of Aristotle: 
“Logic offers us serenity that humans seldom experience; the control of feel-
ings so that they do not control you.”
However, Aristotle also recognizes that, as social creatures, human 
beings need social connections and community in order to live a flourishing 
life (what Aristotle labels “eudaimonia”). Spock’s half-human nature comes 
through strongly here. When he attempts to suppress emotion, he cuts him-
self off from the care of others, which means denying the social part of human 
yearnings. This in turn leads to the repression of his happiness. He clearly 
cares for his mother, as witnessed in his emotional responses whenever she 
is negatively invoked by others, and he also cares romantically for Uhura. 
He seems to also desire acceptance from his father and his peers and takes 
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a considerable degree of pride in his accomplishments (as demonstrated in 
his displeasure with Kirk’s cheating to “beat” Spock’s Kobayashi Maru—the 
“unwinnable situation”—program at Starfleet Academy). Aristotle would 
argue that, when they are appropriate, Spock might be more fulfilled by 
experiencing such emotions. His emotional suppression causes Spock to 
seem at times tortured and confused. His self-denial actually seems to work 
against the well-being and happiness that, for Aristotle, represent the high-
est possibility of life.12
As representations of the Aristotelian conception of the soul, Kirk and 
Spock complete one another. It is perhaps in this vein that Aristotle refers 
to friendship as a “second-self.” Both Kirk and Spock are capable in their 
own right of high-level rationality and passion, and both demonstrate these 
capacities in a number of ways. However, it is through the interactions they 
have with one another that they truly achieve a state of excellence in their 
actions and achieve a state of self-mastery. When Kirk tells Spock Prime 
that “coming back in time, changing history . . . that’s cheating,” the Vulcan 
responds, “A trick I learned from an old friend.” Spock Prime is made whole 
by his comradeship with Kirk Prime, just as the young Kirk and Spock even-
tually complete one another through the virtue born from their impending 
friendship. As Spock Prime tells his younger, alternate self when explain-
ing why he led Kirk to believe that the two Spocks could never meet, “You 
needed each other. I could not deprive you of the revelation of all that you 
could accomplish together, of a friendship that will define you both in ways 
you cannot yet realize.”
The friendship between Kirk and Spock is important from an Aristo-
telian perspective because such friendship between two potentially great 
figures will ultimately produce in them virtuous behavior and right action. 
Not only does friendship provide meaning and depth to life, the care that 
develops between friends makes them strive to act honorably, courageously, 
truthfully, and with temperance because they want what is best for their 
friends and want to be viewed positively in return. As Aristotle writes, 
“Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in vir-
tue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in 
themselves. . . . Those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most 
truly friends.” He goes on to describe how all friendship seeks the good, or 
happiness, and asserts that friendship is “based on a certain resemblance; 
and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in 
the virtue of the nature of the friends themselves.”13 Both Kirk and Spock 
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have incredible potential, but it is only through mutual respect and a rela-
tionship between them as beings of equal worth and qualities that will allow 
them to fully realize all that is possible within each other. And for Aristotle, 
such actualization will yield a personal flourishing for each, which is what 
is truly best.
I Like This Ship! You Know, It’s Exciting!
Beyond the burgeoning friendship that will shape the destinies of Captain 
Kirk and Mr. Spock, Abrams’s Star Trek explores the relationships that estab-
lish a particular kind of community aboard the Enterprise. Here again the 
film reflects significant aspects of Aristotelian philosophy about ethics and 
human development. Aristotle argues in The Politics that “a social instinct 
is implanted in all men by nature,” meaning that individuals are naturally 
drawn to community and the formation of social relationships with oth-
ers.14 In fact, for Aristotle, ethics and virtue are discovered through interac-
tion and are therefore born from community. However, in order to educate 
individuals on virtuous behavior and provide for their moral development, 
the community itself must be properly organized.
It is important to note that, just as in The Original Series, the charac-
ters in Star Trek are in large part defined by the roles they play on the ship. 
Reflecting the Aristotelian notion of a community as being properly ordered 
when everyone performs well the roles for which they are best suited, each 
crew member on the Enterprise ensures the well-being of his or her fellows 
by committing to excellence in his or her job. Spock is capable of command, 
but that is not the function most apt for him. Just as Bones is best suited 
for his position overseeing sick bay and Scotty for serving in engineering, 
Spock’s background and training on Vulcan, as well as his personality, make 
him best equipped to be chief science officer and second in command. After 
Pike is taken hostage, Kirk assumes command not because of a personal 
desire to ascend in rank but because he is convinced by Spock Prime that it 
is the role he has to take on to best serve the community. As Aristotle notes, 
“Both the common people and those of the better class wish the best men 
to rule; for thus and thus alone do all get what they aim at.”15 The Enterprise 
allows each individual to flourish because each serves in the capacity for 
which he or she is best suited, which leads to the public betterment of the 
crew as a whole.
Moreover, the crew, like Kirk and Spock, are getting to know one another 
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and are establishing the grounds for a community based upon dignity and 
mutual respect. Nyota Uhura proves her superior capabilities in communi-
cations and xenolinguistics (the study and deciphering of alien languages) 
by decoding the signal linked to Nero’s Narada vessel, and Montgomery 
“Scotty” Scott proves his own genius with warp technologies that allow 
Kirk, Spock, and Pike to be beamed back aboard the Enterprise at warp 
speed from multiple locations (a feat previously thought to be impossible) 
when they destroy the Narada. Dr. Leonard “Bones” McCoy not only bril-
liantly uses his medical insights and knowledge to smuggle Kirk aboard 
the Enterprise when it is first set to depart but also takes command of sick 
bay after the death of the previous chief medical officer when the Enterprise 
first encounters and is attacked by Nero’s ship. Hikaru Sulu proves to be a 
master of hand-to-hand combat and, with a sword, volunteers for the dan-
gerous mission to try and destroy the Narada’s drilling platform above the 
planet Vulcan, and Pavel Chekov deciphers Nero’s plan to use red matter to 
destroy all of Vulcan. As separate individuals, each is skilled in his or her 
own way. As a community working toward a single end, however, they are 
able to accomplish great things that no other ship in the vast Federation is 
able to achieve.
What Abrams establishes on the Enterprise is the beginnings of what 
Aristotle referred to as koinonia, a type of solidarity that defines a commu-
nity based on affective friendship toward one’s fellows. Community mem-
bers develop a deep respect for one another and their capabilities despite 
their individual differences and unique traits. These bonds develop among 
the crew a type of harmony that Aristotle refers to as concord, a feature of 
friendship in which members of a community “have the same opinions about 
what is to their interest” when it comes to the larger, core questions and 
values of the community.16 As Aristotle suggests about such a community, 
its members need not find common agreement on all things, and dissent is 
not only possible but will likely occur from time to time (Bones referring 
to Spock as a “green-blooded hobgoblin” following a disagreement about 
whether the acting captain should have marooned Kirk on Delta Vega, for 
example), but ultimately their bonds will enable them to share a commit-
ment to the public good of all and to create consensus around the goals and 
mission of the Enterprise.
But what keeps a community organized in this regard? Why is there not 
more infighting or intrigue on the Enterprise? Certainly Aristotle under-
stands the potential for political communities to break down so that the 
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public good gives way to private interests. He describes how “bad men can-
not be in accord except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, 
since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labor 
and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for 
advantage for himself criticizes his neighbor and stands in his way.”17 The 
resulting competition would ultimately destroy the commonwealth and pit 
individuals and factions against each other rather than unifying them in 
advancing the public good.
One might be tempted to argue that the community is disrupted in this 
way when Kirk angers Spock to the point where he has to relieve himself 
of command under the provisions of Starfleet Regulation 619, a provision 
that asserts that a commanding officer who is emotionally compromised 
must resign command. However, Spock Prime had convinced Kirk to use 
this as a means of getting the young Spock angry so that he would resign 
his duties as the acting captain of the Enterprise for the larger public good, 
not for personal gain. Kirk has little difficulty in getting Spock to lash out 
with great anger, since the Vulcan has just witnessed the destruction of 
his entire planet, including the death of his mother. The goal, however, is 
not one of personal gain for Kirk. Instead, it is to stop Nero from further 
unleashing his destructive vengeance on the Federation, and Spock Prime 
knows that the only person who can stop Nero is Kirk. Beyond that action, 
done only to further override concerns for the common good, power plays 
for the benefit of fulfilling the personal desires of individual crew members 
are all but nonexistent.
An Aristotelian answer to the question of why the crew aboard the Enter-
prise begins to mesh into a cohesive unit dedicated to the public good is, 
once again, because of the social benefits of friendship. In this case the Enter-
prise can be viewed as a microcosm of the polis (a political, self-governing 
community). The crew receive orders from higher-ranking officials within 
the Federation, but ultimately their internal command structures cause 
them to act as a governance body. What develops from a community of this 
kind, when sharing a commitment to common values, is an esprit de corps 
(a sense of group spirit). Aristotle writes, “Such concord is found among 
good men; for they are in accord both in themselves and with one another, 
being, so to say, of one mind . . . and they wish for what is just and what is 
advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavor as well.”18 
Each crew member aboard the Enterprise displays excellence within his or 
her respective functions and the evolving relationships among them make 
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possible their commitment to one another toward a common aim. They are 
able rationally to suppress desires of advancement and pursuit of higher and 
higher ranks and accolades because of their virtuous respect for the dignity 
of one another and their common commitment to the good of the mission 
and the rest of the crew.
Live Long and Prosper
Friendship is important to Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and the moral 
progress of the individual. In Abrams’s Star Trek, the clashes and tensions 
between Kirk and Spock lay the groundwork for the kind of friendship that 
will ultimately pave the path for their heroic future. Likewise, Aristotle’s 
notions of the proper development and arrangement of the soul as being 
cultivated by the justly ordered society are deeply embedded in the com-
munity that has formed among the crew of the Enterprise.
Into Darkness finds Kirk risking his career by violating the Prime Direc-
tive to save Spock. Spock’s disagreement with the decision further reflects 
the interplay of reason and appetite in two men who need one another to 
be whole. Clearly the philosophy of Aristotle continues to pervade the story 
lines and adventures of Kirk, Spock, and the rest of the crew. In rebooting 
the franchise, Abrams has left his own unique mark on the classic charac-
ters and has carved out a parallel universe in which die-hard Trekkies and 
new fans alike can enjoy watching the U.S.S. Enterprise once again “boldly 
go where no man has gone before.”
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heroIC Love and Its InversIon In 
the Parent-ChILd reLatIonshIP In 
abraMs’s star trek
Charles Taliaferro and Emilie Judge-Becker
In philosophy there is a tradition according to which there are three precepts 
of justice (preacepta juris): live in a morally right way, do no harm to oth-
ers, and render to each what is her or his own.1 One of the more vexing and 
interesting questions that remains quite unsettled in twenty-first-century 
philosophy concerns the duties (if any) that are owed between parents and 
children. We believe that the 2009 film Star Trek (directed by J. J. Abrams 
and written by Roberta Orci and Alex Kurtzman) speaks to the question of 
what is owed in a loving, heroic parent-child relationship, and in so doing 
it speaks to questions about living morally and not harming others. The 
film does not just speak to the heroic; it can suggest something important 
to those of us who have more humdrum parent-child relationships, but this 
will be a matter we will only suggest at the end of our chapter. To get things 
started, we offer a brief overview of the philosophy of parent-child relation-
ships and then move to Star Trek. An important qualification: while we will 
be using the film to make philosophical observations about the parent-child 
relationship, we are not claiming that Abrams himself or the writers were 
intentionally crafting a philosophy. Rather, we are proposing that the film 
may be used to extract an important lesson about parent-child relations, 
especially as this bears on heroic, loving sacrifice and its inversion.
Philosophers have taken different positions on the relationship between 
parents and children. In Greco-Roman times parents (especially the father) 
had absolute power over children, and abortion and infanticide were not 
uncommon (approved of by both Plato and Aristotle in cases of severe infant 
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deformity). But even among the ancients, a parent killing a child was often 
considered horrific (Hercules’s killing of his children and wife made him 
cursed, Medea’s killing of her children was, quite literally, considered tragic), 
and there is a powerful, intimate tenderness displayed between parents and 
children in the oldest poem in the west, the Iliad (Hector’s loving care for 
his son).2 As we come to the modern era, many philosophers (most notably 
John Locke in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) defended the idea 
that children were not owned by parents and that they were to be treated as 
proper individuals with rights and duties of their own. But precisely what 
those rights and duties are has not been fully settled by philosophers as we 
begin the twenty-first century. This has been especially vexing as philoso-
phers in more recent times have sought to develop a secular account of the 
parent-child relationship.
There is not total disagreement today on the parent-child relationship. 
Most philosophers today and in the modern era think that if someone gives 
birth to a child, then they have some responsibility for the welfare of the 
child, if only to ensure that the child is raised in a healthy way. Philosophers 
may diverge on the comparative ethical significance of a genetic connec-
tion between parent and child, the importance of gestation (is a “surrogate” 
mother a true or real mother?), the ethics of adoption, and so on, but what 
might be called motherly or fatherly love has a fairly clear meaning when it 
comes to identifying the responsible care that we (today) expect of parental 
care for children. But what of children themselves and their duties, if any? 
Of course, as an infant, a child lacks the kind of self-control that can form 
the basis for morally responsible action, but once he or she has some pow-
ers of agency, is it the duty of a child to love his or her parents? Could love 
ever be a duty? Love seems to be an emotion, and emotions do not seem 
to be immediately under our self-control. If we do have a duty to love our 
parents, what would its basis be? In healthy settings, presumably the child 
has received a great gift (life itself and a good upbringing), but the child 
never asked for this gift. If a child ought to love or honor her or his parent, 
this seems to be something that has been involuntarily thrust on the child, 
and not something the child must ethically take ownership of. In many, if 
not most, religious traditions the parent-child relationship is considered a 
sacred bond to be treated with honor. In a secular context and without such 
recourse to sacred honor, how is one to articulate the bond and entitlements 
of these distinguishable individuals, especially from the standpoint of a child 
on the road to an autonomous, independent life?3
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Abrams’s Star Trek offers an illuminating alternative framework to 
address questions of parent-child duty. Questions of duty are relevant, but 
at the heart of the film is a portrait of how loving sacrifice and devotion 
can summon one into the honor of being an adult. At times we will refer 
to this as owning one’s adulthood. Here we follow the use of the term “to 
own” employed by modern philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
and others, in which to own something is to accept and acknowledge respon-
sibility for something. At crucial points in the film, there is a summoning 
for one to take ownership of one’s character. Matters of duty come after 
this summoning.
The Heroic, Self-Sacrificing Parent
The film begins with a father saving the life of his wife and child. The U.S.S. 
Kelvin, a Federation starship, is lured into a trap by Romulans. The Romu-
lan Nero compels the Kelvin’s captain onto his ship, the Narada, where 
the captain is summarily killed (after being asked for the whereabouts of 
Ambassador Spock and the year). This leaves George Kirk in command of 
the Kelvin. George orders the evacuation from the Kelvin of all the crew, and 
we soon learn that the evacuees include his pregnant wife, Winona, who 
is in labor. George intends to follow his wife and crew, but then he learns 
that the automatic pilot is off-line and the ship needs to be steered and the 
weapons fired manually so that the others (which we later learn number 
eight hundred) can escape. George sees that if he abandons the ship, there 
would be little chance of escaping the deadly intentions of Nero. Piloting a 
collision course with the Romulan vessel, George has his last conversation 
with his wife (now flying away in an escape pod) while their son is born. 
Together they choose a name for their son, James Tiberius Kirk, after his 
paternal and maternal grandfathers. The mother and crew escape under 
direct orders from George.
George Kirk: Do exactly as I say, shuttle 37.
Winona: George, it’s coming, our baby.
George: . . . , Captain to shuttle 37, is my wife on board?
Shuttle 37: Yes sir, she is.
George: I need you to go now, do you hear me?
Shuttle 37: We’re waiting on you, sir.
George: No, just go, take off immediately.
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Winona: Sweetheart can you hear me?
George: I can hear . . .
The escape is under George’s command, and the husband and wife have 
their last words. He: “I love you so much.” She: “I love you!”
James T. Kirk, who is born only minutes before his father dies, lives 
in the shadow of his father’s enormous, heroic self-sacrifice. He strug-
gles with adolescence, perhaps due to the ordinariness of life with his 
rather mirthless and perhaps cruel stepfather or guardian and his absent 
mother, who is not shown again on-screen. We are not told whether the 
man who functions as a kind of dysfunctional guardian is actually the 
boy’s stepfather or another relative. In any case, the man seems exactly 
the opposite of the missing father-hero. When the boy James takes a car 
for a joyride, the stepfather figure says, “You think you can get away with 
this just because your mother’s off planet. You get your ass back home 
now! You live in my house, buddy. You live in my house, and that’s my car. 
You get one scratch on that car and I’m gonna whip your ass.” Here the 
stepfather figure is concerned about his own personal ownership, rather 
than the welfare of the boy or the well-being of the boy’s mother. It is his 
house and car, not his and the boy’s mother’s (“off planet” might even 
suggest she has died or at least that she is no longer living with the boy 
and his so-called guardian). There is an almost absurd contrast between 
the father, George, who willfully sacrificed a starship to save lives and the 
stepfather/guardian who threatens physical violence for a mere scratch 
on his vehicle!
James does not at first take ownership of himself or his role as the son 
of his father. After a rather pointless bar fight, he comes face to face with 
Captain Christopher Pike. It is clear from the start that Pike is a surrogate 
father or at least fatherly. Pike’s first words to James are, “You all right, son?” 
And when James asks (incredulously) whether Pike knows who he is, the 
answer is thoroughly parental.
James: Who am I, Captain Pike?
Pike: Your father’s son.
James is then summoned to take ownership of his life in following the path 
of his father. To some, George’s sacrifice was a complete loss. This is not 
how Pike sees it.
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Pike: Something I admired about your dad, he didn’t believe in 
no-win scenarios.
James: Sure learned his lesson.
Pike: Well, that depends on how you define winning. . . . If you’re half 
the man your father was, Jim, Starfleet could use you. You know, 
your father was captain of a starship for twelve minutes. He saved 
eight hundred lives, including yours and your mother’s. I dare 
you to do better.
Notice that Pike does not resort here to the language of duty but speaks of 
daring. Pike calls on James to live up to the precepts of justice, but this is a 
heroic summons or call, not an ordinary one (a subject we will return to).
The heroic father’s sacrifice plays a role in James’s (supposedly) cheat-
ing in his training, in his warning Captain Pike of the imminent danger of 
falling into the same trap his father and crew fell into aboard the Kelvin, and 
in his rescuing Captain Pike. The latter is a kind of reversal of the loss that 
we see at the outset of the film. While James cannot rescue his father, he 
can rescue a man who has been acting as his father. In all this we see James 
slowly coming to act as his father might, but as his own person and at his 
own pace. He must live through modest humiliation in romance (Spock, 
not James, “gets the girl”), he must sneak on board the Enterprise through 
comic subterfuge with the help of Bones (the ship doctor, who must go into 
space due to financial ruin in a divorce), Scotty, and the older Spock. But in 
all this movement toward taking ownership of his character, James winds up 
filling out the meaning of his father’s self-sacrifice and perhaps even (in part) 
the meaning of the love of his parents. If James had turned down Pike’s dare 
and settled for the life epitomized by the stepfather/guardian figure, it would 
mean that his father had saved the life of someone who was living a petty, 
loveless life of self-preoccupation and meanness. In this way, there may be 
some support for the Aristotelian view that part of the value of childhood 
and growing up lies in the end achieved. This is sometimes called the pro-
spective view of childhood, the idea that the value of childhood rests in how 
it shapes the adult. Michael Slote offers this lively analogy in describing the 
prospective view: “Just as dreams are discounted except as they affect (the 
waking portions of) our lives, what happens in childhood principally affects 
our view of total lives through the effects that childhood success or failure 
are supposed to have on mature individuals.”4 We would only add that there 
is a sense in which George’s sacrifice (while good in itself) would be seen in 
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a somewhat different light if James, his mother, and all eight hundred crew 
members went on to live horrendous, cruel lives. Fortunately, the father’s 
sacrifice is further vindicated by the son’s own heroic deeds and character.
There is an extraordinary inversion in the story of James and the story 
of the tyrant Nero. We point this out following a focus on Spock and the 
summons he must heed in owning his character.
Focus on Spock
In contrast to James Kirk, Spock’s father is not (at least at first) a paradigm 
of the loving hero. In the first scene in which Spock appears, he is in school 
being picked on by other Vulcan children because of his mixed heritage, 
with a Vulcan father and an earthling mother. In Spock one sees someone 
who, through much of the film, struggles to be loyal to both parents. Finally 
the bullies push him too hard, and Spock relinquishes his Vulcan control 
for human passion as he starts hitting one of the bullies. Later his father, 
Sarek, lectures him about controlling himself—the father tries to make Spock 
identify less with his human half. Spock eventually asks Sarek why he mar-
ried a human, since Vulcans tend to look down on them. Sarek responds in 
an emotionally detached manner, saying that “marrying [Spock’s] mother 
was logical.” Later in the film we meet Spock’s mother, Amanda. Unlike 
Sarek, whom Spock seemed unable to please, Amanda expresses completely 
unconditional love for her son. She makes it clear that no matter what Spock 
chooses in his life, she will always be proud of him. It is perhaps partly the 
love of his mother that finally moves Spock to yield to passion in an alter-
cation on the Enterprise, allowing James Kirk to take command. And it is 
by yielding to his human side that Spock is able to give himself over to a 
romance with Uhura and, finally, to a friendship with James. Sarek eventu-
ally valorizes this love when he withdraws his earlier account of the mar-
riage to Spock’s mother: “You asked me once why I married your mother. I 
married her because I loved her.”
Spock has to come to terms with an especially personal form of loving 
sacrifice in coming to own his character in the context of the parent-child 
relationship: he must sacrifice the desire for strict self-control and being 
invulnerable to deep pain and grief. Perhaps it is his mother’s love for him, 
followed by his father’s confession of love after her death, that helped Spock 
to adult ownership. It is the older Spock who knows that the growth from 
childhood to adulthood has to be a learned process that involves a kind 
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of interior education and cannot be reduced to following rules or sharing 
information. This is why the older Spock did not intervene more directly in 
bringing his younger self into the full picture of the drama that was unfolding.
Younger Spock: Then why did you send Kirk aboard when you 
alone could have explained the truth?
Older Spock: I could not deprive you of the revelation of all that 
you could accomplish together. Of a friendship that would define 
you both. In ways you cannot yet realize.
James’s response to the death of his father and Spock’s to the death of his 
mother are a complete inversion of Nero’s response to the death of his family.
A Family Inversion
While the death of a father and mother play a role in James and Spock becom-
ing heroic adults and lead them to seek to save lives, the death of family has 
the exact opposite impact on Nero. Late in the film we learn more of what is 
driving Nero on his mission of mass murder (his destruction of the Vulcan 
planet alone amounted to killing six billion people). Nero describes him-
self as a person who, at the outset, chose “a life of honest labor. To provide 
for myself and the wife who was expecting my child.” There is a slight hint 
at egocentrism in the use of the expression “my child” as opposed to “our 
child” that he and “the wife” were having, but we can take his word that he 
was honest and (at least) not criminal at one point. Nero’s planet was in 
trouble and (leaving out the details) the Federation designed a plan to save 
the planet, which Spock would execute. Through no fault of the Federation 
or Spock personally, the rescue did not succeed and the planet was lost. By 
Nero’s lights, Spock and the Federation “allowed my people to burn while 
their planet broke in half.” The death of his family and his people set Nero 
on a path of ruthless killing. Nero states his position in stark terms: “And 
when I lost her [“the wife”], I promised myself retribution. And for twenty-
five years I planned my revenge against the Federation.”
Nero (and eventually Spock) time-travel back to before Romulus was 
destroyed. At the outset of the film, Nero’s plan is now to destroy the Federa-
tion and all its planets, thus (he believes) saving his planet. But notice that 
while the stated goal is to save his planet, uppermost in Nero’s mind seems 
to be the infliction of pain. He wants members of the Federation to know 
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what he felt when he had to come to terms with the death of his family and 
planet. In this fashion, Nero winds up cementing the pain into his character, 
even though if he succeeds in rescuing his planet then (paradoxically) there 
would be no pain for him to feel, because his family and people would live. 
He also does not give any notice of another possibility: time travel could 
allow both he and Spock to work with the Federation and those Romulans 
alive before the destruction to save the planet. Here is an exchange between 
Nero and Captain Christopher Pike, when Pike is in captivity: “And for 
twenty-five years I planned my revenge against the Federation. And forgot 
what it was like to live a normal life. I did not forget the pain. It’s a pain that 
every surviving Vulcan now shares. My purpose, Christopher, is to not sim-
ply avoid the destruction of the home that I love . . . but to create a Romu-
lus that exists, free of the Federation. . . . That is why I will destroy all the 
remaining Federation planets. Starting with yours. Then we have nothing 
left to discuss.” We wonder how much this “love” of his home is truly love 
when taking into account Nero’s death.
When it becomes clear that Nero has failed in his goal of destroying Earth 
and he is vulnerable to the Enterprise’s lethal weapons, Captain James Kirk 
offers him a chance to surrender. He explains to his crew, “Showing them 
compassion may be the only way to earn peace with Romulus.” If Nero had 
surrendered, he would still be free to love his lost family and planet, albeit 
this love would involve great grief. On the other hand, as we just noted, he 
might also stand a chance of averting the destruction of his planet in the 
future. But instead of making such choices, he chooses death for himself 
and his crew. His last words are, “I would rather suffer the end of Romulus 
a thousand times. I would rather die in agony than accept assistance from 
you.” Really? Even if that assistance could be extended to save his family 
and planet, not just once but a thousand times?
Nero has let the loss of his family and planet lead him to choose death 
rather than life. While George gave his life, and might have given his life a 
thousand times, to save his wife and child, Nero seems to be willing to die 
a thousand times rather than accept assistance that might save his wife and 
child, and perhaps his whole planet. There is a sense in which Nero may 
be operating with the more ancient view of childhood: he, as the father, 
has power and ownership over his child and thus can elect not to save the 
child. (Perhaps a hint of Nero adopting this ancient Greco-Roman practice 
lies in his bearing the name of one of the most notoriously abusive Roman 
emperors.) While James and George give themselves over to heroic love, 
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Nero abandons himself to bold, ruthless hatred. George’s last words are 
words of love, and in the final sequence in which we see James, the friend-
ship between him and Spock seems securely launched, and yet in the case 
of Nero his last words involve hatred and the desire for the annihilation of 
himself and the crew. James, on the other hand, comes to learn to own his 
adulthood and its new responsibilities. In the closing scene in the academy, 
it is James’s heroism that enables him to be fully accepted by the upright. 
Let’s Go Home
So what do children owe parents? Abrams’s film leads us to think that this 
question is dependent upon an antecedent question: How have parents 
acted toward and with their children? If the parent is like James’s stepfather/
guardian figure, the answer might well be “not much.” But if parents are like 
James’s father and mother, given the father’s sacrifice and the testimony of 
love between them, then the child is naturally summoned to take owner-
ship of his or her life and honor. Similarly, if even one of the parents is like 
Spock’s mother or perhaps, too, like the father who finally confesses his true 
love, there is a summons to love others in adulthood. It is this satisfying 
loving cycle that enables James and Spock to achieve the kind of fraternal, 
respectful, dynamic friendship that is so key to the film and virtually all the 
variations of the world(s) of Star Trek.
What should we do if we are not like the parents of James or Spock? 
Undoubtedly, at least one reader of this chapter is not the captain of a star-
ship yet still has occasions for heroic self-sacrifice. The film does not give 
a direct answer to this, but we suspect a good reply to any parent reading 
this is that you should try to be such parents as the parents of James and 
the mother of Spock. There is an important point about virtue that is worth 
noting. Two persons may be equally virtuous, and thus equally praiseworthy 
and beautiful, and yet only one of the persons is given the opportunity to act 
and display that virtue in the movie. So you might never be in command of 
a starship and you may never have the occasion to show the depth of your 
love for your child, but you can still be the sort of parent who would do this 
if the occasion arose. And that is (in our view) beautiful and praiseworthy.
No one said that any of this—actual self-sacrifice or being disposed to 
act in loving heroism—would be easy, and we are reminded of this in one 
of the last sequences in the film. When Captain Kirk has had his final battle 
with Nero, he issues this command: “Sulu, let’s go home.” Sulu replies, “Yes, 
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sir.” But they are not at warp speed; they must escape a massive vacuum that 
threatens to undo them and their ship. With heroic effort, they escape and 
make their way home. Perhaps the point is that getting to the right home 
and the most fulfilling living out of the three precepts of justice requires a 
great love that summons us not just to “inspirational valor and supreme 
dedication to your comrades” (in the words of the assembly when awarding 
Kirk a high commendation) but such valor and dedication to your children 
and parents.
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Impartial Morality and Personal Obligations in Alias
Brendan Shea
J. J. Abrams’s Alias tells the story of a spy named Sydney Bristow. Like many 
fictional spies, Sydney is a quick-thinking expert in disguise and physical 
combat who regularly risks life and limb in order to protect the innocent. 
Also, unlike some of her more cold-blooded fictional counterparts, Sydney 
tries to be honest and kindhearted and to treat others as they deserve to be 
treated. So, whereas a character like James Bond strives to avoid the emo-
tional entanglements that come with close personal relationships, Sydney 
works hard to maintain close relationships with family and friends. She 
strives, in other words, to be both a good spy and a good person; her choices 
and actions model many of those qualities that we think are central to liv-
ing a moral (or ethical) life.
While Sydney’s relationships are valuable to her, they also complicate 
her efforts to live the moral life. Friends, relatives, and romantic partners 
compete with the U.S. government for Sydney’s time and energy, and they 
provide prime targets for enemies to threaten, seduce, or otherwise make use 
of. When conflicts arise between her personal and professional life, Sydney 
is forced to balance two seemingly incommensurable demands of morality: 
the first, that she fulfill her duty (as a spy, superhero, and all-around good 
person) to do what is best for people in general; the second, that she fulfill 
her duty (as a daughter, friend, or romantic partner) to do what is best for 
particular people.
Sydney’s case is complicated by various factors (e.g., by the fact that 
many of her friends and family are spies), and this problem is a universal 
one. Her solution should thus be of real interest to us. In this chapter I will 
examine how Sydney and the other characters in Alias fare in their attempts 
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to meet these two sets of obligations, and I will consider what lessons this 
might have for the rest of us.
Morality and Impartiality
While it is difficult to say exactly what exactly morality is, viewers of Alias 
should have few problems distinguishing characters who (generally) behave 
morally from those who (generally) do not. So, whereas moral characters 
like Sydney and Vaughn regularly risk their lives to save others, immoral 
characters like Sloane and Irina steal, lie, and kill in order to advance their 
own selfish agendas. Perhaps the most fundamental difference between 
moral characters and immoral characters concerns the role that other peo-
ple play in their decision making. An immoral character like Sloane treats 
other people as tools that can be used to get what he wants—money, power, 
immortality, and so on. A moral character like Sydney, on the other hand, 
recognizes that other people have their own interests and goals (e.g., not 
being killed) and that it would unfair of her to act as though her well-being 
is any more important than theirs is.
According to many moral thinkers, it is just this sort of “equal” or 
“impartial” treatment of others that is at the heart of moral behavior. In 
order to act impartially, one must refrain from showing favoritism (or “par-
tiality”) based on morally irrelevant characteristics. So, for example, such 
views are opposed to ethical egoism, which is the theory that every person 
ought to do whatever is in his or her own best interest.1
One famous example of an impartial moral principle is the “Great 
Commandment” of the Gospels, which commands the reader to “love thy 
neighbor as thyself ” (Mark 12:12). Impartial moral principles have also been 
defended by various philosophers. For example, one version of Immanuel 
Kant’s (1724–1804) categorical imperative directs the reader to “so act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”2 In order to 
treat people as ends one must, according to Kant, refrain from doing bad 
things to them merely to advance one’s own agenda, however worthwhile 
that agenda might seem. Kant claims that this requirement means that we 
cannot kill, lie to, or harm innocent people. The principle is impartial inso-
far as it requires that we consider other people as our moral equals and con-
strain our behavior accordingly.
Also, John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) principle of utility states that a moral 
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action is one that leads to “not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the 
greatest amount of happiness altogether.”3 The principle is impartial because 
everyone’s happiness counts for exactly the same; one is not allowed to put 
a higher value on particular people’s happiness. So, for example, this prin-
ciple requires that a person be willing to sacrifice his or her own life if this 
is the only way to save two lives.
John Rawls (1921–2002) argues that a given principle is just if and only if 
everyone would agree to it under a so-called veil of ignorance. When people 
are under this veil, they are ignorant of all the things about themselves that 
might distort their moral judgment: for example, their gender, age, race, 
religious and political beliefs, place in society, and physical and intellectual 
abilities. This ensures that impartial principles will be chosen, since all the 
people who are choosing are ignorant of anything that might make it pos-
sible for them to be partial.4
If acting morally requires us to act impartially, then it is easy to explain 
why Sydney is such a morally exemplary person. As a spy, Sydney makes 
considerable sacrifices in order to ensure the safety and happiness of others. 
Along with the obvious risks to her life, Sydney is forced to put off school, to 
break off relationships, and to refrain from doing a great number of things 
she would probably have enjoyed more than being a spy. This type of self-
less behavior shows that that Sydney values the well-being of other people 
and does not unduly privilege her own wants and desires.
Three Moral Dilemmas
While the above theories do a good job of explaining our duties toward peo-
ple in general (e.g., don’t kill innocent people, give money to charity, etc.), 
they have little to say about the special obligations we have to our friends, 
family, and coworkers. By special obligations, I mean those obligations that we 
have toward friends and family that are different than (and perhaps stronger 
than) the duties we have to everyone else. So, for example, we ought (mor-
ally) to spend time with these people, to listen to their problems, and to do 
everything we can to ensure their safety and well-being. Conflicts between 
impartial moral duties and special obligations to loved ones occur quite 
frequently in Alias, and the way that the characters respond to them can 
reveal a great deal about who they really are. In this section we will take a 
brief look at three such dilemmas. In the next section we will consider some 
possible responses to such dilemmas.
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The first type of dilemma occurs when one must choose between saving 
the life of a loved one and saving the lives of a greater number of innocent 
strangers. Such scenarios are a regular staple of both moral philosophy and 
spy shows, and Alias is no exception. Sydney encounters such a dilemma, for 
example, in the final episode of season 1 (“Almost Thirty Years”). She has, 
after considerable effort, managed to recover a journal page from a long-dead 
man named Rambaldi. She knows that the page contains directions for using 
a mysterious device that she suspects (correctly) might be very dangerous if it 
were to be acquired by the wrong people. In fact, the page turns out to contain 
directions for how to use a weapon (the “circumference”) that can cause people 
to become violently insane. Sydney’s problem is that her close friend Will has 
been kidnapped and the kidnappers have demanded the journal page as the 
price for his return. Given Sydney’s suspicions about the nature of the device, 
what should she do? Should she save her friend by handing over the page, or 
should she protect the public at large by refusing to hand it over? The problem, 
it seems, is that her impartial moral duty (“don’t let bad people get weapons 
of mass destruction”) conflicts with her more specific duty to aid her friend.
For those of us who are not spies, dilemmas of the first type are (thank-
fully) rare. We are, however, often faced with moral dilemmas of a differ-
ent type. In these scenarios we are asked to decide how much of our time 
and energy should be devoted to helping people in general and how much 
should be devoted to helping the particular people to whom we are closest. 
The characters in Alias, many of whom work in intelligence, are often faced 
with this type of dilemma. Jack, for instance, has long been forced to bal-
ance being a father to Sydney with his job as a spy, while Sydney is forced 
to balance her own job as a spy with her personal life. Sydney and Jack are, 
in a wide variety of ways, constantly being forced to decide between work 
and family. They must choose between honoring promises to the CIA and 
honoring promises to friends, between spending time on the job and spend-
ing time at home, and between telling the truth about their jobs to those 
close to them (and perhaps endangering their lives) and lying about what 
is perhaps the most important part of their lives. The question here is, How 
much time, money, and energy ought one devote to helping loved ones, and 
how much should be devoted to helping strangers?
The final dilemma concerns the morality of taking revenge against 
those who have harmed our loved ones. By revenge, I mean simply the act 
of harming someone because that person harmed someone close to you. This 
may involve taking direct action against the person, or it may simply involve 
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making sure that the person’s crimes are exposed to the proper authorities. 
Taking revenge in this sense does not necessarily require that one do some-
thing immoral. Sydney’s actions in bringing down SD6, for example, are acts 
of revenge in the sense that is meant here. The question here is not whether 
it is morally okay for Sydney to try and bring SD6 down (since it clearly is), 
but whether Danny’s death obligates Sydney to do so.
Even with this caveat in mind, it may seem odd to characterize the desire 
to seek revenge as a moral motivation. After all, the desire to seek “revenge” 
against those who have done you wrong is commonly contrasted with the 
desire to bring those people to “justice.” For our purposes here, however, I 
think that this distinction can be safely ignored. We are concerned only with 
those cases in which the person being targeted for revenge actually did the 
crime and where the punishment proposed fits the crime. It seems safe to 
say that most of us, for instance, can sympathize with Sydney’s anger over 
Sloane’s murder of her fiancé or with Jack’s anger over Irina’s treatment of 
Sydney. In fact, it seems plausible that many of us would think less of Sydney 
and Jack if they were not the type of people who take such things person-
ally—that is, if they were not the type of people who feel specially obligated 
to make sure Sloane and Irina do not “get away with their crimes.” Approv-
ing of this sort of revenge does not, of course, require that one approve of 
every act of revenge. Sloane’s murder of Dixon’s wife, for instance, might be 
an act of vengeance, but it is clearly immoral.
What to Do?
The characters of Alias respond to the three dilemmas outlined in the previous 
section in a variety of different ways, and these differences reveal a great deal 
about their moral decision-making process. In this section I will take a closer 
look at these responses and consider in more detail what might be the morally 
correct way of responding. I will suggest that there are, in general, three ways 
that the characters of Alias respond to these dilemmas. Two of these ways are 
“extreme” views, according to which we don’t really have the moral obliga-
tions we thought we did. I will argue that these views are mistaken and that we 
ought to instead adopt the “moderate” view exemplified by Sydney’s actions.
NO SPECIAL TREATMENT?
The first, and perhaps simplest, way of resolving these moral dilemmas is to 
simply ignore the fact that the situation involves any particular people and 
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to simply act as if everyone involved were a complete stranger. According to 
this view, for instance, the fact that Sydney and Jack are father and daugh-
ter is morally irrelevant to the types of duties they owe to one another. So 
if Jack would normally choose to sacrifice one innocent agent’s life to save 
the lives of two other innocent agents, he should do so even if the one agent 
in question is Sydney. This doesn’t that mean Jack isn’t obligated to try to 
save Sydney if she is captured, or vice versa; however, it does mean he has 
no greater obligation to save Sidney than he would to save any other of his 
fellow agents. Similarly, while this view is compatible with various people 
(e.g., Sydney and Vaughn) being in love, it says that one’s moral duties to a 
loved one are just same the same as they are to anyone else.
In Alias something like this viewpoint is occasionally put forward by 
certain “higher-ups” in the CIA (such as Devlin), who seem willing to sac-
rifice their agents’ lives in any case where their analysis suggests this is the 
least “risky” action for the CIA to take. This is not to say that they throw 
their agents’ lives away needlessly; rather, it is simply that they don’t feel any 
more of an obligation to protect their agents than they do to protect other 
innocent people.
The best example of the first response, however, is probably provided 
by Jack’s treatment of Sydney. Jack was, by his own account, a mediocre 
father who nearly always chose his work at the CIA over spending time 
with Sydney. According to the view being considered here, Jack’s behavior 
was perfectly moral. After all, we have every reason to think that Jack was 
good at his job; that is, the information he was able to provide the CIA was 
instrumental in protecting the lives and interests of U.S. citizens. So, for 
each family dinner or school function of Sydney’s that Jack missed, he was 
doing work that directly helped save the lives of many others. The problem 
is that, while all of this may be true, there remains the sense that Jack did 
not fulfill his moral obligations to Sydney.
One (in)famous philosophical defender of this view is William Godwin 
(1756–1836). He considers the hypothetical choice between saving the life of 
a (socially insignificant but beloved) parent or sibling and saving the life of 
an archbishop who is known for doing good works. Godwin argues that in 
such cases “the life ought to be preserved which will be most conducive to 
the general good,” even if this other life happens to be oneself or one’s close 
relations; so we ought to save the archbishop. This, according to Godwin, 
is what justice (i.e., impartiality) demands; if we fail to save the archbishop, 
we are being unjust to all of the (many) people who will suffer as the result 
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of his death. We have unduly privileged the people that we love and have 
thus failed to treat others as their moral equals.5
While few contemporary philosophers endorse Godwin’s radical con-
clusion, many have suggested that the moral obligations we have toward far-
distant strangers are in fact quite similar to the obligations we have toward 
those we know and love. Peter Singer, for instance, has argued that morality 
requires that we give nearly all of our disposable income to poverty relief. 
This is because we have every reason to expect that the money will do far 
more good when used to purchase food or medicine for the truly needy than 
when used to purchase luxuries for our loved ones or ourselves. On Singer’s 
view, it is not so much that we overestimate the obligations we have to our 
family and friends as that we underestimate our obligations to everyone 
else. So, insofar as we agree it would be morally wrong to let a sibling die of 
starvation when we could afford to buy him or her food, we ought also to 
agree that is morally wrong to spend money on luxuries when this money 
could be used to save strangers from starvation. If Singer is right about this, 
then it would seem to imply that any money spent on luxuries (e.g., buying 
a diamond engagement right, going out for a fancy dinner, etc.) is immoral.6
This view of our moral obligations is, as both Godwin and Singer seem 
to recognize, radically at odds with the way that most people think about 
these things. And while a view’s unpopularity is hardly evidence that it is 
false, there do seem to be some legitimate reasons for concern. After all, 
the decision makers at the CIA who are too willing to sacrifice agents’ lives 
might strike one as cold and inhuman; similarly, there seems to be a genuine 
sense in which Jack’s failures as a father cannot be excused by noting all of 
the good things he was able to do while ignoring his young daughter. The 
question is whether we can find a way to reconcile these concerns with an 
impartial view of morality.
NO IMPARTIAL MORALITY?
While the first approach counsels that personal relationships have no place 
in moral thought, the second approach advises that such relationships are in 
fact the only things of moral relevance in the types of dilemmas we are dis-
cussing here. This approach holds that we do have obligations to our nearest 
and dearest and that the existence of these obligations means that morality 
is not really impartial. More specifically, this approach says that we ought to 
do everything we possibly can for our nearest and dearest, regardless of the 
effect these actions might have on other people. This view says that one should 
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always choose to save a loved one, regardless of the cost to others; that it is 
always okay to choose family over work; and that there are no limits to the 
revenge that might be exacted on behalf of a loved one who has been harmed.
For a simple example of how this approach might work in practice, 
consider the case of a father trying to determine what help he ought to give 
to a daughter in need of a heart transplant. The first view would say that 
the father has no special obligation to make sure she gets the medical treat-
ment she needs, though he may have a general moral requirement to care 
for sick people (especially those he is well placed to help). The second view 
says, by contrast, that the father can (and perhaps should) do everything 
in his power to make his sure his daughter gets the treatment she needs. If 
this means holding the physician at gunpoint or killing innocent people to 
harvest their hearts, so be it. The only thing of importance, in this view, is 
the father’s obligation to help his daughter.
When Nadia becomes ill in the final season of Alias, Sloane finds him-
self in a situation similar to that of the hypothetical father. His actions in 
this case, moreover, serve as a good example of what the second approach 
advises. Representatives of an evil organization (Prophet Five) promise 
Sloane that they can cure Nadia; however, they tell him that they will do so 
only if Sloane agrees to serve as a double agent. Sloane (reluctantly) agrees 
to do so, even though he knows that his actions as a double agent might 
lead to the deaths of innocent people, including Jack or Sydney. Sloane’s 
reasoning seems to be that his duty to save Nadia outweighs any obligation 
he may have to other people.
A second example of the second view is provided by Sloane’s wife, Emily. 
During the second season episode “Truth Takes Time,” Emily learns that 
Sloane is still involved with various illegal activities (and is still lying about 
them to her). Based on this knowledge, she goes to Sydney and tells her that 
she is willing to help the CIA catch Sloane (though only if the CIA doesn’t 
seek the death penalty). From an impartial point of view, turning in Sloane 
would obviously be the right thing for Emily to do, even though Sloane swears 
to her he will give up his life of crime. Emily knows, after all, that Sloane has 
lied to her in the past and that he has made a habit of killing innocent people. 
In the end, however, Emily feels guilt over turning in her husband to the CIA 
and chooses to warn Sloane of the CIA’s trap for him. She, like Sloane, seems 
to feel that her duty to stand by her husband trumps her obligation to pro-
tect the people who might be harmed by Sloane’s continuing his evil ways.
Few philosophers explicitly endorse the view that one is morally permit-
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ted to do whatever one likes for the sake of loved ones. However, some have 
argued that we ought to reject the ideal of an impartial morality for precisely 
the sorts of reasons that Sloane and Emily do so—that is, because obeying 
the demands of such a morality would require that we give up everything 
that makes life worth living.
Bernard Williams (1929–2003), for instance, has argued that being 
truly impartial is incompatible with leading a meaningful life. According 
to Williams, a person’s life is meaningful only if he or she has one or more 
ground projects that are “closely related to his [or her] existence and which 
to a significant degree give meaning to his [or her] life.” For Emily, such a 
project might be her life with Sloane; for Sloane, such projects might involve 
Nadia’s well-being and the pursuit of the Rambaldi artifacts. The problem 
arises, according to Williams, when one realizes that obeying an impartial 
morality might require that you give up any hope of completing your ground 
projects—for example, it might require that you turn your husband in to the 
police or let your daughter die when you could save her. Williams argues 
that it is completely unrealistic to expect humans to behave in this way. 
After all, if people’s ground projects are what give their lives substance, then 
demanding that they give up on these projects is quite similar to demand-
ing that they commit suicide.7
Williams concludes from the above considerations that the impartial 
view of morality is false: 
One reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to 
other persons will express themselves in the world in ways which 
cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and that they 
also run the risk of offending against it. They run that risk if they 
exist at all; yet unless such things exist there will not be enough 
substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to 
life itself. . . . Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, 
including adherence to the impartial system; but if it has substance, 
then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system, 
and that system’s hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure.8 
While Williams’s view does not entail that Emily’s and Sloane’s actions are 
morally right, it suggests that they are not quite morally wrong either. Instead, 
it might be thought that such extreme cases inhabit a sort of gray area about 
which it is impossible for us to pass moral judgment at all.
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Insofar as this view allows for a more nuanced judgment of characters 
like Emily, it clearly gets something right. The problem, if there is one, lies 
in the fact that it leaves so little room for any moral judgment. There is, after 
all, a fairly clear sense that Emily and Sloane know that they are doing the 
wrong things but choose to do them anyway. Their choices to act in the way 
that they do might be understandable, especially given their circumstances; 
however, this does not mean that what they are doing is morally okay.9
SYDNEY’S MODERATE SOLUTION
There are good reasons to be suspicious of both the preceding views. After 
all, it seems intuitively clear that Jack ought to have been a better father to 
Sydney and that Sloane ought to have rejected Prophet Five’s deal. These 
intuitions suggest there is some special obligation to take special care of 
one’s “nearest and dearest” but this does not give us license to do just any-
thing on their behalf.
Of all the Alias characters, Sydney provides the best example of this 
moderate view. She neither ignores her special obligations to those close to 
her nor ignores her obligations to everyone else. So, for example, consider 
Sydney’s actions when Will’s kidnappers demand that that she trade a Ram-
baldi page for his release. Sydney is aware that this page contains the plan 
for building and using a dangerous device. She is also aware, however, that 
considerable time and effort will be needed to effectively utilize the device 
and that it may be possible for her to do other things to prevent the device 
from being used. It is thus unclear how much danger there really is in giving 
the plan to this organization. In the end, Sydney decides to have Jack trade 
the page for Will but to simultaneously attempt to destroy the organization’s 
lab (which will prevent or delay their attempts to use the device). Sydney’s 
choice here is notably distinct from what either extreme view would have 
dictated. The first view would suggest that Sydney refuse to make the trade 
at all, on the grounds that Will’s life could not possibly be worth the risk; 
the second solution would urge that Sydney make the trade as offered (and 
not attempt to blow up the lab), on the grounds that doing anything else 
might put Will in unnecessary danger.
One can easily find other examples of Sydney doing this sort of balancing 
act. So, for example, Sydney makes regular efforts to spend time with family 
and friends, even though she could undoubtedly find more “spy work” to do. 
She has dinner with her father, goes on dates with Vaughn, and spends holi-
days with her friends. She also regularly disobeys her superiors in order to 
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save the lives or friends or family and proves willing to seek revenge against 
those who hurt them. However, she is not willing to do just anything for 
her loved ones. She is, for example, willing to turn her father in to the FBI 
when she suspects that he may have once worked for the KGB, and she is 
willing seek out and fight her mother in order to prevent the destruction of 
New York and London.
Sydney’s “moderate” view is, in many ways, both intuitive and compel-
ling. The philosophical difficulty for this view, however, is to explain why we 
have special obligations to certain people at all, if morality really requires 
that we be impartial. This difficulty is notably unique to the third view. The 
first view evades the difficulty by claiming that there are no special obliga-
tions, while the second view evades it by claiming that morality does not 
really require that we be impartial.
One way of explaining why we have special obligations to loved ones 
is to note the moral importance of acting quickly and without hesitation or 
fear. Impartial morality, after all, requires that we all do our best to help and 
protect others when we can. The best way of helping and protecting oth-
ers, however, is surely not to spend all of our time exhaustively cataloging 
everyone’s problems and to act only when we are sure that we have cho-
sen the best possible course of action. If we did this, nothing would ever 
get done and we would end up helping no one. In the world of Alias, for 
instance, such a strategy would ensure that no bomb would ever be defused 
and that no bad guy would ever be caught. It is far better to simply assume 
that loved ones who are in danger ought to be rescued, that parents ought 
to spend time with their children, and that evildoers ought to be brought 
to justice. This is because such actions are, in the vast majority of cases, to 
the benefit of everyone involved. This solution, which is defended by Peter 
Railton, might also explain why it is a morally good thing for us to think 
of our loved ones as being special or different from other people. This sort 
of love can, after all, be a powerful motivator to quick, decisive action in 
defense of others. According to Railton, the best (most moral) types of 
people are those, like Sydney, for whom these types of selfless behavior are 
almost “second nature.”10
If Railton is correct, then Sydney’s choice to trade the Rambaldi page 
to save Will’s life is a moral one even if it (in the end) leads to a larger num-
ber of causalities. This holds not because Will’s life is more valuable than 
other people’s lives but because of Sydney’s relationship to Will. Sydney has 
worked hard to be the sort of person whom family and friends can count on 
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for aid, comfort, and protection. This, according to Railton, is exactly what 
impartiality requires of her. One cannot be this sort of person, however, 
and also be the sort of person who is continuously trying to figure out how 
much the life of a loved one is “worth” when compared to the lives of oth-
ers. This does not mean, of course, that one should simply ignore the well-
being of strangers. Instead, one ought to try (as Sydney does) to help both 
one’s loved ones and everyone else.
A slightly different explanation of the importance of special obligations 
is suggested by Frank Jackson, who emphasizes the importance of a sort of 
a moral “division of labor.” Jackson begins by noting that it would be hor-
ribly inefficient to require that everyone simultaneously help and protect 
everyone else. So, for example, it is plausible that we have an impartial moral 
duty to see to it that the children in our community have food, shelter, and 
education. However, the fact that we have such an obligation does not mean 
that each one of us should offer food or housing to every child we happen 
to meet. Instead, most societies have found that it works better to assign 
responsibility for individual children to a relatively small number of people 
(e.g., parents, teachers, social workers, etc.). Ideally, this sort of system will 
meet the needs of all children, by making sure each child has an appropriate 
number of caretakers who will look out for his or her interests.11
Jackson argues that this sort of “sector system,” which assigns specific 
moral duties to specific people, works best in particular types of situations. 







invested in the outcome.
The best examples of these situations involve the sorts of moral duties that 
we owe to our loved ones—for example, to console them when they are 
sad, to talk through difficult choices with them, to buy them appropriate 
birthday gifts, and so on. These sorts of duties simply cannot be done by 
a complete stranger. Raising a child well, for instance, requires the efforts 
of a person (or people) who knows a lot about that particular child’s needs 
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and abilities and who is willing to invest a good deal of physical and emo-
tional resources. Moreover, there would be no great benefit to the child in 
having too many people take this sort of interest in his or her life; instead, 
these sorts of duties can best accomplished by a relatively small number of 
people (parents, relatives, etc.).
In Jackson’s view, then, Sydney is doing just as she ought to do in treating 
her loved ones in a different way (and better) than she treats strangers off the 
street. Sydney’s eventual choice to leave the spy life behind and concentrate 
on raising her child with Vaughn, for example, does not mean she is “letting 
the country down” or unjustifiably favoring her child. Sydney, unlike her 
father, Jack, has simply realized that the she does have special obligations to 
her child and that these obligations cannot always be trumped by the need 
to save the world from the latest impeding disaster.
A Model of Moral Behavior
The moral dilemmas of Alias characters are, in certain ways, wildly different 
from the dilemmas that we encounter in our daily lives. Most of us will never 
be asked to conceal government secrets from loved ones, to seek revenge 
against spies who have murdered our fiancé, or be asked to fight our parents 
to prevent genocide. In other ways, however, the dilemmas faced by these 
characters should be quite familiar to us. Part of living a moral life involves 
figuring out how one can simultaneously respect the idea that everyone 
deserves equal treatment and the idea that we have special obligations to the 
particular people with whom we are closest. In this respect, as in so many 
others, Sydney provides a model of moral behavior.
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Is abraMs’s star trek a  
star trek fILM?
Daniel Whiting
Is J. J. Abrams’s reboot Star Trek (2009) a Star Trek film? To ask this is, in 
part, to ask what category of film Star Trek belongs to. Questions about 
categories or kinds are as old as philosophy itself. What kinds of things are 
there? How do these kinds of things relate to one another? What determines 
what things belong to these categories? These are all questions asked in the 
branch of Western philosophy known as metaphysics.1 Whether Star Trek is 
a Star Trek film—whether it belongs to that series or category—is not simply 
a question one can ask about the film, or so I shall argue: it is a question that 
the film itself asks. To this extent, the film appears to engage in metaphysics.
However, as I shall also argue, the film seems to suggest that judgments 
as to whether something belongs to a series are not wholly descriptive; 
rather, they are in large part evaluative. Further, making these evaluative 
judgments might lead one to reevaluate one’s conception of the “essence” 
of that series. Thus, in the end I shall maintain that, according to Star Trek, 
determining whether something belongs to a series such as Star Trek—and 
so what the nature of that series is—is primarily an aesthetic matter rather 
than a metaphysical one.
Of course, there is a certain reflexivity involved when a film that is 
ostensibly a sequel to other films and that ostensibly belongs to a series 
based in turn on a television series tackles such issues, since in doing so it 
is reflecting upon itself, on its own status and its relationship to other works. 
Stephen Mulhall maintains that the various contributions to the Alien series 
(1979–) manifest “a reflective engagement with their own status as sequels, 
and hence with questions of inheritance and originality” and that in doing 
so they reflect “upon the conditions of [that series’] possibility.”2 The same, 
as I shall try to show, can be said of Star Trek.
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Questions about what it takes to belong to a series can seem abstract 
and of purely intellectual interest. However, as Kendall Walton stresses, 
“aesthetic judgement rests on [judgments about a work’s category] in an 
absolutely fundamental way,” since “what aesthetic properties a thing seems 
to have may depend on what categories it is perceived in.”3 More generally, 
judgments about what category a work belongs to necessarily inform our 
appreciation, understanding, and evaluation of artworks since the aesthetic, 
expressive, and representational properties of a work are determined in part 
by the categories it belongs to, that is, what form of art it is, which historical 
or stylistic genre it belongs to, which artist or movement it is a product of, and 
so on. For example, the same array of paint on canvas might be dynamic for 
a Mondrian but lifeless for a Kandinsky, while what it takes for a work to be 
bleak differs between film noir and romantic comedies, and so on. Hence, in 
raising questions about the category to which it belongs, Star Trek is raising 
questions about how it should be appreciated, evaluated, and interpreted.
George Kirk and James T. Kirk
Gene Roddenberry’s original Star Trek (1966) television series ran for three 
seasons; it spawned five spinoff television series and (prior to Abrams’s Star 
Trek) ten movies, as well as numerous books, comics, and video games. It is 
perhaps not a great surprise, then, that at some point a putative member of 
this franchise started to raise questions about the status of this series and the 
member’s place in it. Moreover, Abrams is himself responsible for a num-
ber of television series, including Alias (2001–2006) and Lost (2004–2010), 
as well as another film that belongs to a series based in turn on a television 
series, Mission: Impossible III (2006). It is no less surprising, then, that a 
work by Abrams should raise questions concerning what it takes to belong 
to a series and so about what kind of film Star Trek is.4
One might think that Abrams’s movie is evidently a Star Trek film, since 
it appropriates the original television series’s title, includes many charac-
ters, locations, artifacts, and events whose names are the same as those 
in the original and subsequent series, exploits the same musical theme, 
exhibits some narrative continuities with other accepted members of the 
series, and involves one of the series’s original actors (Leonard Nimoy). 
Implicit in this assumption is the thought that the above are among the 
criteria that determine whether a work counts as belonging to the Star 
Trek series. However, while these criteria might be necessary for a Star 
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Trek film, Abrams’s Star Trek certainly challenges, self-consciously, the 
idea that they are sufficient.
The first indication of this, before it has even begun, is that the film is 
simply titled Star Trek (as opposed to, say, Star Trek XI). This immediately 
suggests that the film is not taking for granted that it belongs to a series 
and also introduces the thought that previous Star Trek films might not be 
properly called such. Another early indication of the film’s concerns is that 
it opens neither with the well-known theme from the original series nor 
with the famous voiceover that begins “Space: the final frontier . . .” These 
decisions seem to send out the message that there is, or should be, no pre-
sumption that the film belongs to the series of the same name.
These concerns are reinforced in Star Trek’s dramatic opening sequence. 
As the film begins, a Romulan ship emerges slowly from a “lightning storm.” 
Soon after, another starship appears that one might easily assume to be the 
U.S.S. Enterprise, given its distinctive shape, multinational crew, and blink-
ing lights; it is, however, the U.S.S. Kelvin, as we learn later. The name of this 
ship recalls the Kelvin temperature scale, which begins at absolute zero, an 
association that can be taken in two ways: it might be understood to raise 
again the idea that this film’s place in a series, its belonging to the category 
of Star Trek films, is not being assumed; or it might be understood as an 
assertion that this film is in some way returning to the absolute beginning, 
that is, to the original Star Trek series. I shall return to these themes repeat-
edly in what follows.
The captain of the Kelvin, Rodau, boards the Romulan vessel to nego-
tiate with its captain, Nero. Nero asks Rodau if he knows Spock, to which 
Rodau replies, “I am unfamiliar with Ambassador Spock.” So it appears that, 
in the universe of Abrams’s Star Trek, familiarity with Spock, a character so 
familiar from the Star Trek series and its universe, is not taken for granted.
In Rodau’s absence an officer named Kirk assumes the role of captain. 
At this point one might be tempted to think that this is James T. Kirk, cap-
tain of the Enterprise, one of the central characters in the original televi-
sion series. However, it is not long before we learn that the acting captain 
is George Kirk. This trick seems designed precisely to unsettle our assump-
tions that the world of the film we are watching is the same world familiar 
to us from the original Star Trek series and so in turn to start to unsettle our 
assumption that we are watching a Star Trek film.
Abrams’s Star Trek has barely started and already it is questioning and 
leading its viewers to question its relation to the Star Trek series, its status as 
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a Star Trek film: several established conventions, such as the use of numerals, 
voiceover, and music, have been breached; twice over the expectation that 
we are witnessing people and vehicles from the Star Trek universe has been 
thwarted; and characters in the film appear not to be familiar with central 
figures from the original series. In these ways we are surely being encour-
aged to ask, Is Abrams’s Star Trek a Star Trek film?
An Alternate Reality
George sets the Kelvin on course to collide with the Romulan ship but its 
“autopilot” is destroyed, and so George chooses to sacrifice himself by manu-
ally directing the ship. There are two things to note here. First, though it is 
not apparent until later, the result of the sacrifice George makes at the start 
of the movie—a sacrifice necessitated by Nero’s decisions to follow Spock 
into the wormhole and to attack the first Federation vessel he sees when 
emerging from it—is that everything that follows takes place in an alterna-
tive reality to that in which the original Star Trek series—and the movies, 
television shows, books, and comics that followed it—takes place. Second, 
in bringing this about George does not, because he cannot, rely on any pre-
determined procedures or any algorithmic principles of the sort that might 
be mechanically applied.
These two points are reinforced later in the following exchange:
Spock: We must gather with the rest of Starfleet to balance the terms 
of the next engagement.
Kirk: There won’t be a next engagement—by the time we’ve gathered, 
it’ll be too late. But you say he’s from the future and knows what’s 
going to happen—then the logical thing is to be unpredictable.
Spock: You are assuming that Nero knows how events are predicted 
to unfold; on the contrary, Nero’s very presence has altered 
the flow of history . . . thereby creating an entire new chain of 
incidents that cannot be anticipated by either party.
Uhura: An alternate reality.
Spock: Precisely. Whatever our lives might have been, if the time 
continuum was disrupted, our destinies have changed.
First, Uhura’s stating of the obvious reminds us that the events of Abrams’s 
Star Trek belong to a different chain, or series, than any that are familiar from 
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other putative members of the Star Trek franchise. This film is, or aspires 
to be, “new,” to break radically from its “history.” Second, the events of Star 
Trek and the lives they involve are “unpredictable;” they cannot be “antici-
pated” and are not as they were “destined” to be, according to the original 
continuum or series.
Evidently these two points are linked. In not relying on established 
principles or in deviating from the norm, a new universe is created through 
the destruction of the old. And given that the universe is new, established 
principles or norms do not apply.
There are two ways to interpret the decision to relocate the film at its 
outset to an “alternate reality.” On the one hand, the opening scenes appear 
to declare that the film to follow is in no way a straightforward continuation 
of the Star Trek franchise, perhaps that it does not belong to that series at 
all. At the very least, it invites us to think about whether it counts as a Star 
Trek film. On the other hand, recall the words of George, who is in large 
part responsible for creating the alternate reality, to his wife, who is escap-
ing the ship while in labor: “I’m not going to be there. This is the only way 
you’ll survive.” Directing the Kelvin in an unforeseen way and breaking with 
history allow George to save his wife, and so their son, James T. Kirk, who 
is born at the moment of sacrifice. This suggests that to cast off the series 
with which we are familiar, and so to create “lives” not determined by what 
has been taken to be the governing principles of that series, is precisely the 
way to preserve the Star Trek series. In this respect, Star Trek presents itself 
as a return to and redirection of the Star Trek universe and series.
Kirk’s Inheritance
Given George’s sacrifice, James Kirk loses a parent, and so his life unfolds 
without the formative influence and guidance of his father.5 In this respect 
Kirk’s life seems to embody the situation of Star Trek itself—both to stand 
in an uncertain relationship to predecessors of the same name and to unfold 
in a way that is not predetermined by established precedent.
In view of this, it is interesting to note that, while Zachary Quinto and 
Karl Urban seem to attempt to mimic Nimoy’s Spock and DeForest Kelley’s 
Leonard McCoy, respectively, Chris Pine, who plays the adult Kirk, does 
not appear to be trying at all to impersonate William Shatner. Though Pine 
bears some physical resemblance to the young Shatner, he studiously avoids 
Shatner’s characteristic (indeed, infamous) halting speech pattern.6 Pine’s 
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acting style encourages us to question the assumption that Pine is inherit-
ing Shatner’s character, that is, the Kirk from the original Star Trek universe, 
and reinforces the thought that, whatever the status of Pine’s Kirk, he will 
not be played according to predetermined conventions.7
According to Nero, in the original Star Trek universe (Shatner’s) Kirk is 
“considered to be a great man.” Nero’s choice of words keeps the attribution 
of greatness at a distance, as if to suggest that this attribution might not be 
well founded. In any case, Nero notes, “That was another life, a life I will 
deprive you of just like I did your father.” It is difficult to make sense of these 
remarks. On the one hand, Nero seems to be talking literally about depriving 
Kirk of life in the Star Trek universe by killing him (as he killed his father). 
On the other hand, Nero seems to be talking figuratively of depriving Kirk 
of the life in which he is considered to be a great man (on its most natural 
reading, the indefinite description “a life” inherits its reference anaphori-
cally from the preceding definite description, “the life”). It is not clear how to 
reconcile the two readings—if Nero were to kill Kirk, he would not deprive 
him of the life in which he is considered to be a great man, since by killing 
Kirk’s father, he has already deprived Kirk of that life. Still, the important 
point for present purposes is that, prior to Nero’s intervention, Kirk, and by 
implication Star Trek, possesses a (questionable) reputation for greatness, 
a reputation that is linked to a certain heritage and that is under threat, in 
part because that link is under threat.
In the viewer’s first real encounter with Kirk, he is as an adolescent reck-
lessly driving a car into a chasm while listening to the Beastie Boys. That 
the destroyed car is from the period in which the Star Trek television series 
was produced reinforces the suggestion that Abrams’s Star Trek has wil-
fully broken with the history to which one might have assumed it belonged. 
That said, the choice of a song, titled “Sabotage,” from the mid-1990s as the 
accompaniment to Kirk’s act of destruction might suggest an implicit criti-
cism of later ostensible members of the Star Trek series as responsible for 
disrupting, and ultimately wrecking, the series that they claim to inherit.8 
What is clear is that this scene serves to establish Kirk as a rebel.
Kirk’s rebelliousness points in two directions. First, the presumption 
appears to be that Kirk’s subversive character is a product of the fact that 
he lacked paternal guidance, that his life is not influenced by his prede-
cessor and namesake. Second, given Kirk’s rebelliousness, the events of 
his life (hence, of the film) cannot be anticipated in advance and will not 
unfold according to convention (I already noted above the adult Kirk’s 
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urge to be “unpredictable”). This reinforces the thought that Kirk embod-
ies the film’s status.
The picture Star Trek presents of the relationship of Kirk to his past 
is, however, not a straightforward one; specifically, his break with the past 
might not be as total as it might first appear. After all, his rebellious charac-
ter is presented as resulting from the prior events involving his father and 
Nero. Moreover, Kirk is his father’s son and it is inevitable that he would 
receive some input from his heritage, if only at the biological level. The idea 
of an individual—or, for that matter, that of an artwork—whose character 
and actions—or expressive, representational, and aesthetic properties—are 
in no way influenced by external factors, including historical factors, is, of 
course, a myth, albeit a romantic one.
In view of this, consider Christopher Pike’s seemingly irrational faith in 
Kirk’s aptitude for Starfleet. On the basis of what appears to be no evidence 
whatsoever, Pike insists that Kirk is his “father’s son.” It might appear that 
Pike is taking for granted precisely what is in question, namely, that the Kirk 
of Abrams’s Star Trek is the Kirk of Star Trek (and so, in effect, that Abrams’s 
Star Trek is a Star Trek film). However, it should not be overlooked that Pike 
also dares Kirk to “do better.” This hints at a theme not yet discussed. Pike’s 
remark suggests that, to the extent that Kirk has inherited his past, Kirk 
should draw upon that heritage and its resources in a “better” fashion than 
has been done to date. So Kirk must not allow all or undesirable aspects of 
his inheritance to determine and dominate his character and life but must 
be selective and draw upon only those aspects that are desirable in a supe-
rior fashion. This points to a different way in which Kirk, and by implication 
Star Trek, might be “unpredictable”—not (per impossibile) through being 
in no way influenced by what has gone before, but through exploiting what 
has gone before in an original and innovative way.
In light of this, consider the following case in Star Trek of the past appear-
ing to repeat itself. At the start of the film, George Kirk is made captain of 
the Kelvin when his predecessor leaves to negotiate unsuccessfully with 
Nero. Later, Pike leaves the Enterprise to negotiate with Nero. The immedi-
ate result is that Spock is made captain of the Enterprise. Nonetheless, with 
the aid of Spock himself, though Nimoy’s Spock from the original Star Trek 
universe (and series), Kirk becomes captain and succeeds in saving Pike 
and defeating Nero. The message here seems to be that there is a standing 
threat of merely reproducing the past, following the precedent set by pre-
decessors, with disastrous consequences (indeed, disastrous consequences 
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for the entire Star Trek universe). However, the message continues, this is 
a threat that can be avoided, not by entirely disregarding the past—say, by 
not listening to the original Spock—but by learning from it in a selective 
and novel fashion.
Always a Child of Two Worlds
Like Kirk, Spock embodies and dramatizes the concerns of Abrams’s Star 
Trek. Before turning to consider the significance of the events involving 
Spock, it is worth noting that the actor who portrays him, Quinto, was 
previously best known for playing a character in another well-known tele-
vision series, namely the serial killer Sylar in Heroes. This casting decision 
is extremely suggestive. Sylar is immortal; he manages to return to life on 
several occasions after what appears to be his death. Moreover, Sylar is a 
parasite; he owes almost all his powers to the victims he kills in order to 
access their brains. One might be tempted to think that we are being invited 
to see a connection between Sylar and Star Trek—a series that seems to be 
incapable of dying and whose putative members are parasitic upon the abili-
ties of others and so are, to that extent, inauthentic.
This is, admittedly, speculative. Another, more evident, way in which 
Quinto’s previous role as Sylar has resonance with respect to his role in Star 
Trek is that, like Kirk and (as I shall discuss shortly) Spock, Sylar’s lineage is 
a complex matter. Sylar grew up in the absence of his father and later is led 
on two occasions to believe falsely that a certain individual is his biological 
father, respectively, Arthur Petrelli and Martin Gray. Eventually Sylar meets 
his real father—from whom, it appears, Sylar inherited his ability to acquire 
others’ powers and who, it turns out, killed his biological mother—only to 
leave his father to die from cancer. Similarly, Sylar is led on two occasions to 
believe falsely that a certain individual is his biological mother, respectively, 
Virginia Gray—whom Sylar kills—and Angela Petrelli. The identity of his 
real mother has yet to be revealed. I have abstracted from the labyrinthine 
details of Sylar’s efforts to learn the facts about his parentage. The important 
point for present purposes is that the near-bewildering array of issues con-
cerning Sylar’s lineage and the resultant uncertainty about his relationship 
to his apparent predecessors surely informed, or at least casts an interesting 
light on, the decision to cast Quinto as Spock.
As we did with Kirk, we first meet Spock as a child and immediately 
discover that he faces difficulties as a result of his relationship to his prede-
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cessors. Spock is deemed to be “disadvantaged” by his parentage, specifi-
cally by the fact that his father, Sarek, married a human, Amanda Grayson. 
As a result, Sarek is deemed a “traitor” and the young Spock is bullied for 
being “neither human nor Vulcan”; in his own words, he has “no place in 
this universe.”
There are two strands to tease out here. First, due to Spock’s parentage, as 
Sarek tells him, “You will always be a child of two worlds.” Setting the literal 
reading aside, in one sense this seems a nod to the fact that the character of 
Spock is to be found both in the original Star Trek universe and in the alter-
nate reality of Abrams’s Star Trek. This in turn puts the relation of Quinto’s 
Spock to Nimoy’s original Spock in question, just as the relation of Abrams’s 
Star Trek is to the original show and the subsequent works bearing its name.
Second, as with Kirk, Spock’s parentage causes problems. The charge 
seems to be not that Spock is in no way influenced or guided by his past but 
that (at least according to other Vulcans) the guidance is of the wrong sort. 
More specifically, Vulcans are not supposed to feel emotion; rather, they are 
to be entirely “logical” in their decision making. Through years of training 
from birth, Vulcans are required to develop the mental discipline to repress 
their very real strong emotions so that they might guide their thought and 
behavior by “rational” considerations alone. The perceived danger, then, is 
that Spock’s decisions and actions might be governed not purely by imper-
sonal algorithms of the sort, say, that an autopilot could mechanically exe-
cute but instead by a certain and distinctively personal sensibility, just as 
Abrams’s Star Trek purports not simply to be mechanically following out the 
paths laid out by the established conventions of Star Trek (which is in part 
the reason why its status as a Star Trek film is under consideration). It is no 
surprise, then, that, like Kirk, Spock is deemed (by a minister) to be a “rebel.”
The parallels between Kirk and Spock go further. Just as Pike dares Kirk 
to do better, Sarek insists, “Spock, you are fully capable of deciding your own 
destiny. The question you face is: Which path will you choose?” Like Pike, 
Sarek seems remarkably confident that it is within Spock’s power to direct 
his own life and so, rather than allow his heritage to rule him, to make it his 
own by drawing upon it in an effective and novel manner (in a similar way 
to that in which Spock later turns the Romulans’ and Vulcans’ “common 
ancestry” to his advantage in accessing the Romulan computer systems).
This leads to the following point. One respect in which the universe of 
Abrams’s Star Trek differs from the familiar Star Trek universe is that in the 
former Spock’s home planet, Vulcan, is destroyed by a black hole that Nero 
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places at the center of the planet. In a dramatic rescue, Spock manages to 
save (most of) the Vulcan High Council, which, we are told, is “tasked with 
protecting” Vulcan “cultural history.” On the one hand, this moment rep-
resents another instance in which a link between a character and a certain 
lineage (or “history”) governed by institutions and conventions (or “culture”) 
is threatened and to some extent broken. As Spock memorably puts it, “I 
am now a member of an endangered species.” So, too, the suggestion seems 
to be, Star Trek is a species in danger of extinction, the stream of films and 
other formats bearing its name notwithstanding.
On the other hand, thanks to Spock’s efforts, “The essence of our culture 
has been saved in the elders who now reside upon the ship.” Spock’s lineage 
and the institutions and conventions to which it is subject are preserved or, 
more precisely, their essence has been, those essential features of the “cultural 
history” or, so it is implied, of the accidental features it accrued over time, 
stripped. This, of course, holds out hope for the continuation of that par-
ticular series, though perhaps in a manner more faithful to it than its more 
recent instances. It is clear, I think, that in a similar fashion Abrams’s Star 
Trek takes itself to offer hope for the continuation of the Star Trek series by 
returning to its roots and distilling its essentials. I shall return to this below, 
but it is a sign of the film’s confidence in this possibility that Spock says to his 
fellow crew members, “I need everyone to continue performing admirably.”
Breaking the Rules
Kirk and Spock first meet when Kirk participates in the Kobayashi Maru 
test—first presented in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982)—programmed 
by Spock. Rather than accept that the test presents a “no-win situation,” Kirk 
completes it successfully, though only, as Spock complains, by “changing the 
conditions of the test” and the “rules” or “principles” behind it.
First, note that Kirk is participating in a “simulation,” a simulation that 
is supposed to conclude in only one way, failure. Given the established con-
cerns of Star Trek, outlined above, one can take this as acknowledging the 
possibility that the film will merely simulate a Star Trek film, rather than 
constitute an authentic or genuine member of that kind; indeed, the sug-
gestion might seem to be that the realization of this possibility is inevitable. 
Moreover, viewers are (at least intended to be) unaware initially that the 
Klingon attack, with its familiar setup and appearance, is a simulation. As a 
result, viewers are duped into taking the scenario at face value, as genuine. 
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This ploy seems intended in the first instance to acknowledge the temp-
tation to conform to viewers’ expectations and to create a film following 
established conventions before proceeding to thwart those expectations 
and encourage viewers not to accept uncritically the authenticity of what 
they experience. (Compare the first appearances of the Kelvin and George 
Kirk, discussed above.)
In turn, an implication of the scene seems to be that one can avoid 
the fate of merely imitating a Star Trek film only by refusing to play by the 
rules, that is, by not following established convention. And, as it happens, 
success through cheating is common in Abrams’s Star Trek.9 For example, 
McCoy manages to get Kirk onto the Enterprise by breaking the rules, spe-
cifically, by injecting him with a vaccine that leads Kirk to simulate(!) the 
symptoms of an illness, while Uhura boards the Enterprise only by exploit-
ing her relationship with Spock. Likewise, Spock provides Scotty with the 
equation for transporting during warp, which in the original universe Scotty 
“discovered”—and, as Kirk reminds the original Spock, “Coming back in 
time, changing history . . . that’s cheating.”10 Of course, in each case, cheat-
ing leads to positive outcomes. Perhaps the message here, to echo earlier 
thoughts, is that the principles of the Star Trek universe are not mechanical 
algorithms to be mechanically executed but, at most, rules of thumb to be 
followed, adapted, or ignored as the situation demands.
As just noted, Kirk meets the Spock from the original Star Trek universe; 
in fact, he meets Nimoy’s Spock from the original Star Trek television series. 
His doing so is an incredible coincidence, one that is so utterly unbeliev-
able and so very convenient for the film’s storyline that the only charitable 
interpretation that prevents the meeting from being a serious narrative fail-
ing is that it is somehow destined or predetermined. I am not suggesting 
that the film sustains this interpretation but it is at least consistent with its 
thematic preoccupations.
Setting this aside, Nimoy’s Spock turns out to have a pivotal role in Star 
Trek: he is (at least perceived to be) responsible for the destruction that led to 
the creation of the alternate reality in which the bulk of the film unfolds, and 
he is largely responsible for the film’s happy ending. I shall take each in turn.
When Spock’s ship first appears, Nero says, “Welcome back.” Nero has 
waited, we are told, “for the one who allowed our home to be destroyed.” 
(Spock failed to prevent Romulus from being destroyed by a supernova.) It 
is hard not to read this as an implicit criticism—one that we have encoun-
tered before, although one here kept safely at arm’s length by the fact that 
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the words are spoken by the film’s maniacal villain—according to which the 
participants in the various works bearing the name of “Star Trek” that fol-
lowed the original series, including its original cast members, played some 
part in the destruction of the “home,” that is, the Star Trek universe or parts 
of it. (Compare Nero’s circumspect attribution of greatness to Shatner’s Kirk, 
discussed earlier.)
That said, it is Spock who saves the day by rescuing Kirk on Delta Vega, 
informing Scotty of the formula for midwarp transportation, and, finally, 
by telling Kirk how to have Spock (i.e., himself) removed from command. 
So it is thanks in large part to Nimoy’s Spock that the crew at the close of 
Star Trek is the same the crew in the same roles as in the original—I shall 
return to this shortly—and that this crew is successful in saving Earth from 
the Romulan attack. In this respect, the past has a positive, if not exclusive, 
influence on the present.
The original Spock on Delta Vega initially tells Kirk that Spock’s coun-
terpart in the alternate reality must not be made aware of his existence. It 
turns out, however, that the “one rule you cannot break” is broken. When 
Nimoy’s Spock meets Quinto’s Spock, the former’s closing words are strik-
ing: “My customary farewell would seem oddly self-serving.” That is, Spock 
alludes to but does not utter the famous, and now hackneyed, words “Live 
long and prosper.” On the one hand, this might seem to point to the idea 
that whether the Star Trek series and its inhabitants have longevity and, more 
pertinently, whether it will prosper through the contribution of Star Trek 
has yet to be determined (“I shall simply say, ‘Good luck’”). On the other 
hand, picking up on a suggestion broached earlier, Spock’s words betray a 
sense of confidence and the tone suggests that long life and prosperity are 
a given. I shall return to this below.
An Aesthetic Matter
In light of the above, what can we conclude about what it takes to be a Star 
Trek film? What are the criteria for belonging to the Star Trek series? Part of 
the answer that Abrams’s Star Trek appears to give to the questions it raises 
is that there are no purely formal or descriptive criteria that one could spell 
out such that, if something meets those criteria, it counts as belonging to 
the Star Trek series. So, for example, to be a bona fide, authentic, genuine, 
Star Trek film it is not sufficient that it include characters called “Spock” 
or worlds called “Vulcan,” has the words “Star Trek” in its title, includes an 
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actor whose performance mimics that of DeForest Kelley’s McCoy, begins 
with certain theme music, exhibits a certain specifiable narrative structure, 
and so on. Associated with this is the thought that one could not identify 
any rules or principles in advance such that by following or abiding by 
them one is guaranteed to produce a Star Trek film. Indeed, Abrams’s Star 
Trek seems to suggest, a film might qualify as a Star Trek film even though 
it flouts, bends, and ignores putative rules or criteria.
One might say that, for Star Trek, judgments as to whether some-
thing belongs to a series are not or should not be wholly descriptive (or, 
one is tempted to say, “logical”); rather, they are in large part evaluative. 
Where there are rules, whether a film is a Star Trek film is not determined 
by whether those rules are followed but by how well and in what manner 
they are applied, and where there aren’t any rules, it is determined by how 
faithful to the spirit—not the letter—of previous films the candidate is.11 So, 
according to Star Trek’s contribution to the ontology of art, one cannot leg-
islate in advance or judge by the application of some impersonal principles, 
based perhaps on one’s experiences of past instances of the series, whether 
a given film belongs to a given series or what it takes to belong to a certain 
category of film; instead, one must make judgments about how faithful a 
film is to its heritage, to the style and substance of its predecessors, and to 
what extent it draws upon that heritage in a sensitive and imaginative (i.e., 
nonmechanical) way in realizing its (perhaps as yet unrealized) potential. 
Making these judgments in turn might lead one to reevaluate one’s concep-
tion of the “essence” of that series. All of this is, of course, a reminder that 
what category or series a work of art belongs to is primarily an aesthetic 
matter—rather than, say, a metaphysical one.12
To Boldly Go
In closing, I note that Abrams’s Star Trek does not simply tell us what would 
count as an answer to the question, Is Abrams’s Star Trek a Star Trek film? It 
also offers an answer to that question. Abrams’s Star Trek seems confident 
that it has earned its status as belonging to the Star Trek series (and implicitly 
suggests this is not true of many other contenders for that status). As already 
explained, at the close of Abrams’s Star Trek all the original crew members 
of the Enterprise are in place and in their original positions, presenting the 
film as a faithful return to its source. The Star Trek universe has, the film 
seems to declare, restored the Star Trek universe. In light of this, recall Pike’s 
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words to Kirk: “Your father would be proud.” These appear to confirm that 
Pike’s seemingly irrational faith in Kirk, discussed above, was well placed, 
since Kirk has lived up to the reputation of his predecessor, which in turn 
appears to betray an assurance that Star Trek has lived up to its name.
Most glaringly, and perhaps audaciously, the film ends with the famous 
words with which the episodes of the original series begin, “Space: the final 
frontier . . . ,” accompanied by the original theme and a montage of planet 
flypasts like those in the original credits. In doing so, Abrams’s Star Trek 
asserts that, while it could not be assumed to have done so from the start, 
it has shown itself to have earned its place in that series (by its own lights). 
This confidence seems to me dangerously close to overconfidence; there is 
an air of smugness about the film, a certain arrogance in its apparent convic-
tion that it has decisively answered the question it raised at its start. How-
ever, I shall leave it to those more familiar with the original Star Trek series 
than I am to decide whether Abrams’s confidence, like Pike’s, is well placed.
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deterMInIsM, free WILL, and 
MoraL resPonsIbILIty In aLIas
Vishal Garg
The medium of motion picture serves a wide variety of purposes in contem-
porary society. We might watch a movie as a diversion or turn on the TV to 
relax at the end of a long day. Nightly news, documentaries, and historical 
and biographical shows help us gain information about the world around 
us. Television and movies can be used as a bonding mechanism; one of the 
things we have in common with people all over the world is that many of 
us have seen the same TV shows and movies, and we can use such com-
mon interests to start conversations. Another purpose of motion picture is 
to teach us. A quick trip to the video store reveals that we can use our tele-
vision to learn how to cook better, play the guitar, and improve our homes. 
We can use our television to learn in other ways, too. Specifically, we can 
use it to learn about ourselves. It is this purpose of television, as a tool for 
self-improvement, that is the driving force behind this chapter.1
Motion picture is often used as a storytelling medium, and as such, it 
exposes us to characters and situations we never would have seen other-
wise. As Lady Bird Johnson said, “Art is the window to man’s soul; without 
it, he would never be able to see beyond his immediate world.” As we get to 
know the characters in a movie, we start to ask questions about them: we 
wonder about their motivations, their goals, and their decisions. We might 
make moral judgments about their personal character and their actions. We 
may put ourselves into their shoes and ask, What would I have done in the 
same situation? It is this question (and the answers we give) that helps us 
to learn about ourselves, and, ideally, enables us to use television as a tool 
for self-improvement.2
Readers who have watched Alias (and I expect that most readers have) 
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might have asked themselves this question several times. The reader may 
have asked questions like, Would I have had Sydney Bristow’s courage to 
take down SD-6 after they killed my fiancé? Could I resist the kinds of 
temptation that corrupted the moral compasses of Irina Derevko and Arvin 
Sloane in their search for power? and Would I have sought vengeance like 
Jack Bristow if I discovered that somebody had tried to kill my daughter?
It is by our answers to these questions that we learn about ourselves. 
We hope that we could show Sydney’s courage, defy temptation, and resist 
Jack’s bloodlust. But when we ask ourselves these questions honestly, we 
may discover that we are not as virtuous as we might wish to be. This real-
ization, for some of us, may be a first step toward moral self-improvement. 
Thus it seems that we can use Alias as a tool to learn about ourselves and to 
improve our own character.
However, there are challenges to our ability to use the show for the pur-
pose of self-improvement. Specifically, our attempt to use it as such assumes 
that the question What would I have done in the same situation? is one that 
makes sense. That is, in asking the question we assume that we actually could 
have acted in ways different than the characters acted. The question is only 
worth asking if the Alias universe is not deterministic and if the characters 
in it have free will.3
Rambaldi’s Prophecies
Unfortunately, given the role that prophecy plays in the show, it seems that 
the Alias reality is deterministic and its inhabitants do not have free will. 
Specifically, the prophetic fifteenth-century polymath Milo Rambaldi made 
several prophecies, nearly all of which proved true over the course of the 
show’s five seasons. The problem here is that the accuracy of Rambaldi’s 
prophecies challenges the possibility that the characters could have acted in 
ways other than the ways they did, because many of their actions brought 
his prophecies to fruition. If the metaphysics of the Alias universe are such 
that the future had already been completely determined when Rambaldi 
wrote his prophecies (in which case Rambaldi merely recognized the inevi-
table future and wrote down what would happen), then the Alias universe 
is deterministic. If the characters could not have acted other than how they 
did, then perhaps they did not have free will. If this is the case, then we 
also would not have free will when we put ourselves into the shoes of those 
characters. We would have had Sydney’s courage, succumbed to temptation 
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like Irina and Sloane, and put Sydney into Project Christmas like Jack. If 
the characters in the show have no choice in the matter, then the question 
of whether we would have done the same thing becomes trivial, and we can 
learn nothing about ourselves from asking it.4
In this chapter I save Alias from the challenge that Rambaldi poses and 
argue that the Alias universe is, in fact, not deterministic. I examine Ram-
baldi’s prophecies and their outcomes and use tools provided by great philo-
sophical thinkers to argue that the characters have free will, and that they 
are therefore morally responsible for their actions. If my arguments in this 
chapter are successful, then we may use Alias as a tool to understand and 
improve ourselves, and it has a value beyond its mere entertainment value.
Determinism
Before I give my argument for why the accuracy of Rambaldi’s prophecies 
does not cause problems for our desire to use Alias to understand ourselves, 
it is important to be clear about exactly what the problem might be. That 
is, if one is going to argue against a position, it is necessary to first lay out 
that position. The first point to be made here is that when philosophers talk 
about determinism they usually are talking about what is also called causal 
determinism, and it is this form of determinism that will be the concern here.
Causal determinism can be defined this way: “The world is governed 
by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified 
way things are at a particular time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as 
a matter of natural law.” The main point here is that, if determinism is true, 
then the way things are at one time combined with the laws of nature is 
enough to guarantee that the world will be a certain way in the future. Or, 
to put it another way, past events guarantee future events.5
The reader may wonder about the connection between the accuracy of 
Rambaldi’s prophecies and determinism, and how strong the link between 
the two is. Rambaldi’s prophecies do not ensure that the Alias universe is 
deterministic, for it is possible that Rambaldi was incredibly lucky, or that 
his prophecies were vague enough that they were very easy to fulfill. Because 
there are possibilities besides determinism to explain the accuracy of Ram-
baldi’s prophecies, it is important to understand the relationship between 
the prophecies and determinism and to see how strong that relationship is.
What exactly is the argument from the truth of Rambaldi’s prophecies 
to determinism? How does one get from the accuracy of prophecy to deter-
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minism? The answer is that one can use abductive reasoning (also known as 
“explanatory reasoning”) to make the inference from “Rambaldi’s prophecies 
were overwhelmingly accurate” to “I have reason to believe that the Alias 
universe is deterministic.” A schema for this kind of inference was laid out 
by C. S. Peirce:
The surprising fact C is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.6
The basic idea behind such a mode of inference is that some hypothesis A 
explains some surprising fact C if the truth of A would make C something 
that we would expect. A’s ability to explain C gives us reason to suspect that 
A is true. In the case at hand, the surprising fact is that Rambaldi’s proph-
ecies were almost universally true. This is quite a surprising fact, but we 
would expect it to be true if the Alias universe were deterministic. If the 
state of the world when Rambaldi lived were enough to fix all future events, 
then Rambaldi may have made observations that, combined with a deep 
understanding of the laws of nature, would have been enough for him to 
predict the outcome of future events. Because determinism would nicely 
explain the accuracy of Rambaldi’s prophecies, we have reason to suspect 
that determinism is true. Throughout the rest of the chapter, I refer to this 
as the explanation from determinism.7
I hope the preceding is enough for the reader to understand the argu-
ment for determinism; the main thrust is that determinism explains the 
accuracy of Rambaldi’s prophecies, and this gives us reason to suspect that 
determinism is true of the Alias universe. However, this may not be enough 
on its own; although it may give us reason to suspect that determinism is 
true, we need to ask whether determinism is the best explanation for the 
accuracy of Rambaldi’s prophecies. If there is a better explanation, then we 
should adopt that instead of the explanation from determinism.
Prophecies and Scope
I contend that there is a better explanation for the accuracy of Rambaldi’s 
prophecies: they were self-fulfilling prophecies. In order to determine 
which explanation is better, we must determine how good of an explanation 
determinism is for the facts at hand. One useful criterion in determining 
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the value of an explanation is scope. Specifically, it is useful to see whether 
a particular explanation explains all of the facts that need explanation, or 
just some of those facts.8
When considering this with respect to Alias, it seems that there are at 
least some prophecies for which the explanation from determinism fails to 
account. Specifically, not all of Rambaldi’s prophecies came true. Near the 
end of season 4, there were two prophecies that we learned about that did 
not come true. These were Il Diluvio, and Rambaldi’s prediction of a battle 
between the Chosen One (Sydney Bristow) and the Passenger (Sydney’s 
half sister Nadia Santos).
Il Diluvio (The Flood) was a prophecy in which Rambaldi “imagined a 
moment when the world would be cleansed; when everything would begin 
anew.” Rambaldi believed that there would be an apocalypse, and a conversa-
tion between Sydney’s mother and father (Irina Derevko and Jack Bristow) 
suggests that Rambaldi gave instructions as to how the flood should occur. 
At the end of season 4, Elena Derevko (Irina’s sister, who is also involved 
in organized crime) attempted to fulfill the prophecy by building a giant 
Mueller device in Sovogda and using a Russian satellite to broadcast its 
frequency worldwide. This broadcast, combined with the intake of tainted 
water provided by Arvin Sloane’s charitable organization Omnifam, would 
turn everyone who drank the water into rage-filled subhumans who would 
attack and kill each other and also kill those who were not infected by the 
tainted water. Additionally, Elena expected the Russian government to bomb 
Sovogda, dispersing toxins from the Mueller device into the atmosphere, 
with potentially catastrophic results.9
After learning about Elena’s plan, a team consisting of APO members 
Sydney Bristow, Nadia Santos, Jack Bristow, and Michael Vaughn go to 
Sovogda to stop Elena Derevko. They are later joined by Rambaldi follower 
Arvin Sloane (whose roles in the show include leader of SD-6, head of Omni-
fam, and director of black-ops organization APO). With the assistance of 
tech expert Marshall Flinkman and APO’s Eric Weiss, the group is able to 
disable the Mueller device and thwart Elena’s plan, thus foiling Il Diluvio.
The second of Rambaldi’s failed prophecies involves the predicted battle 
between the Chosen One and the Passenger. According to Irina, Rambaldi 
wrote that “when blood-red horses wander the streets and angels fall from 
the sky, the Chosen One and the Passenger will clash and only one of them 
will survive.” Irina and Jack see a white horse that looks red due to the reflec-
tion of light from the Mueller device. Later, Nadia, who has become sepa-
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rated from the rest of the group, sees angel statues that have fallen from their 
perches atop buildings. Thus the antecedent conditions of the prophecy (red 
horses and falling angels) are met. However, when an infected Nadia attacks 
Sydney atop Elena Derevko’s hideout, Sydney chooses not to kill Nadia; 
instead she attempts to subdue Nadia without killing her. Nadia is later shot 
by Sloane, causing her to fall into a coma. She survives this, however, and is 
later revived. Sydney, of course, survives the clash as well.10
Both of these major events demonstrate that Rambaldi’s predictions 
were not always accurate, and they serve as counterexamples to the expla-
nation from determinism. The explanation from determinism suggests 
that Rambaldi’s prophecies were inerrant due to what seems to be perfect 
knowledge of the state of the world and the laws of nature. The explanation 
from determinism resembles a scientific theory, and as such we can use the 
theory to make predictions and then test those predictions to see if the the-
ory is accurate. The explanation from determinism predicts that Rambaldi’s 
prophecies will be inerrant. However, the fact that his prophecies do contain 
errors suggests that there is a flaw in the explanation from determinism.
Although Rambaldi’s inaccurate prophecies demonstrate a flaw in the 
explanation from determinism, they are not in themselves sufficient to give 
us good reason to reject the theory. The reason for this is that the theory 
may still be the best explanation for the facts at hand, even if it does not 
perfectly explain all of the facts. In order to reject the theory, then, it is nec-
essary to provide an alternative theory that is better than the explanation 
from determinism. I contend that an alternative explanation, which I call 
the explanation from self-fulfilling prophecy (or the explanation from SFP), 
is preferable to the explanation from determinism.11
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
A self-fulfilling prophecy is a prophecy that would not be made true if the 
prophecy had not been made. In other words, it is a “false definition of the 
situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false concep-
tion come true.”12 Thus self-fulfilling prophecies predict events that would 
not necessarily occur; however, these events end up occurring because the 
prophecy itself induces behavior that makes the prophecy come true.
An example of a self-fulfilling prophecy can be seen in another J. J. 
Abrams work, Lost. In Lost, John Locke is told by many people on the island 
that he is special and destined for great things. Locke eventually believes 
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them, and through this he gains the confidence that the island has a destiny 
for him. Because of this confidence, he eventually becomes the leader of the 
Others and many of the occurrences on the island are the direct result of 
Locke’s unwavering belief in his own importance. If these things would not 
have happened had Locke not been told of his importance, then the predic-
tions people made about Locke are self-fulfilling prophecies.
The explanation from SFP holds that Rambaldi’s prophecies came true 
because people who were aware of those prophecies behaved in ways that 
would ensure their truth. It grants that Rambaldi had a vast knowledge of 
the state of the world and of the laws of nature, but it claims that such knowl-
edge is not sufficient to have ensured the validity of his prophecies. Rather, 
the prophecies needed to be fulfilled by followers of Rambaldi who wished 
to bring them to fruition.
To put this within the framework of the abductive schema described 
earlier, the explanation from SFP starts with the same surprising fact (that 
many of Rambaldi’s prophecies came true) but, rather than attributing this 
to determinism, it attributes this to the choices made by people to make 
those prophecies come true. That is, it is a surprising fact that Rambaldi’s 
prophecies came true, but, if it were true that followers of Rambaldi made 
those prophecies come true (the SFP view), then we would expect those 
prophecies to come true as a matter of course. Hence there is good reason 
to believe that the explanation from SFP is true.
Like the explanation from determinism, the explanation from SFP makes 
certain predictions that we can test. Specifically, it predicts two things: (1) 
there will be several cases in which Rambaldi’s prophecies were unlikely to 
come true but were made true due to the choices made by followers of Ram-
baldi, and (2) we might find cases where followers of Rambaldi (or others) 
made choices that falsified his prophecies. We will start by examining some 
prophecies to see if (1) is the case.
Of Clockmakers and Everlasting Life
Early in season 1, Sydney goes to see a clockmaker who is reputed to be 
the descendant of Giovano Donato, the only person with whom Rambaldi 
ever collaborated. Donato’s descendant tells Sydney that Rambaldi predicted 
Donato’s death. He also inadvertently reveals that he is not a descendant of 
Donato but is Donato himself. After Donato repairs the clock that Sydney 
brought for him, he stands up and tells her, “It is over.” When he stands, he 
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comes between Sydney and the only window into his apartment and is shot 
and killed by a sniper who was aiming for Sydney.
It seems fairly clear that this is an example of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Rambaldi presumably knew that people would want to determine the pur-
pose for his clock and would need to take it to Donato to fix it. Additionally, 
Rambaldi likely suspected that those who wanted the clock fixed would have 
nefarious purposes in doing so. Donato, knowing that he had fulfilled the 
purpose that Rambaldi had set out for him, intentionally blocked the only 
viewpoint to Sydney and to the clock itself. The sniper who shot Donato 
waited until the clock was finished before shooting, presumably because he 
was aware of the importance of the clock.13
Another of Rambaldi’s prophecies is one that Sloane referred to during 
an expedition to find a Rambaldi artifact, which occurred in between sea-
sons 3 and 4. Sloane tells Nadia, “Rambaldi wrote that a man would come 
and discover the true meaning of his work, and in doing so would change 
the world. I always wanted to be that man.” Sloane does, in fact, become that 
man, as he eventually becomes the only one to take advantage of Rambaldi’s 
greatest achievement, which was everlasting life. However, he does so largely 
because of the prophecy. Were Sloane not to have read Rambaldi’s prophe-
cies (including the one quoted above), then it is exceedingly unlikely that 
he ever would have become involved with the followers of Rambaldi and 
brought Rambaldi’s works to fruition. It is because the prophecy modified 
Sloane’s behavior that it came true, and thus it clearly fits the above defini-
tion of a self-fulfilling prophecy.14
The reader may still be skeptical at this point about the explanation 
from SFP, so I will consider Rambaldi’s most prominent prophecy, found 
on page 47 of his manuscript. The text of page 47 reads, “This woman here 
depicted [the Chosen One] will possess unseen marks, signs that she will 
be the one to bring forth my works: bind them with fury, a burning anger. 
Unless prevented, at vulgar cost, this woman will render the greatest power 
unto utter desolation. This woman, without pretense, will have had her 
effect, never having seen the beauty of my sky behind Mount Subasio.” The 
woman referred to in the prophecy is widely believed to be Sydney Bristow, 
as she possesses the unseen marks Rambaldi describes in the prophecy.15
When Sydney first hears about the prophecy, she attempts to render it 
false by going to Mount Subasio. However, we discover in the series finale 
that Sydney misinterpreted the prophecy (or, at least, that Sloane believes 
she did). Sydney, in an attempt to stop Sloane from completing Rambaldi’s 
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work, tracks him to Mount Subasio. She finds him in a cavern in the moun-
tain, where he reveals that the term “my sky” in the prophecy referred to 
marks on an ice cavern created when sun shone through an amulet that 
belonged to Rambaldi. He then tells Sydney that he is sorry and that this 
isn’t his choice, but she “is not allowed to see this.” Sloane then shoots the 
ice beneath Sydney’s feet, causing her to fall through it.
Though Sloane claimed that he had no choice in the matter, it seems 
clear that he did. It is because Sloane knew that the prophecy specifically said 
that the Chosen One would never have seen Rambaldi’s sky behind Mount 
Subasio that he shot the ground beneath Sydney’s feet, preventing her from 
seeing it. Thus it was the prophecy itself that changed Sloane’s behavior in 
this case, causing him to prevent Sydney from seeing the sky and thus mak-
ing the prophecy true. Thus the prophecy from page 47 is another example 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy.16
Although I cannot discuss all of Rambaldi’s prophecies due to space 
considerations, I hope that the prophecies I have discussed are sufficient to 
convince the reader that the explanation from SFP is as plausible an expla-
nation of the accuracy of Rambaldi’s prophecies as the explanation from 
determinism. Since both explanations could plausibly explain the accuracy 
of Rambaldi’s true prophecies, we must look to Rambaldi’s false prophecies 
to determine which of the two theories is to be preferred.
The explanation from determinism fails to explain Rambaldi’s false 
prophecies. However, the explanation from SFP does provide an explanation. 
Specifically, it gives us the resources to understand what it was that made 
some of Rambaldi’s prophecies false. Il Diluvio became false through the 
actions of the team from APO that stopped Elena Derevko. It was through 
their choices that Il Diluvio never took place. In these cases, the behavioral 
changes caused by Rambaldi’s followers’ awareness of the prophecies were 
insufficient to make those prophecies come true, because there was strong 
opposition on the other side. In the case of Rambaldi’s prediction of a clash 
between Sydney and Nadia, it was Sydney’s choice not to kill Nadia that 
made the prophecy not come true. Again, we see that the key factor in pre-
venting the prophecy from being realized was a character’s conscious choice.
The preceding discussion has shown that the accuracy of Rambaldi’s 
predictions is insufficient to establish that the Alias universe is determin-
istic. I have provided an alternative explanation for the accuracy of those 
predictions (the explanation from SFP) and shown that it can explain more 
than the explanation from determinism. Thus, one ought to prefer the 
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explanation from SFP to the explanation from determinism, and therefore 
Rambaldi’s accurate prophecies do not give sufficient reason to accept that 
determinism is true.
Free Will
Although the reader may think that the preceding discussion has been suf-
ficient to show that it is reasonable to believe that the inhabitants of the 
Alias universe are morally responsible, it has not quite done so. In contem-
porary philosophical discussion, the notions of free will (which is taken to 
be a necessary condition for moral responsibility) and determinism come 
apart. Thus, showing that there is no good reason to believe that the Alias 
universe is deterministic is not sufficient to show that the characters in the 
show have the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. All that 
we have shown thus far is that it is an open question whether the Alias uni-
verse is deterministic.
However, some philosophers hold that, even if determinism is an open 
question, we do not have the kind of free will required for moral responsi-
bility. Thus, while the preceding discussion of determinism may have been 
enough to convince those philosophers who adhere to incompatibilism that 
the characters in Alias have free will, convincing others will require a further 
step. This further step requires establishing the claim that the characters in 
Alias have the kind of free will that is required for moral responsibility. It 
will help to first clarify exactly what kind of free will is required for moral 
responsibility.17
A standard philosophical definition of the kind of free will required 
for moral responsibility is that a person has free will in making some deci-
sion (say, for example, choosing to watch an episode of Alias rather than 
Cloverfield) if she or he could have chosen otherwise. However, such a 
definition seems unusable for our purposes. It is difficult in the real world 
to determine whether people could have chosen otherwise (which is why 
philosophers are still puzzling over the free will question, despite over two 
thousand years of work on it); it is even more difficult to determine whether 
the characters in the fictional world of Alias could have chosen otherwise, 
for we do not have the access to their world that would be required for 
such determinations.
Many of the arguments in favor of free will are arguments that make 
use of an individual’s personal experience. On these arguments, part of 
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the reason one has for believing that one has free will is that one experi-
ences life as if one has free will. Because neither I nor the reader is part 
of the Alias universe, and because none of the characters who inhabit 
that world have said that they experience life as if they have free will, it is 
not possible to use personal experience to determine whether or not the 
characters are free.18
Volitions and Desires
I will instead use an alternative philosophical definition of free will, pro-
vided by Harry Frankfurt, which holds that an individual has the kind of 
will necessary for moral responsibility if that individual has second-order 
volitions. In order to understand second-order volitions, it is first necessary 
to understand second-order desires. Second-order desires are those desires 
that are about other desires. For example, suppose I have a desire to own a 
Mueller device. That is what is called a first-order desire. It is a desire about 
some object that I want (the object need not be physical, as in the case of a 
first-order desire to be loved).19
A second-order desire is a desire that has as its object a first-order desire. 
So, if I think that the Mueller device is a terrible plague on humanity and 
I have a desire not to desire it, then I would have a second-order desire. 
Second-order volition is a companion to a second-order desire; the rela-
tionship between “volition” and “desire” is that volition involves one’s will, 
whereas desire involves only a mental state. Volition is the process by which 
one who has desires satisfies them; it is the process that one uses to commit 
to a particular course of action that satisfies one’s desire. A second-order 
volition, then, involves using one’s will to commit to (or to not commit to) 
satisfying some second-order desire.
Frankfurt argues that second-order volitions are the condition that is 
necessary for freedom of the will, and that freedom of action (the ability 
to choose otherwise than one has chosen) is insufficient for moral respon-
sibility. Animals, for example, can choose to run in any direction they 
want; however, this is insufficient to show that animals have the type of 
will required for moral responsibility. Freedom of the will thus requires 
something stronger. Frankfurt argues that this something stronger is the 
freedom “to will what [one] wants to will, or to have the will he wants.” A 




At this point a question presents itself: We do not have access to any of the 
characters’ inner workings, so how can we determine whether or not they 
have second-order desires, second-order volitions, and the ability to align 
their will with those second-order volitions? We can do so by examining 
the relationship between Arvin Sloane and his hallucinations of his dead 
daughter Nadia in season 5. Nadia, being a hallucination of Sloane’s, gives 
us some insight into the inner workings of his mind. Although establishing 
that Sloane has free will is insufficient to demonstrate that all of the charac-
ters in the show have free will, it at least gives a good reason to believe that 
the remaining inhabitants of the Alias universe have the kind of free will 
required for moral responsibility.
Nadia begins season 5 in a coma. Sloane, by making a deal with a shad-
owy organization of Rambaldi followers called Prophet Five, secures a sub-
stance that, when injected into Nadia, wakes her from her coma. Nadia later 
goes to Sloane’s house for a visit and discovers that Sloane is still obsessed 
with Rambaldi after seeing that he still has a copy of page 47 from the 
Rambaldi manuscript. She demands that Sloane choose between her and 
his obsession with Rambaldi and throws the page into the fire. In Sloane’s 
attempt to recover the page before it burns, he pushes Nadia out of the way 
and she falls through a glass table. The cuts she sustains from the glass are 
fatal, and she bleeds to death.21
After Nadia’s death, Sloane begins to have hallucinations of her. Sloane’s 
hallucination advises Sloane against trying to betray Prophet Five, which is 
holding Sloane captive and forcing him to decode a Rambaldi manuscript. 
Sloane here has a first-order desire to betray Prophet Five, but the hallucina-
tion of Nadia suggests that he is conflicted about that desire. Additionally, 
the hallucination of Nadia tells Sloane that the reason he is hallucinating 
about her is because he wants both to have his daughter alive and to fulfill 
his obsession with Rambaldi. Nadia is haunting Sloane because he wants 
her to haunt him.22
It is clear from this discussion that Sloane has a first-order desire to be 
with his daughter. However, the accusatory way in which he asks her why 
she is there has a subtext: Sloane is not really asking his hallucination why 
she is there. Rather, he is telling her to go away. This reveals a second-order 
desire to want to not be haunted by Nadia. This second-order desire is addi-
tionally revealed through Sloane’s actions with respect to Prophet Five. He 
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continues his obsession with Rambaldi; it seems that his renewed fervor 
reveals his desire to choose Rambaldi over Nadia. This desire is closely con-
nected with Sloane’s second-order desire that Nadia go away. By choosing a 
course of action that he believes will fulfill this second-order desire, Sloane 
reveals a second-order volition. Because Sloane has a second-order voli-
tion, he meets Frankfurt’s condition for freedom of the will, and therefore 
Sloane has a free will.
We see Sloane’s second-order volition elsewhere as well. Near the end 
of season 2, Sloane, while discussing Rambaldi with Irina, tells her that 
he wishes he had “never heard that man’s name.” Sloane’s previous actions 
have shown an obvious desire to follow Rambaldi’s plan by realizing Ram-
baldi’s prophecies. However, here he is showing that he wishes he did not 
have such a desire. Additionally, his actions in the next episode show that 
he is willing himself to satisfy his second-order desire. Sloane journeys to 
the Himalayas, where he meets with the monk who originally sent him on 
the Rambaldi quest. It is at this point that Sloane makes his will fully con-
form with his second-order desire to not want to desire to bring Rambaldi’s 
prophecies to fruition. He forsakes his quest to follow Rambaldi, and in 
doing so reveals his free will.23
Thus Sloane has free will. Sloane’s free will is the type required for moral 
responsibility, and thus Sloane is morally responsible for what he does. 
Although Sloane’s moral responsibility does not guarantee that other inhab-
itants of the Alias universe are morally responsible, it suggests that they are, 
for it would be quite strange if Sloane was the only character inhabiting the 
Alias universe who has free will.
The Implications of Free Will
Now that I have shown that the characters in Alias have free will, it may be 
worthwhile to consider the implications of this. Recall that in the begin-
ning of this chapter I explained that one of the reasons we watch television 
shows like Alias is to learn more about ourselves. We put ourselves in the 
shoes of the characters and use them as tools to make moral evaluations of 
ourselves. However, the challenge posed by Rambaldi’s accurate prophecies 
was that such moral evaluation was not possible if the characters themselves 
were not morally responsible. Having shown that the characters are morally 
responsible, then, has also shown that it is legitimate for us to use Alias for 
the purpose of evaluating our own moral character. I hope that the reader 
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will indeed work to intentionally realize this purpose, as the moral conun-
drums posed by the show are quite fascinating, and I have found it worth-
while at times to evaluate myself by placing myself in the characters’ shoes.
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fIndInG dIreCtIons by IndIreCtIon
The Island as a Blank Slate
Elly Vintiadis and Spyros D. Petrounakos
What is striking about Lost is the extent to which it challenges what we 
take for granted. This in itself may be of no philosophical importance. But 
through its explicit use of philosophers’ names and themes of philosophical 
importance like free will vs. determinism, faith vs. reason, time, causation 
and so on, Lost would make any philosophically inclined viewer try to find 
philosophical connections. Such was the case with us, as we found ourselves 
attracted initially to the centrality of the character of John Locke. Having 
made the connection with the epistemology of the philosopher John Locke, 
we gradually realized that epistemological questions are raised through both 
the content and the form of the show, for both the characters and the audi-
ence of Lost. Further thought on the characters of John Locke and Desmond 
Hume as the plot unfolded led us to the rationalist-empiricist debate and 
to the concept of a blank slate. This debate has left an indelible mark in the 
history of Western philosophy, as any student of epistemology can attest.1 
This chapter presents our thoughts on these issues, in keeping with the title 
of the present volume, which we understand as gesturing also toward the 
attitudes, aims, and ambitions of J. J. Abrams and his team as they worked 
on the project of Lost. Of course, we do not think that Lost, or any show 
for that matter, can (or aims to) exhaust these debates. But as philosophers, 
we will use the show to try to illustrate some of aspects of these debates for 
the nonspecialist reader. As fans—as Losties ourselves—we will also try to 
bring forth how groundbreaking we believe the show to be.
The Rationalist-Empiricist Debate
When the philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) wrote his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding one of the main questions that preoccupied thinkers 
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concerned, on the one hand, the source and the limits of knowledge and, on 
the other, the role that reason, the senses, and faith play in its acquisition.2 
In part this was a result of the prominence and the promises of the nascent 
new science, which challenged many people’s long-standing and deeply 
entrenched beliefs. Prior to John Locke, the French philosopher René Des-
cartes (1596–1650) had maintained (as Plato and the Scholastics had done 
previously) that reason is the source of knowledge, justification, and truth 
and that at birth the human mind comes equipped with certain innate ideas, 
such as that of God.3 Because of the central role allotted to the faculty of 
reason in the attainment of knowledge, the school of thought that Descartes 
represents is called rationalism (from ratio, the Latin word for reason). In 
contrast, Locke belongs to the rival school of the British empiricists, who 
believed that we come into this world without any innate ideas but, instead, 
our mind is furnished by experience, from which we gradually build the 
entire edifice of our knowledge. This idea is encapsulated in Locke’s view 
that at birth the human mind is a blank slate, a tabula rasa, on which expe-
rience is written. But it is important to note that for Locke experience has a 
dual aspect: we experience the external world through our sensations and 
we experience our own minds through reflection. By combining these two 
natural faculties of sensation and reflection we become aware of the agree-
ment or disagreement between our ideas and acquire knowledge.
If we now turn to Lost, we see that from the very beginning we are 
introduced to a duality through two main characters, Jack Shephard and 
John Locke. Jack is the doctor, the man of science who strongly believes 
in the empiricist idea of the importance of the senses in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Jack quickly assumes, de facto, the role of the leader—a move 
that reflects the assumed predominance and importance of factual, empiri-
cal knowledge within the community of survivors. Yet quickly Jack finds a 
rival in John Locke, who, despite his name, is the man of faith. In a group 
that must survive in a foreign and hostile terrain, the leader is called upon 
to make sense of the new environment and situation. By positioning Locke 
and Jack in the role of leaders, the show immediately presents a dilemma 
for both viewers and characters as to whom it would be best to follow. The 
dilemma is intrinsically connected to the question of what is the right way of 
acquiring knowledge of the world. This is a theme that recurs in the series, 
and two prominent examples immediately come to mind. The first exam-
ple is in the second season episode “Man of Science, Man of Faith,” which 
deals directly with the question of whether it is science or faith that is to be 
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trusted in decision making. This is reflected in the question raised by Jack’s 
hesitation, in the face of Locke’s immediate acceptance, about whether the 
survivors should continue inputting the numbers in the computer. The sec-
ond example occurs in the fifth season episode “Dead is Dead,” in which 
Ben, Locke, and Sun set out for the temple to find the smoke monster that 
must judge Ben. En route Ben asks Locke how he knows where to find the 
smoke monster, to which Locke, in a turn of phrase that has become some-
thing of a character trademark, says, “I just know.” But Ben insists, posing 
the prototypical question of knowledge acquisition: “Did it come upon you 
gradually, or did you wake up one morning suddenly understanding the 
mysteries of the universe?”4
Indeed, the backbone of the plot revolves on the antithesis of these two 
leading figures and, in turn, on these two ways of seeing the world and the 
human mind. When Jack tries to set down the rules that he regards as appro-
priate for their new environment and the crucial issue of survival, Locke, 
who represents the rationalist stance on the island, opposes him and follows 
his gut instinct, an intuition that comes in the form of an unshakeable foun-
dation of a newfound faith. It is through this faith that Locke, who started 
out from Sydney as a disillusioned cripple, finds meaning on the island. 
After all, one should not forget that his life on the island begins with what, 
as far as he is concerned, is a miracle. And it is through this faith that he 
becomes a catalyst for all that follows. Jack, on the other hand, as someone 
who bases his decisions on evidence, like any good empiricist would, lacks 
Locke’s unshakeable certainty.
Above, we noted that for Locke the philosopher we come to know the 
world through ideas in our minds based on our sensory input. This means 
that ultimately our knowledge cannot extend beyond what is given to us 
by our senses and our reflection on their input. Note, however, that the 
question regarding the sources of knowledge is an important one because 
its answer circumscribes what we can have knowledge of. Since our senses 
are not only limited but also fallible, if knowledge comes from the senses, 
all we can be certain of is what we perceive to be the case and not what is 
the case, independently of perception. What is the case is inaccessible to 
us because we cannot transcend our senses and compare the world to our 
experiences. So while empiricism can give us certainty about what our senses 
tell us, it leaves us in the unfortunate predicament of never being able to 
reach certainty about the nature of the world—and this skepticism is the 
price that empiricists have to pay. In line with this, in Lost we see that Jack 
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is tormented by doubt about the correctness of his beliefs but knows full 
well that his beliefs, especially within the island’s environment, are open to 
falsification at every turn. In contrast to this, Locke exhibits the absolute, 
but also subjective, certainty of faith.
According to the philosopher Locke, when knowledge of something 
can be acquired through sense perception and reasoning there is no real 
question of whether we should turn to faith or intuition for answers. But 
as we noted, empirically gained knowledge is limited, so faith does have a 
role to play, according to Locke, when we reach the bounds of reason (and 
the senses). Thus he writes, “That the dead shall rise, and live again: These 
and the like, being Beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely matters of 
Faith; with which Reason has nothing to do.” Yet even in cases where we 
have to rely on faith, “it still belongs to Reason, to judge of the truth of its 
being a Revelation, and of the significance of the Words, wherein it is deliv-
ered.” Locke defines faith in terms of revelation and opposes blind accep-
tance of anything that is presented as a revelation, insisting instead that we 
impose the constrains of reason and evidence when it comes to deciding 
whether something is in fact a genuine revelation or not. Otherwise faith 
is nothing but an unfounded “enthusiasm,” something like the blind faith 
of a religious fanatic.5
Throughout its course, Lost adopts a critical stance toward the strict 
empiricism of science viewed as the only, or the best, path to knowledge. 
Through the crucial role that faith and intuition play in the show and the 
tormenting doubt of Jack the empiricist, before his change of heart, the mes-
sage seems to be that reliance on experience alone makes us miss something 
essential. From this perspective, faith can be seen as a catalyst, something 
that sets the wheels of action back in motion: It is Locke’s faith that every-
thing happens for a reason that is critical in finding and entering the hatch 
as well as in stopping the survivors’ time travel, whereas his temporary loss 
of faith causes the first discharge of electromagnetic energy when he stops 
inputting the numbers into the computer. Again, it is Locke’s death that 
brings them all back to the island, and near the end we find Jack admitting 
that Locke was right. Recall also that the lamppost to which the Oceanic Six 
go to find the way back to the island is situated beneath a church, appropri-
ately so since the mystical emerges as the main force on the island and, one 
is led to assume, in life as well.
But it is not Locke who saves the island and the other survivors. And 
so it seems that, in the end, there is another sort of faith that is rewarded 
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in Lost. It is Jack who saves the island and the others and who comes by 
his faith in the way prescribed by Locke the empiricist philosopher: gradu-
ally and only when no other rational options are available—that is, after 
he has left the island, returned to it, seen the mirror in the lighthouse, and 
talked to Jacob. In the episode “316” Ben tells Jack that what was really great 
about Thomas the Apostle was his doubt and that he was convinced of the 
resurrection only when he touched Christ’s wounds. Like Thomas, Jack 
arrives at faith by weighing the evidence. And it is this “nonenthusiastic” 
form of faith that Jack painstakingly arrives at that transforms him from an 
arrogant doctor into the man who performs the ultimate act of faith, self- 
sacrifice, and, in the end, saves the other survivors and the island. Of course, 
early on John Locke had told Jack that faith had never been easy for him, 
but we assume that that meant having faith in his previous life—it seems 
that believing in the island came easy after he was healed. In a sense, then, 
Jack’s empiricism broadens and, without abandoning his beliefs as a man of 
science, his empiricism proceeds by indirection to arrive at the only epis-
temological route that can help make sense of the island: a grounded faith.
Overwhelming Reasons to Doubt
This kind of faith is contrasted with Locke’s enthusiastic form of blind faith 
that is close to the kind expounded by the Danish existential philosopher 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). For Kierkegaard having faith (as also being 
in love) is not something we decide to do by weighing evidence. Faith is not 
hope that something will turn out to be true. Rather, it is believing in some-
thing though one understands at the same time that there are overwhelm-
ing reasons to doubt it. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard sees faith as by 
its nature paradoxical, because the “leap of faith” is conscious resignation 
to the completely uncertain and unknown. The details are not important in 
the present context; what is, is the different kinds of faith exhibited by Jack 
and Locke and the fact that in the end it is not a blind leap of faith that is 
the way to salvation but a faith reached via an empirical route.6
So though it initially looks as if faith is contrasted to science in Lost, 
upon closer scrutiny it is two kinds of faith that are contrasted with each 
other and empirically informed faith, though paradoxical, is the one that 
comes through as being more substantial. In “The Last Recruit” the Man in 
Black expresses this view when he tells Jack that he took over the body of 
the dead Locke because he was not a believer but a sucker who was stupid 
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enough to believe and die for the idea that on the island everything happens 
for a reason. The creators of Lost seem to be telling us here that, as Ben tells 
Jack, “Sooner or later everyone is convinced.” The residual question then 
concerns the kind of faith that will lead us to the truth. Lost here echoes 
Bertrand Russell when he wrote, “It is not what the man of science believes 
that distinguishes him but how and why he believes it.”7
Beyond the philosophical concept as we find it in Locke’s epistemology 
there is another way that the notion of a blank slate is used in everyday con-
texts, and that is to signify a new beginning. This is the theme of the third 
episode of the first season, “Tabula Rasa,” but it also underlies the entire 
series. Of course, the plane crash functions as a moment of rebirth, a new 
beginning in a new land among strangers where the past, in some respects, 
does not exist. For some, like Kate, Sawyer, and Charlie, this is a chance to 
reinvent their lives, unshackled from mistakes of the past. For others, like 
Locke, this is a new life as a physically able man.
But the media phenomenon that is Lost does not exhaust itself in its 
characters and plot. Lost breaks new ground in media history also because 
of its influence on reshaping audiences’ perception of television. The meta-
phor of a blank slate as a new beginning serves us well in this context. So 
in what follows our focus is not the characters confronted by the island but 
the audience confronted with Lost.
The Audience: From Passive to Active Viewing
Beginning in the 1920s with the Frankfurt school, the dominant framework 
for understanding the relation of the audience to the medium of television 
was, for a number of decades, the behaviorist “effects” or “hypodermic” 
model. This stresses the effect that the medium has on the shaping of the 
audience’s reception of the content of this medium and, in consequence, its 
thought and behavior. As the term “hypodermic” (which literally means 
“under the skin”) implies, according to this view the audience approaches 
the media text as a blank slate and is a passive receptor that unquestioningly 
accepts whatever message the medium supplies. This model, prominent when 
the medium of television was fairly new, was subsequently challenged by a 
series of different theories. By the 1980s the general consensus was that the 
audience is active in its reception of the media text. According to the “active 
models,” viewers filter, process, and interpret the input they get from the 
media given their backgrounds, history, gender, class, and so on and may 
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be users of the TV medium instead of being used by it. Though there are, of 
course, differing views concerning the level and the form of audience activity, 
the general idea is that the audience is now seen not as a passive but as an 
active decoder of the medium’s message. It is a given, therefore, today, after 
at least three generations have grown up with television as an overarching 
and penetrative mass medium in their daily lives, that the audience for a TV 
show is not a blank slate awaiting the content of the TV medium. Rather, the 
audience comes to the show already equipped with a broad range of prior 
ideas about the medium and the message and thus with the decoding tools 
and expectations that such prior knowledge implies.8
Applying the metaphor of the blank slate, we can say that though the 
audience is not a blank slate in Locke’s sense, it is in the metaphorical sense 
that Lost pushes the audience into a position in which preconceived ideas 
and expectations cease to apply. In doing this it compromises our (the view-
ers’) ability to use our decoding tools to reason about the show, forcing us 
to adopt a more holistic attitude in our approach. It thus makes us revise 
and conceive anew our ideas about what it is to watch a show. Though we 
are definitely not the passive viewers of the effects model, we are no longer 
the confident navigators of the medium either. As Christian Shephard tells 
Jack at the very end, we have to “let go” in order to move on.
By now television has become a well-known medium, arguably the 
most resonant of all, and viewers are immersed in the television codes and 
conventions that are used to convey meaning. However, as Lost unfolds, 
and in so doing breaks with convention, we find ourselves repeatedly 
amending our tools for understanding the television text. Conventions 
are genre-specific, well-established narrative and audiovisual features of 
the television text that stories within a genre share, which help viewers 
navigate the story by indirectly telling them what to expect and what to 
look for. Typically, no matter how groundbreaking a TV show is, the nar-
rative and visual conventions are laid down at its beginning in order to 
orient the viewer. Though the generic conventions of a series need not be 
exhaustively laid out, there are general patterns that one expects to find 
depending on the kind or genre of show. For instance, we expect menacing 
music in thrillers, technology that is not currently available (or not even 
plausibly possible) in science fiction shows, and, in a romantic comedy, 
that when boy meets girl, they will most probably not like each other but 
in the end will walk hand in hand into the sunset. Yet these conventions 
rely on prior experience that enables the viewer to learn to recognize 
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them. Breaking these conventions undercuts our ability to make induc-
tive generalizations that help us understand the show and allow us to take 
part in the gradual build-up from the ground up until we reach the show’s 
denouement. In what follows we will attempt to identify some of the con-
ventions that are broken by Lost.
Characters
Lost has an unconventionally large number of main characters. Their iden-
tities and prominence change throughout the series: some main characters, 
like Walt and Michael (and, why not, Vincent), fade into the background 
and secondary characters like Miles, Richard, and Juliet become main 
characters, while new characters are introduced throughout the show—the 
tail-section survivors, the Others, the Dharma initiative, the freighter crew, 
the Temple residents. To make matters even more complicated, within this 
group and its shifting membership, the opposition of good-bad charac-
ters collapses along with our sense of the moral standing of each charac-
ter—think of Ben, Locke, Sayid, and Whidmore. The overall effect is one 
of doubt as to whether such boundaries can be clearly drawn in the first 
place. Hence the development of sympathy for the protagonist—a standard 
element of popular culture, according to Noël Carroll—is also challenged 
by Lost. We are not even allowed the security of assuming that main char-
acters such Libby, Boone, Charlie, Daniel Faraday, Eko, and Locke (all of 
whom die) are invulnerable.9
Still, the greatest innovation in this respect is the introduction of 
the island as a character in its own right from the very first season. It 
quickly becomes clear that the island is not just a backdrop for the action 
but is, in itself, an active narrative agent that affects the plot. Charac-
ters in the show repeatedly personify the island by referring to it as an 
agent: Locke tells Jack that the island brought them there; Eloise, who 
seems to have privileged access to information about the island, tells 
Desmond that the island has work for him to do; and in season 6 Ben 
tells Lapides, “The island still got you in the end.” We are also given 
reasons to believe that the island has sympathies and antipathies, the 
most straightforward ones being that the island has healing proper-
ties but seems to be selective as to whom it will cure—it kills pregnant 
women and it did not cure Ben’s spinal tumor nor Jack’s appendicitis, 
but it cured Locke and Rose.
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Genre
The genre that Lost belongs to is immediately identifiable, and this leaves 
us in a boat very much like Charlie’s when he asks at the end of season 1, 
“Guys, where are we?” Though we anticipate a drama, as the show pro-
gresses elements of an adventure genre become increasingly frequent, until 
the show begins to transform itself into almost a science fiction series. There 
are elements of other genres too: Kate and Sawyer’s relationship typifies the 
romance motif, as does Sawyer’s character, who also brings to mind char-
acters in historical dramas and period pieces, like Mr. Darcy in Pride and 
Prejudice and Charlie Allnut in The African Queen. Also, the number of char-
acters, some of the characters’ demises, and even more so their returns are 
classic conventions in soap operas but rarely found in other genres, though 
Lost successfully incorporates them within its intricate narrative.
Of course, there is a trend in television productions and films to play 
with genre boundaries. Genre-defining characteristics are not as hard and 
fast as they used to be, and more and more often we see new hybrid genres 
appearing, like dramedies (e.g., Ally McBeal, Desperate Housewives, Ugly 
Betty). In this sense viewers of Lost are perhaps much less in the dark than 
we make them out to be. It is true that by now genre transgression is indeed 
mainstream. Yet it becomes clear that the genre that Lost belongs to is nei-
ther classic nor hybrid. Rather, its genre identity shifts from season to season 
and sometimes from episode to episode. And in this Lost takes this trend 
of cross-genre experimentation to an entirely new level that is novel to the 
medium and not anticipated by the audience.
Narrative Technique
Lost is very complex and intentionally disorienting. It is not presented to the 
viewer as a story that progresses in a predictable manner through a begin-
ning, a middle, and an end but begins as a puzzle that offers us hints in a non-
linear fashion throughout the show from the plot’s different time sequences. 
This changing narrative structure adds to the stratified and complex plot, 
making Lost an unconventional candidate for mainstream culture. Though 
accessibility and facility in understanding are not necessary requirements 
for acceptance by mainstream culture, they usually are present. Lost, through 
its huge cultural impact, plays a central role in transforming the core of our 
expectations and standards regarding popular culture.10
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For the first two seasons—and for all of season 3 except the last epi-
sode—flashbacks that give us biographical information or snippets about 
the characters that we expect to be relevant to the plotline are interposed 
in scenes. Though analepsis and prolepsis (flashbacks and flash-forwards) 
are by no means uncommon as narrative techniques, the disorienting use 
they are put to in Lost is an innovation in itself: in their more common use, 
these narrative techniques have a clear function to which we are quickly 
introduced. A flashback is usually an interjected scene that gives us infor-
mation about the background of a character or a story line that is essential 
to our understanding of the development of the character and the plot. Yet 
in Lost flashbacks often take up as much time as the story itself and, more 
often than not, they complicate the narrative further instead of providing 
answers to existing puzzles.
This use of narrative techniques to purposely perplex and intrigue the 
audience moves up a level with the introduction of flash-forwards in the 
season finale of season 3. There we are faced with no other option but to 
shift from our comfortable, by that point, handle on flashbacks to an under-
standing that what we are viewing is, first, scenes of things that have not 
yet, but will, occur and, second, an attempt to incorporate these in the plot 
itself. But we are not given any clue as to how either is to be done. Indeed, 
in the first flash-forward we see a bearded Jack in a state we have never seen 
him in before: drinking heavily, making heavy use of oxycodone pills that 
he has stolen from the hospital, living in a messy apartment, not allowed to 
operate—that is, we see him in a state of despair and personal disrepair, very 
much the opposite of the leader or composed doctor figure we were used to 
in the season 1 flashbacks. When he is thus introduced, though, we are not 
aware of the change in the format of the episode and, as a result, it is only at 
the very end that we realize that this is a peek into the future instead of the 
past. With the introduction of flash-sideways in season 6 it becomes clear 
that we are being intentionally befogged. We don’t know what is happen-
ing and so we don’t know how to amass information to make sense of it all. 
What is the timeline of the flash-sideways? Is it a parallel universe? Another 
possible world in which the plane did not crash? The flash-sideways leaves 
us once again in a blank-slate state in which we must gather clues anew, as 
the building-block process of evidence gathering collapses and we are forced 
once again to explore.
Furthermore, by making the island, that is to say the setting itself, a 
character in the show (as is the case in films such as The Shining and Picnic 
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at Hanging Rock), Lost introduces an innovation by including cinematic 
devices in television. This incorporation of cinematic aspects is also evident 
in the way that the show imposes itself on the viewers. Through its ever-
shifting form, with its constant changes in narrative technique, in character 
focus, and in generic direction, the attempt to decipher the show’s puzzles 
intensifies, and one is left wondering whether the way the show is presented 
is itself a aspect of the entire narrative.
Cross-media Scope
In line with the idea of finding directions by indirection, the cross-media 
references mentioned above are activated as soon as the show’s narrative 
scope increases to include media other than television, giving the audience 
an even broader playing field in which to gather clues about the episodes. 
Alternative reality games that include Driveshaft’s real website, which 
includes references to the untimely death of the young star, the Hanso 
Foundation (mentioned in the closing credits of Mission: Impossible III) 
site, and, of course, the book Bad Twin that Hurley is seen reading in “The 
Long Con” (available on Amazon and written by Gary Troup, who was lost 
in the plane crash) reflect aspects of the massive presence of Lost in other 
media. These are not merely extranarrative additions but are intended to 
increase our immersion into the narrative itself: we are given information 
on people and events in the show that the show itself has not revealed to us. 
Through these, we obtain further clues as to what we should be watching for 
in the show itself. This makes the experience of watching Lost at the time it 
was aired very different from the experience of watching it on DVD later.
But it also makes us reconceive the whole concept of a TV series. Even 
though it is true that with the Internet today no show is left unturned, the 
volume of Lost’s Internet presence has brought this element to a new dimen-
sion. Fan-related literature of the extent one sees with Lost was once exclusive 
to soap operas (and Star Trek). But even today, with a very strong Internet 
presence for shows like Gossip Girl, Lost stands apart in that its very complex 
narrative has made its fans use this extra content not just for entertainment 
or to communicate with other fans but to develop a clearer understanding 
of the plot. Lost demands from its viewers immersion into the plot, alert-
ness, and extensive use of all available puzzle-solving tools. In this respect, 
in trying to find their way around the show, the viewers resemble the char-
acters in the series itself. It often seems to require faith from us, faith that 
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this is leading somewhere and that at some point the entire picture will fall 
into place. We are also forced to tap into all sorts of auxiliary knowledge to 
unravel the meaning of the various clues: numbers, philosophers, literary 
and cultural references, anagrams. These often very obscure allusions, this 
inherent complication in Lost, the nonlinear plotline, and the involvement 
it requires from its audience were a departure from tradition in at least 
two ways. On the one hand, viewers are called upon to actively participate 
and to gather clues from content, presentation, and other media, a process 
that gives new meaning to the activity with which a viewer engages with a 
show. On the other hand, the knowledge and conventions viewers have to 
fall back on are of little use in that new horizon. So epistemologically we 
find ourselves facing a metaphorical blank slate and an expanded horizon 
of possibilities from which to begin building our knowledge again. Above 
we mentioned some of the ways in which Lost challenges our assumptions. 
It challenges our assumptions about the show, television, and mainstream 
culture through a narrative that tackles one of the most profound questions: 
What should I believe?11
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you Can’t ChanGe the Past
The Philosophy of Time Travel in Star Trek and Lost
Andrew Fyfe
The stories of J. J. Abrams’s Lost (2004–2010) and Star Trek (2009) take us 
back in time. What makes these time-travel narratives stand out is how they 
abide by the logical prohibition against changing the past and display an 
understanding of the logical problems involved in doing so. However, Lost 
and Star Trek differ in how they handle this prohibition. While the char-
acters of Lost travel into their own past but are unable to change anything, 
the characters of Star Trek are able to change things but do not travel into 
their own past. In neither case do the characters travel back into their own 
past and make changes.
But why can’t the past be changed? Why would logic prohibit changing 
the past, but not time travel, parallel universes, or alternate timelines? After 
all, none of these ideas seems more plausible than any other. Furthermore, 
how could it be logically possible to travel back into one’s own past if it wasn’t 
possible to change it? These are the questions that form the basis of this chap-
ter, and they are also the kinds of questions that one would encounter while 
investigating the philosophy of time.1 To better understand the unique logical 
problems involved with changing one’s own past, I will begin by explaining 
the philosophy behind the prohibition before moving on to describe how 
this shapes the narratives of both Abrams’s Lost and his Star Trek.
Physical and Logical Possibility
It isn’t possible to travel through space faster than the speed of light. To the 
best of our present knowledge, physical law prohibits doing so. However, 
there is another sense in which faster-than-light travel is possible. Things 
could have been different, or, more specifically, physical law could have been 
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different such that our universe placed no upper bound on speed. This is 
why it is something of a mystery as to why our universe has the particular 
physical laws it does rather than some other set; that is, given that our physi-
cal laws could have been different, why are they the way they are?
What this illustrates is that there are different kinds of possibility and 
impossibility. Since the physical laws investigated by science prohibit faster-
than-light travel, it can be said to be physically impossible to do so; that is, 
impossible given the physical laws that actually govern our universe. How-
ever, there does not appear to be anything in logic that rules out the possibil-
ity that the universe could have been governed by a different set of physical 
laws. Given this, faster-than-light travel can still be said to be logically pos-
sible; that is, possible given the laws of logic.
It also isn’t possible to draw a figure that is both a square and a circle. 
However, there is nothing in physical law that prevents me from doing so. 
Instead, it is the laws of logic that make this impossible. Which is to say, it is 
not logically possible to draw a figure that is at once both four-sided and yet 
also only one-sided. Furthermore, unlike the physical law, the laws of logic 
could not have been different than they actually are.2 In fact, this might be 
the distinctive feature of a law of logic that distinguishes it from a physical 
law. Consequently, there is no way things could have been different so that 
I could draw a circle-square.3
Where this is all relevant to our examination of time travel is concern-
ing whether we are trying to answer the question “Is time travel physically 
possible?” or whether we are trying to answer the question “Is time travel 
logically possible?” If time travel isn’t logically possible, then it isn’t physi-
cally possible either. However, time travel could be logically possible and 
yet physically impossible. Which is to say, time travel might be allowed by 
the laws of logic but prohibited by the physical laws that actually govern our 
universe—as faster-than-light travel happens to be.
As an answer to the question “Is time travel physically possible?” the 
physical laws that govern our universe seem to be surprisingly amenable 
to time travel. This could turn out to be mistaken, but for now it is an open 
question among scientists whether anything in physical law rules out time 
travel, and so far, nothing appears to. But physical possibility is the domain 
of science and the scientist. Since this is a work concerning philosophy and 
its place in the work of Abrams, I will be concerned only with what philoso-
phers have to say about the logical possibility of time travel and changing the 
past. Furthermore, when people express a skepticism about the possibility 
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of time travel they usually do so because they think of it as logically impos-
sible. The question, then, that will set my agenda in this work will be “Is time 
travel logically possible?” rather than “Is time travel physically possible?”4
The Grandfather Paradox
A paradox is a set of propositions that independently appear to be true but 
that together appear to give rise to a contradiction. Which is to say, while 
they each seem to be true by themselves, it seems that they cannot all be true 
together. There are two ways of resolving a paradox. Either we can reject 
one of the propositions that give rise to the contradiction, or we can show 
how (despite appearances) no contradiction arises even if all the proposi-
tions were true.
The most famous reason for thinking time travel might not be logically 
possible comes in the form of a paradox. The so-called grandfather paradox 
can be thought of as the collection of the following independently plausible 
propositions (assuming time travel is possible), which together give rise to 
a contradiction:
(P1) It is possible for me to go back in time.
(P2) If it is possible for me to go back in time, then it isn’t possible  
 that I never came to exist.
(P3) If it is possible for me to go back in time, then it is possible that I  
 never came to exist.
The first proposition encapsulates what we are taking for granted, that time 
travel is possible. The second proposition points out the apparently incontro-
vertible fact that for me to be capable of going back in time, then I must have 
come to exist at some point in time if I am to do so. And the third proposi-
tion encapsulates the fact that if I could go back in time, then I would seem 
to be capable of doing things like killing my paternal grandfather before my 
father was born (i.e., things that would ensure that I never came to exist). 
Given that all three of these propositions cannot be true together, we are 
faced with a paradox. To resolve the paradox we must either reject one of the 
propositions as false or we must (cleverly) find a way in which they could all 
be true without giving rise to a contradiction. Since there doesn’t seem to be 
any way around the contradiction these propositions give rise to and given 
that we are trying to investigate the possibility of time travel, we should see 
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if we can reject either proposition P2 or P3 first and abandon proposition 
P1 only if it is our last resort for resolving the logical paradox. If there is no 
other way to resolve the grandfather paradox than to reject P1, then we will 
know that it is not logically possible to go back in time.
Proposition P2 seems the hardest to justify rejecting. How could I go 
back in time if I never came to exist in the first place? We might try mak-
ing sense of the idea by saying something like, “I came to exist in the past 
before I went back in time and changed the past,” but this notion doesn’t 
stand up to close scrutiny. Notice how such a response relies on the notion 
of “before.” However, what is it for me to have come to exist before I go back 
in time and change the past other than that I came to exist in the past? If I 
were to change the past so that I will no longer come to exist at any point in 
the past leading up to when I travel back in time, then there will be no time 
in which I came to exist before I traveled back in time. It does make sense 
to say that I could travel back into or create an alternate timeline where I 
kill my own grandfather and thereby never come to exist, but then my origi-
nal past would still exist as it was and in that sense I will not have actually 
changed my own past.5
Holding onto proposition P1 until our only option is to abandon it, 
we might try rejecting proposition P3 to resolve the grandfather paradox. 
That is, we might reject the idea that if I could go back in time, I would 
then be able to change the past in ways that would ensure I never came to 
exist. However, if it is possible for me to go back in time, then what would 
prevent me from doing things like killing my paternal grandfather before 
my father was born? We might try to say that logic would prevent me, but 
this runs contrary to the way the laws of logic work. For example, suppose 
that I build a time machine and with that time machine I were to go back 
in time with an arsenal of weapons and the goal of killing my grandfather. 
Will the laws of logic make my weapons misfire? Make me slip on a banana 
peel? Make my bullets bounce off of my grandfather as if he were Super-
man? The problem is that the laws of logic do not work like physical laws. 
Logic doesn’t prevent me from drawing a figure that is both a square and a 
circle by repeatedly breaking my pencil or causing the paper I am trying to 
draw the figure on to burst into flames. Rather, what the laws of logic show 
is that there is just no such figure for me to draw. Logic is not some force in 
the universe guiding banana peels beneath time travelers’ feet in order to 
avoid contradictions, and so if logic supposedly prevents me from killing my 
grandfather then there would need to be some less “active” way for it to do so.
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The result is that while logic doesn’t appear to give us grounds for 
rejecting either proposition P2 or proposition P3, logic does demand that 
we reject one of the three propositions that give rise to the contradic-
tion and so we appear to be forced into rejecting proposition P1. That is, 
forced to say that it is not logically possible for me to go back in time. Or 
at least this is how things appeared until some recent work in philoso-
phy breathed new life into the idea that instead of rejecting proposition 
P1, the correct resolution of the grandfather paradox is the rejection of 
proposition P3.
Resolving the Paradox without Rejecting Time Travel
The problem with rejecting proposition P3, that is, allowing time travel but 
disallowing time travelers from doing the sorts of things that would gener-
ate a contradiction, is that logic isn’t in the business of causing guns to jam, 
banana peels to appear, or bullets to bounce off flesh. What is needed in order 
to reject proposition P3 is some way in which the laws of logic entail that 
one of these coincidences will occur without having to say the laws of logic 
are acting like a physical force pushing objects around in space to actively 
cause these coincidences.
Philosophers began to realize how logic might entail these coincidences 
with the publication of David Lewis’s article “The Paradoxes of Time Travel” 
in 1976. Since then, Lewis’s ideas in that paper have been further developed 
and defended by philosophers like Nicholas J. J. Smith and Theodore Sider 
and a consensus has been rapidly forming among philosophers that the cor-
rect resolution of the grandfather paradox involves rejecting proposition P3 
rather than proposition P1.6 In the following passage, Sider offers a helpful 
way of understanding the line of thinking that changed philosophers’ minds 
about time travel by drawing our attention to a more mundane example of 
how logic might entail a coincidence:
Suppose I tried to throw a heavy stone at a fragile window. Since I 
have good aim and a strong arm, the window would break. I might, I 
suppose, slip on a banana peel, or hit a bird passing by with the rock, 
or have my throw deflected by a great gust of wind, or have a sudden 
failure of aim despite many years of training in stone-throwing. But 
at the very least, it surely is not the case that one of these strange 
coincidences would happen. The [proposition:] If I were to try to 
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throw the stone at the window, I would slip on a banana peel or hit 
a passing bird or . . . is false.7
That is to say, it might occur that some coincidence will prevent me from 
breaking the window, but it would be false that to say that such coincidences 
would occur. This is also the problem we faced in trying to reject proposition 
P3 to resolve the grandfather paradox. It might occur that some coincidence 
would prevent a time traveler from killing his or her paternal grandfather 
before his or her father is born, but there does not seem to be any reason we 
can say such coincidences would occur—at least without mistakenly think-
ing of the laws of logic as a force in the world ensuring that they would. 
But then Sider considers a different proposition: “If I were to try to throw 
the stone at the window but the window did not subsequently break, then 
I would slip on a banana peel or hit a passing bird or . . .” Unlike the first 
proposition, this one is true. Sider explains that the difference lies in the fact 
that this second proposition’s antecedent (i.e., what appears after the “if ” 
but before the “then”) already contains circumstances that could only come 
about through an unlikely coincidence: “Here I have built my failure into the 
antecedent; the [proposition] concerns what would happen had I tried and 
failed. Here, I think, our sense is that the [proposition] is now true. Given 
the background facts, the only way for me to fail to hit the window would be 
for some strange coincidence to occur.”8 Which is to say, it is only because 
we already know that the window will not break, that we can know that a 
coincidence not only might prevent me from breaking it but that a coinci-
dence would prevent me from breaking it. Furthermore, if we already know 
that the window doesn’t break, then we need not think of logic as actively 
causing a coincidence to prevent me from breaking it. Given the unlikely 
setup and result contained in the antecedent, logic entails that an unlikely 
coincidence will occur but without having to cause that coincidence. And, 
in fact, the same thing can be said about time travelers attempting to kill 
their paternal grandfather before their father is born.
Suppose I travel back to a time before my father was born and attempt 
to kill my grandfather. Supposing that I have good aim, a reliable weapon, 
and so on, some unlikely coincidence would have to occur for me to fail at 
my task. Yet we already know that I do fail. Since I exist, we already know 
that my grandfather does live long enough to conceive my father and, conse-
quently, we also already know that I fail in my attempt to murder him. Which 
is to say, we know that the following proposition is true: “If a time traveler 
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were to try to kill his paternal grandfather before his father was conceived, 
he would slip on a banana peel or have a sudden change of heart or . . .” 
Such coincidences might seem so unlikely that we cannot say for certain 
that they would happen without having to also say that logic would actively 
cause them to occur, but in fact we can know that they would occur without 
seeing logic as playing such an active role since we also already know that 
an unlikely result occurs (that my grandfather survives) given the setup (my 
capability and motivation to kill him). It is only if we ignore the fact that 
we know that my paternal grandfather survives at least long enough for my 
father to be conceived, that it would be mysterious how we could know a 
coincidence would occur to prevent me from killing him. However, given 
that we do know that my paternal grandfather survives at least until my father 
is conceived, our knowledge that a coincidence would occur to prevent me 
from killing him before that time is an unremarkable logical entailment.
Of course, this line of reasoning rules out more than time travelers sim-
ply killing their own grandfathers, it also rules out their changing the past 
in any way. Suppose that instead of setting out to kill my grandfather, I were 
to travel back in time with the aim of assassinating Adolf Hitler in 1930. 
Given that we already know that Hitler lived until 1945, we also already 
know that I will fail at assassinating him in 1930. Or, to put it another way, 
we know that I have already failed to kill him. While if I had access to a time 
machine and were myself a skilled assassin it might require some unlikely 
coincidence to prevent me from killing Hitler in 1930, given that we already 
know that Hitler lived until 1945 we also already know that some coincidence 
prevented me from assassinating him in 1930. If I had been successful in 
assassinating Hitler in 1930 our past wouldn’t change, it would have always 
been different. There is only one past and it cannot be changed. Either Hitler 
died at the hands of a time traveler in 1930 or he lived until 1945. If a time 
traveler wanted to go back and kill Hitler in 1930, then his only hope is the 
fact that recorded history might be wrong about the date of Hitler’s death. If 
recorded history is correct, then the time traveler already knows that some 
coincidence prevented him from being successful once he arrived in his past.
The result is that while it is logically possible to travel back in time and 
affect the past, it isn’t possible to change it. If I were to travel back in time 
and contribute to the events of the past, then it will have always been the 
case that I affected the past in the way I did. Which is not to say I cannot 
travel to some parallel universe or alternate timeline that exactly resembles 
a point in my own past and cause the past of that universe or timeline to 
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unfold differently than my own. However, then I would not be changing my 
own past but merely contributing to the past of another universe or time-
line. If I travel back to my own past, then logic entails that what I will do is 
already contained in that past.9
Time Travel in the TV Series
If the philosophy of time travel allows that we can travel to our own past 
and affect it but not change it, then storytellers have three formats they may 
follow in telling a time-travel narrative:
(F1) allow backwards time travel and allow characters to change the  
 past in violation of logical constraints,
(F2) allow backwards time travel but disallow characters from  
 changing the past, or
(F3) allow so-called backwards time travel to a parallel universe or  
 alternate timeline that is similar to the characters’ own past and  
 allow those characters to affect the past of that universe such that 
 it comes to differ from the past of their own universe or timeline.
Usually time-travel stories are instances of format F1. Famous examples 
include the Terminator and Back to the Future series of films. One thing 
that is noteworthy about both Abrams’s Lost and his Star Trek is that while 
they do not follow the same time-travel-story format, both avoid the philo-
sophically problematic format F1. While this fact alone would be enough to 
show some appreciation of the complexities of time travel, Lost goes beyond 
merely avoiding format F1 in making the question of which format Lost fol-
lows a major plot point of the show’s last two seasons and—in a remarkable 
way—the cliffhanger ending of Lost’s fifth season.
To illustrate how the philosophy of time travel becomes such an impor-
tant question in Lost, let’s consider a few examples of how the characters 
of Lost raise the question. Here is Daniel Faraday in the first episode of 
the fifth season (“Because You Left”), explaining that while it is possible to 
travel back into one’s own past it still isn’t possible to change it—suggesting 
that Lost is an instance format F2: “Time—it’s like a street, all right? We 
can move forward on that street, we can move in reverse, but we cannot 
ever create a new street. If we try to do anything different, we will fail every 
time. Whatever happened, happened.” Then, in the eleventh episode of the 
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fifth season (“Whatever Happened, Happened”), Miles attempts to explain 
to Hurley, Kate, and Jack why he knows Sayid’s attempt to kill young Ben 
in the past will fail:
Hugo “Hurley” Reyes: [Hurley looks at his own hand mystified]
Miles Straume: What the hell are you doing, tubby?
Hurley: Checking to see if I’m disappearing.
Miles: What?
Hurley: Back to the future, man. We came back in time to the island 
and changed stuff. So if little Ben dies, he’ll never grow up to be 
big Ben who’s the one that made us come back here in the first 
place. It means we can’t be here and therefore, dude—we don’t 
exist.
Miles: You’re an idiot.
Hurley: Am I?
Miles: Yeah, it doesn’t work like that. You can’t change anything. 
Your maniac Iraqi buddy shot [Ben] Linus, that’s what always 
happened. It’s just we never experienced how it all turns out.
Hurley: That’s really confusing.
Miles: Yeah, well, get used to it. But the good news is that Linus 
didn’t die, so that means the kid can’t either. He’ll be fine.
Kate Austen: Didn’t look like he’s gonna be fine. What if you’re 
wrong?
Miles: Well, if I’m wrong then I guess we all stop existing and—none 
of it matters anyway then does it?
Hurley: Let me get this straight. All this already happened.
Miles: Yes.
Hurley: So—this conversation we’re having right now, we’ve already 
had it.
Miles: Yes!
Hurley: Then what am I gonna say next?
Miles: I don’t know.
Hurley: Ha! Then your theory is wrong.
Miles: For the thousandth time, you dingbat. The conversation 
already happened, but not for you and me. For you and me it’s 
happening right now.
Hurley: Okay, answer me this. If all of this already happened to me, 
then why don’t I remember any of it?
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Miles: Because once Ben turned that wheel, time isn’t a straight line 
for us anymore. Our experiences in the past and in the future 
occurred before these experiences right now.
Hurley: Say that again.
Miles: [Miles tries to hand Hurley his gun] Shoot me. Please, please.
Hurley: Ah ha! I can’t shoot you, because if you die in 1977, then 
you’ll never come back to the island on the freighter 30 years 
from now.
Miles: I can die! Because I’ve already come to the island on the 
freighter. Any of us can die! Because this is our present.
Hurley: You said that Ben couldn’t die because he has to grow and 
become the leader of the Others.
Miles: Because this is his past.
Hurley: But when we had captured Ben and Sayid, like, tortured him 
then why wouldn’t he remember getting shot by that same guy 
when he was a kid?
Miles: Huh. I hadn’t thought of that.
While for most of the fifth season the audience is given explanations for 
why the past cannot change like the two above from Faraday and Miles, the 
season is also littered with hints that this might be mistaken. For example, 
at the end of the above dialogue between Miles and Hurley, Hurley points 
out that if the past cannot change then older Ben should have remembered 
time-traveling Sayid shooting him as a child. This suggests that Miles might 
be wrong about the inability to change the past. Even Faraday comes to later 
question whether he is right about the prohibition on changing the past 
when, in the fourteenth episode of the fifth season (“The Variable”), Faraday 
postulates a (logically absurd) exception to the prohibition:
Daniel Faraday: But—we can change that. I studied relativistic 
physics my entire life. One thing emerged over and over—can’t 
change the past. Can’t do it. Whatever happened, happened. All 
right? But then I finally realized—I had been spending so much 
time focused on the constants, I forgot about the variables. Do 
you know what the variables in these equations are, Jack?
Jack Shephard: No.
Faraday: Us. We’re the variables. People. We think. We reason. We 
make choices. We have free will. We can change our destiny.
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The problem with Faraday’s reasoning here is that the logical prohibition on 
changing the past isn’t a constraint on free will. The past cannot be changed, 
but if a time traveler has gone back and affected it, then the past happened 
the way it did partly because of that time traveler’s own free choices. The 
past already includes whatever free choices the time traveler makes, but they 
are still his free choices.
While this argument of Faraday’s is a philosophically interesting bit to 
include in the show itself, what is perhaps more impressive is what Faraday’s 
second-guessing of the logical prohibition on changing the past contributes 
to the story. While the audience has been told time and again by characters 
like Faraday that the past cannot change, there are also hints likes these that 
the characters might be wrong about this. What this sets up is the season 
finale of the fifth season (“The Incident”), in which the characters attempt 
to detonate a nuclear bomb in hopes of changing their past. The episode 
ends with a cliffhanger question: “Did the bomb go off? Can you—and did 
they—change the past?”
Season 6 of Lost begins without clear answers. There now appear to be 
two universes or timelines, one where the bomb has gone off and one where 
it hasn’t. The characters in the apparent universe or timeline where the bomb 
hasn’t detonated are left thinking that you can’t change the past after all, while 
the characters in the other apparent universe or timeline have never time 
traveled in the first place. The impression the story leaves on its audience is 
that Lost has unexpectedly turned out to combine formats F2 and F3 in an 
interesting and original way. While the characters had traveled back into 
their own past and were unable to change anything, because they tried to 
detonate the nuclear bomb in their past, when a parallel universe or alter-
nate timeline branches off from that point it is a universe/timeline where 
the bomb has successfully gone off. What is interesting about this move is 
that while the inhabitants of the parallel universe or alternate timeline never 
travel back in time and detonate a bomb in their past, their universe/timeline 
shares a past with the original universe/timeline that includes time travelers 
from the future of the original universe/timeline detonating a nuclear bomb 
in their shared past. The characters of the original universe/timeline remain 
stuck with the hellish past they’ve been trying to change, but in attempting 
to change it they have unknowingly created a better parallel universe or 
alternate timeline for their counterparts to live in.
As season 6 progresses, one of the characters in Lost, Desmond Hume, 
comes to believe that this better parallel universe or alternate timeline exists 
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and that it is possible for the inhabitants of the original universe/timeline to 
escape over to it. The audience is led to believe Desmond is correct about 
the idea of traveling to the parallel universe or alternate timeline due to the 
flashbacks the characters in the better parallel universe or alternate timeline 
begin to have of the original universe/timeline. This plot culminates in the 
series finale (“The End”), leading up to which Jack and Desmond argue over 
whether the better parallel universe or alternate timeline exists and whether 
they might be able to escape to it:
Desmond Hume: This doesn’t matter you know.
Jack Shepard: Excuse me.
Desmond: Him destroying the island, you destroying him. It doesn’t 
matter. You’re going to lower me into that light and I’m going to 
go somewhere else. A place where we could be with the ones that 
we love. And we’ll never have to think of this damn island again. 
And you know the best part Jack?
Jack: What?
Desmond: You’re in this place. You know we sat next to each other 
on Oceanic 815. It never crashed. We spoke to each other. You 
seemed happy. You know maybe I can find a way to bring you 
there too.
Jack: Desmond, I tried that once. There are no short cuts, no 
do-overs. What happened, happened. Trust me, I know. All of 
this matters.
While at this point, the audience has been led to believe Desmond is right, 
Jack is proven correct in the end. What the other, seemingly better paral-
lel universe or alternate timeline turns out to be is the afterlife. Lost reveals 
in its final episode that it has always been an instance of time-travel story 
format F2, that even while you can travel back into your own past, you 
won’t be able to change it. Although Jack does find a positive interpretation 
to give this logical prohibition in the end. In his exchange with Desmond, 
Jack argues that if the past could be changed then what we do in the pres-
ent wouldn’t matter. Unless your past remains the same, then your actions 
will end up being erased by later changes in the timeline and in this sense it 
won’t matter what you do. Jack has given up on trying to change his unfor-
tunate past, but he has now come to think that in having an unchangeable 
past his actions have value in a way they wouldn’t if the past could change. 
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The question Jack now leaves the audience to wrestle with is not the logical 
possibility of changing the past, but how a changeable past would affect the 
value of our actions.
Time Travel in the Movie
In an important way, the question of value Jack wrestles with in the finale 
of Lost is also one that plays a role in the way time travel is treated in Star 
Trek. If Abrams’s film about the young crew of the Enterprise had followed 
the lead of Lost and treated the past as unchangeable, then the writers of 
the new series of films would be committed to ensuring that their film is 
consistent with the many Star Trek shows and films that are set later in the 
franchise. This would mean, for instance, that the audience would know 
from the start that none of the central crew will die since they already know 
that they survive to be consistent with the shows and films in the franchise 
where their older selves appear. However, if Abrams’s Star Trek took format 
F1 and allowed the past to be changed, then it would wipe out the future 
of every other show and film in the franchise. Despite being fictional, for 
the events portrayed in those shows and films to be fictionally eliminated 
from the timeline would rob them of their value. Watching the new films 
inaugurated with Abrams’s Star Trek, we would be engaged in a story that 
results in every other Star Trek show and film no longer mattering because 
they will no longer have occurred.
The result is that Abrams’s Star Trek adopts format F3. Specifically, it is 
set in a parallel universe at a point similar to the past of the Star Trek universe 
we are already familiar with from other shows and films. In order to connect 
the story of this universe with the stories of the other Star Trek shows and 
films and in order to allow it to still vary from the universe of those shows 
and films, Abrams has several characters from that universe “time-travel” to 
his parallel universe and affect it in such a way that its past will now unfold 
differently than the past of their original universe.10
As we can see, time travel plays a different role in the story of Star Trek 
than Lost. In Lost questions over whether or not you can change the past, 
free will, and fate are central to the story. In Star Trek time travel serves as 
a practical storytelling tool, allowing Abrams to tell an origin story of the 
crew of the Enterprise that allows the future to unfold differently than the 
rest of the Star Trek franchise but without undermining the value of those 
shows and films by telling a story in which they are made to no longer exist.11
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Still, there is a storytelling problem that time-travel narratives following 
format F3 risk falling into. Specifically, when characters don’t travel back 
into their own past and change things there, the question arises why they 
would care to change how the past unfolds in a parallel universe or alternate 
timeline? Star Trek avoids this problem by having its character Nero travel 
to the parallel universe in pursuit of the Spock of the original universe. Nero 
isn’t just out to kill Spock in as many parallel universes he can. Rather, the 
story’s antagonist is motivated by seeking revenge on the original Spock 
who he believes to have wronged him. That might still leave open the ques-
tion why Nero takes his revenge on Spock by destroying the counterpart to 
Vulcan in this parallel universe, but we might allow for the purposes of the 
story that the original Spock is himself concerned with the welfare of his 
counterparts, even in other universes. It isn’t original Spock’s actual home 
world being destroyed, but it is the one inhabited by his species and family 
in this universe. Furthermore, madmen bent on the destruction of whole 
planets should not really be expected to be consistent in the motivation and 
thinking behind their acts.
In the end it is not a mark against a work of fiction if it does not abide by 
the constraints of logic. Both the Terminator and Back to the Future series 
of films do so with great success. However, a time-travel narrative that does 
follow one of the logically consistent formats is rare and therefore offers a 
writer the opportunity of a more original story. While Star Trek follows the 
more well-known logically consistent format for time-travel narratives, the 
film is noteworthy in that it consciously adopts the only format that both 
avoids devaluing the rest of the Star Trek franchise and frees the story it 
tells from being constrained by the future portrayed by the rest of the Star 
Trek franchise. Lost stands out not only because it adopts the most uncom-
mon time-travel narrative format, but also because it finds a way to make 
the philosophical questions surrounding time travel and changing the past 
central components of the story it tells.12
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for the laws of logic to be different (i.e., they might differ from what I believe them to 
be), it is not metaphysically possible for the laws of logic to be different (i.e., differ from 
what they in fact are).
3. Now, certainly, the words “circle” and “square” could have had different mean-
ings than they do. We might be able to refer to those properties with different words 
or refer to different properties with those same words so that I would be capable of 
drawing a figure that we would call both a square and a circle, but what would remain 
logically impossible is for one figure to at the same time have the properties of both of 
the figures that using current English we refer to with the words “circle” and “square.” 
Which is just to say, the claim that drawing a circle-square is logically impossible is not 
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Certainly everyone would agree that the past does not presently exist, but presentism is 
the rather extreme metaphysical position that the past does not even exist in the past. 
It might also be worth pointing out that there are also many more mundane forms of 
possibility that philosophers as a profession are not concerned with. For example, what 
is and isn’t financially possible for me. Given my current income, it might be financially 
impossible for me to afford my own private jet but still financially possible for me to 
afford a trip on a commercial airline. However, what I will be concerned with in this 
work is logical possibility.
5. The idea is essentially that time might have two or more dimensions (rather than 
the one we normally suppose it to have) and that while I would not be able to travel back 
to the exact time on the two-dimensional temporal plane and kill my own grandfather 
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inspection, however, this account seems not to give us time travel as we know it from 
the stories. When the traveler revisits the days of his childhood, will his playmates be 
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9. Perhaps a better way of making this point is stating that while it is logically pos-
sible to go back and change the past, logic entails that as a matter of fact no one will. 
Which is to say, there is a logically possible way the world could have been where a time 
traveler would successfully kill Hitler in 1930, but since our past does not contain a time 
traveler assassinating Hitler in 1930 we know that the actual world won’t ever include 
any time travelers who go back in time and successfully kill Hitler in 1930. In this sense 
it can be said that it’s logically possible for me to go back in time and kill Hitler in 1930, 
only we already know that any attempt on my part happens to fail.
10. In Abrams’s Star Trek film time is not taken to be multidimensional with many 
timelines running parallel to our own, but rather the film assumes the many-worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, where parallel universes branch off from our own 
during certain quantum events. In the film itself this is hinted at when young Spock is 
asked the question, “What is the central assumption of Quantum Cosmology?” and he 
answers, “Everything that can happen does happen in equal and parallel universes.” One 
of the most peculiar consequences of quantum mechanics is that it appears to say that 
things can enter a state of simultaneously possessing two conflicting properties. This 
consequence of quantum mechanics has entered popular culture through the example 
of Schrodinger’s cat being simultaneously both alive and dead. The interpretation of 
quantum mechanics that says there exist many other universes parallel to our own is 
an attempt to do away with this strange result by instead postulating that the cat is alive 
in one universe while dead in another.
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11. One might be concerned, however, that by following format F3 for the Star Trek 
film there is a conflict with the many other franchise shows and films that follow format 
F1. However, while format F1 and format F2 could clearly not coexist, there is nothing 
preventing a story from involving both format F3 and either format F1 or F2. Which is 
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to a parallel universe or alternate timeline and follows format F3.
12. For more on why the worlds described by make-believe stories are capable of con-
taining logical contradictions even while actual and possible worlds cannot, see Kendall 
Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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rabbIt’s feet, hatChes, 
and Monsters
Mysteries vs. Questions in J. J. Abrams’s Stories
Paul DiRado
Mission: Impossible III begins, strangely enough, at what seems to be the end. 
Ethan Hunt is tied up and held captive by an unnamed bad guy. This bad guy 
tells Ethan that unless he gives up the location of the mysterious-sounding 
Rabbit’s Foot, a tied-up and gagged woman (with whom the audience is led 
to believe Ethan has a romantic relationship) will be killed. When Ethan 
either can’t or won’t reveal this information to the bad guy, the woman is 
shot, and the film cuts back several weeks earlier, to a party being held by 
Ethan and the murdered woman. The remainder of the film is haunted by 
this first scene, and we (the audience) spend most of this time trying to fig-
ure out how the ordinary and everyday circumstances in which the char-
acters originally find themselves will lead them to the tragic moment with 
which the film begins. In that respect, Mission: Impossible III is structured 
as a mystery. We know that Ethan will wind up captured by the bad guy, but 
we don’t know how—given his retirement to civilian life—his capture will 
occur. And much of the fun of Mission: Impossible III comes from trying to 
figure out this mystery.
Looking at the projects on which J. J. Abrams has worked, it seems clear 
that he is quite intrigued by mysteries of all kinds. In many of his movies, 
including Mission: Impossible III and Cloverfield, and especially in his TV 
work—Alias, Lost, and Fringe—resolving a mystery is an important task both 
for his characters and for the audience. What is that thing terrorizing New 
York? What are the true motives of Sydney Bristow’s secretive agency? Why 
is there a polar bear on the island? For the characters, resolving these mys-
teries is often a matter of life and death. For the audience, the overwhelm-
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ing desire to figure things out keeps our attention glued to the screen and 
makes us come back week after week to discover another clue.
Because of their centrality to his works, studying the mysteries in J. J. 
Abrams’s TV shows and movies offers us a good opportunity to philosophi-
cally understand precisely what a mystery is and what will count as a satis-
factory resolution to a mystery. This question is of no small importance to 
our ordinary lives. Though the mysteries we encounter in everyday life are 
a bit more mundane than the ones facing Jack and the castaways in Lost, we 
are confronted with mysteries both big and small all the time. We may feel 
suddenly sick and wonder what precisely is ailing us and what we should 
do to feel better. Or perhaps a friend has suddenly started acting coldly to 
me—why? Was it something I did?
Our task in this chapter will be to figure out precisely what a mystery 
is and what sorts of resolutions to mysteries one could reasonably expect 
to find. This also has been a task of a great many scientists, philosophers, 
and other thinkers throughout history, from both the East and West.1 First, 
we will distinguish mysteries from questions. This distinction is necessary 
because an unanswered question will initially appear to be the cause of some-
thing appearing mysterious. We will show that a mystery is not reducible to 
an unanswered question, or even a set of unanswered questions. This result 
is quite important, as it will reveal that you cannot expect a mystery about 
some topic to necessarily be resolved by merely answering previously unan-
swered questions about that topic. People who complained that shows like 
Lost or Fringe never answered any questions are not entirely correct—those 
shows actually answered a great many questions, but they did so without 
ever resolving the mystery underlying those questions. With this revelation 
established, we will turn toward the question of what precisely does make 
something mysterious, if not an unanswered question, and how the resolu-
tion of a mystery will look different than the answering of a question.
Are Mysteries and Questions the Same Thing?
The first thing we need to determine is precisely what we mean by a mystery 
and how a mystery differs from a question, if at all.
Let us start with questions. Mission: Impossible III begins, as we have 
discussed, with the big bad guy named Davian asking Ethan Hunt about the 
location of the Rabbit’s Foot. Clearly he is asking Ethan a question. We should 
take some time to pinpoint certain aspects of precisely what Davian is doing 
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when he asks this question. Davian wants to know some piece of information 
that he doesn’t already know. We will call what he desires a proposition—a 
simple declarative statement that reveals some property about some subject 
being discussed.2 In this particular case, the subject is the Rabbit’s Foot, and 
the property Davian wants to know about the Rabbit’s Foot is its location. 
The question that Davian asks Ethan Hunt is a request for Ethan to share this 
proposition, to tell Davian the location of the Rabbit’s Foot. Since Davian 
asks Ethan in particular this question, it must be the case that he believes 
that Ethan is in possession of this proposition (i.e., the answer to his ques-
tion). He doesn’t ask the gagged woman sitting near Ethan where the Rab-
bit’s Foot is located, nor does he ask any of his evil henchmen. Each person 
either knows or does not know the proposition that Davian desires. We can 
tell that he believes that Ethan does know the proposition detailing the loca-
tion of the Rabbit’s Foot from the fact that he asks Ethan about its location.
 Questions of this kind admit of relatively straightforward answers. 
“Where did I leave my car keys?” asked by itself, is a question and can be 
answered satisfactorily by “I left my car keys on the counter.” “How does a 
person kill bacteria?” can be answered satisfactorily with the proposition 
“Bacteria can be killed with antibiotics.” And so on. A person has answered 
a particular question about some topic only if the proposition that they 
give is true. Simply stated, a proposition is true if the subject of the proposi-
tion actually in fact possesses the property assigned to it in the proposition. 
“The car keys are on the counter” is a true proposition if and only if the car 
keys really are on the counter.3 If the car keys are actually inside of a drawer, 
then the proposition “The car keys are on the counter” is false. Similarly, if 
antibiotics didn’t in fact kill bacteria, the proposition “Bacteria are killed by 
antibiotics” would be false. A true proposition that reveals the asked-about 
property of a subject is a satisfactory answer to a question. If Ethan had tried 
lying about the location of the Rabbit’s Foot, his lie would not be a satisfac-
tory answer to the question, regardless of whether or not Davian believed it.
The answer to a question is usually quite simple and definite. That is not 
to say that it is easy to answer every question—it may have taken scientists 
a long time and much effort to discover that antibiotics kill bacteria, and 
we might search for hours for missing car keys. Rather, the answer itself is 
simple—it always takes the form of a true proposition, or perhaps in certain 
more complicated cases several true propositions. The answer to “How do 
I get to your house?” might require several propositions: “First, turn left on 
Church Street. Then turn right on 2nd Avenue . . .” But this extra layer of 
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complication does not make the answer any less definitive once it is discov-
ered. Once one discovers the true proposition or propositions that answer 
the question, the question is pretty much exhausted and is no longer of any 
importance. There is no further reason for us to continue searching for an 
answer to a question once we have discovered the answer, because the ques-
tion came about because we lacked a proposition. Once that proposition 
was discovered, the question is no longer relevant. Once we find the car 
keys, we no longer need to wonder about their location. And we certainly 
don’t need to keep looking further for them! Any other question that we 
may go on to ask about car keys after they have been found—such as “Why 
did I leave the car keys in the drawer?”—is asking about something com-
pletely different and unrelated to the location of the car keys and demands 
a different and largely unrelated proposition as an answer. After answering 
a particular question, we can move on to the next concern in our day. That 
one particular question goes away.
What Is Inside the Hatch?
Now that we have briefly discussed some of the key features of questions—
mainly, that each question has at least one true proposition that answers 
the question and that exhausts our concern with the question—we need 
to determine whether or not a mystery is the same thing as a question. At 
first blush, the two seem identical. After all, every mystery can be expressed 
as a question. As an example of a mysterious happening, let’s consider the 
discovery of the Hatch in season 1 of Lost. Throughout most of that season, 
many people (both in the audience and in the cast) expressed this mystery 
in the form of a question, “What is inside the Hatch?” And fans spent many 
hours hypothesizing potential answers to this question, all of which are 
propositions. Maybe the sickness is contained within the Hatch. Or maybe 
some evil entity is trapped inside of it. Or perhaps a Scotsman is down there 
pushing a button every one hundred and eight minutes to save the world. 
Superficially, mysteries and questions seem to basically be the same thing.
However, this superficial first impression is misleading. Does the ques-
tion “What is inside the Hatch?” adequately and exhaustively capture the 
mysteriousness of the original discovery of the Hatch in season 1? Remem-
ber that the sense of resolution that accompanies the answer to a question 
is the defining characteristic of questions—that once a question has been 
adequately resolved and satisfactorily answered, the question is no longer 
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relevant and it makes no sense to keep looking for the answer any further. 
If this question about the Hatch is the same thing as the mysteriousness of 
the Hatch, if questions and mysteries are exactly the same thing and the 
only reason the Hatch appears mysterious is because we lack possession 
of certain true propositions about it, then once the audience discovers the 
answer to the question “What is inside the Hatch?” the mysteriousness of 
the Hatch should go away. In the beginning of season 2, once the audience 
did in fact learn the answer to “What is inside the Hatch?”—once the audi-
ence learned a whole, complete series of true propositions addressing what 
was inside the Hatch, such as, “A Scotsman pushing a button every one hun-
dred and eight minutes is inside the Hatch,” “A bunch of food is inside the 
Hatch,” “An electromagnetic anomaly is inside the Hatch,” and so on—did 
the mysteriousness of the Hatch simultaneously go away along with these 
answers? Not at all. These answers in no way made the Hatch appear less 
mysterious—indeed, many of the answers made the Hatch seem even more 
mysterious! And the audience expressed this continued sense of mystery 
with new questions: “How does pushing a button save the world?” “Where 
do those large pallets of food come from?” and “What is that weird electro-
magnetic anomaly?” Far from exhausting the mystery, answering the ques-
tion that the audience originally used to express the mystery only seemed 
to make the Hatch more mysterious.
We have seen that, although a sense of mystery about something can 
be expressed as a question, this question does not satisfactorily exhaust 
that sense of mystery and that a mystery seems deeper and more enduring 
than the questions we use to express it. Let us dig deeper and try to figure 
out more precisely how questions and mysteries relate to one another. One 
of the characters in the episode “Across the Sea” claims, “Every question I 
answer will simply lead to another question.” We have seen that this claim 
was quite true about the mystery of the Hatch. Answering the first question 
that we used to express this mystery certainly led to a whole series of other 
questions, all efforts at expressing the mysteriousness associated with the 
Hatch. It is important to note that these new questions aren’t just reformula-
tions of the original question and to see that the original question, “What is 
inside the Hatch?” was perfectly and satisfactorily answered. That question 
was asking for a list of things inside the Hatch, a list that we have acquired. 
“How does pushing the button save the world?” is in no way asking the same 
thing as “What is inside the Hatch?” and cannot be answered by simply giv-
ing either a list of more things inside the Hatch or a more precise account 
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of the things already listed. With that in mind, we should ask precisely how 
these new questions relate to the original question that the audience used 
to express their sense of mystery about the Hatch. Answering this question 
might help clear up the mystery about mysteries.
One possible resolution of this difficulty could be that a mystery is not 
necessarily identical with just one question and with one set of missing 
propositions about some topic, but with a whole cluster of questions and 
missing propositions. If this theory is correct, answering one question about 
a mysterious topic would not necessarily eradicate the sense of mystery about 
that topic, because a series of other questions could still remain unanswered. 
In terms of our example of Lost’s mysterious Hatch, this explanation would 
say that the mystery of the Hatch does not stem from just the initial ques-
tion about it that the audience used to express the mystery but rather from a 
whole series or cluster of related questions about the Hatch, not all of which 
had been answered once the audience discovered what was inside. At a given 
time, one of these questions, say “What is inside the Hatch?” appears to be 
more important or relevant than the rest, and for this reason the audience 
expresses the mystery using this question. But there are other propositions 
about the Hatch that the audience still lacks, such as who built the Hatch 
or why the numbers are written on it, and so the Hatch remains mysterious 
even after what is inside the Hatch is discovered.
This theory is certainly an improvement over our initial hypothesis, that 
a mystery and a question are the same thing. It quite correctly recognizes 
that often a mystery can be expressed with multiple different questions, all 
of which are related to each other in some way. However, it still falls short 
of being an adequate account of mysteries, for two different reasons. We will 
see that it cannot account for why, in the course of exploring a mystery, new 
questions that were completely unknown at the beginning of the explora-
tion frequently emerge. This first flaw will highlight a larger difficulty. The 
mysteries as a cluster of questions theory cannot account for the relation 
between the disparate and self-contained questions and missing propositions 
associated with the mystery, even among the ones that are known from the 
beginning of the investigation.
Strange Buttons, Food Pallets, and Electromagnetic Anomalies
Initially we noted that the answer to the question “What is inside the Hatch?” 
gave rise to a whole series of other questions, questions like “How does push-
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ing a button save the world?” “Where do those large pallets of food come 
from?” and “What is that weird electromagnetic anomaly?” Now, it cannot 
be the case that all of these questions, all of these missing propositions, were 
originally present, along with “What is inside the Hatch?” and “Why are the 
numbers written on the Hatch?” when the Hatch first appeared mysterious 
to the audience. The audience didn’t know that there were strange buttons, 
food pallets, or electromagnetic anomalies within the Hatch, after all, and 
you can’t formulate questions about things that you don’t know that you 
don’t know. Certainly, the audience did in fact lack the answers to all of these 
questions, but this lack did not contribute to the original sense of mystery 
about the Hatch. If that is so, why then do these new questions get wrapped 
up in that original sense of mystery once the audience discovers them?
A quite plausible answer is that the sense of mystery surrounding a 
particular topic is tied intimately to missing propositions about that topic. 
The original set of questions about the Hatch, for instance, concerned the 
initial set of unknown propositions about the Hatch. But through explor-
ing the mystery, new missing propositions about a given topic are revealed. 
These new missing propositions therefore join the overall cluster of miss-
ing propositions and give rise to new questions about the topic. Thus, once 
the audience discovered that an electromagnetic anomaly was within the 
Hatch, what this anomaly is joins all of the other still-unanswered questions 
in making the Hatch seem mysterious.
What this account cannot explain, however, is why some of the unan-
swered questions about the Hatch add to the sense of mystery surround-
ing the Hatch and some do not. At any given moment, there are countless 
numbers of propositions that a person lacks. For instance, the audience does 
not know the ingredient list for the Dharma Initiative brand ranch dressing. 
They don’t know precisely all the parts that make up the Dharma computer, 
and most of the audience probably do not know the mechanics by which 
that computer is able to turn on. The audience doesn’t know any of these 
propositions and uncountable more propositions besides them. Why does 
the absence of these propositions seem entirely nonmysterious, and why do 
these propositions do nothing to enhance the sense of mystery surround-
ing the Hatch? More importantly, why do some of the missing propositions, 
such as how pushing the button saves the world, add to the sense of mys-
tery surrounding the Hatch while the overwhelmingly uncountable mass of 
missing propositions barely even seems worthy of asking a question about?
Indeed, we can even ask this same question about the initial sense of 
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mystery that surrounded the Hatch at the point of its initial discovery. Why 
is it that not knowing what’s inside the Hatch makes it seem mysterious, 
while not knowing the chemical compounds that make up the Hatch door 
does not? Why is not knowing why the numbers are written on the outside 
of the Hatch mysterious, but not knowing why the numbers were imprinted 
in the particular typeface that they were not mysterious at all? All of these 
propositions about the Hatch are unknown, but only a relatively tiny num-
ber of these missing propositions make the Hatch seem mysterious. Given 
the current theory we have been considering about the relation between 
mysteries and questions—that something seems mysterious insofar as there 
remains an unknown proposition about it—any missing set of propositions 
about a topic should make that topic seem mysterious. But if that were strictly 
true, then everything in the world would appear mysterious, because no one 
could ever be in possession of all of the true propositions about anything. 
Only certain missing propositions make a topic appear mysterious. But our 
current theory cannot account for what distinguishes some propositions 
from others in this way.
Nor can we save this theory by adding the proviso that only relevant 
or important propositions make something seem mysterious when they 
are unknown. One very important and relevant missing proposition about 
the Hatch is how the castaways can use it to aid them in their fight against 
the Others. This question is particularly important and relevant at the end 
of season 1, when the Others are supposedly about to raid the castaways’ 
camp, and Jack wants to know if the Hatch could be used as a place where 
the castaways could hide. But Jack doesn’t find the Hatch at all mysterious, 
even though he lacks this relevant piece of information about it. His con-
cern is purely practical. This point is demonstrated clearly by the fact that 
when Jack answers this question—people cannot hide within the Hatch, 
and so it cannot be used by the castaways in their fight with Others (at least 
at that time)—Jack loses all interest in the Hatch. He doesn’t then wonder 
what is inside the Hatch, or who built it, or anything of the other mysteri-
ous unknowns surrounding it, all of which seem unimportant and irrelevant 
to him in the face of the danger posed by the Others. Just because some 
important question about a topic is unknown does not make it seem mys-
terious, and many mysteries concern questions that do not seem immedi-
ately practically relevant.
For lack of a better way of putting it, some things just seem weird and 
some do not. It’s weird or strange or unusual that an unopenable Hatch is 
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in the middle of the jungle. It’s weird that there is a strange electromagnetic 
anomaly within that Hatch, and it is quite odd that pushing a button every 
one hundred and eight minutes saves the world. It is this weirdness that 
seems to make certain questions about particular topics appear mysterious 
and the usualness of other questions that does not make them appear very 
mysterious. Not knowing the precise ingredient lists for packaged food items 
is not unusual, but finding a whole bunch of packaged food on a deserted 
island is quite unusual and invites questions about where it came from and 
why it is there. Going forward, our task will be to determine more techni-
cally and precisely what we mean by “weirdness” and “unusualness” and to 
determine how these factors relate to both questions and mysteries.
What Makes Something Strange?
The Abrams-produced Cloverfield begins with scenes of ordinary life. One 
of the movie’s protagonists, Rob, has won a job in Japan, and his friends are 
holding a going-away party for him. Nothing in these scenes is particularly 
weird or unusual, and the only thing even remotely mysterious in them is 
why there is tension between Rob and one of his (seemingly) platonic female 
friends. And this tension seems mysterious only because of the disconnect 
between these scenes and earlier footage of the happy pair engaged in an 
erotic relationship in the past, one that none of Rob’s friends seems to know 
about. The movie doesn’t take on a stronger aura of mystery until later, when 
a supposed earthquake and power outage are followed by the head of the 
Statue of Liberty bouncing into downtown New York City.
The difference between the early and later parts of the movie is striking. 
In the earlier, everyday scenes, both the characters and the audience quite 
comfortably know how to navigate the world. Every object that is encoun-
tered is fulfilling its expected role, and every person is acting as would be 
expected. Even the somewhat mysterious lovers’ quarrel isn’t that odd, as 
romantic pairs break up and experience tension fairly frequently. The only 
thing that makes it seem at all mysterious and odd is that usually the couple’s 
friends would know about such couplings. This comfort with the scenario 
and the world that starts the movie is of course radically upset by the even-
tual arrival of the monster. Suddenly, both the characters and the audience 
are confronted with creatures whose behavior no one can anticipate or pre-
dict. A striking consequence of this interjection of the uncanny is that the 
monster, and the little monsters that fall off of it, suddenly make everything 
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else in the movie, things and people that were previously familiar and ful-
filling expected roles, suddenly become unpredictable and, in some cases, 
frightening. What was at first a world that everyone knew how to navigate 
suddenly has become upset, and neither the audience nor the characters 
can rely on the world obeying its ordinary rules.
Ordinarily speaking, our world appears to us coherently. It is always the 
case that we possess uncountable propositions about the world. However, 
we don’t just possess this assortment of facts as a disconnected list of true 
things, with every fact standing alone by itself unrelated to all the others.4 
A person knows where her keys are located; let us say that they are inside 
the drawer of her desk. But the proposition “The keys are located in the 
drawer of her desk” only actually tells this woman where the keys are in a 
practical way because she knows a series of other related propositions, such 
as “The desk is located in the corner of my apartment.” But knowing the 
location of her desk in this way requires knowing where the desk is in rela-
tion to everything else in the apartment, knowing that the bookshelf is to 
its left, a dresser is to its right, and so on. She must also know what the desk 
looks like, which means distinguishing its features from the features of both 
other desks and everything else in the apartment. She must also know how 
to open up desk drawers, a skill that, at first blush, cannot even be reduced 
to a proposition. Without being in possession of this whole interconnected 
web of skills and propositions, the woman cannot be said to know where her 
keys are. Practically speaking, just knowing that keys are located in a desk 
drawer does not help you acquire those keys unless you also know where 
that desk drawer is and how to access it.
Now, we must not assume that a person is consciously aware of all these 
propositions all the time. Indeed, part of what it means for something to be 
familiar to us is that, in the course of actually doing things in our everyday 
life, we do not have to consciously think about the familiar thing or how it 
relates to the other familiar things around us, or even how to use it. When 
a woman needs her keys, she simply walks to her desk and opens a drawer. 
She doesn’t need to think about how to do either of those things or about 
where the drawer is located, what it looks like, and so on. However, if the 
same woman is asked to grab someone else’s keys out of the drawer of a desk 
in an apartment that she is not familiar with, then she will have to be much 
more consciously aware of what she is doing. She may even need to ask her 
friend where the desk is, or what it looks like, or whether or not there are 
any tricks to opening it.
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Questions, we have seen, always come about in response to a missing 
proposition. The woman who is asked by a friend to grab his keys out of 
the desk drawer is not lacking the proposition that says where the keys are 
located; she already knows that the keys are located in the desk drawer. She 
does, however, lack a whole series of related propositions that would be 
necessary for her to successfully acquire the keys, practically speaking—
mainly, she doesn’t know where the desk drawer is located. For this reason, 
she will need to ask where the drawer is located before she will be able to 
acquire the keys. She does, however, know what a desk drawer looks like, 
and she probably is familiar with how to open a desk drawer. So she will 
not need to ask about either what the desk drawer looks like or how to open 
it. She does not need to ask about either of these topics because our ordi-
nary world, the web of our propositions and skills, is coherent. She may not 
know exactly what her friend’s desk looks like, but in the course of her life 
she has encountered other desks and can reliably trust that all desks look 
somewhat similar and share certain distinctive features. We ordinarily ask 
questions about a missing proposition only when the absence of that propo-
sition stops us from practically being able to do something. Let us call this 
the proposition becoming conspicuous. The woman in our example cannot 
grab the keys because she doesn’t know where the desk is, so she is forced 
to ask about it. She also doesn’t know exactly what the desk looks like, but 
since the absence of this proposition will most likely not prohibit her from 
finding the keys, she doesn’t need to ask about it. However, if in the course 
of looking for the keys knowing what the desk looks like does become con-
spicuous—if perhaps the desk is of an extremely unusual design or looks 
more like a table than a desk—the woman may ultimately come to need to 
ask about it.
In the example as we have considered it thus far, the woman may ask 
her friend several different questions without anything about the keys or the 
desk seeming particularly mysterious. Nothing is weird about not know-
ing where desks or keys are located or with trying to find them. It fits quite 
nicely into our coherent understanding of the world that people might on 
occasion lose keys and need help finding things. But what if the woman, 
in the course of searching for the keys, encountered something that did 
not fit into her coherent understanding of the world? Let us assume that, 
once she finally finds the desk, it is hanging sideways on the wall instead of 
being on the floor. We could quite plausibly expect such a desk to suddenly 
appear quite mysterious. For our story, we shall assume that the woman 
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will choose to express this mystery with the question “Why is there a desk 
hanging on the wall?”
The first thing to note is that the manner in which the desk becomes 
mysterious is different from the manner in which the initial question about 
it was first prompted. The question “Where is the desk?” arose because, in 
the course of trying to accomplish the practical task of getting the keys out 
of a drawer within the desk, the woman became conspicuously aware that 
she did not know the answer to this question, an answer that she needs if 
she is to accomplish her task. As an analogy, consider trying to put a puzzle 
together, but one of the pieces is missing from the box. Think of the picture 
that you are trying to make in the puzzle as analogous to the task that the 
woman is trying to accomplish. You become aware of the absence of this 
last piece only when, in the end, the absence keeps you from completing 
the picture. Asking a question is analogous to searching for that last miss-
ing piece. It is triggered by the absence of a proposition.
But consider the mysteriously hanging desk. The circumstances in 
which the woman discovers the desk would appear mysterious regardless 
of whether or not the desk’s unusual location made it harder to accomplish 
her task. Indeed, the question by which she expresses the mysteriousness 
of the desk, “Why is the desk hanging on the wall?” is not itself a practi-
cal question, not one that will help her get the keys from the desk if it were 
successfully answered. The desk does not appear mysterious because of the 
absence of a proposition. It instead appears mysterious because of the pres-
ence of a proposition that doesn’t fit in with the coherent web of proposi-
tions on the basis of which the woman has thus far navigated the world. To 
return to our analogy of the puzzle, suppose that you find a puzzle piece 
that simply doesn’t fit together with any of the other pieces. Desks don’t 
hang off of walls, they rest on the floor. Unopenable Hatches don’t appear 
in the middle of the jungle. The head of the Statue of Liberty is attached to 
the body of the Statue of Liberty; it doesn’t roll through the center of New 
York. The discovery that any of these propositions is true cannot be readily 
made to cohere with the remainder of the web of propositions surrounding 
tables or Hatches or downtown New York. This is even true of mundane 
and nonsupernatural mysteries, like those found in crime procedurals. The 
crime scene where all of the facts fit together perfectly with one another, 
where it is fairly obvious why and how the crime was committed and the 
only thing left to figure out is the identity of the killer, is not terribly mys-
terious. But when the facts of the case don’t obviously fit together—where 
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someone was killed but the doors and windows are all found locked from 
the inside—then the case suddenly becomes quite the compelling mystery. It 
is the incoherence of the known propositions about a situation that is respon-
sible for anything appearing mysterious.
How Do You Resolve a Mystery?
We must test this hypothesis against two more difficulties. First, if mys-
teries do not emerge because of absent propositions, but rather emerge 
from the discovery of incoherent propositions, why do people express the 
mysteriousness of something in terms of a question, or indeed many ques-
tions? Second, in what manner does a mystery ever get resolved, if at least 
in principle every question about a mystery that gets answered could lead 
to another question?
Human beings are quite stubbornly attached to the familiar coherency 
of their world, to their web of propositions. We genuinely believe that our 
understanding of how things work is, if not perfect, close enough to the 
truth—that just one fact, or object, that doesn’t fit in with all the rest is not 
enough to make us start over again from scratch. Thus, when we discover 
a proposition that does not cohere with all the others, our first impulse is 
not to scrap the prior coherency of the whole but rather to assume that the 
particular incoherent proposition is in some way flawed because it will not 
cohere with everything else. There must be some unknown reason why the 
proposition appears to not cohere with the rest of the world. Discovering this 
reason will reveal that the proposition really did cohere with all the others 
all along but only appeared not to because we lacked all the relevant infor-
mation. There must be a reason why the desk is hanging from the wall, and 
if the woman could figure out what it is, her discovery of the hanging desk 
would make perfect sense. And there must be a reason why the head of the 
Statue of Liberty is in the middle of downtown New York. Of course, in the 
case of Cloverfield, the answer that the audience discovers to this first ques-
tion, that a monster knocked it off, is just as, if not more, incoherent with 
our expectations about the makeup of the world than the original inexpli-
cable proposition. Since coherence has not been restored, the mystery has 
not been resolved, and so the audience must try to formulate new questions 
in an effort to rediscover the coherence of the whole web of propositions.
No answer to any question, then, can ever be said to “answer” a mystery. 
A mystery doesn’t need an answer, but to be resolved it needs all of the vari-
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ous propositions discovered in a situation to make sense with one another 
and to cohere with previous experiences and expectations about the world. 
However, this coherence is not itself one of the propositions about a situa-
tion, just like the picture that is made from all the pieces of a puzzle is not 
itself one of the pieces but rather something formed when all of the pieces 
are arranged in the correct way. Answering questions about a mysterious 
topic, like Lost’s Hatch, might help provide bits and pieces of the puzzle, 
pieces without which no coherent understanding of the Hatch is possible.
It was not answers to the mysteries of Lost or Cloverfield, or even the 
mysterious Rabbit’s Foot in Mission: Impossible III, that the audience wanted, 
but rather for all of the facts revealed in those movies to form a coherent and 
understandable whole that made the sense of mystery surrounding those 
topics get entirely resolved. Unfortunately for those desires, another aspect 
of Abrams’s works—besides featuring mysterious circumstances—is that he 
is far more interested creatively in preserving this sense of mystery than in 
clearly resolving it for his audience.
Notes
1. For example, see Bertrand Russell, “The Value of Philosophy,” in The Problems 
of Philosophy (1912; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 153–61.
2. For more about propositions, questions, mysteries, and the appropriate way to 
think about these things, see, for example, Patrick Hurley, A Concise Introduction to 
Logic (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2008).
3. Epistemology is the sub-branch of Western philosophy that deals with knowl-
edge, justification for our beliefs, and truth (among other topics). In epistemological 
circles, this position is known as the correspondence theory of truth; see the papers 
in, for example, Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd, eds., Truthmakers: The Contemporary 
Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
4. This hints at the position known in epistemological circles as the coherence the-
ory of truth; see, for example, Paul Thagard, “Coherence, Truth and the Development 





Monsters of the WorLd, unIte!
Cloverfield, Capital, and Ecological Crisis
Jeff Ewing
In the last decade the “monster movie” has been revived as an important 
subgenre of science fiction and horror films. Part of this rebirth has been 
J. J. Abrams’s Cloverfield. Cloverfield and its viral backstory tell the story of a 
creature awakened by accident by Japanese industry in its pursuit of a profit-
able “secret ingredient.” Indeed, the careless operations of business, oriented 
toward profit in the process of “innovation,” had extremely negative conse-
quences due to the impact on the environment. Karl Marx, in his extensive 
critique of capitalism, articulates a number of features of capitalism, class 
society, and the relation between modes of production and ecology that serve 
to show (among other things) how capitalist production neglects the costs 
to humanity and the ecosystem in favor of profit, and as a consequence it 
produces a number of negative ecological effects. In this chapter I will use 
Marx’s critique of capitalism, including capitalism’s one-sided domination 
by the pursuit of capital accumulation and its ecological impact, to show 
how Clover was awakened and what Clover’s rampage can represent with 
regard to capital’s unforeseen ecological consequences.
Revival of the Monster Movie
The monster movie genre was nearly deceased before it emerged as a giant 
from the science fiction and horror waters and rampaged through our cin-
emas in the last decade. Between South Korea’s critically well-received The 
Host (2006), Stephen King’s The Mist (2007), Abrams’s Cloverfield (2008), the 
gene-splicing cautionary tale Splice (2009), Norway’s Troll Hunter (2010), the 
Finnish Rare Exports (2010), and the British Monsters (2010), the monster 
movie is back in a big way. Cloverfield was well received and very influential 
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both in the reestablishment of monster films and in breaking new ground 
in found footage horror.
Monster movies (and specific subgenres such as zombie, vampire, and 
alien-centric films) have historically often contained explicit or implicit 
political elements and deep political or cultural messages. The politics of 
horror is well recognized, for example, by notable Mexican director and 
producer Guillermo del Toro: “Much like fairy tales, there are two facets 
of horror. One is pro-institution, which is the most reprehensible type of 
fairy tale: Don’t wander into the woods, and always obey your parents. The 
other type of fairy tale is completely anarchic and antiestablishment.”1 Dis-
comfort with technology and its implications as well as recognition of the 
nearly infinite possibilities of deep space, the depths of the ocean, and the 
horrors of the unknown fed science fiction and horror in the whole of their 
history. For example, science fiction in film has been used to explore the 
dangers of nuclear power, providing a general allegory for the dangers of 
nuclear technology (as in The Day the Earth Stood Still [1951]) and exploiting 
fears of the effects of radiation creating “nuclear monsters” (as in The Beast 
from 20,000 Fathoms [1953], Them! [1954], the original Godzilla [1954], 
or X: The Unknown [1956]; also see the more recent The Children [1980]).2 
Indeed, “for American movie audiences, the catharsis [stimulated by such 
horror] serves to vent emotion which, in turn, represses nuclear guilt. Gojira, 
Mothra, Ghidrah, Ebirah, the giant ants in Them, the octopus in It Came from 
Beneath the Sea, the jet-propelled prehistoric turtle Gamera, mutant birds, 
tarantulas, sea serpents, and dinosaurs all serve as metaphors for nuclear 
power and armaments.”3 Such films have also expressed discomfort over 
the potential devastation of nuclear war (as in Five [1951] or On the Beach 
[1959]), and fears regarding radiation have continued until recently (as in 
2012’s The Chernobyl Diaries).
Science fiction in print or film has often used outer space and extrater-
restrials to explore political themes as well. Alien invasions in films, nov-
els, or television often involve themes regarding alien races threatening the 
subjection of Earth to invasion (War of the Worlds [novel 1898, film 1953]), 
extraction of resources (L. Ron Hubbard’s Battlefield Earth [novel 1982, film 
2000]), genocide/extermination (Independence Day [1996]), colonization 
(the television show V ), enslavement, abduction (frequently seen in The X 
Files), consumption of humans as a food source (the Twilight Zone episode 
“To Serve Man” [1962]), war (the novel Ender’s Game [1985] or Starship 
Troopers [serial begun 1959, film 1997]), or destruction (Charles Pellegrino 
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and George Zebrowski’s novel The Killing Star [1995]), and often multiple 
elements are found in a single work. Frequently these elements echo and 
implicitly critique periods of world history and actions of nations against 
each other (and sometimes perform such a critique through making the alien 
race[s] sympathetic subjects of human aggression, as in James Cameron’s 
Avatar [2009]). Aliens in horror often reflect similar concerns, with ele-
ments that implicitly or explicitly express political themes. The background 
of Ridley Scott’s Alien (1979) is a future world in which corporations have 
attained unprecedented power. As Jim Naureckas notes, Alien “offered a 
strong critique of corporate domination and women’s submissive roles. . . . 
For Scott the Company’s corruption stands as a critique of capitalism.”4 Films 
about human interactions with extraterrestrials in both horror and science 
fiction often express and/or amplify our deepest concerns and fears about 
the present and the future, and often these fears have political implications.
Science fiction and horror have been venues for expression of dystopian 
and often horrific potential futures. A number of very influential dystopian 
novels have emerged to critique potential futures, including a future of state 
censorship (Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 [1953]), a totalitarian surveillance 
state (George Orwell’s 1984 [1949]), a world in which totalitarian control is 
maintained through the mandating of superficial pleasures (Aldous Hux-
ley’s Brave New World [1931]), and a world in which unchecked popula-
tion growth and environmental ruin destroy civilization (Harry Harrison’s 
Make Room! Make Room! [1966]). Popular futuristic films with dystopian 
themes, sometimes emerging from novels or short stories and sometimes 
standing alone, have critiqued possible effects of the technological creation 
of artificial human beings (such as the effects of using them for slave labor, 
as in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner [1982] or as highlighted in TV’s Battlestar 
Galactica [original 1978, remake 2004–2009]); have projected the negative 
effects of further development of trends under capitalism (such as further 
proletarianization, in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis [1927] or, more recently, In 
Time [2011]); varied negative futures marked by further corporate domina-
tion over society (Blade Runner, RoboCop [1987], or Mike Judge’s Idiocracy 
[2006]); or have considered potential consequences of the world descend-
ing into either totalitarianism (Terry Gilliam’s Brazil [1985], George Lucas’s 
THX 1138 [1971]) or anarchy (Mad Max [1979]).
Horror, further, is often embedded with cultural critique as either an 
explicit or an implicit element of the plot. George A. Romero’s genre-defining 
Dead series uses a zombie apocalypse over a series of films to critique the 
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military, the media (Diary of the Dead [2008]), government (Day of the 
Dead [1985]), American consumerism (Dawn of the Dead [1985]), and 
capitalism and its economic effects between the haves and the have-nots 
(Land of the Dead [2005]). In the original Night of the Living Dead, the 
portrayal of the main character, Ben, is far from typical of African Ameri-
cans in cinema at the time: “Slapping the frantic Barbra to calm her down, 
shooting the crazed father of a sanctimonious white family determined to 
hide in the fruit cellar, and existing as the only survivor of the ordeal, only 
to be shot down by a white-trash militia there to save the day, Ben single-
handedly revolutionizes the presence of African Americans in cinema.”5 
Even though the racial politics of the original Dead film are clear to some, 
the level of ambiguity of the message is reduced with all subsequent films.6 
Horror films have also been used to critique biological weapons and other 
government experiments (frequently found with a critique of the govern-
ment, as in The Crazies [1973] or 28 Days Later [2002]), media propaganda 
(They Live! [1988]), the negative effects of advertising and the food industry 
(The Stuff [1985]), the effects of racism (White Dog [1982]), anti-immigrant 
fervor and the laws that result from it (if you count the severity of violence 
in certain scenes in Machete [2010]—not quite horror, but hey, I really like 
it), and even the devolution of the nuclear family (The Texas Chainsaw Mas-
sacre [1974]). Mike Nichols’s Wolf (1994) critiques the predatory effects of 
capitalism, while Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs (1991) can be 
read as a critique of workplace sexism, Wolfen (1981) serves as a critique of 
what would happen if classes develop into castes, and Se7en plays off our 
fears of our greatest vices. Indeed, horror works through the utilization of 
our deepest fears . . . and so many of our fears regard the potentialities of 
the future and the ills of the present, providing a firm venue to use political 
and social allegory in the construction of tales of horror.
Treatments of monsters in horror and science fiction literature and 
film share the capability to serve as venues for political and social allegory. 
Indeed, the “gist of horror is facing evils in everyday life. This is to say that 
the genius of horror is subtext: symbolism that creeps beneath surface mean-
ings to assault our dreams and awaken our minds. Subtext is implicit text 
underneath the explicit, literal text, that is, the message in the communica-
tion medium.”7
Monster films can serve to tell both of the kinds of horror tales that 
Guillermo del Toro identifies—both the anarchic and antiestablishment, 
critical variety and the proinstitution, fear-and-order variety. The horror 
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movie problematizes the “social construction of ‘evil’ ’’ that demonizes “the 
Other,” that is, “that which is deemed by dominant culture antithetical to 
the Self, which in this civilization embodies the interests of white bourgeois 
patriarchy and capital.”8 Indeed, the horror genre, “from its inception in the 
German Expressionist cinema and the Universal horror films of the 1930s 
. . . seemed to understand the Other as a scapegoat and to refuse to see the 
monster as an aberration to be put down to secure bourgeois normality.” 
As the genre developed, progressive trends advanced: “The horror films of 
the 1960s and 1970s became steadily more progressive, constantly chal-
lenging the legitimacy of capitalist, patriarchal rule, with the monster no 
longer metaphysical or the product of a lab experiment gone awry. Instead, 
the monster became an emblem of the upheaval in bourgeois civilization 
itself, a ‘perfectly ordinary bourgeoise,’ thus dissolving further the Self/Other 
dichotomy.”9 Moreover, as Sharrett argues, neoconservative elements begin 
to bleed further into the horror genre in general following the Reagan era, 
adding to the complexity of the neoconservative messages. The monster, 
the eternal Other, and its treatment and origin are important elements in 
the monster movie genre.
Often monsters have directly represented that which was feared in the 
society they came from. The racial politics embedded in King Kong (1931) 
are often critiqued for representing racist stereotypes and fears of black 
men: “Racist conceptions of blacks often depict them as subhuman, ape 
or monkey-like. And consider the plot of the film: Kong is forcibly taken 
from his jungle home, brought in chains to the United States, where he is 
put on stage as a freak entertainment attraction. He breaks his chains and 
goes on a rampage in the metropolis, until finally he is felled by the forces 
of law and order.”10
Another classic movie monster, Godzilla, originated in the original 1954 
Toho classic as a four-hundred-foot-tall prehistoric monster emerging due 
to a hydrogen-bomb test. Indeed, “Godzilla was, even in its bowdlerized 
‘King of the Monsters’ incarnation, an obvious gigantic, unsubtle, grimly 
purposeful metaphor for the atomic bomb.”11 Regarding the ever-popular 
undead monsters—namely, vampires and zombies—it has been argued 
that “more vampire movies come out when Democrats are elected to the 
US Presidency, and more zombie movies come out when the Republicans 
are in office.”12 One possible explanation is that “Democrats, who want to 
redistribute wealth to ‘Main Street,’ fear the Wall Street vampires who bleed 
the nation dry,” Annalee Newitz, editor of io9.com, has argued, noting that 
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Dracula and his ilk arose from the aristocracy. “Republicans fear a revolt 
of the poor and disenfranchised, dressed in rags and coming to the White 
House to eat their brains.”13 Monsters are clearly often used as embodiments 
of symbolic political meanings.
Looking at the origin stories of the monsters in the rebirth of mon-
ster movies is just as instructive. The Host begins with an American mili-
tary pathologist dumping a couple hundred bottles of formaldehyde into 
the sewer system; in a few years a bizarre-looking amphibious monster 
emerges from the Han River. The movie follows a family’s efforts to res-
cue a girl taken by the monster, as well as the response of the government. 
The movie was explicitly inspired by a real-life incident in the year 2000 in 
which a Korean mortician working for the U.S. military in Seoul dumped 
a large quantity of formaldehyde down the drain and later a deformed fish 
was found. The South Korean government is portrayed as bureaucratic and 
inept, while the United States is portrayed as not caring about the effects of 
its actions in Korea, and the film is a thinly veiled critique of the effects of 
the United States in Korea. Similarly, The Mist, based on the Stephen King 
novella of the same name, tells the story of a man trapped in a supermarket 
(with his son and a number of others in his town) by a thick mist, within 
which lie terrifying creatures. The mist results from a military experiment 
gone wrong, thus revealing a critique of the U.S. military. Simultaneously, 
right-wing religion divides the townspeople within the supermarket, and 
over time the right-wing religious are shown to be as frightening as the 
monsters outside (or more so).
Splice tells the story of genetic engineers who break the rules in corporate- 
funded research by including human genes in a secret splicing project, and 
negative consequences emerge. The film simultaneously critiques the potential 
negative consequences of emerging technologies and, particularly towards the 
end, corporations for playing irresponsible games with dangerous technolo-
gies for profit. Troll Hunter involves the discovery by a group of students of 
the existence of trolls, while the government both attempts to keep the trolls 
from preying on the human population and to keep their existence a secret. 
Rare Exports involves the discovery of the creature behind the myths of Santa 
Claus, who punished naughty children instead of rewarding the good. The 
movie finds an American businessman leading a corporation attempting 
to unearth the Santa Clause creature (entombed beneath a mountain) and 
concludes with the production of a curious “rare export”; thus both begin-
ning and end of the movie provide the elements of a critique of corporate 
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responsibility. Finally, Monsters begins in a world where a NASA deep-space 
probe has crashed, spreading extraterrestrial matter along the U.S.-Mexico 
border and producing a large number of extraterrestrial monsters through-
out that zone, while the protagonists attempt to safely escape the zone from 
Mexico by crossing over the border. Thus, in the words of an NPR review, 
“All of this . . . is in the service of an obvious social metaphor. . . . Here, the 
U.S. military has erected a huge border wall along the Rio Grande to keep 
aliens from, um, entering the U.S. illegally.”14 In other words, Monsters can be 
interpreted as a critique of U.S. immigration policy. Many of these films, in 
short, extend a critical eye to either the government and military (The Host, 
The Mist, Monsters, or Troll Hunter) or corporations (Splice, Rare Exports). 
These critical trends and the longer and more extensive history of embed-
ding horror, science fiction, and monster movies with political, economic, 
and cultural criticisms are by no means absent from Cloverfield.
Abrams and the Environment
Abrams’s Cloverfield follows a group of New Yorkers as they attempt to 
survive a monster attack on the city. The film itself is notable for the lack 
of a direct backstory regarding the monster. So since, as I have shown, the 
origin of the monster is often a central part of the film’s explicit or implicit 
critique, how do we excavate the social and political critique embedded in 
the film? The lack of direct backstory was part of Abrams’s conception from 
the get-go: “[Drew] Goddard pointed out the lack of explanation in the film 
of the creature’s origin was deliberate so as to make the film more realistic, 
as civilians would not know where it would come from.”15 So what can we 
know about the creature?
Cloverfield was preceded by a viral marketing campaign, spread in 
pieces through numerous websites, which gives us insight into the monster. 
According to the film’s backstory, Tagruato is a Japanese mining company 
with oil rigs throughout the world, which uses “groundbreaking deep-sea 
drilling technology” to go to places that no one has gone to before.16 Tagruato 
owns subsidiaries that specialize in “deep sea bioprospecting . . . [and imple-
ment] Tagruato’s advanced exploration technology to study extremophiles 
found only in the deepest parts of our oceans” (Yoshida Medical Research), 
engage “in the conception, design, manufacture and integration of advanced 
technology products” (Bold Futura), and create paraffin wax by-products 
from their petroleum reservoir (ParafFun! Wax Distributors), as well as a 
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cold-beverage company called Slusho!17 Tagruato was founded in 1945 as a 
mining company, declined over time, and was reborn in 1989 when an engi-
neer, Ganu Yoshida, reoriented the company toward oil. “Over the next 15 
years, twelve more drilling stations were built all over the globe, each more 
efficient and productive than the last. Yoshida became C.E.O., and soon left 
the tainted name behind to rename the company Tagruato, after its dream-
filled founder. Following the model of diversification, Yoshida expanded into 
subsidiaries including Bold Futura, Yoshida Medical Research, Slusho! brand 
happy drink, and ParafFun! Wax Distributors.”18 Ganu is the son of Noriko 
Yoshida, who wanted to create “the best drink ever” and disappeared while 
searching for the “greatest, most tastiest ingredient.” Ganu took over her quest.
One day the Tagruato company (under Ganu’s leadership) discovered 
“Seabed’s Nectar.” Ganu had a dream telling him to drink the ingredient, 
and Ganu himself realized he had found the ingredient his mother had 
been looking for. Seabed’s Nectar, discovered in the cold of the bottom of 
the ocean, was used in Slusho! drinks, sold nearly frozen to preserve the 
ingredient. The massive size of the Cloverfield monster is largely due to its 
resting at the bottom of the ocean and consuming large amounts of Sea-
bed’s Nectar, which has steroid-like properties and promotes cell division 
and growth. It had rested on the ocean floor for thousands of years, gaining 
size in the deep of the Atlantic Ocean. Clover was discovered by Tagruato’s 
Chuai Station, which was destroyed in 2008, prior to the monster’s emer-
gence in New York.19
The released, angry monster rampages through New York, which is 
where Cloverfield picks up. Cloverfield tells the story of the rampage by fol-
lowing six New Yorkers attending a going-away party for Rob Hawkins, prior 
to his moving to Japan to become vice president of marketing for Slusho! 
Ironic, huh? The film follows Rob; his brother Jason; his longtime friend and 
love interest, Beth; his best friend, Hud; Marlena, a girl who spends most of 
the party trying to avoid Hud; and Lily, a friend of Beth and Marlena. The 
six of them attempt to escape New York before the military initiates HAM-
MERDOWN protocol and bombs New York and the monster. But is this 
a simple monster film, merely about a rampaging “thing” and a destroyed 
city? (Is there even such a thing as a simple monster film?)
At first glance, yes, Cloverfield is about a monster that rampages through 
a city. As we have seen, however, a monster’s backstory and context are 
dramatically important for unearthing the social or political subtext of a 
film. The first thing to note is that neither the military/government nor 
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corporations were the origin of Clover, its physical attributes, or its size. It 
is established through the film’s viral backstory that the monster grew to 
its size by consuming a large amount of Seabed’s Nectar (yep . . . the main 
ingredient of Slusho!). Sometime after, Clover hibernated for thousands of 
years. This origin story doesn’t thus implicate anything about corporations 
or governments, but one can easily infer certain themes about nature from 
it. Nature is a force subject to human actions but ultimately beyond human 
control, suggested both by the complete disconnection of Clover’s origin 
from human actions and by people’s continuing inability to escape its ram-
page or (likely) destroy it. (While we never see what actually happens to 
Rob and Beth, nor the results of the HAMMERDOWN bombing, after the 
end credits you can hear “help us” inside the static, and if you play this part 
of the video backward you hear something like “it’s still alive.” So in other 
words, the audience doesn’t know either.) Nature is also largely unpredict-
able. (Cloverfield’s director, Matt Reeves, noted that “the key to it is that the 
monster was a baby. The monster was suffering from separation anxiety and 
was absolutely disoriented and pissed, ‘where’s mommy?’ and terrified. That 
was the most important aspect of the creature.”)20 The monster was designed 
to be unpredictable, and that unpredictability was used to make Clover all 
the more frightening.
A further point, both connected to nature yet moving beyond it, is that 
two general trends guide many of the plot elements of the film: (1) mate-
rial needs (most obviously survival, though it should not be forgotten that 
the creature grew to its enormous size because of what it ate, survived in a 
long sleep, was awoken because of unintended consequences of a soft drink 
company’s actions, and rampaged because it was scared and increasingly in 
pain); and (2) (human) social activity that obviously requires and presupposes 
yet transcends mere material need, as a significant portion of the film and 
its drama rests on Rob’s decision to not run to safety and instead attempt to 
save Beth and on his friends’ choices to stay with him in the effort to save 
Beth (rather than run themselves).
An analysis of the political and social subtext of Cloverfield also can’t 
omit its sometimes subtle (sometimes not so subtle) relation to the events 
of 9/11. Even in the early promotional stage, before people knew what the 
monster or threat was about, posters related that “Some Thing Has Found 
Us” and showed a headless Statue of Liberty. As Stephanie Zacharek of 
Salon.com critically notes, “Cloverfield harnesses the horror of 9/11— 
specifically as it was felt in New York—and repackages it as an amusement-
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park ride. We see familiar buildings exploding and crumpling before our 
eyes, and plumes of smoke rolling up the narrow corridors formed by lower-
Manhattan streets, images that were once the province of news footage and 
have now been reduced to special effects.”21 In a Time interview, Abrams 
indirectly alludes to a connection between the monster and the events of 
September 11. He explains, “With Cloverfield we were trying to create a film 
that would be entertaining and, as a by-product of the subject matter, per-
haps be a catharsis. We wanted to let people live through their wildest fears 
but be in a safe place where the enemy is the size of a skyscraper instead 
of some stateless, unseen cowardly terrorist.”22 Cloverfield does show clear 
inspiration from the events of 9/11, and the monster’s rampage can be seen 
as an allegory in some respects for that event. But other than a fairly face-
value connection between particular historical events and the content of 
the movie alongside some very abstract connections to the environment, is 
there another level of meaning?
While the actions of the company Tagruato did not create the monster or 
its size, it did release the creature. How did this happen? Clover was suppos-
edly awakened by submarines at Chuai Station, that is, as an unintentional 
consequence of corporate actions related to the environment.23 The prox-
imity of Chuai Station to Clover is suggested to have something to do with 
Tagruato’s discovery of Clover.24 In the associated (but widely considered 
noncanonical) Cloverfield/Kishin manga, Clover is under study by Tagruato.25 
Clover, the object of study or the accidental discovery of a corporation as it 
plunged into Seabed’s Nectar, Clover’s food source, is woken in the course 
of that profit-driven activity and proceeds to rampage through New York 
City after destroying the rig. As a dangerous element of nature unleashed 
by careless corporate activity within the depths of the environment (for the 
purpose of profit), Clover is at the very least a possible symbol of the nega-
tive consequences to human beings of damages to the environment brought 
about by corporate activity in the pursuit of profit, so characteristic of capi-
talism. But to analyze this further, is the environment necessarily harmed 
by the ordinary profit-seeking tendencies of capitalism? Karl Marx, the 
philosopher and radical economist, would answer with an unequivocal yes.
A Specter Is Haunting Hollywood
Karl Marx, nineteenth-century philosopher, economist, and critic of capi-
talism, argued that capitalism inherently involves a number of negative 
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consequences for humanity and nature and that its everyday operations 
contribute to these harmful ends. The background of Marx’s critique of 
capitalism is found in a theory originated by Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
commonly referred to as “historical materialism.” Marx summarizes this 
most succinctly in what is commonly referred to as his 1859 preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely rela-
tions of production appropriate to a given stage in the development 
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, 
the material productive forces of society come into conflict with 
the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the 
same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the 
framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the 
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of 
the whole immense superstructure.26
To round out certain aspects of this precise (but too swift) summary of his-
torical materialism, we should add certain elements of other formulations 
before proceeding.
In Marx and Engels’s earlier work The German Ideology, they sum-
marize “premises” of history that precede all other human history. The 
“first premise of all human history” is “of course, the existence of living 
human individuals,” and therefore “the first fact to be established is the 
physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation 
to the rest of nature.” Otherwise stated, the first premise “of all human 
existence and, therefore, of all human history . . . [is] that men must 
be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ . . . But life 
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involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, cloth-
ing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production 
of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself,” 
which “today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled 
merely in order to sustain human life.”27 The importance of the “mode of 
production” in this instance stems from the fact that the distinguishing 
feature of the human species, for Marx, is that humans “begin to distin-
guish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their 
means of subsistence” and “the way in which men produce their means 
of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of 
subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce.”28 Moreover, the 
“second” moment of human history is “that the satisfaction of the first 
need . . . leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first 
historical act.”29 The conditions of continued production and interaction 
with nature need to be continually reproduced. Finally, the third premise 
of human history is “that men, who daily remake their own life, begin 
to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man 
and woman, parent and children, the family.”30 Perhaps these moments 
of history might be summarized as (1) production, (2) reproduction of 
the conditions of production, and (3) reproduction of the human spe-
cies, the first two contained in the concept of the “mode of production,” 
the economic system, and the third generally contained in the notion of 
the “mode of reproduction,” that is, the family.
The importance of production and reproduction of the human species, 
then, underlies historical materialism, though the latter is often ignored. 
Surely that nuance is not exhibited in the shorter 1859 preface, largely due 
to the separation of production from reproduction under capitalism (and 
thus the subordination of the latter), but it is picked up again by Engels in 
The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. Engels notes:
According to the materialist conception, the determining factor in 
history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction 
of immediate life. This, again, is of a twofold character: on the one 
side, the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing, 
and shelter and the tools necessary for that production: on the other 
side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation 
of the species. The social organization under which the people of 
a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is deter-
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mined by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of 
labor on the one hand, and of the family on the other.31
Thus the ultimate preconditions of human history are the success of human 
production (which requires the meeting of human needs and keeps human 
beings alive) and reproduction (which requires just that, successful repro-
ductive activity simultaneous with material conditions that allow continuing 
generations to survive well enough to continue the species). Both production 
and reproduction, however, require continuing mediation with nonhuman 
nature in order to be successful, and thus, ultimately, humanity’s interac-
tion with nature as individuals and as a species significantly characterizes 
and affects successful production and reproduction, and therefore, human 
history.
This importance of nature in Marx’s theory, though often lost in ear-
lier interpretations of Marx’s historical materialist conception of human 
history, is expressed in John Bellamy Foster’s Marx’s Ecology. Foster writes 
that “Marx tended to see his materialist conception of history as rooted in 
a materialist conception of nature, which together constituted the realm of 
natural history.” The strength of Marx’s analysis and incorporation of nature 
“lay in its emphasis on the quality of the interaction between humanity and 
nature, or what he was eventually to call the ‘metabolism’ of humanity with 
nature through production.”32 Marx wrote, specifically, that labor in the 
abstract refers to “the entire productive activity of man, through which his 
metabolic interchange with nature is mediated.”33 What Marx and Engels 
advocated regarding human interaction with nature, which was necessary 
for the survival of the species, was not the absolute absence of human impact 
on nature but instead “that of encouraging a sustainable relation between 
human beings and nature through the organization of production in ways 
that took into account the metabolic relation between human beings and 
the earth.”34
Marx’s development of the concept of metabolism to describe this inter-
action between humanity and nonhuman nature was developed in Marx’s 
mature work in Das Kapital. Marx argues that “the labour-process,” the core 
of human production and interchange with nature, “is human action with 
a view to the production of use values, appropriation of natural substances 
to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effective exchange 
of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed 
condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social 
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phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase.”35 Labor 
incorporates the materials of nonhuman nature to allow human survival, 
and nature (and such metabolism) is the background condition to all human 
activity. Marx clearly critiques the Gotha Program, the party platform of 
the German Social Democratic Party, for its denial of nature’s importance. 
Whereas the platform states that “labour is the source of all wealth and all 
culture,” Marx contends in “Critique of the Gotha Programme” that “labour 
is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values 
(and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labour, which itself 
is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labour power.”36 Here, 
in a very mature work, Marx not only makes it evident that he views nature 
as at least coequal to human labor with regard to the “creation of use val-
ues,” that is, the rendering of the products of nature and human labor into 
useful and usable goods, but indeed proceeds to subordinate human labor 
analytically to and within nature, insofar as humanity is part of nature, not 
beyond it. But where does this leave us with capitalism and nature?
Marx argues that under capitalism, as a distinct mode of production 
with a class division between the bourgeoisie, who privately own the means 
of production (the goods that human labor interacts with to meet human 
ends in the process of achieving the human metabolism with nature), and 
the proletariat, who largely do not, goods are produced for the sake of capi-
tal accumulation, the profitable expansion of capitalist industry. In other 
words, capitalists own the resources and tools required for noncapitalists 
to achieve their metabolism with nature, and those individuals need to 
then orient their human interaction to be profitable for capitalists; thus the 
human metabolism with nature and the impact of human labor on nature 
are both subordinated to profitability. Profitability becomes the standard 
of the human interaction with nature; it determines how nature is valued, 
what kinds of impacts thus tend to occur, and thus what might happen to 
nature because of human action. With profitability as the standard, human 
interaction with nature is not limited by successful meeting of human needs, 
sustainability, ecological balance, or anything of that kind but is instead ori-
ented toward the singular goal of profit at all costs, restricted primarily by 
limited considerations of sustainable resource use (which in many cases is 
not a factor in short-term business accountancy). More importantly, human 
interaction with nature is restricted by the effects of class struggle on limit-
ing the capacity of the bourgeoisie to subordinate all things to the singular 
standard of profitability.
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In short, Marx’s notion of historical materialism highlights (among 
other things) that (1) the background condition to human activity is nonhu-
man nature; (2) humanity needs consistent interaction with nature through 
labor; and (3) humanity is itself a part of and neither above nor separate 
from nonhuman nature. People are of nature and ultimately subordinate to 
it, and while their actions can affect and change it they cannot subject it to 
their will in an absolute sense. Additionally, the (4) subordination of human 
activity to capitalism subordinates nature and humanity’s impact on it to 
that which is profitable. This often causes, in Marx’s terminology (follow-
ing a discussion of the work of the chemist Justus von Liebig on the impact 
of capitalism on the soil through the application of large-scale agriculture), 
“an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism” and 
thus squanders “the vitality of the soil.” More generally, capitalism introduces 
“metabolic rifts” in nature’s natural processes, which ultimately undermine 
their vitality, break apart elements of the ecosystem, and have disastrous 
effects on nature. In short, capitalism produces disastrous consequences 
to nature through its one-sided focus on profitability as the criterion of its 
interactions with nature, and thus interactions end up badly for both nature 
and humanity.
The Chuai Station Ideology
As we’ve seen, horror and science fiction have often incorporated political 
and social critique, sometimes explicit but often implicit. Cloverfield proves 
no different, and it connects to Marxian political ecology on a number of 
levels. First, Cloverfield certainly contains an element that shows obvious 
inspiration from and to some degree represents the events of 9/11. This has 
been alluded to in interviews and noted in several reviews and academic 
articles. From a broadly Marxian standpoint, one could analyze terrorism 
and/or the events of 9/11 in a number of ways, foremost among them likely 
those accounts that center around (1) a critique of imperialism and the reac-
tions of subordinated populations to it, connecting the state to capitalism in 
the modern period, and perhaps also (2) a focus on the use of (specifically 
fundamentalist) religion as a tool of control that fuels terrorist activity. The 
latter point, for example, notes that “the real innovation” in terrorism in “the 
late twentieth century is the appearance of radical religious (or quasireli-
gious) nationalist groups adopting terrorism as their main form of struggle, 
sometimes within the framework of established religion (mainly Islam, but 
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also Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism), and sometimes in the form of 
millenarian sects.”37
This new terrorism aims “not clearly at defined political demands but at 
the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the popula-
tion. . . . In its most extreme form, this new terrorism intends to liquidate all 
satanic forces, which may include the majority of a country or of mankind” 
that is, the achievement of “purity” by destruction of the impure.38 In this 
instance, perhaps, analytical connections could be made between (1) the use 
of religion as a superstructural “weapon” of a subordinated group or region 
against Western/American political/economic dominance, (2) the back-
ground of religion itself, grounded in material socioeconomic context, and 
(3) the background of the global reach of the American and Western states 
in the context of the spread of monopoly capital and uneven development.
Perhaps the “terrorist” link of the Cloverfield monster attack is not the 
strongest analytical connection, although it might be perhaps the most obvi-
ous inspiration. Clover is a scared, large baby. It arrives in the city without 
intending to arrive in the city, becomes scared and enraged while in pain, 
eats people because of hunger, and so on. This motivation is far more char-
acteristic of an animal’s instinct than a human being’s motivational choices. 
Marx writes in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “The animal 
is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from 
it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will 
and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determi-
nation with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes 
man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he 
is a species-being.”39 Clover’s motivations are deeply and purely material; 
Clover is its life activity, and its actions are not “the object of his will and his 
consciousness.” The causes of Clover’s rampage are far more characteristic 
of an animal ruled by intent than of human beings’ more complex, freely 
conscious choices. Regardless of whatever association might be made with 
terrorism and inhumanity, or terrorists with monsters, terrorism is a com-
plex and multifaceted human activity, embedded in a wide religious and 
sociopolitical/economic context, and terrorists, whatever else they are, are 
still human beings making human choices, dramatically unlike the sources 
and the origins of Clover’s rampage. Clover is a walking, breathing, destroy-
ing material force whose actions admit no superstructural influence or deter-
mination, and Clover’s actions, the actions of an animal, are instinctual. In 
short, while connecting the Cloverfield events and the events of 9/11 can 
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present the film as a sort of crude analogy of a terrorist event and the chaos 
and destruction that accompany it, it is at best a crude, face-value connec-
tion. Considering the monster for what it explicitly is analytically cuts off 
the potential of Clover to serve as a deep political allegory about terrorism 
or terrorists. What might be a deeper connection than the events of 9/11?
The sheer materiality of Clover’s actions, then, speak far more to natural 
force than human motivation. This, combined with the canonical expla-
nation of the monster’s origin in its long consumption of Seabed’s Nectar 
(a wholly natural, albeit strange, substance), firmly ground Clover as a 
representative of nature. Nature, as represented by Clover, shares tenets 
with the approach to nature of Marxian political ecology—nature can 
be affected by human beings, but it is ultimately outside human control. 
Human beings can be responsible for negative impacts on nature (gener-
ating ecological crises, awaking and enraging Clover), but there are lim-
its to our control and impact. To be successful within the constraints of 
nature, our actions must be consistent in the long run with the material 
constraints of nature (avoid imposing metabolic rifts, avoid waking Clo-
ver, etc.), and to fail to avoid these pitfalls is to risk destruction. Clover 
perhaps best represents not nature in general in its normal operations, 
that is, an ecosystem’s normally uninterrupted metabolic process (which 
the hibernating Clover, who over presumably thousands of years peace-
fully consumed Seabed’s Nectar and slept, might be said to represent at 
that pre-human-interaction stage), but ecological crisis, wherein formerly 
harmless (but always potentially destructive) nature becomes massively 
destructive with ultimately little warning.
Of the major sources of ecological crisis, then, human action (the inter-
jection of metabolic rifts into natural processes), the destruction of ordinary 
natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, etc.) and exoplanetary 
threats (comets, etc.), Clover seems to be specifically most representative of 
ecological crises due to human-created metabolic rifts, as Clover was awak-
ened as a consequence not of natural processes or exoplanetary threats but 
as an unintentional result of a company’s actions in pursuit of profit. More-
over, the monster became progressively enraged through its engagement 
with the destructive capabilities of the American military and state. If the 
profit-centered activities of a corporation, following the logic of the capitalist 
mode of production, altered nonhuman nature in such a way as to produce 
disastrous effects (created a metabolic rift?), perhaps the underlying mes-
sage, however intentional or unintentional, is to highlight both that corpo-
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rate activities in production affect nature and that their effects can produce 
metabolic rifts, or large-scale ecological crises.
To examine this possibility, let’s do a brief review. Marx’s exposition of 
historical materialism highlights that (1) a necessary precondition to human 
activity is nonhuman nature (which humanity can affect but not ultimately 
control), (2) humanity (alongside all species) needs constant interaction 
with nature through labor, and (3) humanity is itself a part of and neither 
above nor separate from nature. Beyond this, (4) the subordination of human 
activity to capitalism subordinates nature and humanity’s impact on it to that 
which is profitable (i.e., profitability rather than anything else becomes the 
standard by which corporations affect nature) and (5) this often produces 
metabolic rifts—effectively cleavages in the processes of the ecosystem such 
that ecological crises are produced. These (6) often have destructive results.
In Cloverfield, Clover can best be understood as the predominant mate-
riality of nature—Clover is a large animal whose driving forces are hunger, 
fear, pain. Moreover, it was Clover’s metabolism with nature through Sea-
bed’s Nectar that produced its size and, presumably, its long life, rather than 
human intervention. Clover was awakened as a consequence of corporate 
activity in the pursuit of profit and had grown increasingly angered because 
of the activities of the American state—that is, human beings had the capac-
ity to negatively affect Clover but had nothing to do with its origin. In this, 
Clover moved from harmless, long-dormant natural force to devastating and 
uncontrollable force of nature—that is, Clover became a representation of 
ecological crisis caused by irresponsible corporate activity. It was Tagruato’s 
intervention in the otherwise continually undisturbed metabolic process of 
Clover that interrupted its long, peaceful slumber (and continuous diet of 
Seabed’s Nectar . . . yum!). In other words, in the pursuit of profit Tagruato 
in effect produced an ecological crisis by creating a metabolic rift, whose 
consequences were the destruction of much of New York City. Cloverfield, 
as it turns out, is far more than a fairly face-value articulation of post-9/11 
fears of terrorism—it serves as an illustration of ecological crisis.
The monster subgenres of horror and science fiction, alongside science fic-
tion and horror more generally, have long been used to display and explore 
our social and political fears, or the unintended consequences of human 
action against particular social and political backdrops. Often the origin and 
background of the creature that causes the crisis tell us as much as its actions 
and the actions of the characters around it. Clover can be considered as a 
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destructive natural force, an ecological crisis caused by the introduction of a 
metabolic rift in nature due to corporations’ profit-seeking behavior. Clover-
field, then, illustrates key elements of Marx’s theory of historical materialism 
and Marxian political ecology and serves to show how, in the pursuit of profit, 
capitalism produces actions that neglect their potential costs on humanity 
and the ecosystem. Consequentially, the ecological impact of capitalism is 
often destructive (and can be ultimately uncontrollable). Clover’s awaken-
ing and rampage can perhaps be viewed as more than a good-time scare-
fest. Instead, perhaps Cloverfield can engage us in thoughtful critique about 
the negative ecological consequences of the capitalist mode of production.
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CLoverfIeLd, suPer 8, and the 
MoraLIty of terrorIsM
Robert Arp and Patricia Brace
The trope of invasion by otherworldly or mutated others has often been 
used in the science fiction film genre as a metaphor for terrorism and con-
quest. From the Communist-threat, mind-control original Invasion of the 
Body Snatchers (1956) and War of the Worlds (1953), to nuclear-bomb-test 
fears in Godzilla (1954/56 U.S. release) and Them (1954), to the nuclear 
war instigated by cybernetic beings in the Terminator films and television 
series (1984–2009), these sorts of monster movies have played on our fears 
of losing control of our minds, bodies, and cities. In the post-9/11 era the 
fear of “the other” invading us, intent on both physical and psychological 
terror and conquest, has been given new impetus. In two J. J. Abrams films, 
Cloverfield (producer, 2008) and Super 8 (writer and director, 2010), we see 
this concept play out in different ways. A fuller definition of terrorism and 
the question of whether it is ever morally justified will help us see how these 
two films may be understood as a reflection of their times.
What Is Terrorism?
Deriving from the Latin terrere (meaning “to frighten”), terrorism is a 
concept that has been defined in multiple ways, and like many politically 
charged concepts there is no universal definition upon which all can agree. 
Yet in Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman notes features that we can point to 
as indicative of terrorism.1 Paraphrasing Hoffman, terrorism is an act that is:
(1)  Violent, namely, causing physical harm or death. This violence is 
directed toward some intended target that the perpetrator believes 
deserves physical harm or death but usually entails harm or death 
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for innocent persons who act as collateral damage. Thus, beyond 
the obvious harm done to the intended target, the suffering and 
death of innocents seem to be a key feature of a terrorist act.
(2)  Perpetuated in such a way as to cause psychological trauma to 
those who survive or witness the violence firsthand or are privy 
to the effects of the violence through experiencing the aftermath 
of the violence, through word-of-mouth, or through media 
sources. In other words, a terrorist act is orchestrated so as to 
have a threatening and frightening psychological effect beyond 
the immediate victim or target. This causes the specter of a “we 
don’t know when it’s coming, but it’s coming” kind of terror. So 
it’s not just the terror associated with the violent action being 
carried out right before someone’s eyes, so to speak, but also the 
terror that is burned into people’s memory banks, as well as the 
terror that haunts the various scenarios that people can imagine 
taking place at some future time.
(3)  Intended to bring public, media attention to some smaller group, 
cause, ideology, or individual that usually perceives itself as being 
treated unjustly or inappropriately by the larger group, cause, 
ideology, or other individuals that make up the social world of 
both groups.
The above characterization of terrorism comports well with the descrip-
tion in a United Nations Secretary General report from 2004 of terrorism 
as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or 
non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compel-
ling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from 
doing any act.”2 And this certainly was the intent of Sergey Nechayev, who 
was one of the first persons in Western history (documented, that we know 
of) to use the word terrorist to describe himself and the activities of his Rus-
sian faction, People’s Retribution, back in 1869.3 Examples of terrorist acts 
include assassinations, bombings, sabotage on a grand scale, kidnapping, 
and hijacking of airplanes or facilities.
Justifications for Terrorism
Most people think that a terrorist act is wrong and immoral and that there 
are no situations whatsoever in which a terrorist act is, or could be, justi-
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fied. However, there are those who would maintain just the opposite. What 
might the justification(s) for terrorism be? One commonly held justification 
for terrorism goes something like this:
If a person or minority group is being treated unjustly in a social 
situation (for example, through genocide, systematic torture or rape, 
general lack of basic rights and privileges, etc.), and there is no way 
to address or redress the injustice through the social situation’s own 
legislative, judicial, and/or administrative system(s), then the person 
or minority group is justified in utilizing terrorist actions to address 
and/or redress the injustice.
One example comes to mind where terrorist acts seem justified, and it has 
to do with the fascist totalitarianism of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler’s 
regime (1933–1945). There exist volumes and volumes of historical accounts, 
as well as firsthand accounts, of the utter horror experienced by minori-
ties (including, but not limited to, Romany gypsies, Jews, the disabled, and 
homosexuals) living in this regime in which historically unprecedented 
forms of suffering, genocide, and general injustices took place. The minority 
peoples in this regime—pretty much anyone not considered to be an Aryan 
German—were treated in grossly inhumane ways.4
In fact, terrorist actions against Nazi Germany have been documented. 
For example, the film Valkyrie (2008), starring Tom Cruise, was based on 
what has come to be called the 20 July Plot of 1944, which was a failed 
assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler orchestrated primarily by Claus von 
Stauffenberg. Von Stauffenberg and many other German nationalists had 
become convinced by 1944 not only that their country was losing World 
War II but also that a government agreeable to the Allies needed to be put 
into place so that Germany could survive. Further than this, the Nazi atroci-
ties committed against Jews and other minority groups were unacceptable. 
Thus, according to von Stauffenberg and his conspirators, Hitler and other 
high-ranking Nazis needed to be assassinated and a new governing body put 
in place. The 20 July Plot of 1944 bombing assassination attempt failed to 
kill Hitler—the bomb went off underneath a sturdy table Hitler was seated 
at during a meeting, and it is believed that the table shielded him from the 
full force of the blow—however, few would dispute that this example of ter-
rorism was a good thing and that a better thing would have been for Hitler 
to have been killed in the attack.5
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But what about innocents who suffer and die as a result of terrorist acts? 
In fact, in the 20 July Plot of 1944, although two Nazi generals and one Nazi 
colonel died, both of whom it could be argued deserved it, an innocent Ger-
man stenographer also died. Surely the stenographer did not deserve this, 
and in fact, causing him harm is considered immoral, correct?
There are two responses we can note here. The first is that any terror-
ist act—almost by definition, as we saw above—will include harm done to 
innocents, and this harm is justified on the grounds of collateral damage. 
In any kind of war or fight, there may be innocents who suffer, and that’s 
just par for the course in these situations. There is an obligation to avoid 
such collateral damage, or at least minimize it as much as possible; no one 
should intentionally harm innocents just for the sake of harming them. 
Thus, when the terrorist is carrying out a plan, the most moral thing to do 
would be to target only those who are directly responsible for the injustices. 
So, for example, von Stauffenberg in the 20 July Plot of 1944 seemed to have 
the right idea in trying to blow up only Hitler and members of his cabinet.
Another response regarding the immorality associated with innocent 
victims of terrorist acts is that there really are no innocent persons in these 
social settings where a minority group is being treated unjustly. By virtue 
of living in the social setting perpetuating the injustice, all those benefiting 
from the privileges of that social setting are complicit, all are responsible, 
and hence all are guilty. There may be something to this concerning Nazi 
Germany, where it seems as if the majority of the population—judges, leg-
islators, doctors, scientists, businesspersons—knew about the Holocaust (or 
at least knew about the straightforward scapegoating and prejudice against 
Jews and other non-Aryan types) and either did nothing to prevent it or 
assisted in some way.6
However, there are those who would argue that citizens are not directly 
responsible for the policies and procedures put into place by their govern-
ment—especially in totalitarian regimes like Hitler’s Germany, Joseph Sta-
lin’s U.S.S.R., or Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China—and so they are 
not guilty and should not be targeted by terrorist acts. In more democratic 
regimes it may be the case that innocent citizens are not so innocent, but we 
all know that even in the most democratic of regimes, the “common person” 
often does not have the power to influence public policy. Hence a strong 
case can be made that the “all are complicit, all are guilty” argument does 
not work, and terrorism is not justified. Further, it’s even harder to justify 
that young children, the mentally handicapped, and the mentally ill in the 
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offending social setting—even the most evil and vile of social settings—are 
complicit and responsible in the same way that, say, the governors of that 
society, or rational adults, are.
The Immorality of Terrorism, the Harming of Innocents, and 
Kant and Mill
In talking about the suffering of innocents, we hinted above at one impor-
tant reason why the terrorist act is considered immoral. Many would argue 
that the harming of innocents, even for the “necessary evil” of collateral 
damage, is wrong. There are at least two positions in the history of West-
ern philosophy that can be appealed to as justification for the immorality 
of harming innocents.
One contemporary philosophical argument that harming innocents is 
wrong can be traced back to the work of the famous German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant observes that persons are unique in that 
they are conscious, rational beings, capable of making their own free and 
informed decisions. From the fact that humans are unique in this way, Kant 
tells us that we should “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as 
a means, but always at the same time as an end.” Kant is not ruling out the 
moral possibility of treating people as means. After all, we have to use people 
to acquire goods, services, information, and such things in order to live our 
daily lives. What he is ruling out is treating a person as nothing but a means 
for such ends. In other words, a person must always be treated as an end in 
him- or herself, even while also being used as a means to some other end. 
Because we are conscious, rational beings, persons have a “sanctified” and 
intrinsic value (as ends) and not just an instrumental value (as a means to 
an end), like some object, tool, thing, or instrument of terrorist objectives.
From this perspective, then, morally right decisions are those decisions 
that treat a person as an end, and morally wrong decisions are those that 
treat a person as a mere instrument or means to an end, specifically the end 
of some terrorist’s master plan.7 Also, Kant makes it clear that any kind of 
murder is considered immoral since the one murdered is being used by the 
murderer for the sake of the murderer’s satisfaction, malice, or other selfish 
reason. Interestingly enough, the same goes for the avenger, where a person 
is used for the sake of vengeance.8
So from this Kantian perspective, persons, by virtue of their conscious 
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rational capacities, are free and autonomous beings having inalienable worth 
or dignity. Because of this intrinsic worth, a person should never be treated 
as collateral damage resulting from terrorist activities, whether that person 
is a prince or pauper, saint or sinner. It’s primarily from this Kantian per-
spective that we are disgusted by the terrorist’s actions in harming or kill-
ing innocent persons.
Another philosophical reason that terrorism is immoral can be traced 
back to the ideas of the famous British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873). Mill argued that an action is morally good insofar as its consequences 
promote the most benefit or biggest payoff, or pleasure for the most persons 
affected by the decision. This view has been termed utilitarian because of 
the apparent usefulness (utility) to be found in generating the most satisfac-
tion for the group of persons. The foundation of morality, as far as utilitar-
ians are concerned, is simply happiness—actions are good insofar as they 
increase the pleasures or decrease the pains of people, in general.9 “What is 
most beneficial for the most” is the utilitarian’s slogan.
Now, the utilitarian position justifies treating persons as means to the 
greater good of achieving benefit for the majority. For example, if the greater 
consequence of saving the group from some evildoer requires killing one, 
two, or even a hundred people in the process, then, on utilitarian grounds, 
this may be deemed morally correct. Think of the assassination attempt on 
Hitler cited earlier.
Or, if you’re with a group of people on a lifeboat trapped at sea, you might 
be justified in taking the rations from the guy who is near death or beyond 
help; you could even be justified in killing one person and surviving on that 
person’s flesh until you’re saved by a passing ocean liner! It’s the whole “kill-
ing one to save many” kind of thinking. Back in 1972 a Uruguayan rugby 
team crashed in the Andes Mountains and survivors actually had to eat the 
dead.10 Mr. Spock said it best in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982), and 
he even walked the talk by sacrificing his own life: “The needs of the many 
outweigh the needs of the few . . . or the one.”
The utilitarian position can be used to argue that terrorist acts are 
wrong, given that the majority in a social setting are terrorized and suffer 
pain. If pain on a grand scale is the result, then the action should not be 
performed—period. The suffering of innocents adds an extra bit of pain 
that the utilitarian could argue makes the terrorist act all the more immoral.
Using the Kantian perspective and Mill’s utilitarian position to exam-
ine the actions of the invaders in both Cloverfield and Super 8 will allow us 
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to determine whether or not their actions may be defined as terrorism and 
whether they may be seen as morally justified. In addition, this should allow 
us to make comparisons as to how each film, made in a post-9/11 world, deals 
with the question of how to depict terrorism relative to the events of that day.
Like Godzilla
The narrative begins with the first frames, indicating that this film was recov-
ered from the rubble of “Incident Site U.S. 447, formerly known as Central 
Park, New York City.” One is immediately caught off guard and intrigued 
because of one’s own direct visual experience of the destruction of parts of 
that American city in the 2001 terrorist attacks. Even if one was nowhere 
near any of the sites that were attacked that day in Washington, D.C., Penn-
sylvania, and New York, every media outlet was focused on the unfolding 
events. Images of paper from the offices above fluttering down like giant 
snowflakes, the wave of ash and smoke barreling over and then enveloping 
those standing or fleeing in the streets as the towers collapsed, the shocked 
faces of people watching from inside the relative safety of storefronts or tak-
ing shelter behind cars—these are all set in the national memory of that day. 
Opening this film with reference to the destruction of a major landmark in 
that same city sets an expectation of disaster.
The conceit that this is, in effect, a home movie, is indicated by the 
filmmaker’s deliberate imitation of an amateur handheld style (many of the 
sequences were in fact shot by the actor playing Hudson “Hud” Platt [T. J. 
Miller] or camera persons wearing the same pants and shoes), reminiscent 
of the at times nausea-inducing Blair Witch Project (1999). The opening 
sequence, dated “APR 27” continues with a domestic “morning after” scene 
where two main characters, Rob Hawkins (Michael Stahl-David) and Beth 
McIntyre (Odette Yustman Annable) are introduced. Rob films their outing 
to Coney Island, and snippets of the scenes on this section of the tape reap-
pear at irregular intervals through the rest of the film and finally bookend 
the piece to form a frame. Because they have been accidentally taped over 
they are apparently “bleeding through.” The banal, everyday romance they 
show is contrasted with documentation of the terrifying alien attack that 
forms the main action of the film.
The scene then switches to a loft-style apartment in lower Manhattan 
on May 23, where there’s a bon-voyage party for Rob, who has taken a new 
job and is moving to the Godzilla-referent Japan.11 This realistic portrayal 
300 Robert Arp and Patricia Brace
of an ordinary activity is needed contrast for the extraordinary events that 
will soon unfold. In “Picturing Paranoia: Interpreting Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers,” Steven M. Sanders states that this sort of establishing of realism 
may be seen to symbolize “that everyday life, even the most ordinary, is 
essentially unstable and potentially verging into darkness and disorder.”12 The 
ante is upped when Beth arrives with a date—the budding romance glimpsed 
in the first scenes has apparently ended—and Rob causes a scene trying to 
talk to her alone. The domestic drama soon takes a backseat to an incred-
ibly loud noise and short blackout as the scarier part of the film begins. A 
local newscast describes the sinking of a large ship in New York harbor, near 
Liberty Island, and a possible earthquake in the city. They wonder aloud if it 
is another terrorist attack even while going to the roof to get a better view.
As Hud, Rob, his brother Jason (Mike Vogel), Jason’s girlfriend, Lily 
Ford (Jessica Lucas), and a girl from the party who Hud was trying to chat 
up, Marlena Diamond (Lizzy Caplan), make their way downstairs to the 
street, we have the scenes most directly visually quoted from 9/11. A large 
projectile crashes into a skyscraper and then ricochets down, destroying 
cars and streetlights, coming to rest in the middle of the street. As it stops 
we realize that the object is the decapitated head of the Statue of Liberty. 
The improbability of this—we question what sort of force could do such 
a thing—sets the tone for the horrors to come. In the distance something 
thirty stories tall and apparently alive passes between skyscrapers. Then 
the iconic Empire State Building collapses in the same manner as the Twin 
Towers, and a huge cloud of smoke and ash billows toward them. They all 
take shelter in a bodega, which shakes with the thunderous footfalls and 
unearthly bellowing of the creature. The windows are blown out and shelves 
collapse. Jason daringly heads out into the street that now looks like a war 
zone, as fires burn, alarms and sirens sound, and sheets of paper fall from 
the sky. Ash-covered pedestrians run or wander in a daze and we recognize 
one of them as Marlena, who appears to be in shock.13 Jason again takes 
the leadership role, reminding them that whatever caused this destruc-
tion is still there and advising, “We get the hell out of Manhattan. Now!” 
Again mimicking those who walked out of the city on 9/11, they head for 
the Brooklyn Bridge. Unfortunately the creature has the same destination 
in mind, and Jason is lost when it destroys the bridge. Hud continues to 
film throughout, because, as he tells Rob, “People are gonna wanna know. 
How it all went down. . . . People are gonna need to see this. This is gonna 
be important.” He continues to add running commentary through the rest 
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of his appearance in the film, speculating on the origin and motivations 
of the invaders.
After Jason is killed, Rob steps into the leadership role and decides he 
must rescue Beth, who was trapped in her apartment when the invasion of 
the city began. The remaining members of the group attempt to make their 
way to her building, but are stopped by a very direct encounter with the 
creature and the soldiers who are attempting to battle it. Taking shelter in 
the subway, they decided to follow the tracks to a stop nearer Beth’s building. 
It is here that the most horror-film-style encounter occurs, underground, 
in the darkened tunnel.14 Fleeing rats clue them in that something is amiss. 
Through the camera’s night vision setting Hud can see that the spider-like, 
reptilian, Great Dane–sized creatures that drop off the larger one have fol-
lowed them into the tunnel, crawling on the ceiling like orcs. They are 
attacked, and while bravely knocking the creatures off of Hud, Marlena is 
bitten. Making their way to an opening into a department store, they find 
it has been made over into a makeshift triage and ground operations cen-
ter by the military. As with Jason, a direct encounter with an alien proves 
to be Marlena’s undoing: she screams horribly, then spectacularly explodes. 
Another innocent is lost to the creatures’ rampages through the city.
After finally reaching Beth’s building they are shocked to see that it has 
been sideswiped by the big alien and knocked into the twin building next to 
it, where it leans, precariously supported. In seeming imitation of the 9/11 
first responders who went up the towers while the occupants fled down, 
Rob, Lily, and Hud climb thirty-nine floors in the adjoining building, then 
jump across to get to Beth’s apartment. Although she is impaled on a piece 
of steel rebar and her steeply canted living room is open to the sky, Beth is 
alive. As they free her, the giant creature can be seen outside the window, 
heading in their direction. “What is that?!” Beth screams. The only possible 
response is given by Hud: “It’s a terrible thing.” Just when they think they 
are safely in the other building, a spider lizard appears. After Rob disables 
it, Beth again screams, “What was that?!” Hud’s almost blasé, matter of fact, 
“I don’t know, something else, also terrible,” is the perfect response to the 
ridiculous level of terror to which they are now accustomed.
Dodging debris from the monster, they make it to the helicopter evacu-
ation site but are separated from Lily and put into different choppers. Her 
fate is unknown, but Rob, Beth, and Hud’s chopper is literally knocked out 
of the sky by the creature. As they escape the wreckage and attempt to flee, 
Hud is killed by his direct contact with the alien. His encounter does provide 
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us with stunning close-up images of its rilled, moveable ears and face, yet 
we are unable to determine whether there is any real intelligence there. We 
are given little time to mourn Hud (though we are able to see that he is not 
eaten by the creature) as we follow the only survivors, Beth and Rob, who 
take refuge in an arched walkway tunnel. As we hear the creature’s screams 
and the military jets’ bombardment continues, warning sirens blare and 
they know their deaths are imminent. The tunnel collapses; the film stut-
ters, then returns to the scene of Beth and Rob’s day out to Coney Island, 
the barely visible crash of a space cylinder into the ocean behind them, and 
Beth’s final ironic statement, “I had a good day.”15
The Unopened Mystery Box
In his now-famous TED.com speech, Abrams spoke about the enjoyment 
he feels in deliberately holding back information.16 Like a magician’s Mys-
tery Box, the secrets allow us to use our own imagination to fill in the gaps. 
Unlike what we learned about the Taliban terrorists of 9/11, in Cloverfield we 
are never told the giant being’s true identity and motivation for this attack 
on the city, nor do we know if this is an isolated incident or something 
happening simultaneously all over the country or the world. Is the creature 
an alien or something that mutated and rose from the ocean’s depths like 
Godzilla? Did the ocean crash of the cylindrical object (glimpsed best in a 
freeze-frame of the start of the final scene of Rob and Beth on the Coney 
Island Ferris wheel) bring the creature to Earth, or merely awaken it? Was it 
a government experiment gone wrong? If our definition of terrorism relies 
on the concept that there is a specific goal desired by the perpetrator of the 
violent and murderous actions, then the mysteries of Cloverfield leave us in 
the dark as to what that goal could be. In its rampage the monster comes 
upon Liberty Island and rips the head off of the Statue of Liberty, tossing 
it all the way into the Manhattan neighborhood where Rob and his friends 
were partying. As a special effect, it is stunning and led the mysterious trail-
ers shown for months in theaters and online before the film’s premiere. As a 
metaphor, this is a bit heavy-handed—American liberty goes the way of the 
guillotine—or is it just that the creature saw the statue as a biped threat of 
its own size and attacked it? Does the creature intend to take over the city 
for its own use or simply kill those who drew it out of the deep? Is it the first 
wave of an invasion force or a one-of-a-kind nightmare?
The smaller insect-lizard creatures that drop off of the monster are also 
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never fully explained. Are they its young? Another parasitic or symbiotic 
alien race? The males of its kind sent to impregnate new hosts? The equiva-
lent of a virus, infecting each of us individually? The horrible exploding 
death of Marlena after she is bitten by one could be argued in any of these 
ways. Since we are not made aware of the creature’s goals beyond destroying 
everything around it, despite the film’s New York setting and reenactments 
of 9/11 visual tropes, a true analogy to terroristic acts is never fully real-
ized in the film. The cameo appearances of three famous creature-feature 
monsters—the giant ants from Them!, the beast of The Beast from 20,000 
Fathoms, and King Kong—in the film seem to argue for an earthly, albeit 
mutated, origin for the creature rather than an extraterrestrial one.17 If it is 
a relatively mindless animal acting on instinct rather than with intelligence, 
its main goal is probably escape rather than conquest or revenge.18
The creature in the next film, Super 8 is something completely differ-
ent. It is definitely an extraterrestrial; it is large, powerful, and intelligent 
and can read minds. It has also been held captive by the military-industrial 
complex for about twenty years, sustained by consuming large chunks of 
raw meat, and is really, really angry.
Another Alien Movie
Though set in 1979, Super 8 is a modern post-9/11 work. It has certain 
nostalgia for a time before the dawn of the twenty-first century, when kids 
could more safely ride their bikes at night, your film took three days to get 
developed, and the Soviet Union was still the biggest threat to our national 
security.19 This is before people flew planes into buildings and the digital 
images you just captured on your iPhone could be immediately uploaded 
to YouTube. It was the era of Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977) and 
Star Wars (1977), when little gray aliens were technologically powerful yet 
benign or looked like us and battled evil empires “in a galaxy far, far away.” 
It also references many of Abrams’s collaborator Steven Spielberg’s slightly 
later kid vs. adult adventure films, such as The Goonies (cowriter, 1985) and 
E.T. (director, 1982).20 Like those films, the end of Super 8 features a recon-
ciliation of parent and child and the return of the “lost boy” to his home.21 
Where it differs from films of that era is not only in the thirty years’ worth 
of sophistication added to special effects but also in the alien’s search for 
home after he is stranded. Both ET and the Super 8 alien have sophisticated 
technical skills, the ability to communicate telepathically, and strange food 
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cravings. Odd but cute and little, ET was lucky to have been found first by 
a little boy, Elliot, and to have escaped incarceration by the men with keys. 
Super 8 shows how a similarly gifted but twenty-foot-tall alien captured by 
the U.S. military has to go rogue, exhibiting behaviors that could be deemed 
terroristic.
Zombies in Wonderland
In 1979 in Lillian, Ohio, six ordinary junior high kids are making a movie 
for a Super 8 format film contest. One of them, Joe Lamb (Joel Courtney), 
is still mourning the loss of his mother, who died in a steel mill accident six 
months before. Working on the makeup and special effects for the zombie-
themed horror film The Case, directed by his best friend and neighbor, 
Charles Kasnyk (Riley Griffiths), is what’s kept Joe going. As in Cloverfield, 
the film begins by setting up the ordinariness of life, this time in a small 
town and complete with seventies period detail in dress, cars, décor, and 
technologies.22 After the opening scenes, set at the post-funeral home visita-
tion, establish Joe’s alienation from his father, Deputy Sheriff Jackson “Jack” 
Lamb (Kyle Chandler) and his father’s anger toward another mill worker, 
Louis Dainard (Ron Eldard), the scene shifts to the last day of school. With 
the freedom summer affords them, the two boys and their three friends—
Cary (Ryan Lee), head zombie and pyrotechnics specialist; Martin (Gabriel 
Basso), lead actor; and Preston (Zach Mills), actor and crew—make plans 
to finish the film by the festival deadline. However, Charles has decided that 
they are missing something important—mainly a plot—for their opus. He 
asks a girl, Alice Dainard (Elle Fanning), on whom he has a secret crush, to 
play the wife of the main character. Charles comes from a large two-parent 
family, a home that serves as a refuge of sorts for Joe, even more so after his 
mother’s passing. For Charles, the true motivation for the film-within-the-
film’s protagonist should rightly revolve around his loving family relation-
ship with his wife.23
In a way, the zombie scenes shot by the boys for their Super 8 contest 
film become the same sort of framing device for Super 8 as the Rob and Beth 
romance scenes in Cloverfield. Alice, as Martin’s character’s wife, urges him 
to come away with her for a romantic weekend, but his investigative work is 
more important, so he refuses. Rob broke off any thought of a serious rela-
tionship with Beth because his new job was taking him to Japan. Martin’s 
wife is zombified and he must rescue her by finding and administering the 
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one available vial of cure. Beth is trapped by the giant alien attack and Rob 
must rescue her. Also in the “real life” portion of the main action in Super 
8, when Alice is taken “down the rabbit hole” by the alien, Joe becomes the 
hero protagonist, putting together the clues necessary to find her (subter-
ranean creature, sinkhole by cemetery, dirt in garage windows) and is the 
only one who can save her.
It’s a Train Wreck
If we use the United Nations Secretary General report from 2004 as our 
baseline, the actions of the Super 8 alien could be defined as terrorism. 
Recall that it describes terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or 
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of 
intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”24 We know that the 
creature is a sentient being after learning of its telepathic connection with 
one of the scientists studying it, Dr. Woodward (Glynn Turman), who is 
now working at the Lillian middle school as a science teacher.25 Because of 
its experience of captivity and the torturous “testing” by the government 
agency at Area 51, it could be seeking revenge against its captors, chiefly 
the head of the project, Air Force Colonel Nelec (Noah Emmerich). After 
its ship crashed in 1958, it was captured and held by the U.S. Air Force, 
which was seeking information about its technology, a spacecraft made 
up of thousands of small silver objects resembling a Rubik’s cube that dis-
assembles. Because of his physical contact with the alien, Dr. Woodward 
knows that it is intelligent and only wants to rebuild its ship so it may 
return home, but his pleas for its release are ignored. Dismissed from the 
project, Woodward later takes a job in Lillian that puts him in position to 
interfere with the train transporting both the alien and its craft across the 
country. Driving his pickup truck onto the tracks directly into the path 
of the train, derailing it, seems to be an act of desperation. Is it his own 
moral code pushing him to free the alien, or is the alien still somehow in 
mental contact or even control of him? This action could cause the deaths 
of not just the military personnel on board the train but many innocent 
people—the train crew and anyone in the vicinity of the careening, explod-
ing boxcars. If fact, the young filmmakers have chosen the Lillian train 
depot as the site for that night’s filming and miraculously escape harm in 
the spectacular crash, which demolishes the station. They flee the scene, 
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taking with them a small silver-white object resembling a Rubik’s cube that 
spilled out of a cargo container.26
The alien is able to break free in the aftermath of the crash and makes 
itself at home in Lillian, excavating a series of tunnels and placing its nest 
underneath the water tower in the center of downtown. Somehow sensing 
its arrival (like the rats in the subway tunnel in Cloverfield), all of the dogs 
in Lillian run away from their homes.27 It proceeds to use the cover of dark-
ness to gather electronic and metal parts with which to rebuild its craft and 
to rather violently kidnap townspeople for information and to perhaps stock 
its larder. Those we witness being taken by it are the town sheriff, Pruitt 
(Brett Rice), the Kelvin Gas Station clerk and Walkman early adaptor Breen 
(Beau Knapp), a telephone lineman, and later, Alice. At the town hall meet-
ing called after the sheriff ’s disappearance we learn that others have been 
taken, several of whom are seen hanging (hopefully just unconscious) in 
the underground lair. The Super 8 alien is consciously using its captives to 
fulfill its goal of reconstructing its ship and leaving the planet. Remember, 
as Kant believed, because we are conscious, rational beings, persons have a 
“sanctified” intrinsic value (as ends) and not just an instrumental value (as 
a means to an end), like some object, tool, thing, or instrument of terrorist 
objectives. When Cary and Joe find the alien’s cave and witness it eating a 
human leg, they and we are repulsed. Should the alien have an aversion to 
eating the flesh of sentient beings, as humans do?28
The literally subterranean secrecy with which the creature operates 
and the crimes of theft, kidnapping, and destruction of property may all 
be seen as necessary by the alien to succeed in its goal to return home. 
However, not everything it does is simply to reach that goal. Some of its 
actions seem primarily motivated by revenge. After the boys have discov-
ered the truth about the alien in their mission to rescue Alice, they are 
captured by Colonel Nelec and taken onto a fortified military prison bus. 
While they discuss the possibilities for escape, the bus is violently struck 
and knocked on its side by the alien. One by one it kills the air force air-
men Nelec sends out after it, until he and the boys are left alone on the 
bus. Nelec tries to open the door of the boys’ cage, but one of the dead men 
outside has the key. While the alien works to punch its way into the bus’s 
interior, frenzied in its attempt to reach the man who tortured and kept 
it captive, Joe breaks out a window and the boys escape. Our last view of 
Nelec is similar to that of Marlena’s end in Cloverfield—a bloody splash 
on a translucent wall.
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This incident fits the first part of Hoffman’s detailed definition of ter-
rorism—violence, causing of physical harm or death directed toward some 
intended target that the perpetrator believes deserves the physical harm or 
death—but may fall short on the last: usually entails harm or death done 
to innocent persons that act as collateral damage. The intended victim of 
the alien’s wrath was Nelec, so the three airmen could be seen as collateral 
damage. However, the alien also made no attempt to capture and “store” 
any of the military men, probably because it saw their uniforms as emblem-
atic of its captors. The boys are able to escape while it is distracted trying 
to reach Nelec, and it leaves after the colonel’s death without harming the 
boys, who are still nearby. Yet they could have been seriously injured or 
even killed by the attack on the bus, just as they could have been from the 
train wreck. That those incidents did not result in harm to them is more 
luck than design by the perpetrators of the terroristic violence, Dr. Wood-
ward and the alien.
Another interesting question raised by the alien’s terroristic actions is 
whether or not it is even bound by human legal or moral obligations. To 
be fair, no rights, as such, were extended to it by humanity when humans 
deliberately shot down its craft with a nuclear device, captured it, drugged 
it, and held it prisoner for decades.29 In an audiotape found by the boys in 
Dr. Woodward’s storage locker, the scientist describes his understanding 
of the alien, achieved through a telepathic link: “Through pain and lack of 
compassion we have taught him to hate us all. We have turned him into an 
enemy.” After the attacks of 9/11, people searched for answers to understand 
what would provoke a group of people to commit mass murder in the name 
of a religious cause. On the world stage, Osama bin Laden and the Islamic 
terrorists who perpetrated the attack put forth their belief that the “great 
Satan,” the United States, was trying to destroy their culture and belief sys-
tem through economic, social, and military imperialism. From their per-
spective, anyone associated with the government of the United States—any 
citizen, man, woman, or child—was an enemy combatant and deserved 
death. If we use Hoffman’s definition of one side of terrorism as coming 
from an “individual that usually perceives itself as being treated unjustly or 
inappropriately by the larger group, cause, ideology, or other individuals 
that comprise the social situation in which the groups inhabit,” the Super 8 
alien’s actions fit the mold of a terrorist. Using a utilitarian position, a case 
could be made for its terroristic actions to be seen as justified. This is the 
crux of how we understand the final act of the film.
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Otherness and Alienation
The subterranean alien in Super 8 is physically monstrous to human eyes 
and capable of extreme violence, yet it has the intelligence to build and 
operate an interstellar spacecraft and can telekinetically move large objects 
and explode weapons. In designing it, creature artist Neville Page, Abrams, 
and consultant Steven Spielberg needed something large enough to stop a 
bus and toss people around like kittens, strong and flexible enough to dig 
a twenty-foot-tall tunnel under the city, but with hands delicate enough to 
manipulate sensitive electronic equipment. Their solution was a double set 
of arms, jointed at the shoulders with long-fingered hands, and powerful legs 
with clawed feet capable of digging like a badger. With touch it is also able 
to understand the thoughts and emotions of its human captors and, later, 
captives and to project its own. The alien’s touch so affected Dr. Woodward 
that he gave his life to free it. Yet because of its terrifying physical form and 
its own rage at its mistreatment and torture at the hands of Nelec and the 
other government scientists, all of those whom it encounters in the town 
of Lillian (before Joe) are too frightened to try to communicate with it. 
Even Alice, who understands what it wants, cannot move beyond her fear 
to give it the same release to go as Joe is capable of doing. Joe is able to see 
beyond that “otherness” and recognize his own pain and loss in the creature’s 
actions. A quiet kid who would rather make models and monster movies 
with his friends than go to sports camp, Joe’s closest familial relationship 
was with his mother. Joe has been alienated from his father most of his life. 
Something was taken from both of them—for Joe, his mother, and for the 
alien, his freedom—and this allows the communion they reach in the tun-
nels after Alice’s rescue.
After Joe frees Alice, the sheriff, and another woman, they attempt to flee 
but are caught by the alien, who violently knocks the adults aside (possibly 
killing them) and grabs up Joe. He is able to somehow stay calm and really 
communicate with it. “We understand. But not everyone’s horrible. I know 
bad things happen. Bad things happen, but you can still live. You can still 
live,” Joe tells it. We see the alien’s face close up and in focus, the nictitating 
membranes (protecting its eyes from the dirt caused by its subterranean 
digging) flip back and its much more human-looking eyes focus in on the 
boy.30 Understanding between the two allows Joe to be spared. When a noise 
indicating something is ready with the alien’s device attracts its attention, it 
sets the boy gently on the ground and leaves.
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The final reconciliation of both Alice and Joe with their respective 
fathers parallels the creature’s acquisition of the silver-white Rubik’s cubes 
that will allow it to reconstitute its ship and go home. The magnetic force 
that draws the cubes and other metallic items to the water tower pulls Joe’s 
mother’s locket out of his pocket and opens it, revealing the picture of which 
he symbolically lets go.
This examination of Abrams’s Cloverfield and Super 8 looked at the inva-
sions perpetrated by two nonhuman “alien” beings on American soil. Clo-
verfield used visual tropes from the 9/11 attacks on New York City, which 
resonate in the minds of the audience because of our shared memory of that 
terrorist action. Its twenty-something cast would have been in junior high 
in 2001 (the same age as the young protagonists in Super 8), and so they 
grew up with that sword of Damocles—that expectation of another attack—
hanging over their heads. Their initial reaction to the events unfolding in 
front of them is to automatically think that the terrorists have struck again. 
However, the origins, motivations, and even sentience of the giant creature 
attacking the city are never revealed, so even though it rains down death 
and destruction on the city even greater that the Taliban attack, we are left 
with an open question of whether its actions fit our definition of terrorism. 
Super 8, with its 1979 setting, draws on our nostalgia for the gung-ho, “let’s 
help the nice alien get home” of Spielberg films like E.T.: The Extraterrestrial 
grafted onto that same post-9/11 awareness that an attack on America is not 
just a possibility, it has happened.
Recall that one could argue that the terrorist act is justified if there is 
no avenue for addressing injustices in some social setting. Could there be 
other ways, besides blowing up buildings and people, to call attention to 
one’s plight? Consider the nonviolent forms of protest exhibited by the likes 
of Jesus Christ, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. And why per-
petuate terrorist acts on someone else’s land, as was the case with the 9/11 
attacks? The alien in Super 8 believed he had no choice. He was shot down 
while observing our planet, treated horribly by his government captors, 
and had to survive as best he could when he was afforded the opportunity 
to escape. Obtaining the materials and technology to recraft his ship and 
return home necessitated sometimes violent and criminal actions that he 
seemed to feel were justified. The fear sowed in Lillian by his scavenging, 
kidnapping townspeople, and telekinetically setting off all of the military 
weapons was a by-product of these actions. There are social settings—for 
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example, fundamentalist theocratic regimes—in which the most heinous 
acts are committed against good people and oppression, injustice, and frus-
tration are commonplace. In settings such as these, it’s no wonder that folks 
commit terrorist acts or even preach anarchy—such people are powerless 
and downtrodden. Taking direct vengeance on his captors, especially the 
deliberate killing of Colonel Nelec and the airmen on the bus, was where 
the alien truly stepped over the moral line according to our definition of 
terrorism. He was not in imminent danger of death, his ship was ready (as 
shown in his departure soon thereafter), and he didn’t need them for build-
ing materials, information, or food; therefore this was pure revenge. Well, 
it is a monster after all . . . 
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taLkIn’ ’bout a revoLutIon
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a PLaCe for revoLutIons In 
revoLutIon ?
Marxism, Feminism, and the Monroe Republic
Jeff Ewing
In J. J. Abrams’s Revolution, the world is a dark place. More particularly, 
Revolution takes place fifteen years after electricity all over the planet was 
suddenly disabled, and with it, all technology that uses it. In what once was 
the United States of America, the U.S. government has collapsed (divided 
into six new nations), and territories are now controlled by warlords, militias, 
and rebel gangs. The story is set in the area now called the Monroe Repub-
lic, controlled by Sebastian Monroe and the Monroe Militia, and follows 
the attempt of Charlie Matheson, her uncle Miles, and their friends as they 
attempt to rescue Charlie’s brother and mother from the heart of Monroe’s 
territory. Monroe is convinced that the Mathesons know something about 
the blackout—and something about how to turn the power back on. Their 
history in the Monroe Republic reveals a lot about its operations as a politi-
cal body, and two theoretical traditions have given us a number of tools to 
analyze it—Marxist and feminist theory. In this chapter, I will use those tools 
to look at the class and gender relations of the Monroe Republic, which lead 
to a greater understanding of a number of facets of life after the blackout. 
Critical analysis shows that the Monroe Republic is hierarchical in terms of 
both class and gender (in ways that suggest the deep interconnection of the 
two) and, as we will see, without serious restructuring and a reprioritization 
of state policy, the republic cannot be expected to last.
When the Lights Went Out . . . 
Revolution begins fifteen years after the era of electricity suddenly (and with-
out warning) ends—electric power, all over the globe, stops working. With-
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out electrical power, the U.S. government collapses (presumably along with 
the rest of the nation-states around the globe), and in its place rise warlords, 
militias, and rebel gangs. The territory of the United States is now overtaken 
by six separate and independent nations—the California Commonwealth, 
the Plains Nation, the Republic of Texas, the Georgia Federation, the Waste-
land, and the Monroe Republic. The Monroe Republic was organized and 
built by Sebastian Monroe and Miles Matheson, the former acting as presi-
dent of the republic, with the latter building the strength and tactics of the 
Monroe Militia as its general (until a failed attempt to assassinate Monroe 
leaves Miles in hiding until the events of Revolution).
The story told in Revolution starts when the Monroe Militia arrives 
where most of the Matheson family lives, seeking Miles and his brother, 
Ben. Monroe suspects they know something about the cause of the black-
out. Miles is elsewhere, still in hiding, but Ben is shot and his son Danny is 
taken. Ben’s dying words to Charlie (daughter of the Mathesons, older sis-
ter to Danny, and Miles’s niece) are to find Miles in Chicago to save Danny. 
Miles, Aaron (a long-standing family friend), Maggie (Ben’s girlfriend after 
being long separated from his wife), and Charlie set off in pursuit of Danny 
(eventually they also lose Maggie and seek out Nora, with whom Miles once 
had a relationship but who has since joined the rebels). Beyond Miles’s 
betrayal, the Mathesons are of interest to Monroe as he suspects (correctly) 
that they know something about the cause of the blackout. Rachel Mathe-
son, Ben’s wife and mother to Charlie and Danny, had already been taken 
into Monroe’s custody. Rachel and Ben eventually are found to be part of a 
small group of individuals connected to a government project (picked up 
by the Department of Defense) whose accidental result was the blackout. 
The project intended to create a source of cheap and accessible energy but 
instead disabled electricity within its area of operation. Each member of that 
group—Ben Matheson among them—has a pendant, which over time are 
revealed to be capable of turning electricity back on within a certain radius. 
Once that is discovered by Monroe, the search for a pendant intensifies.
Militias in Revolution have a relative monopoly of control over their 
respective territories and the food supply and weapons within them. The 
rise of the Monroe Republic was facilitated by Miles’s command of often 
ruthless efficiency and tactical expertise. It is revealed that the territories 
have skirmishes with each other (also engaging in diplomacy and sometimes 
alliances) along their borders, and the control Monroe has over the Monroe 
Republic weakens outside its strongest zone—the area around Philadelphia. 
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Meanwhile, inside the borders of territories lie both bandits and rebels, the 
term reserved for groups of individuals fighting for a restoration of the U.S. 
government (normally identifiable by a U.S. flag tattoo on their body and/or 
a U.S. flag in their possession). Within the borders of the Monroe Republic, 
Monroe has effectively absolute power (able to decree laws, promote within 
the militia by command, issue penalties, and enforce his laws or penalize 
“traitors” at will). While individual communities within the Monroe Repub-
lic are shown to have a degree of autonomy within their borders, they are 
subject to the payment of taxes (monetarily or with crops) and conscription 
of soldiers by the republic and are required to follow the republic’s various 
laws, which are well known. It is not explicitly mentioned how many laws 
have been officially decreed within the Monroe Republic (nor whether they 
are written or merely widely known), but a small number of laws of the 
Monroe Republic are known, including,
The Baltimore Act, outlawing the purchase, sale, ownership, or 
transportation of any firearms by any citizen (outside loyal militia), 
on penalty of death (revealed in “Chained Heat”).
The Immigration and Naturalization Defense Act, allowing all 
militia personnel to search, detain, and question anyone whose 
involvement in illegal or subversive behavior is suspected (revealed 
in “No Quarter”).
(Additionally, the production and sale of heroin is also legal, revealed in 
“Sex and Drugs.”)
It is also not entirely clear what, if any, privileges have been gained by 
communities within the Monroe Republic, save for the policing function 
served by the militia and the protection of republic borders against other 
territories.
Recruits in the Monroe Militia are often abducted children, and mem-
bers of the Monroe Republic are branded on their wrist with its symbol, 
an M inscribed in a circle. These abducted children are forcibly trained to 
be obedient soldiers. Upon encountering one in an attempt to rescue an 
abducted, conscripted child in “The Children’s Crusade,” Miles describes a 
conscription ship to Charlie, Aaron, and Nora: “It’s a conscription facility 
. . . soldier factory. Kids go in, they’re . . . reeducated. Soldiers come out. It’s 
one thing snatching a kid off a wagon, Charlie, but this . . . you don’t just 
318 Jeff Ewing
storm a place like that. It’s impossible.” When Charlie is captured later in the 
same episode, before the commander brands her wrist with the symbol of 
the Monroe Republic, he explains, “You see, militia soldiers aren’t just born. 
We make ’em. It’s time for you to become an official member of the Monroe 
Militia.” The militia also commands fleets of remaining high-technology 
weapons and vehicles (such as military helicopters) whose use relies on 
electrical power (and thus were disabled during the blackout). In effect, in 
the world of Revolution, political authority is underwritten by coercive and 
organizational supremacy (and as of this writing we have little knowledge 
of the political and economic structures of the other remaining territories, 
as names reveal little about the structures of the territories, though we know 
that the Georgia Federation is ruled by a woman, President Foster). Not all 
the details of life after the blackout have been revealed, but can we bring the 
structure of the Monroe Republic into clearer focus? One critical tradition 
that can highlight features of the Monroe Republic, bringing greater insight, 
is that of Marxist theory.
Marxism and the State
The foundation of the historical and political analysis of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, historical materialism, holds that “the ultimately deter-
mining element in history is the production and reproduction of imme-
diate life.”1 The baseline conditions of human history, be it the history of 
a particular person, society, or the species as a whole, are the capacity to 
survive and (with regard to societies and the species in general) reproduce 
oneself. Beyond ideas, religions, the state, and so on thus lies the need to 
exist, to maintain existence through an individual’s material interchange, or 
“metabolism” with nature, and to reproduce existence in future generations. 
As Marx and Engels bluntly state in The German Ideology, “The first premise 
of all human existence and, therefore, of all human history [is . . . ] namely, 
that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ 
But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, 
clothing and many other things.”2 Survival is the first premise of human his-
tory, and consequentially the “first historical act is thus the production of 
the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.”3 Thus 
production is the base prerequisite of continued human existence, through 
which human labor transforms nonhuman nature into a means to meet 
human needs and secure human survival. Production occurs in the histori-
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cally variable mode of production in which this labor is organized and in 
labor, “the entire productive activity of man, through which his metabolic 
interchange with nature is mediated.”4
Production and reproduction thus form the metaphorical base of soci-
ety, whose functioning sets ultimate limits on the successful possibilities of 
existing state and ideological structures. Moreover, control over the means 
of production and reproduction guarantees influence over the other spheres 
of society, just as an ideology must “make sense” within the given material 
constraints of an individual’s life to be truly internalized. Marx and Engels 
elaborate the consequences of this insight in the famous “1859 preface”:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely rela-
tions of production appropriate to a given stage in the development 
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, 
the material productive forces of society come into conflict with 
the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the 
same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the 
framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of 
development of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the 
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the 
whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformation it is 
always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation 
of the economic conditions of production which can be determined 
with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, 
artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men 
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.5
Later formulations of historical materialism (such as Engels’s Origin of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State) pick up the complexity of The Ger-
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man Ideology in recognizing both production and reproduction as ultimate 
factors determining human history (as production is necessary for contin-
ued existing human life, and reproduction is a precondition of continuing 
human generations and a prerequisite of current human life).
As a primary source of social power, control over production (through 
ownership over the means of production) grants substantial control over 
society, and over time classes emerge with some individuals controlling the 
means of production, thus able to control the activities of others through 
control over their means of survival, and others condemned to work for them 
in order to meet their needs (being themselves divorced from resources). As 
Marx and Engels summarize in the Communist Manifesto, “The history of all 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, 
patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, car-
ried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time 
ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes.”6 Over time, this antagonistic rela-
tionship of the various class societies in history, in which some individuals 
own the means of production (thus reaping benefits from the labor of oth-
ers), and the consequences of this antagonistic relationship reach the point 
of revolution, the revolutionary transformation of the mode of production.
To protect such differential power, the ruling class must isolate the pri-
mary coercive powers in an institution above society, the state, wherein “it 
follows that every class which is struggling for mastery . . . must first con-
quer for itself political power.”7 As Engels argues in “The Origin of Family, 
Private Property, and the State,” “As the state arose from the need to hold 
class antagonisms in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst 
of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most power-
ful, economically dominant class which, through the medium of the state, 
becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of 
holding down and exploiting the oppressed class.”8 The state and its coercive 
power is thus a key locus of class struggle, and the laboring class struggles 
to overcome existing state power or use it for its benefit, just as the ruling 
class struggles to keep it operating in its interests. Moreover, as Marx argues 
in Das Kapital, “Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a 
new one. It is itself an economic power.”9 The imposition of a new mode of 
production (for Marx) involves the use of coercive force in order to establish 
and secure the new relations of production against the former ruling classes. 
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This orientation toward the utility of force for protection of the new rela-
tions of production led to Marx and Engels’s prescription in the Communist 
Manifesto that “the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise 
the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. 
. . . The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all 
capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in 
the hands of the State.”10 In other words, Marx and Engels highlight the use 
of coercive force in the transition between modes of production and in the 
spreading of one mode of production and its relations of production over 
new territory, but coercive capacity is ultimately underwritten by and in the 
long-term dependence on the mode of production from which it emerges.
Marxism and the Monroe Republic
The Monroe Republic does not trace its origins to class conflict, nor is it an 
unintentional result of the “forces of production” or technological devel-
opment in the pursuit of profit. Instead, the blackout occurred as a pure 
technological accident of research whose stated purpose was the develop-
ment of a cheap and efficient energy source. Upon learning of the failure of 
that project (and success in creating technology that disables electricity), 
the Department of Defense remained excited over the development (it is 
suggested that their excitement stems from the potential weaponization of 
the project). We are, however, given no explanation for the blackout that 
directly supports a historical materialist analysis of the state. What is clear, 
however, is that the world has returned to technologies before the reliance 
of human societies on electricity—for example, limited use of technologies 
controlled by steam (mainly a repaired train) and wide use of animal power. 
At a superficial glance, Revolution does not accord with the role Marx attri-
butes to class conflict as a or the primary force behind the transition between 
economic systems, and moreover, it directly seems to work against the Marx-
ian emphasis on increasing technological development under capitalism. 
Before we commit to those theoretical interpretations, let us first examine 
production as it occurs after the blackout.
With what we know thus far in Revolution, the first fact to contend with 
is that after the blackout existing political powers (and presumably corpora-
tions, which are rarely mentioned) collapsed, unable to maintain their control 
in the absence of high-technology military, transportation, communication, 
and surveillance technology. We can assume the same for corporations and 
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existing economic actors. Moreover, Revolution shows how reliance on those 
technologies and the world built to presuppose them offer a poor founda-
tion for the skills necessary to survive in the new era (as shown time and 
again by Aaron’s self-effacing commentary on his own lack of skill and his 
flashbacks in the months immediately following the blackout).
While class struggle did not produce the changes that resulted in the 
blackout, one factor that, Marx argues, generates class struggle is the way 
in which the relations of production (class structure) impede the produc-
tive potential of society and the capacity of the mode of production to meet 
social needs (which are deeply affected by the technology, organizational 
forms, and resources available to a mode of production, among other factors 
of production). Available technology is so important a factor of production 
in Marx’s theory that he has written of it in language strong enough to be 
commonly interpreted as technologically determinist (a claim that I do not 
think stands on the evidence). In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx argues 
that “in acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of produc-
tion, and in changing their mode of production, their manner of gaining a 
living, they change all their social relations. The windmill gives you society 
with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.”11 
The disabling of electricity would, in turn, disable a number of additional 
technologies and thus the capitalists who relied on those technologies.
The elimination of that technological capacity would also undermine 
the state that relies on that economic foundation. As Engels writes in Herr 
Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring),
So, then, the revolver triumphs over the sword. . . . Force is no mere 
act of the will, but requires very real preliminary conditions before it 
can come into operation, that is to say, instruments, the more perfect 
of which vanquish the less perfect. . . . These instruments have to 
be produced, which also implies that the producer of more perfect 
instruments of force, vulgo arms, vanquishes the producer of the 
less perfect instrument, and that, in a word, the triumph of force is 
based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in 
general—therefore, on “economic power,” on the “economic order,” 
on the material means which force has at its disposal.12
Weaponry is produced and thus ultimately dependent on the mode of pro-
duction, and it rests on a technological foundation that allows the destruc-
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tive potential of weapons to develop—but coercive capacity requires a 
technological and productive foundation. It makes sense from a Marxian 
standpoint that the fall of technology would result in a decline of both the 
ruling class factions and the state that relied on that technology (perhaps 
contrary to those who argue that the U.S. government in Revolution would 
have been able to maintain domination over its territory). It also makes 
sense that (1) the Monroe Republic relies on technological leftovers—guns 
have been monopolized because bullets need rationing, implying that they 
cannot generally reproduce them—and (2) there has been a limited recla-
mation of earlier technologies such as steam power. Steam power would 
have variable adaptation within fifteen years, as the decline of the old pow-
ers would be swift but the chaos and process of that fall in its entirety would 
likely take some time, and new powers would rise . . . certainly not ideal 
conditions to fully reappropriate steam technology, long since replaced as 
the primary technology, with its use foreign to many of the contemporary 
world before the blackout.
In that electric-powered technology has been lost and prior technol-
ogy has not yet been fully reclaimed, production largely seems to be ori-
ented toward self-sufficiency, and while shops exist, it is clear that at least 
the general economy is largely organized around self-sufficient produc-
tion, including agriculture, and the reclamation of high-end goods from 
the world before the blackout (such as pharmaceuticals, bullets, etc.). The 
Monroe Militia utilizes its coercive capacity to exploit the population within 
its territory, and we don’t see capitalist employment as the dominant mode 
of exploitation (that is, distinctively capitalist exploitation) within their 
borders (though certainly the sale of various commodities exists and does 
guarantee significant power for particular individuals, as seen with heroin 
production in the episode “Sex and Drugs”). We see few clear instances of 
individuals working for other individuals. The Monroe Republic is not yet 
a stable state underwritten with a stable mode of production. It remains 
a primarily political-military organization with a political mode of sur-
plus extraction, neglecting its material foundations to a significant degree 
(especially given what seems to be a significant interest in the reclamation 
of electricity-based technology but relative neglect of redeveloping steam-
based production).
The Monroe Republic does not seem to actively attempt to maintain 
the conditions of its own reproduction. In this sense, the Monroe Republic 
recalls Engels’s commentary on Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War:
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This war compelled all continental Powers to introduce . . . a military 
burden which must bring them to ruin within a few years. The army 
has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the 
peoples are only there in addition in order to provide and feed the 
soldiers. . . . But this militarism also carries in itself the seed of its 
own destruction. Competition of the individual states with each 
other forces them, on the one hand, to spend more money each year 
on the army and navy, artillery, etc., thus more and more hasten-
ing financial catastrophe and on the other hand, to take universal 
compulsory military service more and more seriously, thus in the 
long run making the whole people familiar with the use of arms; 
and therefore making the people more and more able at a given 
moment to make its will prevail in opposition to the commanding 
military lords.13
As of the events of Revolution, the Monroe Militia seems to have ignored 
the material conditions of its territory in a gamble to secure territorial 
domination as well as to pursue lost electricity. Such a gamble appears as 
though it may pay off, but it has not yet, and the plans we have thus far seen 
imply that the focus of technology would be the powering up of military 
equipment for increased territorial acquisition—we see no plans for facto-
ries, welfare measures, and the like. Enhanced military capacity or not, the 
focus on militarization and neglect of material foundations can only lead 
to ruin in Marxist analyses, for as Engels critiqued the militarism of the 
Prussian model, “the whole organisation and method of fighting armies, 
and along with these victory or defeat, proves to be dependent on material, 
that is, economic conditions; on the human material, and the armaments 
material, and therefore on the quality and quantity of the population and 
on technical development.”14 How long the Monroe Republic can exist as a 
coercive exploitative apparatus, neglecting its material foundations, remains 
to be seen. What does seem to be clear, however, is that the Monroe Repub-
lic contains a diversity of modes of production—some trading for goods, 
some production, little visible production for exchange or reclamation of 
pre-electric industrial technology—but society within its borders suffers the 
political extraction of surplus and the organization of society around the 
needs of the militia. The Monroe Republic is oriented toward exploitation 
and militarism, and as we see with its internal struggles against rebels, its 
legitimacy—a key element for any long-standing mode of production—is 
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as uncertain as its productive future. From a Marxian standpoint, it is only 
a matter of time before the contradictions of the political economy of the 
Monroe Republic rip its apparent stability wide open, ushering in a revolu-
tion in Revolution.
Feminism and the State
Various feminisms differ in their analysis of the precise causes and features 
of women’s oppression, as well as their analysis of the solutions to women’s 
oppression. While there are a number of feminist authors and texts whose 
influence is undeniable, contemporary feminism does not circulate around 
a central figure in the manner that, for example, Marxism has as a school 
of thought (though it should not be denied that Marxism has developed 
into a number of clearly distinct and sometimes widely divergent schools, 
e.g. structuralist Marxism vs. critical theory vs. analytic Marxism). Con-
sequently, a number of feminist thinkers have analyzed the political with 
often deeply conflicting results, and any treatment of feminist analysis of 
“the state” is certainly reductive. Contemporary feminism does tend to have 
certain central insights, however, which have been put forward in a number 
of important analyses—and thus what follows is less an absolute statement 
of some unified feminist political theory and more a highly selective read-
ing of some very important feminist political texts.
To use a loose definition, whatever their diversities, feminisms are uni-
fied in their theoretical aim to define and establish equality between men 
and women and in recognizing that there is no unitary oppression of some 
abstract category of “women,” as women are divided by race, class, sexu-
ality, and citizenship (among other factors). Contemporary feminism is 
increasingly emphatic on the intersectional nature of oppression and tends 
to fight for equality for all people along the lines of race, class, sex, sexual-
ity, nation, and the like. A number of feminist scholars go one step further 
and address the degradation of nonhuman nature in human thought and 
practice (particularly in the thought and practice of the global North). Politi-
cal theory before the feminist movement often ignored women in political 
analysis. Carole Pateman, for example, argues in The Sexual Contract that 
traditional social contract theory (such as that of John Locke) opposes the 
“social contract” to patriarchy and patriarchal right (found, for example, in 
the work of Robert Filmer), but traditional social contract theory ignores 
that: “Paternal right is only one, and not the original, dimension of patri-
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archal power. A man’s power as a father comes after he has exercised the 
patriarchal right of a man (a husband) over a woman (wife). The contract 
theorists . . . incorporated conjugal right into their theories and, in so doing, 
transformed the law of male sex-right into its modern contractual form. . . . 
The original contract takes place after the political defeat of the father and 
creates modern fraternal patriarchy.”15 Male power over women is mani-
fested in the three contemporary “contracts”—the marriage contract, the 
prostitution contract, and the surrogate mother contract—each securing 
in certain ways the control of men over women. Simultaneously, contract 
theory divides civil society “into two spheres, but attention is directed to 
one sphere only. . . . The story of the social contract is treated as an account 
of the creation of the public sphere of civil freedom,” while the “other, pri-
vate, sphere is not seen as politically relevant.”16 These two spheres of civil 
society, however, are mutually dependent, and thus upholding the public/
private separation excludes critical problematization of patriarchal servitude 
in marriage and excludes “the sexual contract” altogether.
A key element of feminist theory in general since the beginning of the 
feminist movement, then, has been the expansion of the political beyond 
the state in order to address problems traditionally considered part of the 
private, thus untouchable, sphere, as signified in the iconic phrase of the 
feminist movement “the personal is political.” These private issues have long 
been subject to critical feminist scrutiny, and an early and influential theo-
rist of many of their aspects is Simone de Beauvoir. In a male-dominated 
society, Beauvoir explains in the introduction to The Second Sex, “just as 
for the ancients there was an absolute vertical with reference to which the 
oblique was defined, so there is an absolute human type, the masculine.” 
Indeed, “For him she is sex—absolute sex, no less. She is defined and dif-
ferentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is 
the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Sub-
ject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”17 This establishment of woman 
as Other bleeds throughout the institutions of society, including the state. 
As Catherine MacKinnon argues, “In male supremacist societies, the male 
standpoint dominates civil society in the form of the objective standard—
that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world, does not appear 
to function as a standpoint at all.”18 The male standpoint and dominance of 
men over women become incorporated by the state, and “two things hap-
pen: law becomes legitimate, and social dominance becomes invisible.”19 
The state “protects male power through embodying and ensuring existing 
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male control over women at every level—cushioning, qualifying, or de jure 
appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization.”20 
Consequentially, the traditional definition of the state as monopolizing the 
means of “legitimate coercion” in a given territory, “thought to distinguish 
the state as an entity, actually describes the power of men over women 
in the home, in the bedroom, on the job, in the street, throughout social 
life.”21 Thus, while certainly there are a variety of feminist perspectives on 
the state, in a male-dominated society, male-standpoint biases become eas-
ily integrated into the functions, prerogatives, viewpoint, and leadership of 
the state, and such a standpoint forms the core of state activity. Moreover, 
such coercive authority de facto supports both the isolation of the private 
sphere in practice (much like it is in thought) and supports the Othering of 
women, effectively guaranteeing their separateness and disempowerment 
in a male-dominated society.
Feminists have understood the political impact of Other status in a 
variety of ways. As Iris Marion Young argues, there are five categories of 
oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural impe-
rialism, and violence.22 In precapitalist societies domination is directly 
accomplished through overt, political means, while capitalism “removes 
traditional juridically enforced class distinctions and promotes a belief in 
the legal freedom of persons.”23 Despite these complexities, the concept of 
exploitation centers around the idea that the results of the labor of one group 
confer undue benefits on another. In that sense, “women are exploited . . . 
to the degree that they are wage workers. . . . As a group, however, women 
undergo specific forms of gender exploitation in which their energies and 
power are expended, often unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to ben-
efit men by releasing them for more important and creative work, enhanc-
ing their status or the environment around them, or providing them with 
sexual or emotional service.”24 Exploitation, then, potentially affects women 
in a number of ways—as workers, and directly in social relations within a 
sexual division of labor.
Beyond exploitation, society has a number of other important forms 
of oppression, including marginalization, where the marginalized are indi-
viduals excluded outright from the social division of labor and participation 
in social life (and consequently potentially subject to material deprivation 
and even death). Powerlessness is a significant and general condition even 
in advanced capitalist societies, as “most people in these societies do not 
regularly participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their 
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lives and actions, and in this sense most people lack significant power.”25 
Moreover, Young also addresses the complexity of powerlessness: “Domi-
nation in modern society is enacted through the widely dispersed powers 
of many agents mediating the decisions of others. To that extent that many 
people have some power in relation to others, even though they lack the 
power to decide policies or results. The powerless are those who lack author-
ity or power even in this mediated sense, those over whom power is exer-
cised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must 
take orders and rarely have the right to give them.”26 Powerlessness is thus a 
complex phenomenon, and associated with powerlessness are a number of 
injustices, including hindrances in the full development of one’s capacities, 
lack of decision-making power in work, and being subject to disrespectful 
treatment. Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness are material 
forms of oppression, grounded in the social division of labor.
Beyond these, Young discusses “cultural imperialism,” which “involves 
the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture, and its 
establishment as the norm,” while “to experience cultural imperialism means 
to experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particu-
lar perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereo-
type one’s group and mark it out as the Other.”27 Finally, Young highlights 
violence, specifically how “many groups suffer the oppression of systematic 
violence. Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must 
fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have 
no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person. . . . What makes 
violence a face of oppression is less the particular acts themselves, though 
these are often utterly horrible, than the social context surrounding them, 
which makes them possible and even acceptable.”28 Thus Young gives us a 
series of tools to examine the “five faces of oppression,” by which we can 
examine the levels of oppression in any structures or sets of social relations.
Feminist philosophers have also separated violence from other concepts 
in political theory. Hannah Arendt, for example, distinguishes between 
power, strength, force, authority, and violence. Power “corresponds to the 
human ability not just to act but to act in concert,” and “power is never the 
property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only 
so long as the group keeps together.”29 Strength references a singular entity 
and is a property inherent in such a singular entity. Force, on the other hand, 
is often used as a synonym for violence but should “be reserved, in termino-
logical language, for the ‘forces of nature’ or the ‘force of circumstance’ . . . 
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that is, to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements.”30 
Authority can be vested in either individual people or offices, but “its hall-
mark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither 
coercion nor persuasion is needed.”31
Violence, on the other hand, is of a purely instrumental character. Con-
trasting violence with power, Arendt remarks, “Power is indeed the essence 
of all government, but violence is not. Violence is by nature instrumental; like 
all means, it always stands in the need of guidance and justification through 
the end it pursues. . . . Power springs up whenever people get together and 
act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together 
rather than from any action that then may follow.”32 These concepts in 
Arendt’s framework are intermingled in practice, and “power, strength, 
force, authority, violence—these are but words to indicate the means by 
which man rules over man; they are held to be synonymous because they 
have the same function.”33 Yet Arendt considers power and violence to be 
opposites, as where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Unlike power, 
which for Arendt is an end in itself, violence (as purely instrumental) “can 
destroy power” but “it is utterly incapable of creating it.”34 Arendt then adds 
a number of analytical lenses by which we can analyze the elements of a 
political body, the means and ends it pursues, and its weaknesses in regard 
to circumstance, means, and ends.
A critical feminist interrogation of violence is important because vio-
lence is often a gendered phenomenon. As noted by R.W. Connell, “Vio-
lence becomes important in gender politics among men. Most episodes of 
major violence (counting military combat, homicide and armed assault) are 
transactions among men,” just as “violence can be used to enforce a reac-
tionary gender politics.”35 Similarly, in the private sphere “many members of 
the privileged group use violence to sustain their dominance. Intimidation 
of women ranges across the spectrum from wolf-whistling in the street, to 
office harassment, to rape and domestic assault, to murder by a woman’s 
patriarchal ‘owner,’ such as a separated husband. Physical attacks are com-
monly accompanied by a verbal abuse of women (whores and bitches, in 
present popular music that recommends beating women).”36 Connell argues 
that violence is both part of a system of domination and a measure of its 
imperfection, as a thoroughly legitimate hierarchy would have a diminished 
need to intimidate and coerce.
The gendered aspects of state policy extend beyond the implications of 
its coercive and regulatory policy (which has significant repercussions on 
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reproductive rights, sexuality, and the like). The welfare policies of various 
states greatly affect and are affected by its citizens in very gender-differenti-
ated ways. As sociologist Ann Orloff argues, “Gender relations, embodied in 
the sexual division of labor, compulsory heterosexuality, discourses and ide-
ologies of citizenship, motherhood, masculinity and femininity, and the like, 
profoundly shape the character of welfare states. Likewise, the institutions of 
social provision—the set of social assistance and social insurance programs, 
universal citizenship entitlements, and public services to which we refer to 
as ‘the welfare state’—affect gender relations in a variety of ways.”37 Thus 
feminist theorists are tasked with the development of means to analyze the 
impact of welfare states on gender. Feminist political theorist Nancy Fraser 
unpacks “the idea of gender equity as a compound of five distinct normative 
principles” (related to the “family wage”).38 These are the antipoverty principle 
(whose purpose is the prevention of poverty), the antiexploitation principle 
(the prevention of exploitation of vulnerable populations), equality principles 
(addressing inequalities between men and women in terms of income inequal-
ity, leisure time inequality, and inequalities of respect), and the antimarginal-
ization principle (requiring “provision of the necessary conditions for women’s 
participation, including day care, elder care, and provision for breast-feeding 
in public” and “the dismantling of masculinity work cultures and woman-
hostile political environments”).39 Fraser also mentions the antiandrocen-
trism principle (involving the decentering of masculinist norms, including the 
revaluing of practices and traits that are undervalued due to their association 
with women). Just as Young provides multifaceted criteria by which we can 
critique states and other institutions for oppressing their citizens, Fraser gives 
us a set of criteria by which we can assess the success or failures of a state to 
adequately address the welfare and gender equality of its citizens.
Gender relations also permeate the interactions between states and 
between states and international bodies. Feminist political theorist Cynthia 
Enloe argues that the international is personal. She explains,
“The international is personal” implies that governments depend 
upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to 
conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than secrecy 
and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are willing to provide 
their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can 
develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They 
need not only military hardware, but a steady supply of women’s 
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sexual services to convince their soldiers that they are manly. To 
operate in the international arena, governments seek other govern-
ments’ recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on 
ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain 
that sense of autonomous nationhood.40
This picture is complex, in that “while women have not been mere pawns 
in global politics, governments and companies with government backing 
have made explicit attempts to try to control and channel women’s actions 
in order to achieve their own ends.”41 In other words, making feminist sense 
of the interactions of states requires looking at the use of gender relations in 
these interactions, the differential power between men and women in these 
interactions and processes, and the meanings of the struggles of various men 
and women in these processes.
While there is certainly a vast diversity of distinct feminist positions on 
issues of state and political power (and the above was, by far, less a compre-
hensive review than a selective archiving of various feminist lenses through 
which we can view the political), feminist theorists give us a variety of tools 
with which we can view how states and gender relations affect each other. A 
feminist analysis of states will allow us to look into the public-private divi-
sion, male biases in the operations and understandings of state structures and 
policies, and the priorities of a given state. We can look at the relation of state 
policy to the use of violence (and the relation of gender relations to violence 
in a given state), both against its own population and against populations 
outside its borders. A feminist analysis can also look at a given state in rela-
tion to exploitation, powerlessness, marginalization, cultural imperialism, 
and violence and the connection of those to gender relations. Moreover, we 
can examine the relation of state policy and actions in alleviating inequalities 
(and specifically gender inequalities), through analyzing the existence and 
efficacy of antipoverty, antiexploitation, equality, antimarginalization, and 
antiandrocentric principles. Finally, in a given political body’s operations, 
we can look at the use and construction of gender relations. What insight 
do these tools give us into the Monroe Republic?
Feminist Political Theory and the Monroe Republic
The changes in the political economy of the world after the blackout seem to 
have a number of repercussions, including in the sexual division of labor and 
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the system of gender relations as a whole. For example, a key element of the 
sexual division of labor under capitalism is the distinction between public 
and private spheres—but in the Monroe Republic, while private households 
exist, it seems as though economic production has predominantly returned 
to the private sphere and men and women share to a greater degree the duties 
of production at home. Thus, one significant effect of capitalism on gender 
relations seems to have changed significantly. Additionally, the Monroe 
Militia, as mentioned before, does not seem to have concerned itself with 
the welfare of the population or its material base in general—it has largely 
abandoned pretensions to welfarist distributions. But if gender relations 
have changed, what have they changed to?
The leadership of the Monroe Militia seems highly gender segregated, 
with men filling the visible levels of leadership. Women are conscripted into 
the army (as seen in “The Children’s Crusade”), but are not seen to be given 
positions of leadership—and of course, leadership in the militia is leadership in 
the government. This may be a de facto leftover from the prior masculine mili-
tary culture rather than an intent, as the Monroe Militia clearly has no qualms 
about regularly employing female bounty hunters (as shown with Mia in “Ties 
That Bind”). The rebels, by contrast, have been more amenable to female par-
ticipation in their campaigns (and again significant, by contrast, is that the 
Georgia Federation, unlike the Monroe Republic, has a female president). In 
addition to being de facto excluded from equal political power and sharing 
economic exploitation with male citizens, women are subjected to performing 
domestic labor in the homes of more powerful militia members (for example, 
in the home of Tom Neville) and are further subjected to distinctively sexual 
exploitation, in which powerful men have access to sexual favors from women, 
presumably prostitutes. For example, in the episode “Sex and Drugs,” upon 
first talking to the captive Danny, Monroe tells him, “Just remember, you’re 
my guest. Anything you want, food, women, anything, just ask, okay?” just 
as the same episode introduces us to Drexel, the leading heroin dealer of the 
Monroe Republic, who is revealed to have a stable of “Drexel’s girls,” whom 
he uses sexually and controls by keeping them addicted to heroin. It seems as 
though the world of Revolution is dangerous in general, but it is an especially 
dangerous place in which to be a woman (highlighted by an attempted rape 
of Charlie by bandits in the pilot episode). While there is little to no indica-
tion that Monroe allows his soldiers to commit rape or sexual violence against 
women (and it seems rather unlikely), powerful men in the Monroe Republic 
do take advantage of their capacity to sexually exploit women.
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The policies of the Monroe Republic, again, seem oriented exclusively 
toward the maintenance of military coercive power, and the official laws we 
are familiar with are utilized to aid militia monopolization of weaponry and 
to allow interrogation and arrest of individuals who rebel or otherwise resist 
the militia. Moreover, it is evident that forced conscription of children into 
the militia is an official policy and means of militia growth. It is clear that 
the priorities of the Monroe Militia are the maintenance and monopoly of 
coercive capacity, measured in strength of arms and number of soldiers, over 
whom discipline is readily exercised (disobedience and especially rebellion 
are often punished by execution). War, then, seems to be the fundamental 
priority of the militia and thus the republic—and the leadership will readily 
break apart families in order to maintain that coercive capacity. Insofar as 
warfare and militarism are associated with masculinity, then, and a focus 
on family is often associated with femininity, these tendencies are implic-
itly supported in Revolution through the sexual segregation of the militia 
and common emphasis by female characters on the importance of family 
(although male characters’ focus is just as often the protection of family, as 
with Miles’s continued efforts, and the use of family ties as tools of inter-
rogation, such as Monroe’s use of Danny to get information from Rachel). 
Consequently, the Monroe Republic’s emphatic pursuit of greater military 
capacity and willingness to break apart families and use familial love as 
leverage to extract information can be interpreted as supporting the idea 
that the policies of the Monroe Republic have a distinctly masculinist bias.
Applying the concrete criteria we have unearthed from various feminist 
theorists, the gender relations of the Monroe Republic prove problematic in 
a number of ways. First of all, while the public-private split so characteristic 
of the gender hierarchy under capitalism has been bridged to a degree, it is 
largely a result of the relocalization of production, and the position of women 
seems to have been diminished in certain distinct ways within the Monroe 
Republic. Considering the five faces of oppression outlined by Young, gender 
relations in the Monroe Republic are still dramatically unequal. First of all, 
women are as subject to economic exploitation as men, but they are addi-
tionally subject to sexual exploitation (and the only domestic laborers we 
have seen in the show are women). Women are subject to a large degree of 
structural powerlessness under the Monroe Republic, for while few men have 
significant decision-making power, no women seem to—indeed, though we 
see a number of female rebels, soldiers, and warriors, the most secure women 
in the Monroe Republic are secure due to the protection of the men in their 
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life. (This is highlighted numerous times; for example, by how often Miles 
has come to the aid of Charlie, Aaron leaving his wife because of his inability 
to protect her, and the security of Captain Neville’s wife as a contrast against 
the position of many women in Revolution.) We are uncertain whether this 
is due to mere contingent circumstances or whether it is a strict policy (and 
thus formal marginalization), but the effect is the same. Thus, by an account 
of Young’s three material criteria—exploitation, marginalization, and power-
lessness—women are substantively disempowered in the Monroe Republic.
By account of Young’s two remaining criteria, cultural imperialism 
and violence, the Monroe Republic fares no better. The Monroe Militia, as 
a governing body, subjects society to the demands of violence, being orga-
nized around warfare and using monopolization of force, conscription, 
and taxation toward this end alone. Violence, properly speaking, is merely 
instrumental and cannot construct or maintain a society (as highlighted in 
discussions by thinkers as diverse as Engels and Arendt), and it is associated 
in a number of ways with men as a prerogative of male power. Thus vio-
lence and war, as men’s spheres and representing masculinist priorities (as it 
implicitly seems to in Revolution), reflect Young’s criteria of cultural imperi-
alism, wherein the priorities of one group (in this case men, who control the 
Monroe Militia and, given the structural integration of sexual exploitation 
of women, seem to be predominately benefited by practice and policy in the 
republic) overtake the policies of an Othered group (in this case, women). 
Moreover, the importance of family is constantly disregarded by Monroe 
or used as tactical leverage, and a warfare orientation clearly dominates any 
suggestion of welfare measures taken by the Monroe Republic on behalf of 
the citizens under it (welfare measures are so far invisible). Alongside this 
lack of welfare policies, the Monroe Republic seems to be unconcerned with 
movements toward gender equality—none of Fraser’s five criteria is visibly 
present. In terms of a feminist balance sheet the Monroe Republic stands 
as a male-dominated, male-focused, violent government, in which women 
are excluded from positions of power, commonly sexually exploited, and 
utilized as objects for powerful men, and which by all meaningful accounts 
is marked by the general domination of men over women.
The Monroe Republic: A Marxist-Feminist Revolution?
From what we know of the Monroe Republic, Marxist and feminist criticism 
have revealed a number of key factors. The Monroe Republic is dominated 
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by the Monroe Militia, which is governed by men in its topmost positions 
and monopolizes coercive power, which it uses to defend and expand its 
borders against rival territories and to secure domination over the citizens 
within those borders. To these ends of warfare the Monroe Republic sub-
jects all other aspects of life—extracting taxation and crops, abducting con-
scripted children, and killing whomever stands in its way. The laws of which 
we are aware are oriented toward this end, neglecting the general social 
need to maintain production and reproduction. The militia seems to take 
no part in attempts to provide welfare or improve the productive capacity 
of the state, and when it does seek higher technology (such as by reclaiming 
steam-powered locomotion or reattaining electricity) it prioritizes military 
uses (using trains to move troops and electricity to power helicopters, for 
example). The Monroe Republic, then, clearly is both a hierarchical and an 
exploitative political superstructure that largely neglects its material condi-
tions, living instead off already-produced goods (such as stockpiling guns and 
ammunition from before the blackout) and operating with a very gender-
differentiated and patriarchal sexual division of labor, in which the rule of 
men is underwritten by the domestic labor and sexual exploitation of women.
By both Marxist and feminist accounts, then, the Monroe Republic is 
hierarchical and exploitative and, moreover, violent and neglectful of the 
conditions of its own existence. As highlighted by both Arendt and Engels, 
states oriented toward violence cannot in the long term stand—they dele-
gitimize themselves and, in ignorance of their foundations, they cannot sur-
vive without changing. However strong the Monroe Militia could become 
from the reclamation of steam technology or electricity, without a change 
in orientation its rule could never be absolute. Three key insights from per-
forming parallel Marxist and feminist analyses of Revolution thus present 
themselves. First, for all its insight, historical materialist analysis has been 
uneven in its recognition of the importance of reproduction and thus of 
family and gender relations as a material base of society. Second, in con-
cordance with a vast array of existing feminist literature, Revolution shows 
that one cannot understand the class relations of a particular society without 
understanding its gender relations, and similarly one cannot understand its 
gender relations in their totality without a command of its class relations 
and the impact of those class relations on welfare and/or on the militarism 
of a particular state. Finally, it reveals that analysis of the state must recog-
nize the uses of masculinity and male-biased policies in underwriting the 
coercive force that secures state and class power—masculinities, in their 
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often-developed capacities for violence, are necessary to support militaristic 
states just as they protect class relationships. This latter, often undertheo-
rized, insight is useful in an understanding of the operations of patriarchal 
modes of production, and without it one cannot understand the political 
economy of Revolution. The possibilities for a humanist, class and gender 
egalitarian revolution in Revolution have yet to be seen—but as both Marx-
ist and feminist analyses reveal, without such a revolution, the longevity of 
the Monroe Republic may be as unlikely as it is undesirable.
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a LIGht In the darkness
Ethical Reflections on Revolution
Michael Versteeg and Adam Barkman
Electricity is the source upon which our modern technologized society is 
dependent. Many technologies that we take for granted every day, such as 
cellphones and computers, rely on this source of power. But what would 
happen if one day everything just shut off? How would human beings sur-
vive in a world without electricity? Such a world is realized in J. J. Abrams’s 
Revolution.
Approximately fifteen years after a global blackout, modern civilization 
as we know it ceases to exist, and the former United States births five new 
political entities, one of which is known as the Monroe Republic. The story 
of Revolution takes place within the Monroe Republic and centers around 
Charlie Matheson, who tries to rescue her brother and mother from Bass 
Monroe, the head of the Monroe Republic. As her adventure unfolds, Char-
lie, along with her uncle Miles Matheson and others, experiences moments 
of loss and hardship as well as moral indecision. Charlie even discovers that 
her uncle was at one time a general for the Monroe Militia. It is a coming-
of-age story for Charlie, who in her childish innocence soon learns that the 
world is not a simple place.
Within the world of Revolution, where murder and stealing could make 
the difference between life and death, an important question of ethics must 
be raised: How do we determine in a given situation what act would be con-
sidered right or wrong? As humans we struggle with these kinds of ethical 
questions all the time. Revolution provides us with a world filled with situa-
tions in which tough ethical questions must be addressed. Moreover, to arrive 
at any decision about how to answer these questions, we require an ethical 
theory, or some sort of ethical framework, that will allow us to navigate the 
ethical waters of Revolution. Many potential theories today try to provide a 
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comprehensive framework for ethical consideration. But there arises another 
question: Which ethical theory is best, and how do we discern this?
In this chapter we consider four ethical theories—ethical subjec-
tivism, contractarianism, utilitarianism, and natural law theory—and 
apply them to Revolution, providing an illustration of how each theory 
functions. Subsequently, we critique each theory, suggesting that there 
are three specific criteria that a viable ethical theory must meet. These 
criteria will be outlined in the discussion, and the ethical theory that sat-
isfies all three criteria may be considered the best ethical theory within 
the scope of our analysis.
“Man is the measure of all things”: Ethical Subjectivism
The first contender for consideration is known as ethical subjectivism, which 
claims that ethical principles are arbitrarily chosen by, and are relative to, 
each individual moral agent. This theory perceives moral understanding as 
a purely subjective enterprise, which is to say, without any objective basis. 
Such an ethical framework could be summarized as follows: What is right 
for you is right for you, and what is right for me is right for me. There is no 
objective right or wrong; rather, there is only what one deems to be pref-
erable. If you believe that breaking the law and stealing weapons from the 
Monroe Militia is morally praiseworthy, then that is true and right for you. 
Similarly, if you believe that taking a woman hostage and sexually violating 
her for fun is morally right, this would also be true and right for you. In any 
particular situation, the ethical subjectivist alone is responsible for deter-
mining what is, and is not, morally permissible. Certainly, such a theory 
would allow one to make quick and decisive ethical choices, which would 
be useful in a postapocalyptic world. To see how this theory would work, 
let’s use an example from the world of Revolution.
In the episode “No Quarter,” a flashback shows Miles and his friend 
Monroe (before the establishment of the Monroe Republic) walking down 
a road together six months after the blackout. As the two of them are walk-
ing, they stumble across a campsite and find the bodies of a couple that had 
recently been killed. A second flashback in the episode continues with Miles 
and Monroe walking down the same road, this time coming across two burly 
men beating a third man to the ground. Miles is disturbed by what he sees 
and proceeds to move toward one of the men, drawing his handgun. The 
man pleads with Miles for his life, claiming that they were only trying to 
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find something to eat. At this point, Miles realizes that it was these two men 
who earlier had murdered the couple down the road. “Can’t call the cops. 
Can’t put ’em in jail,” Miles says. Miles looks as these men and pauses, then 
quickly turns and shoots both of them in the chest. With the two men dead 
Miles turns to Monroe, who is shocked at what has just happened, and says, 
“There’s nobody else coming to help. . . . Somebody’s gotta do something, 
or else there’s gonna be nothing left.”1
According to ethical subjectivism, in this situation Miles would be 
totally justified in doing what he did, since what is morally right or wrong 
is whatever an individual discerns it to be. Miles concluded that killing the 
two men was morally right because they, according to his own perspec-
tive, were guilty of murdering two people and beating a man senseless. On 
the other hand, if Miles had allowed these men to leave unharmed, this 
would also have been the morally right choice and would be equally per-
missible within his subjective ethical framework. Given ethical subjectiv-
ism, Miles’s moral discernment is ultimately arbitrary: any possible choice 
can be either morally right or wrong as long as he deems it so. Morality is 
reduced to something like a groundless opinion, a nonrational feeling, or 
an aesthetic preference.
We can well imagine that some problems arise within this theory. If 
ethical subjectivism is correct and all ethical principles are relative to and 
grounded upon each individual’s subjective choice, then what happens when 
two parties have conflicting ethical frameworks? Consider the example of 
Miles killing the two men. In this situation it seems clear that Miles con-
victed and killed these men based upon at least two ethical principles that 
he believed to be true: “murder is not right” and “beating another person 
senseless is not right.” Now, these ethical principles would apply only to 
the individual in question—Miles—and are not themselves objective in any 
way. If this is so, it’s logically possible that the two men killed by Miles did 
not themselves believe these two propositions to be true. In fact, we can 
imagine that these men could have believed two opposite propositions to 
be true: “murder is right” and “beating another person senseless is right.” 
According to ethical subjectivism, Miles and the two other men are both 
morally “right” because there is no objective ethical standard. In such a 
case, these men were as justified in their actions of murder and beating 
another individual as Miles was in killing both of them. But how can two 
contrary principles, “murder is right” and “murder is not right,” both be 
true at the same time?
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They Can’t Both Be Right
Two contrary propositions cannot both be true simultaneously. In this case, 
murder cannot be both morally right and wrong; it necessarily must be one 
or the other. If every human individual is entitled to his or her own sub-
jective ethical framework, as the ethical subjectivist claims, then it follows 
that logical conflict and incoherence will abound. Therefore, since ethical 
subjectivism has proven to show signs of incoherence, the veracity of such 
an ethical theory is called into question. However, the problem goes fur-
ther still. The basic premise of ethical subjectivism itself proves the theory 
to be self-refuting.
Consider the foundational premise, or proposition, of the theory 
ethical subjectivism: morality is subjectively defined by all human indi-
viduals. If this proposition (P) is true, then it must necessarily apply 
to all human individuals. But if P must necessarily apply to all human 
individuals, this would suggest that there is, in fact, one ethical princi-
ple—namely, P—that all human individuals hold in common. But if all 
human individuals hold P in common, then the content of P (that mor-
ality is subjectively defined by all human individuals) must necessarily 
be false, given that there is at least one ethical principle—namely, P—
that is not subjectively defined by all individuals. Thus, in order for the 
content of P (morality is subjectively defined by all human individuals) 
to be true, P cannot apply to all human individuals and, therefore, must 
be false. Now, for P to be both true and false at the same time and in the 
same way is nonsense, and so the basic premise of ethical subjectivism 
effectively refutes itself.
It is reasonable, then, to conclude that ethical subjectivism cannot sup-
ply an ethical foundation; in addition, the theory itself is self-refuting and 
cannot be rationally maintained. As we saw with Miles and the two men, we 
cannot truly establish the rightness or wrongness of either Miles’s actions 
or those of the two men if morality is subjective to each human individual. 
However, the very purpose of an ethical theory is to determine the ethical 
status of varying actions. Therefore, the following shall serve as the first of 
our criteria for a viable ethical theory: a viable ethical theory is required to 
establish a common and agreed-upon foundation of behavior that is logic-
ally coherent and consistent in order to morally differentiate between varying 
actions. Let’s now look at our next contender and see if it can provide such 
an ethical foundation.
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“By the people, for the people”: Contractarianism
It seems that a viable ethical theory must establish a proper ethical founda-
tion for coherent moral reasoning. To find a common ethical foundation, 
we will now consider John Rawls’s contractarianism and see if this theory 
is up to the task.
Rawls’s contractarianism is a form of ethical conventionalism, which 
states that morality is determined by a social body or society. Contract-
arianism states that ethical principles are defined by a social contract agreed 
upon by a special group of rational individuals who represent the general 
populace of a particular society or social body. Known as the “original pos-
ition,” this group would abandon certain beliefs about the world and them-
selves that might cloud or influence their judgment, including metaphysical 
and religious beliefs, as well as other facts about their social status.2 This 
“veil of ignorance” brackets such beliefs to ensure that these individuals 
will determine an ethical foundation for a society without tailoring moral-
ity according to their own interests.3 For example, if a man knew he were 
wealthy it’s possible that he might promote principles that would advantage 
the wealthy.4 Rawls argues that if people are ignorant of any details about 
themselves and their social status, they would then agree upon an ethical 
foundation that would treat each person equally and fairly, including them-
selves. As Rawls states,
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This 
ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice 
of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency 
of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one 
is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the 
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 
. . . The original position is, one might say, the appropriate status 
quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. 
This explains the propriety of the name “justice as fairness”: it 
conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in a 
situation that is fair.5
The ethical contract of contractarianism would seem to provide at least a 
common ethical foundation, providing us with a basis for morally differen-
tiating between the actions of several individuals, not just one. To see how 
344 Michael Versteeg and Adam Barkman
this theory functions, let’s reconsider the scenario with Miles and the two 
men and see how contractarianism would unfold in the same situation.
Miles considered himself justified in killing those men because he 
believed at least these two ethical principles to be true: “murder is not right” 
and “beating men senseless is not right.” Now, within the context of Revo-
lution, let’s suppose that a group of rational individuals gather together, 
collectively representing the Monroe Republic. Let’s further suppose that 
all of their individual beliefs that may influence their judgments have been 
bracketed behind the veil of ignorance and this group—in the original posi-
tion—agrees upon an ethical contract that presumably reflects a fair society. 
Let’s also assume that this contract either explicitly or implicitly agrees with 
two ethical principles: “murder is not right” and “beating men senseless is 
not right.” Such a contract would now serve as the ethical foundation of 
the Monroe Republic and should provide a standard by which to judge and 
assess behavior between individuals.
Given this particular ethical contract, it would seem clear that the two 
men were indeed guilty of wrongdoing, as Miles believed they were. These 
men acted in violation of the ethical contract of the Monroe Republic by 
violating the principles “murder is not right” and “beating men senseless 
is not right,” and therefore they are guilty of committing immoral acts. If 
contractarianism is true, then the conviction of these men appears to be 
justified and coherent. But what about Miles? Although he was perhaps 
justified in convicting these men of wrongdoing, Miles’s actions are held 
equally accountable to the ethical contract of the Monroe Republic, and 
we are therefore entitled to question Miles’s moral justification for killing 
these men.
If the Monroe Republic had stipulated certain laws about the use of 
capital punishment by certain individuals in certain circumstances, then it 
is possible to argue that Miles could have been justified in killing these men. 
On the other hand, if Miles’s actions were not warranted according to the 
ethical contract, then one could also argue that he is guilty of murder, or 
unjust killing. However, this kind of inquiry would concern only the ethi-
cal contract itself, not the theory of contractarianism per se. In this case, 
the question of Miles’s justification is not necessarily important to the dis-
cussion at hand. What is important, however, is the question of whether or 
not contractarianism can even provide an ethical foundation for discussing 
the ethical status of the actions of individuals. As we have seen, contracta-
rianism provides an ethical foundation that allows us to coherently morally 
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differentiate the actions of more than one human individual—something 
ethical subjectivism could not do.
As-If Ethical Theorizing
Contractarianism succeeds where ethical subjectivism could not, and for 
that reason it is in contention to be a viable ethical theory. However, though 
this theory may establish a common ethical foundation, there are significant 
issues with contractarianism that must be considered. Let’s look at another 
scenario from the world of Revolution to consider such problems.
In the episode “Chained Heat,” a flashback brings us back to when a 
much-younger Charlie is wandering through a city with her parents. While 
playing with a basketball, Charlie lets the ball get away and runs after it, 
stumbling across a stranger who then starts innocently talking with her. 
When Charlie’s mother, Rachel Matheson, calls Charlie to come to her, 
the man grabs Charlie and draws her closer to him, commenting on her 
“pretty face.” Holding her by the shoulders, the stranger warns that he will 
kill Charlie unless Rachel gives him all the food they have. Just then, Ben, 
Charlie’s father, returns from scavenging to find his family being threat-
ened. Ben draws his handgun and threatens to shoot the man if he does 
not let Charlie go. The man slowly brings Charlie back to the Mathesons 
and proceeds to take their cart of food and supplies as he leaves. Raising 
his gun at the man, Ben shouts at him, “Stop, we need that food. I can’t let 
you take it—I’ll shoot!” The man stops and turns toward Ben, replying, “I 
don’t think you will.” He continues to walk away, and Ben slowly lowers his 
gun, watching as the stranger steals his family’s food. However, before the 
man disappears, there is the echo of a gunshot as Rachel, without flinching, 
shoots and kills the man.6
A key ethical question is raised: Was Rachel justified in killing this 
man? To answer this question we would simply heed the ethical contract 
that contractarianism provides. Based on this established contract, which 
serves as an ethical foundation, we should be able to assess whether or 
not Rachel’s actions were right. However, before we can even begin to 
consider Rachel’s justification, an issue arises. Within the theory, Rawls 
implicitly assumes that fairness and equality are qualities that are good, 
or just, which an ethical contract should reflect. Yet this assumption 
raises the question of how Rawls comes to such a conclusion. Moreover, 
to what standard is Rawls referring when he establishes that fairness 
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and equality are just? Why not assume that unfairness and inequality 
are just, or good? By what is Rawls judging the qualities of fairness and 
equality to assess their goodness? Now, if contractarianism is true, then 
for Rawls to justify his claim that equality and fairness are just, he would 
require his original position to agree that equality and fairness are good 
things while at the same time using the presumption of the goodness 
of equality and fairness itself as the “standard” by which the original 
position will judge. But clearly this would be circular reasoning. And if 
Rawls is simply making unwarranted assumptions, then why trust the 
theory of contractarianism at all? Thus it seems that in order to claim 
that equality and fairness are good in and of themselves, Rawls would 
use a separate ethical standard, one outside of his theory of contracta-
rianism, to make such a judgment. But this raises another question: By 
what standard is he judging?
Aside from the previous issue, there is another, more significant prob-
lem for contractarianism. From a practical standpoint, the theory itself is 
untenable and cannot be used in a practical manner. Rawls’s conceptions of 
the original position and the veil of ignorance are part of a thought experi-
ment: they are merely hypothetical. In the words of Rawls himself, the ori-
ginal position is “a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead 
to a certain conception of justice.”7 For a group of individuals to become 
oblivious to all possible beliefs that may influence or bias their judgment is, 
arguably, most likely impossible. And even if it were possible, why should we 
abandon all metaethical beliefs? Certainly we can well imagine that meta-
physical beliefs regarding reality and the nature of the human person are 
important and, therefore, should be involved in the process of forming a 
proper ethical theory rather than abandoned. Theoretically, contractarian-
ism may be able to provide an ethical foundation, but practically speaking, 
the theory cannot sustain its own basic tenets.
Contractarianism, simply put, is an “as if ” ethical framework. Accord-
ingly, if this theory relies on concepts that are purely hypothetical in nature, 
how can it be applied to the actual world? The answer is that it cannot, and 
therefore contractarianism cannot be considered a viable ethical theory. 
And this provides us with our second criterion for an ethical theory: a 
viable ethical theory must be practically applicable within the real (actual) 
world. So far we have looked at ethical subjectivism and contractarianism 
and have seen that both have fallen short of our goal, so let’s see if the next 
contender fares any better.
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“The ends justify the means”: Utilitarianism
From our observations of ethical subjectivism and contractarianism, it seems 
that a viable ethical theory must not only provide an ethical foundation that 
functions in a logical, consistent manner (the snag for ethical subjectivism) 
but must also be capable of being applied practically to everyday moral rea-
soning (the snag for contractarianism). To find an ethical theory that will 
work within the world of Revolution, we will now consider utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism is a form of what is known as consequentialism, which 
bases moral considerations upon the effects or consequences of particular 
actions. The theory of utilitarianism in particular states that ethical prin-
ciples are determined by considering the degree of utility that results from 
the consequences of any action. Right or good actions are those that produce 
the greatest proportion of utility overall. Utility, according to John Stuart 
Mill, is defined by the Greatest Happiness Principle, which states, “Actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend 
to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and 
the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”8 
Utility refers to that which is good in a nonmoral sense. If the consequences 
of an act yield a greater proportion of happiness, or good, over the “reverse 
of happiness,” or bad, then we conclude that such an act is right. Simply put, 
utilitarianism promotes the greatest good for everyone considered.
Now, important to note is the distinction between two different 
approaches within utilitarianism. The first is known as act utilitarianism, 
in which the rightness of an act is determined solely by the good produced 
by individual acts on their own. This approach is concerned with specific 
situations and is more case-by-case in nature, whereas determining the right-
ness of an action is a matter of weighing the consequences of each possible 
act in a given situation. The second approach, rule utilitarianism, states that 
the rightness of an act is determined by how much good is produced while 
adhering to certain guidelines or rules. A right act is one conforming to a 
rule that, if followed generally within a society, would result in a greater 
proportion of utility overall. Even if an act produces immediate harmful 
effects in a particular case, rule utilitarianism considers the effects of the 
action generally, providing a general rule of thumb.
Having distinguished these two approaches, let’s first see how a utilitarian 
would apply act utilitarianism to the situation with Rachel and the stranger. 
From the act utilitarian perspective, we need to consider this situation on 
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its own and imagine the consequences of each possible course of action that 
Rachel could have pursued. If Rachel had let the man go, surely he would 
have benefited greatly from his new food supply. On the other hand, that 
very same act would probably have resulted in the Mathesons starving to 
death (assuming that food was extremely scarce). Consider another action: 
by killing the man, even though his death would be considered harmful, 
Rachel ensured that the Mathesons were able to keep their food supply, and 
the three of them benefited and survived, rather than dying of starvation. 
In this situation it seems to be a greater good for the Mathesons, a family of 
three, to keep the food for themselves and survive, rather than for one man 
to take it for himself. Thus, if we follow this act utilitarian line of reason-
ing, the morally right thing for Rachel to do was to kill the man and keep 
the food for her own family.9
The act utilitarian ethical foundation for determining an act’s ethical 
status (judging an act according to its consequences) certainly seems to be 
logically coherent, and the consequentialist methodology appears to provide 
a method of ethical problem solving that would prove practically applicable 
in the actual world. In fact, much of our day-to-day moral reasoning reflects 
the idea of considering the benefits and the drawbacks of a particular situa-
tion. However, even though the basic consequentialist foundation of act utili-
tarianism does provide a practical methodology in moral problem solving, 
this branch of utilitarianism retains a significant problem. So before moving 
on to rule utilitarianism, let’s look at the problem with act utilitarianism.
The difficulty in act utilitarianism is an epistemological one. In our prior 
example with Rachel, to what extent must she consider the consequences of an 
act before she is justified in making a decision? In other words, how far along 
must Rachel consider the “chain of consequences,” so to speak, before she can 
come to a justified decision? According to the consequences considered, we 
determined that killing the man would seem to produce a greater proportion 
of utility than not killing him. Yet what if, by killing him, Rachel prevented this 
man from bringing food to his wife and children (supposing he had a family), 
thereby causing their deaths? Additionally, perhaps as a result of witnessing 
his death, Charlie potentially could have developed a form of psychological 
trauma in the future. The consideration of this new information could po-
tentially change the balance of Rachel’s utilitarian calculus.10
Now, these considerations are hypothetical, and practically speaking, 
Rachel could not have known such details even if they were the case. But 
that is exactly the point. Act utilitarianism imposes an unsustainable burden 
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that is beyond the epistemic grasp of an individual. To optimally determine 
the yield of utility of a particular act, one would have to consider a near-
infinite regression of possible consequences. In fairness, one might defend 
the act utilitarian position by arguing that Rachel does not need to make an 
optimal conclusion but rather only consider the relevant consequences that 
are readily knowable to her, thereby limiting her epistemic responsibility. 
Indeed, this would limit the number of possible consequences to consider. 
However, if this epistemological adjustment is to be established, then the 
determination of utility yielded in each particular case becomes more and 
more subjective, and the ethical basis of act utilitarianism grows increasingly 
arbitrary. If the ethical status of an act is dependent not only on the con-
sequences considered but now also on the epistemological context (which 
varies from person to person) in which to consider such consequences, the 
resultant conclusion made by an individual retains an even higher degree of 
subjectivity. Thus, for the act utilitarian to arrive at a well-founded conclu-
sion regarding the precise utility produced in any specific case would seem 
a dubious undertaking at best, calling into question the veracity of such an 
approach. To respond to this objection the utilitarian need only adjust his 
or her theory to rule utilitarianism.
In the episode “Sex and Drugs” Miles seeks out one of his old acquain-
tances, Drexel, a leading heroin dealer in the Monroe Republic, and requests 
medical assistance for Nora, a woman accompanying Miles and Charlie, 
who was stabbed in the prior episode. Drexel, a seemingly devious man, 
provides the group with shelter and gives Nora her required aid. In return, 
Drexel demands that Charlie do him a favor. An Irish family up the road 
from Drexel’s mansion, the O’Hallorans, has recently burned his poppy 
crops, used for producing heroin. In order to get back at the O’Hallorans, 
Drexel gives Miles an ultimatum; either Charlie goes and kills their father, 
Bill O’Halloran, or everyone from Miles’s group will be killed. Before Miles 
is able to speak, Charlie accepts the offer and agrees to do what Drexel wants. 
As she prepares to leave on her mission, Aaron pleads with Charlie not to 
go through with it, claiming that the O’Hallorans are innocent. “This is 
murder,” Aaron protests, to which Charlie replies, “I don’t have a choice.”11
What’s the Correct Course?
What, exactly, would be the correct course of action in this instance? To 
reiterate, rule utilitarianism states that an act is right insofar as it adheres 
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to a given rule that, if generally followed, would produce the greatest good, 
or the highest proportion of utility, overall. For example, we could imagine 
“do not take that which is not yours” or “do not steal” as a possible rule. If 
followed generally, it seems that this particular rule would probably result 
in a greater proportion of utility overall. Now, although there may be certain 
cases in which stealing may yield a greater immediate proportion of utility 
in a particular situation, this rule would still yield the greatest good overall 
and would therefore be binding for a rule utilitarian to follow.
In regard to our scenario, we could also imagine that the rule “do not 
kill another person unjustly” would probably result in a greater proportion 
of utility if generally followed. Assuming that this rule would actually apply 
in our scenario with Charlie, we need to discern what the term “unjustly” 
refers to. Recall that for rule utilitarianism an act that is right or just is one 
that follows a rule that would yield greater utility if generally followed. So we 
may translate the previous rule likewise: “do not kill another person unless 
there is a rule that supports such an act.” Thus, in order to be justified in 
killing another person there must be a rule that would support that very 
act. Now, can we imagine a possible rule that would yield a greater amount 
of utility overall and also permit Charlie’s killing of Bill O’Halloran? It cer-
tainly seems possible. For example, the rule “protect your loved ones from 
harm” would certainly seem to produce a greater amount of utility if gen-
erally followed and would also seem to offer justification in Charlie’s act of 
killing. We may conclude, then, that according to rule utilitarianism Char-
lie’s killing of Bill O’Halloran could be justified.
Now, even though rule utilitarianism is often the most preferred 
approach to utilitarianism, it is not without its flaws. In the situation with 
Charlie the rule utilitarian would need to ask the question, What rule, if 
generally followed, would maximize utility? But, when considering a rule 
in a given situation, how does the rule utilitarian discern which particular 
rule(s) to follow? For example, it is conceivable within our case that Charlie 
could have considered another rule, say, “do unto others what you would have 
done unto yourself.”12 Given the rule we already used (“protect your loved 
ones from harm”), both of these rules, if followed generally, would seem to 
produce greater utility in general and would therefore be acceptable to the 
rule utilitarian. However, these two rules would provide us with contrary 
courses of action, and rule utilitarianism does not seem to provide any basis 
to decide which of these rules is “more right.” Thus, in the situation with 
Bill O’Halloran, which rule should Charlie follow? To overcome this issue, 
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perhaps we should choose between different rules based on their output of 
utility. But this appears to be a rehashed form of act utilitarianism, since we 
are deciding what is right based on the output of utility of each possible rule 
(instead of direct consequences) that would apply. If this is the case, then 
the same insufficiencies within act utilitarianism would now apply to rule 
utilitarianism, leaving us with no alternative approach. Thus, utilitarianism 
may not be able to contend any longer.
Yet there is another objection to utilitarianism that seems to be even 
more crucial. In general, the utilitarian ethic does not seem to correspond 
with everyday human moral reality. Although it is true that the consequences 
of an act do somewhat contribute to the rightness or wrongness of an act, 
there also seems to be an ethical quality inherent in the very act itself that 
retains moral value. When we say “murder is wrong” or “genocide is wrong 
or “rape is wrong,” do we really only mean to suggest that these things merely 
produce more “negative” consequences than good ones? Although these acts 
could and probably do produce “negative” consequences, that fact alone does 
not seem to be the sole determinant of an act’s ethical value; there seems to 
be something wrong or right in a particular act itself, regardless of the con-
sequences. For instance, when we act kind to a friend or family member, is 
such an act good only because it produces “positive” effects? Most people 
would want to say no, since acting in a kind manner does not seem to be 
“right” just for the sake of the act’s consequences but rather for the sake of 
the act itself. Certain acts seem to sustain a moral quality that is inherent in 
that act itself, totally independent of its consequences. However, utilitarian-
ism cannot provide an explanation for this. For the utilitarian, ethical value 
is placed only on the consequences of the act, and not on the act itself, which 
would fly in the face of considered moral judgments. If everything we did 
was purely in consideration of consequences, the very nature of things such 
as love, kindness, friendship, and compassion would seem to lose their core 
moral qualities by this consequentialist attitude.
Even though utilitarianism may be able to provide practical means 
for everyday moral reasoning, the consequentialist methodology does not 
seem to correspond with moral reality as we experience it every day. Certain 
actions seem to have an inherent moral value in and of themselves, totally 
unrelated to the consequences that such an act may produce. As well, there 
also seem to be acts that human beings simply intuit to be either right or 
wrong. Many of us would admit a priori that certain things are wrong sim-
ply because that’s the way things are, and the utilitarian cannot account for 
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this phenomenon of common sense. This ultimately provides us with our 
third and final criterion for an ethical theory: a viable ethical theory must 
correspond with and provide an explanation for commonly held human moral 
values and the human moral reality as we experience it every day. With our 
third and final criterion established we now look to our fourth and final 
contender for consideration.
“For goodness’ sake”: Natural Law Theory
As a form of deontological ethics (obligation, or duty-based ethics), nat-
ural law theory states that basic ethical principles are constituted by an 
unchanging, transcendent, and universal moral law that compels all human 
individuals to act in accordance with its ethical standards.13 These ethical 
principles, or laws, exist objectively, meaning that they are true regardless 
of what we as humans think about them.14 Even if all humans believed a 
certain unjust act was just, it would still always remain unjust—we would 
all simply be ignorant or morally deficient. Therefore these principles are 
prescriptive in nature and instruct how humans ought to behave, rather than 
descriptive of how humans actually do behave, and are separated within two 
main categories. The first category is that of general laws, which consists of 
laws that apply generally unless exceptions are warranted.15 For example, 
in one of our prior cases Rachel Matheson killed a man in order to pre-
vent him from stealing her family’s food. According to the general law “all 
things being equal, do not kill another human being,” Rachel would not 
be justified in killing another person under normal circumstances. How-
ever, within this particular case there were other factors to consider that 
would perhaps justify her act of killing the man (e.g., the man stole their 
food, Charlie’s life was threatened, etc.). Further examples of general laws 
include “all things being equal, do not take that which is not yours,” “all 
things being equal, one should speak the truth,” and “all things being equal, 
do unto others what you would have done unto yourself.” The second cat-
egory of principles consists of absolute laws, which must be adhered to in 
every and all circumstances. An absolute law such as “do not kill another 
human individual unjustly (i.e., murder)” will apply in every situation no 
matter what the circumstances. To murder is to violate an absolute prin-
ciple, which is considered always wrong in all cases.
There are other basic principles within the natural law, including the 
principle of general beneficence, which states, “all things being equal, do no 
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harm,” as well as special beneficence, which states, “all things being equal, a 
person acts well or justly to favor his or her family and kin over others.” And 
it is from these basic principles that we can deduce further, not-so-obvious 
ethical principles, such as the principle “parents ought to provide for their 
children.” Such a specific principle can be extracted from both general and 
special beneficence. Along with these principles is the central concept of jus-
tice, which is defined as “treating each as it ought to be treated.” A superior 
ought to be treated as a superior, an equal as an equal, and a subordinate as 
a subordinate. Now, although these concepts and principles of the natural 
law are obvious to us, they are still theoretical—that is, they are not very 
practical. Thus, in order to apply this natural law in a given situation, one 
requires practical wisdom to discern which principles are in play.16 Often 
principles can seem to conflict with each other, and practical wisdom helps 
us to navigate such conflict, gathering all of the relevant principles in order 
to determine the decision that is likely the best. To illustrate the practical 
application of natural law theory, let’s look back at our situation with Char-
lie and Bill O’Halloran.
Charlie is told by Drexel that she must kill Bill O’Halloran or else she 
and her friends will be killed. To work through this we must consider a 
principle of general beneficence, “all things being equal, do not kill another 
human individual,” as well as one of special beneficence, “justly favoring one’s 
family over others.” If we consider these principles alone it seems possible 
that Charlie might be justified in killing Bill O’Halloran, since her family 
is being threatened and she would be obligated to save them. To discern 
what is likely the best course of action we need to consider the extenuating 
circumstances of this scenario. At least to the best of our knowledge, Bill 
O’Halloran does not seem to be guilty of any wrongdoing. If this is so, then 
unless Bill O’Halloran was guilty of a crime unbeknownst to us, or if his 
death was warranted in some other way, he would be considered innocent; 
for Charlie to kill an innocent man would violate the absolute principle “do 
not kill another human individual unjustly” and would therefore be con-
sidered morally wrong. Interestingly, this is the complete opposite of the 
conclusion utilitarianism provided, clearly demonstrating how natural law 
and utilitarianism are different. Natural law is concerned with the nature 
of the act itself, whereas the ends justify the means for the utilitarian. Even 
though killing Bill O’Halloran may result in Charlie’s saving her friends and 
herself, the very act of killing him would still be considered murder since 
Charlie is killing an innocent man. Regardless of the potential “good” con-
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sequences of such an act, the process to achieve such an end—murder—is 
always wrong in and of itself. 
Needed Objectivity
From our example it seems clear that the objective nature of natural law 
clearly provides a proper ethical foundation from which to differentiate 
the ethical statuses of particular acts, thereby satisfying our first criterion. 
Second, natural law theory is practically applicable in the actual world, 
requiring human reason and practical wisdom for moral problem solving, 
thus satisfying our second criterion. And last, using the basic and general 
principles known to us, the conclusion that Charlie ought not to kill Bill 
O’Halloran makes sense according to human moral reality (following the 
moral truth “murder is absolutely wrong”), thereby satisfying our third cri-
terion. Given natural law theory, we were able to work through a specific 
scenario while satisfying all three established criteria for a viable ethical 
theory, therefore establishing the veracity of natural law as a viable ethical 
theory. Now, as with any theory, there are objections against natural law—
objections that we believe can be overcome so that the veracity of natural 
law theory can be maintained. For good measure, let’s take a look at another 
scenario from Revolution and consider these objections.
The episode “Soul Train” features flashbacks of Tom Neville, a major 
within the Monroe Militia, and his life prior to the blackout. An insurance 
agent, Neville was a very timid man and was wary of any kind of conflict. 
In one flashback Rob, Neville’s neighbor, is hosting a party at his house and 
Neville, being the timid man he is, politely asks Rob to turn the music down. 
Rob bluntly refuses to do so. The following flashback takes place after the 
blackout, showing Neville and his wife sleeping until they hear a noise from 
the downstairs of their house. Neville moves downstairs, only to discover 
that his neighbor Rob is stealing from his house. As Neville’s son, Jason, 
comes down the stairs to see what is going on, Rob tells Neville to “walk 
away,” claiming, “I’ll beat you in front of your son.” As Neville tries to fight, 
Rob beats Neville to the ground and starts strangling him. Seemingly help-
less, Neville is able to muster courage enough to push Rob off of him and 
pummels him. With his son and wife now watching, Neville relentlessly con-
tinues to beat Rob until he is dead, no longer the timid man he once was.17
In this scenario the clear ethical question is whether Neville was justi-
fied in killing Rob. Given the basic principles of general beneficence and 
A Light in the Darkness 355
special beneficence, at face value it seems that Neville would be justified 
in killing Rob. Since Rob was stealing from Neville’s house and could have 
been a threat to Neville’s family, his death may have been justified and would 
not, strictly speaking, be considered murder. And certainly if his own life 
were in danger Neville would be right in defending himself, killing a man 
if need be. Although it certainly seems Neville was justified in killing Rob, 
this may not actually be the case. Within natural law theory the motivation 
of an act must also be considered. In this situation did Neville kill Rob sim-
ply out of defense? Or were there ulterior motives, that is, frustration from 
Rob’s prior refusal to “turn it down.”18 If Neville was motivated by defense 
and a willingness to protect his family, killing Rob would be justified. But if 
he killed Rob out of his own personal frustration, this would hardly seem 
to be just motivation for killing a man. Thus, if Neville killed Rob out of his 
own frustrations rather than the will to protect his family and his own life, 
even if killing Rob would have been the right thing, Neville’s drive behind 
the act would render Rob’s death unjust.
Once again, natural law theory is able to provide us with a satisfying 
conclusion that certainly seems to cohere with our common, considered 
moral judgments. Now, one objection to natural law theory suggests that 
the theory itself seems extremely vague and lacks a clearly outlined meth-
odology, which, say, utilitarianism has to offer. We can imagine Neville 
trying to rely purely on practical wisdom and rational discernment to try 
to discern the correct course of action. In Neville’s case, however, it seems 
that the last thing on his mind in that immediate situation would be consid-
ering whether he is killing the man for the right reasons, since he was trying 
to save himself and his family. Although it is true that natural law theory 
seems vague, such an objection does not necessarily reduce the veracity of 
natural law itself. Though it may take hard work to sift through the vari-
ables and consider different principles, it can still be done. This is not like 
act utilitarianism, where there is a seemingly endless regression of variables 
to consider; rather, there are certain knowable principles, and we need to 
discern which of those “trump” others in a given situation. And remember, 
natural law is based off of certain objective moral truths that really do seem 
to exist and derives a methodology of moral differentiation based on such 
principles. It is from these basic principles that we are able to deduce what 
might be the right or wrong course of action in a given situation. Attacking 
natural law theory’s methodology does nothing to denounce the existence 
of such moral principles, which require explanation by any potential ethical 
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theory. As natural law theorist J. Budziszewski states, “The fact that there is 
a Natural Law is more important than any theories about it.”19 Thus a better 
objection to natural law theory would refer to the reality of these general, 
or absolute, principles. Such an objection is difficult, however, since many 
cultures throughout human history have recognized these certain moral 
principles in one way or another.20 Of the four theories considered, natural 
law is the only one to make sense of the existence of these moral values/
truths/principles.
This raises another objection to natural law theory. If indeed the nat-
ural law is known to all humans and is present throughout human history, 
then why have so many people acted against this natural law? If this moral 
knowledge is “written on our hearts,” so to speak, then why, for instance, 
would Rob try to kill Neville if “do not murder” is an absolute principle? 
Should he not know such an act is wrong? Although this is an interest-
ing point it still does not denounce the theory itself. Morally speaking, all 
humans recognize that there are certain moral truths. But, as noted before, 
these moral principles are prescriptive, not descriptive. It is true that many 
humans choose to act in violation of these principles, but that does not 
suggest that such objective principles do not apply or that they do not even 
exist. These laws are not laws of nature, so to speak, in that they describe 
how humans behave; rather, they describe how we should behave. And just 
because humans do not recognize or do not follow these principles all the 
time suggests nothing about their existence. Although many of us perhaps 
speed on a freeway, that does not suggest that laws regarding speed limits 
do not exist. These certain moral laws, or common moral considerations, 
do seem to exist, and natural law is the only ethical theory able to provide 
a satisfactory explanation for their existence.
Lights Out
Abrams’s Revolution illustrates the human necessity for an ethical frame-
work in which to discern right from wrong. And of the four ethical theories 
considered within the context of Revolution, natural law theory would seem 
to be the best candidate. This theory provides us with a sturdy foundation 
on which to differentiate between good and bad without logical incoher-
ence. Although it may seem vague, the theory of natural law is practically 
applicable within the actual world. Most importantly, natural law theory 
recognizes and explains the existence of certain moral truths that humans 
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throughout history have widely recognized, truths that apply within the 
world of Revolution as well. Rather than trying to arrive at what is good or 
bad, natural law theory recognizes that there are certain moral principles 
that already establish what good and bad are and works its way from there. 
And it is these moral principles that provide us with an objective reference 
point—a light in the dark, so to speak, to guide us through moral uncer-
tainty in the world around us.
Notes
1. Revolution, season 1, episode 3.





6. Revolution, season 1, episode 2.
7. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 11.
8. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism and Other Writings, ed. Mary Warnock (Cleve-
land: World Publishing, 1970), 257.
9. There certainly are other choices that Rachel could have considered. Perhaps 
she could have split the food supply in half and shared with the stranger or punched 
him and knocked him out cold rather than killing him. However, the number of poten-
tial variants to consider would be too overwhelming and destructive for discussion—a 
point we will raise later on.
10. These are just a few of the potential relevant factors that would need consider-
ation. The list of variables and possibilities may be unfathomable.
11. Revolution, season 1, episode 6.
12. There are certainly other principles that could be considered that would disavow 
Charlie’s act of killing, such as, “do not murder,” “treat others with respect,” and “do no 
harm,” to name a few.
13. The form of natural law theory summarized in this chapter is very basic and 
hardly reflects the robust nature of Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theory, for example.
14. The word “law” here does not refer to man-made societal laws. Such laws of 
society are referred to as “positive laws” within natural law theory, and in the case here 
“law” is referring to certain moral precepts humans can simply see as basic under the 
right circumstances.
15. J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1997), 62.
16. Ibid., 58.
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17. Revolution, season 1, episode 5.
18. Ibid.
19. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, 65.
20. C. S. Lewis includes an appendix at the end of The Abolition of Man that looks 
at similar moral principles throughout cultures, suggesting the existence of some sort 
of universal moral law.
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